
STRUGGLE FOR THE HIMALAYAS

(A STUDY IN SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS)

By

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UNIVERSITY PUBLISHERS

JULLUNDUR

AMBALA

DELHI

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Jullundur	:	Railway Road
Ambala Cantt	:	Roy Market
Delhi-6	:	Mori Gate

Price : Rs. 25.00

P R E F A C E

This book is a direct consequence of the Chinese invasion of India. I was in the United States when the Chinese launched their large-scale military invasion of India on October 20, 1962. It aroused deep emotions of sympathy for India all over the United States. But there were a number of misunderstandings too. There was a feeling in some quarters that India's mistaken policy towards China had brought upon her the disaster and that her own leaders were partly responsible for this. The reversals the Indian armies suffered in succession at different sectors of the Sino-Indian frontier created the impression that the Indian military machine was of a weak type and that the Indian soldiers had not put their heart into the fighting. Many people were also taken in by the Chinese claims to these territories on historical and ethnological grounds. A 'dialogue' was arranged within a week of the Chinese invasion by an international studies forum at the University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon, U.S.A., where I was teaching as a Fulbright Visiting Professor, between me and a well-known American authority on the Far East, in which I had to confront, and disprove, the historical and ethnic claims of the Chinese. In subsequent lectures arranged at the University of Oregon, I tried to discuss in detail India's China policy over the years, the reasons for unawareness on the part of the Government of India of the fact that the Chinese would invade the country in the way in which they did, the nature and extent of unpreparedness of Indian armies to fight at mountain heights, and the courage and heroism shown by Indian soldiers on unfamiliar mountain terrain in all sectors from Ladakh to Walong. I had also to appear on radio interviews and television programmes and explain to American audiences what I thought could be the motivations of the Chinese in invading India, and how far they could be expected to go in their triumphant march across the Himalayas down into the Indian valleys and plains and oil fields.

At a time when the Chinese were at the climax of their military victories, and the Indian people had been aroused to an unprecedented height of patriotic effort, the Chinese suddenly declared a cease-fire, and then there fell upon me the responsibility of explaining to my American friends why the Chinese had declared a cease-fire, and what the Indian reaction was likely to be. By December 1, 1962, the Chinese armies had started retreating from their advanced positions in all the sectors and the mental agony, through which Indians all over the world had passed, had begun to subside. Then came the question of finding out what would be the likely impact of Chinese invasion on India's domestic and foreign policies, how the defence preparations would have to be escalated, how the planning would be affected and, above all, what would be the impact

of the invasion on the institutions of democracy and the pattern of international relations India had built up during the years. I was invited by the University of California, Berkeley, University of Texas, Austin, and a few other noted academic institutions in the United States to answer questions of this kind. I had to answer similar questions in my formal and informal meetings with faculty members and senior research scholars in the Universities of Tokyo, Philippines and Chulalongkon on my way back to India. In the meantime, an offer was made to me by a leading American publisher to write for them a book on India and China.

This, in brief, is the story of the genesis of this book. By the time I left the United States on June 19, 1963, the first draft of the book had been written out. There was some advantage in writing out the first draft in the United States. There I had full and free access to Chinese as well as Indian sources and the additional advantage of discussing matters with American leaders in the fields of education, journalism and politics. The innumerable letters I was receiving from friends and relations in India, and the clippings of leading editorials and newspaper articles my colleagues in the Department of Political Science at the University of Rajasthan were sending me, had kept me well posted with what was going on in the Indian mind. I was provided with all facilities and assistance in the writing of the book by the late Professor Egbert S. Wengert and Mrs. Velma K. Mullaley, Chairman and Secretary respectively of the Department of Political Science, and by Dr. Carl W. Hintz, Librarian, University of Oregon. A number of my colleagues in the Department, including Mr. Wee don Chang from South Korea, went through the manuscript and gave me valuable suggestions. The book could have been brought out in the Spring of 1964, had I not been loaded for a year, on my return to India, with the responsibility of directing the affairs of a University college in addition to my responsibilities as Chairman of the Department of Political Science. As the uncertainty of the time schedule grew on my mind I had to decide against giving the book to an American publisher. It was at this stage that I accepted the offer from the University Publishers to publish it.

It was only at the end of the academic year 1963-64 that I could think of resuming the threads of my writing. The final revision of the book was taken up during a period of six weeks I spent at the Sapru House, New Delhi, in the Summer of 1964. Dr. A. Appadorai, the then Director of the Indian School of International Studies, was kind enough to place a Professor's room at my disposal and Shri Girja Kumar, the Librarian, Indian Council of World Affairs, extended to me all the facilities I needed for my drawing upon the incomparable source material on the study of international politics that has been accumulated there over the years under his able stewardship. I was also able to go through the recent writings of Patterson,

Alistair Lamb, Bertrand Russell and others, which I could not have laid my hands on outside the library of the Sapru House.

While I was working at Sapru House, the tragic death of Jawaharlal Nehru, the architect of India's foreign policy, took place and following a few weeks of mourning, there was resumed the discussion,—which, in fact, had started in Nehru's life—among the intellectuals of the country as to where Indian foreign policies had gone wrong and what policy would now be the best for the country to follow. I had been developing the thesis for a long time that while India's foreign policy was sound in its global aspect—inasmuch as our attitude towards the Cold War and our relations with the two major powers of the world were concerned—there was a great deal in our regional policies, and particularly in our relationship with our closest neighbours, which was in a bad shape and needed urgent repairing. The correctness of this view was highlighted when in October 1962, while the Western Powers spontaneously came to our help and the Soviet Union, with well-understood initial hesitation, also came to our support, the non-aligned countries of Asia and Africa appeared hesitant in openly expressing any opinions against China, and Pakistan actually started a campaign of hatred and anger against India. The Chinese invasion, it is now being widely felt, has made it necessary for us to do a great deal of rethinking on our entire relationship with the Asian and African countries. Having attended a couple of seminars recently held at Delhi—the one arranged by the Indian School of International Studies at Sapru House from February 22 to March 3, and the other jointly organized by the Press Institute of India, the Indian School of International Studies and the India International Centre from March 8 to 13—I have reasons to believe that there is a growing awareness among the scholars of international politics as well as senior journalists in the country, of the role that India is called upon to play in a changing world. Shri Lal Bahadur Shastri and Sardar Swaran Singh also seem to have realized the need of developing new facets to our foreign policies in the light of the restructuring of power alignments that is going on in Asia, and some steps have been taken (also, too tardily) to improve India's image in countries of South and Southeast Asia from which she seemed to have been growingly isolated for a number of years. There also seems to be a growing realization of the need for some kind of regional organisation in South Asia. As these lines go to the press, it is too early to say whether the Government of India has fully grasped all the requirements and compulsions of a realistic foreign policy for the country. But there are reasons to be optimistic.

The more I look into the pages of my book the more I get the impression that this is not the book I had set out to write. I had started with the ambition of making a deep and comprehensive

study of political developments both in India and China—the experiment with democracy and planning in the one, and with Communism and totalitarianism in the other—, the changing phases of their relationship with each other and the factors and forces which shaped their foreign policies on the global and the Asian planes. This could have become an extremely interesting study in political contrasts. But the facilities for such a study were not available to me in the United States, and could not be thought of in India. During the long time I have taken in the writing of this book I have tried to enter, on the occasion of each revision of the draft, a little deeper into the problems. But I have not been able to go deep enough. My study has been limited to—what the title of the book suggests—the struggle for the Himalayas, and remains basically a study in international relations and foreign policies, though I have also tried to cover the reactions of military combats and foreign policy changes on the domestic political institutions and processes.

While there is a great need for a deep and intensive study of China, we do not yet have any centre in the country where such a study can be carried on. In fact, we need advanced centres of research and study for a deeper understanding of governmental and administrative machinery, political institutions and processes, as well as foreign policies, of all the Asian countries. With constructive and sympathetic guidance from the Vice-Chancellor, Dr. Mohan Sinha Mehta, and with assurances of help from the University Grants Commission and the Asia Foundation, we have set up a South Asia Studies Centre at the University of Rajasthan. But many more such Centres have to come up in the country, if a genuine understanding of the emerging forces in Asia and Africa is to be cultivated. While these Centres have to be independent of Government control, they must also receive the fullest support of the Government of India, particularly of the Ministries of External Affairs and Education.

Let me conclude with a sincere expression of a sense of deep gratitude towards all those who have assisted me in the writing of the book at its different stages. While in the United States, I was constantly testing my ideas and interpretations not only on American audiences and friends but also on my wife and daughter, who were with me. Immediately on my return to India in July 1963, I placed the draft of the book with my two colleagues in the Department, Dr. Iqbal Narain and Dr. C.P. Bhambhri, and asked them to be ruthless in their criticism of any deficiency or lacuna or looseness they found anywhere in the book. I must thank both of them for their sincere comments, in the light of which I have made drastic alterations in the book, though I must also say in fairness to them that I have disregarded as many of their suggestions as I have accepted, which means that the final responsibility of every statement that I have made is absolutely mine. I am grateful to Shri Virendra Narain, Research Scholar in the Department of Political Science, who spent a good deal of his valuable time at Delhi in seeing the book through

the press, and in preparing the Index. I am also thankful to Shri V.K. Ratnani, my Secretary in the Department of Political Science, who typed hundreds of pages, often out of illegible scribblings made by me. Most of the work, however, was dictated to him. Since nobody else could have either taken my dictation as accurately or deciphered my writing as correctly as Shri Ratnani, it would have been impossible to bring out the book without his hard work and loyal cooperation. No list of acknowledgements, however, would detract in any way from the responsibility of ideas and statements made in the body of the book which devolves upon me, and, therefore, whatever shortcomings the reader may come across in the book—and they are a legion—can be most legitimately laid at the doors of the author.

Jaipur,
April 24, 1965

S. P. Varma

“It is a strange turn of circumstance that we in India who stood for peace and worked for it with all our might should suddenly be drawn into this dangerous situation and be faced with the possibility even of war. I do not think war will come. I do not think that any country is foolish enough to jump over the precipice into war. But I say that such possibilities come into our minds.

“If war is thrust upon us, we shall fight, and fight with all our strength. But I shall avoid war, try to prevent it with every means in my power. There are, however, some things which no nation can tolerate. Any attack on its honour or the integrity of its territory no nation tolerates, and it takes risks, even grave risks, to protect them.

“There is one aspect of the question which I wish the Chinese Government and indeed other countries would try to understand. The Himalayas are high mountains, of course, but they are something much more to us and more intimately tied up with India’s history, tradition, faith, religion, beliefs, literature, and culture, than, to my knowledge, any other mountain anywhere. The Himalayas are something much more than mountains to us; they are part of ourselves. And I want the other people to realize how intimately this question affects our innermost being.

“If the two biggest countries of Asia are involved in conflict, it will shake Asia and shake the world. It is not a small border issue that we are troubled about. The issues surrounding it are so huge, vague, deep-seated, far-reaching and intertwined, that one has to think about them with all the clarity and strength at one’s command, and not be swept away by passion into action which may harm us instead of doing us good.

“If the worst comes to the worst and a conflict arises between two mighty countries, it does not much matter if one country has got a few more guns, or a big army; when two giant countries come into conflict in a life-and-death struggle, neither gives in. Certainly India will not give in”.

Jawaharlal Nehru

—Speech in Lok Sabha, November 25, 1959.

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BOOK ONE : HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

INDIA AND CHINA : PARTING OF WAYS

India and China are among the most ancient civilizations of the world. Some five thousand years back the Indians had perfected the art of pottery, evolved a script as well as a system of drainage, and were minting coins, digging septic tanks and using vehicles moving on wheels. Following the great culture they had built up round Mohenjodaro in Sind and Harappa in Punjab, the traces of which are now being discovered deep in Gujarat, Rajasthan and East Punjab, they produced, in the Gangetic plains, the rich literary lyrics of the Vedas and the philosophy of the Upanishads, the most ancient books existing in the world. The Chinese were engaged, simultaneously, in developing their own art and literature, architecture and painting, and in building up empires which expanded and shrank in proportion to the power exercised by the central government and the independence claimed and asserted by people living on the outlying fringes. India was slow in the task of empire-building but, following Alexander's invasion in the fourth century B. C., there arose the mighty Mauryan empire, which produced conquerors like Chandragupta and emperors like Asoka (placed by H. G. Wells among the six greatest rulers of the world). Another great empire, that of the Guptas, developed in India in the fourth to seventh centuries A.D., which produced emperors like Samudragupta and threw the offshoots of Indian political, cultural and economic influences far and wide in the East and Southeast Asia. But even before these great empires had flourished, India had given birth to Buddha, the most ancient among the prophets, and by the beginning of the Christian era the message of the great Buddha had begun to spread to the remotest corners of the Chinese empire. The Chinese, presumably on account of their highly developed culture and extensive political power, were filled up with a sense of a divine mission, and looked down upon the rest of the world as consisting of 'barbarians'. It was, however, remarkable that they placed India, the land of the Buddha, in a separate category and regarded her as the only civilised country outside China from which even the Chinese could learn something.

Both India and China spread out their influences over the larger part of Asia but while the Indian influence was limited to the cultural sphere, and in this sphere went remarkably deep in almost all the countries of Southeast Asia, China was more interested in building

up her political domination and at one time or other in history had extended her empire over Korea, Manchuria, Mongolia, Sinkiang, Formosa, Tibet, Annam, Tonking, and Cochin-China, and claimed tribute from Thailand, Burma, Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim. So far as mutual relations between India and China are concerned, they were limited to Indian thought, art, culture and religion penetrating China through the sustained efforts of a regular stream of Buddhist missionaries to spread the teachings of Buddha in China, on the one side, and to the visits paid by a number of Chinese scholars to India in search of religious scriptures, on the other. Great leaders of Buddhism, like Kashyapa Matanga (65 A.D.), Kumarajiva (401 A.D.), Gunavarman (431 A.D.), and Dharmagupta (590 A.D.), went to China and great Chinese scholars, like Fa-hien (414 A.D.), Huen-tsang (629-645 A.D.) and Yi-tsing (695 A.D.), visited India and carried back Buddhist religious scriptures and the message of Buddha reinterpreted to them by Indian scholars. From the seventh to the tenth century, the influence of Buddhism in China was at its peak, one of the Chinese rulers (Empress Wu, 705-712 A.D.) even trying to make it a state religion.¹ Another area in which Indian and Chinese influences were often found in juxtaposition was Southeast Asia. Indian culture, with political influence following in its wake, dominated over Champa, Cambodia, Annam and Java, while the Chinese spread themselves as far as Tongking—India, on the whole, moved across the seas, while China adhered mainly to the peninsula.

Following the establishment of a vast trade between India and the Arab world and the rise of Islam, India started developing closer contacts with Western Asia, and while her links with Southeast Asia were not completely broken she seemed to have lost contact with China. Under the impact of Islam India went through another renaissance and reformation and built up the mighty Mughal empire, under the auspices of which art and culture, literature and philosophy once again rose to great heights. China seems to have been engaged for all this time in her internal affairs. Her Buddhism having been transformed out of all shape and recognition, and India having almost absorbed and forgotten her own Buddhism, there seemed to be no common link between the two. It was only after the advent of Europeans in Asia, and the subjugation of the mighty civilizations of India and China by European trader-conquerors, that the Indians and the Chinese went to Burma, Malaya and Indonesia and met there once again, but now no longer representing great cultures or political systems but as the helpless, but not completely unwilling, tools of European economic expansionism. It is, however, remarkable that while both the Indians and the Chinese were hated by peoples in whose exploitation by European powers they were assisting, they did not have any direct conflicts with each other. In fact, all over Southeast Asia they seemed to have maintained fairly good relations among themselves. In the beginning of the twentieth century there started the great resurgence of Asia which deeply influenced both

India and China. The first movements of resistance to British power were organized in India about 1905, and in 1911 there came the Chinese revolution, followed by the establishment of a republican government. Each country looked with sympathy and admiration at the powerful nationalist movement which was deeply influencing the other.

Sun Yat Sen looked upon the Non-Cooperation Movement started by Mahatma Gandhi with great admiration, and pointed it out as an object lesson for the Chinese nationalists, while the Indian National Congress expressed its sympathy with the Chinese "in their struggle against the alien domination of their land", and described the Chinese people as "comrades of the Indian people in their joint struggle against imperialism". In 1926, Indian leaders voiced their protest against British intervention in China. In February 1927, at the instance of Jawaharlal Nehru, a joint declaration was issued by the Congress of the League Against Imperialism meeting in Brussels denouncing the use of Indian troops in China to serve British imperialist interests. "The Chinese Revolution", Nehru wrote subsequently in the *National Herald*, "is not an event of local interest and importance. It is a world phenomenon of the greatest historical importance." "To the progressive forces in the world, to those who stand for human freedom and the breaking of political and social bonds", Nehru said in 1936, in particular reference to China, "we offer our full co-operation in their struggle against imperialism and fascist reaction, for we realise that our struggle is a common one". At its Haripura session in February 1938, the Indian National Congress passed a resolution condemning the "brutal imperialist invasion" and expressing solidarity of the Indian people with the Chinese in the common task of combating imperialism and achieving freedom. Following a visit to Chungking in August 1939, Nehru was so much full of praise for "the courage and invincible optimism of the Chinese people and their capacity to pull together when peril confronts them" that Gandhiji had to say that his love for China was "excelled, if at all, by his love of his own country".

Following the Japanese invasion of China, the Indian National Congress sent a medical mission under the leadership of Dr. M. Atal, which did remarkable work, but which was more a symbol of the warmth of India's feelings towards the Chinese. Rabindranath Tagore visited China in 1924, Jawaharlal Nehru in 1939 and Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan in 1944. The Nationalist Chinese leader, Chiang Kai-shek, visited India in 1942. Following his visit to India in February 1942, Chiang Kai-shek strongly pleaded with the American government to exert pressure on the British to relax their hold on India. "The wisest and most enlightened policy for Britain to pursue", he wrote to President Roosevelt, "would be to restore to India her complete freedom". In August 1942, before launching upon his Quit India campaign, Gandhiji wrote a letter to Chiang Kai-shek, in which he went out of his way to tell him that his appeal to

the British power to withdraw from India was "not meant in any shape or form to weaken India's defence against the Japanese or to embarrass you in your struggle...I would not be guilty of purchasing the freedom of my country at the cost of your country's freedom". Two days after the arrest of Gandhiji and other Indian political leaders, Chiang Kai-shek again pleaded with Roosevelt for intervention in the Indian situation. India and China, thus, had the greatest respect for each other. They watched each other's struggle for freedom and self-determination with sympathy and interest and it could be expected that, on emergence into independent nation-states, they would be following common goals and policies and would co-operate with each other in helping the other backward nations of Asia in breaking up their bonds of slavery which tied them to Western powers.

Nevertheless, between the establishment of the Interim Government in India in November 1946 and the fall of the Nationalist Government in China in December 1949, there was friction between India and China on a number of points. At the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi in March 1947, the Kuomintang delegates objected to the display of a map of Asia in which Tibet was shown to be a territory outside China, and protested against India's official recognition of the Tibetan delegation. There was also expression of resentment on their part to India seeming to assume the leadership of Asia. China was also angry at India not agreeing to her request of withdrawing Hugh Richardson, formerly the officer-in-charge of the British Mission in Lhasa and a known advocate of Tibetan independence, till August 1949. The Kuomintang ambassador in India objected to the boundary of Kashmir shown in a map incorporated in a documentary film, and in November 1949, intimated to the Government of India of his Government being firm on not recognizing the McMahon line. Nationalist China showed no sympathy to India in her complaint against Pakistan's aggression in Kashmir nor any appreciation of her advocacy of Indonesia's independence from the Dutch control. The continuous failure of the Nationalists to establish an effective and efficient government in China, much less in giving her people a constructive and visionary leadership, and the rise of the Communists in revolt against them, seemed to lead to a parting of ways between these two ancient civilizations. India was first among the nations outside the Communist bloc (except Burma) to recognize the Chinese Communist Government in December 1949. It did not necessarily involve an approval of Chinese policies or methods. Explaining the position to the Parliament, on March 17, 1960, Nehru said, "It was not a question of approving or disapproving the changes that have taken place. It was a question of recognising a major event in history and appreciating and dealing with it. The new government was a stable government and there is no force likely to supplant it or push it away".

The emergence of the Communists to supreme power in China was likely to accentuate the differences between the two countries still further. While India had fought non-violently against the British, the Chinese Communists had waged an armed struggle for supremacy against the Nationalists, and occasionally fought against the Japanese. India became independent in 1947, but the struggle in China went on, and it was only in October 1949 that the Communists could claim a victory over the mainland of China. While the Indian nationalist movement, under the guidance of Nehru, was in constant touch with international developments, the Communists in China were completely absorbed in their own internal struggle. In fact, their links with the Soviet Union too, throughout the period of their struggle against the Nationalist forces, were of the weakest kind. It was only after capturing power in the country that the Chinese Communists turned towards the Soviet Union for intimate alliance and lasting friendship. In the subsequent years Communist China did not seem to take any notice whatsoever of what was going on in India. These years, on the other hand, formed the formative years in India's history. During this period, she was not only able to lay down the blueprints of her constitutional and economic development but to strike out a completely new path in her foreign policy. The decision to stay out of the two power blocs, which were fast getting more and more rigid in their attitudes towards each other, and to adhere to a policy of non-alignment, was something remarkable. Communist China, on the other hand, refused to recognise the existence of a third road and believed that, neutrality being camouflage, it was necessary for her to "lean on one side", and the only side on which she could lean was the Soviet side.² India and China, thus, had emerged as nation states by following basically different methods and were now, both in internal affairs and external policies, following divergent paths.

Despite the fact that both China and India were Asian countries with great ancient civilizations, their historical development too has been on different lines. While there have been brief periods in Indian history when emperors have tried to bind up India's vast multitudes into common political patterns, they have persistently broken themselves loose, and thrown themselves apart, and remained disintegrated, inchoate masses for centuries. China, on the other hand, has a more sustained tradition of imperial unity. Indians never had in history the racial arrogance, which the Chinese possessed, of their being a highly cultured and civilised entity in a world surrounded by barbarians and semi-barbarians. Very few empire-builders in India have thought in terms of crossing the Himalayan frontiers. In China, whenever her central government has become strong, she has sent out military troops to bring more territory under her control. The Communists in China have carried on the same traditions—Chu Teh being in the same line as Tso Tsung-tang and Chao Erh-

feng—and, in more recent years, have looked upon themselves not only as the greatest power in Asia but in the world. War has always been a matter of delight for the Chinese, and Communist China seems to take as great a pleasure in it as the Imperial China. “Some people call us the advocates of omnipotence of war”, wrote Mao Tse-tung in his *Problems of War and Strategy*. “Yes, we are: we are the advocates of the omnipotence of the revolutionary war”³. Even nuclear war does not seem to have the same terror for the Chinese as for the Russians. China’s present attitudes are in harmony—are in fact the culmination—of her earlier history and traditions. In China, it has been pointed out, there is the direct line of inheritance of the traditional practice of authoritarian rule, from the nomadic dependence on the tribal leader, through the Byzantine empires and Mongol absolutism, to the authoritarian bias of the political ideas of Eastern Europe and Russia. India, with a different history and traditions, opened out its personality fully to the exposure of deep westernising influences which the British brought to her and was ripe for a liberal democratic system of thought and institutions when the British left. Parliamentary democracy, as it has been borne out by experience, has very much suited the Indian character as moulded by history, religion and culture. It was, therefore, not surprising that the two countries developed in two entirely different ways in modern times. —

The basic difference in their foreign policies too was clear from the very beginning. Even before the establishment of the Communist regime Mao Tse-tung had ruled out for China any intermediary position between the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union and the imperialist capitalist camp led by the United States. As early as February 1950, within three months of the establishment of the Communist regime, China entered into a Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union. If China decided to move very close to Russia she also treated the United States as her enemy number one. India, on the other hand, decided to adopt a policy of non-alignment. It was clear that China’s attitude towards India’s foreign policy in general and neutralism in particular was one of misunderstanding and suspicion. India’s membership of the Commonwealth and Nehru’s visit to the United States in 1950 were both regarded with distrust. Between India and China there was also a clash of objectives. The Communist Party of China had reiterated as one of the aims of its policy ‘liberation’ of Tibet, Korea, Burma, Bhutan, Nepal, Hongkong and Annam from foreign control and Chu Teh had declared before a large gathering in Peking in 1950 that “the great People’s Liberation Army would march to further victories until the liberation of all Asia was completed”. This included the liberation of India too! The main difficulty was that India, under Nehru’s leadership, did not seem to play a subservient role to any power in the world, much less to China. India

under Nehru was thinking in terms of her own greatness in Asia. "Long years ago", said Nehru in his historic address to the Parliament on August 15, 1947, "we made a tryst with destiny, and now the time comes when we shall redeem our pledge."⁴ India is a country of destiny: this became the burthen of Nehru's speeches. "Whether we are men or women of destiny or not, India is a country of destiny and so far as we represent this great country with a great destiny stretching out in front of her we also have to act as men and women of destiny, viewing all our problems in that long perspective of destiny and of the world and of Asia". While Nehru discounted in words any claims to leadership in Asia, all his gestures and actions in world politics seemed to confirm it. In the early fifties India was playing a great role for the leadership of the colonial countries in Asia and Africa. With all her narrowness of vision so far as understanding of international politics was concerned, and lack of understanding of India's policies and objectives, China, with her characteristic jealousy and mistrust, was bound to be harsh in her evaluation of India.

Thus, it was clear in the early years of Asian resurgence that India and China had every reason to fall apart. While standing for non-alignment in international relations India was more inclined towards the Western powers, being tied to them for long years by trade, political concepts and language. All her efforts to take an independent stand on all the problems that came up before the United Nations or the other world organizations had failed to convince the Soviet Union that she was really an independent nation, and the Soviet Union had consequently continued to interpret the British withdrawal from India as a "sell-out" by the "landlord bourgeois" dominated leadership of the Indian National Congress and to denounce India as a semi-colony. According to the Soviet understanding of India, the key economic position in India still remained in the British hands and in foreign policy India was being progressively drawn into the orbit of the Anglo-American bloc. Dyakov, a Soviet specialist on Indian affairs, compared Nehru with Chiang Kai-shek and suggested that the vacancy left by Chiang Kai-shek was being offered to Nehru. India was also not sure that the Soviet Union was not instigating the communist parties in different countries to overthrow their legal governments by force or subversion. The Indian Government was engaged at this time in an open struggle against the Communist Party of India striving for an armed revolution. The Government of Communist China seemed to have uncritically accepted the Soviet Union's evaluation of the newly independent Asian governments. India was regarded as "semi-colonial", to be liberated through armed struggle of the "democratic forces of India".

As early as July 1949, Liu Shao-chi had described India, Burma, the Philippines, Indonesia and South Korea as colonies and semi-colonies and exhorted the Communist parties of these countries

to adopt a determined policy to oppose the bourgeois governments in power there. This had been followed by an article in *World Culture* describing Nehru, Thakin Nu and Soekarno, along with Chiang Kai-shek and Syngman Rhee, as 'American imperialist running dogs'. An article in the same journal in September 1949 alleged that the Anglo-American imperialist designs for the annexation of Tibet were being carried out through the hands of Nehru. "The India of Nehru attained 'dominion status' only two years ago, and is not even formally independent in the fullest sense of the word. But Nehru, riding behind the imperialists, whose stooge he is, actually considers himself the leader of the Asian peoples. Into his slavish and bourgeois reactionary character has now been installed the beastly ambitions for aggression, and he thinks that his role as a hireling of imperialism makes him an imperialist himself". "New Delhi has consistently served", it further announced, "as the centre of imperialist intrigues for the obstruction and undermining of the people's liberation movements of Asia". Writing of Nehru, the article said, "As a rebel against the movement for national independence, as a blackguard who undermines the progress of the people's liberation movement, and as a loyal slave of imperialism, Nehru has already been made the substitute of Chiang Kai-shek by the imperialists". Recounting a number of occasions on which Nehru had betrayed the Asian peoples, the article said, "New Delhi has consistently served as the centre of imperialist intrigues for the obstruction and undermining of the people's liberation movements of Asia". Declaring that only the Communist Party and the proletariat and peasantry under its leadership would fight to the last and only then would complete independence and liberation be achieved and the nation delivered from feudalism and imperialism, it announced, "The victory of the Chinese peoples has brought down to the oppressed peoples of Asia and sealed the fate of Nehru and betrayers of his ilk. The Chiang Kai-sheks of India, Burma, Indonesia and others of their ilk must march on the same road to death as Chiang Kai-shek has done..."⁵

Addressing a meeting of World Federation of Trade Unions in Peking two months later, in November 1949, Liu Shao-chi described the leaders of India, Burma and Indonesia as "stooges of imperialism", and talked of "armed struggle for emancipation" in these countries. "In a colony or semi-colony", Liu Shao-chi remarked, "if the people do not have arms to defend themselves they have nothing". "This is the sole path", he continued, "for many colonial and semi-colonial peoples in their struggle for independence". The campaign of vilification against India did not subside even after India had extended recognition to the people's Government of China on December 30, 1949. In fact, Moscow had now started exhorting the Communist parties of Asia to follow the Peking line and suggesting that the path taken by the Chinese people "should be the path taken by the people of many colonial countries in their struggle

for national independence and people's democracy". Mao Tse-tung expressed his hope to B. T. Ranadive, the then General Secretary of the Communist Party of India, that, "relying on the brave Communist Party of India and the unity and struggle of all Indian patriots, India certainly will not long remain under the yoke of imperialism and its collaborators".⁶ He further expressed the hope—and he seemed to be staking much on that hope—that a day would come when, like free China, a free India would emerge in the world as a member of the Socialist and People's Democratic family. There could, thus, hardly be any meeting ground between India, which was proud of her hard-won independence and was trying to formulate a policy of independence in the sphere of world affairs, and Communist China, which was refusing, so arrogantly, to recognize this basic fact and instigating an ideologically committed group of people in the country to armed insurrection.

INDIA, CHINA AND TIBET

A confrontation between India and China soon came on the Tibetan front. The high altitude of Tibet and its geographical situation had formed the most effective barriers to both the Russian designs and Chinese pressures against India on the north. While China had tried on several occasions to turn Tibet into a Chinese province, and succeeded on some, the Tibetans had always asserted their independence as soon as they got an opportunity to do so. History is replete with instances of Tibetans rebelling against the Chinese domination and killing the representatives of the Chinese government stationed in Lhasa.¹ They recognized the Dalai Lama alone as the highest authority. While the Tibetans had been often subjected to Chinese control they had very intimate relations with India also, but these relations were mostly on the cultural and economic levels. The Himalayan ranges sprawling over the whole of India's northern frontier being regarded as insurmountable, India had never feared any invasion from the north. While China and India respected each other for a long time, it was mainly on account of the extensive Tibetan plateau having been interposed between the two countries, permitting a trickle of traders and travellers and religious-minded men but obstructing very effectively any large-scale movement of troops, that there had been peace between the two countries for all these thousands of years. During the last decades of the nineteenth century, the British were attracted by prospects of trade in Tibet. Since the Tibetans were reluctant to open themselves out, the British tried to use Chinese pressure, which the Tibetans were most vociferous in resenting. A pass-port for Tibet was given by the Chinese Government, under pressure from the British, and later rescinded. But the Tibetans were so provoked by the act that they attacked Sikkim, a British protectorate. In 1873, and again in 1876, the Chinese Government plainly admitted before the British Minister at Peking that they did not have sufficient control at Lhasa to ensure the entry of European travellers into Tibet. It was, however, the fear of Tibet passing under Russian control which finally made the British adopt a stronger attitude in the matter. In 1880 Dorjiev, a Russian citizen, came to Lhasa and set himself up as a Lama, and in 1901 certain Tibetan Lamas visited Russia. This confirmed the British fears that the Russians were trying to dig themselves deeper into Tibet,² and led to Curzon's 'forward policy'.³ The Government

of India was never again able to extricate herself from her involvement in Tibet, and when they tried to do so in 1954, on the assumption of China's goodwill, they found that they had got themselves entangled even more than ever in the past.

The Chinese contention that Tibet was always a part of China and, therefore, had no right to enter into treaties with other countries independent of China is not borne out by historical evidence. There are innumerable examples of her having treaties with neighbouring countries, with or without the knowledge or approval of China, and these treaties having been later accepted by China. A treaty was signed between Tibet and Nepal on March 24, 1856, according equal status to both the countries. By virtue of this treaty, Tibet granted extra-territorial privileges to Nepal in Tibet. This treaty clearly confirms the independent status of Tibet to conclude treaties with foreign states. A convention delimiting the boundary between Sikkim and Tibet was signed *by the representatives of the Chinese and the British Indian Governments* on March 17, 1890, and instruments of ratification exchanged in London on August 27, 1890. Under the Convention both the governments agreed reciprocally to respect the boundary so defined so as to prevent acts of aggression from their respective sides of the frontier. An appendix to the Convention further laid down regulations regarding trade, communication and pasturage. *However, the Convention remained inoperative as Tibet refused to recognise its validity*, the Tibetans having informed the British Commissioner that "as the Convention had been signed by the Chinese only, the Tibetan Government refused to recognise it as effective in Tibet". The Convention remained a dead letter, and it was indicated clearly that China's power to conclude binding treaties on behalf of Tibet was illusory. The regulations regarding trade, communication and pasturage too were never put into operation, *and were subsequently cancelled by the Anglo-Tibet Regulation of 1914 signed between the representatives of Great Britain and Tibet on July 3, 1914.*⁴

Following the despatch of an armed force under Col. Young-husband to Lhasa, a Convention was signed by the representatives of Great Britain and Tibet on September 7, 1904, with a view to resolving the doubts and difficulties which had arisen as to the meaning and validity of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 and the Trade Regulations of 1893 and as to the liabilities of the Tibetan Government under these agreements. The Convention carries the clear impression that any treaty concluded by China on behalf of Tibet could not be binding on the latter and would not be implemented by her. It was primarily in the nature of a trade agreement, though it imposed a number of political restrictions too. The Tibetan Government undertook to open trade marts at Gyantse, Gartok and Yatung to the British and admit British goods at tariff 'to be mutually agreed upon'. The Convention prohibited any concessions by the Tibetans,

in territory or trade or politics or fiscal matters to any foreign power—thus ‘opening’ Tibet to British trade and securing to Great Britain control over the external policy of Tibet. Article IX of the Convention made it obligatory on the part of the Government of Tibet that, without the previous consent of the British Government, (a) no portion of Tibetan territory would be ceded, sold, leased, mortgaged or otherwise given for occupation to any foreign power, (b) no such power would be permitted to intervene in Tibetan affairs, (c) no representatives or agents of any foreign power would be admitted to Tibet, (d) no concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, mining or other rights would be granted to any foreign power or the subject of any foreign power, and (e) no Tibetan revenues, whether in kind or in cash, would be pledged or assigned to any foreign power, or the subject of any foreign power, etc. This was clearly an attempt to seal Tibet against any external influences.

However, for reasons of high diplomacy and with a view to using the fiction of China’s suzerainty over Tibet to counteract Russian designs, the British Government thought it necessary to get the above Convention with Tibet ‘confirmed’ in another Convention signed with the plenipotentiaries of China on April 27, 1906. This was in the face of repeated assertions by the Chinese Government of their helplessness with regard to any control over Lhasa—in 1882-83 they had gone to the extent of declaring unequivocally that Tibet was not a part of the Chinese empire. Lord Curzon was frank in his acknowledgement of the realities of the situation. “Chinese suzerainty over Tibet”, he wrote to the Secretary of State, “is a constitutional fiction—a political affectation which has been maintained because of its convenience to both parties (Britain and China)”. The preamble to the Convention of 1906 refers to the refusal of Tibet to recognise the validity of, or to carry into full effect the provisions of, the Anglo-Chinese Convention of March 17, 1890 and the Regulations of December 5, 1893, and bears witness to the fact that the 1904 Convention between Tibet and Great Britain was validly concluded and was in operation. It further demonstrates, on the one hand, the right of Tibet to conclude treaties with foreign governments without the intervention of the Chinese Government, and on the other hand, the lack of power on the part of China to conclude treaties on behalf of Tibet. By this Convention the British Government ‘engaged not to annex Tibetan territory or to interfere in the administration of Tibet’ in return for an undertaking on behalf of the Government of China ‘not to permit any other foreign state (clearly meaning Russia) to interfere with the treaty or internal administration of Tibet’. The concessions mentioned in Article IX (d) of the Anglo-Tibetan Convention were ‘denied to any state or to the subject of any state other than China’, but it was arranged with China that at the trade marts of Gyantse, Gartok and Yatung Great Britain would be entitled to lay down telegraph lines connecting them with India.

A trade agreement, incorporating the Tibet trade regulations was

signed by the Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain and China and the Tibetan delegate on April 20, 1908. Tibet was clearly invited to be a party to the agreement in order to provide for the possibility of her disclaiming any responsibility under a convention signed directly between China and Great Britain. The Tibetan delegate, Wang Chuk Gyalpo, was named by the High Authorities of Tibet as 'their fully authorised representative to act under the directions of Chang Tachen and take part in the negotiations'. These Regulations were subsequently 'cancelled' by the Anglo-Tibetan Regulations of 1914 signed between the representatives of Great Britain and Tibet on July 3, 1914. The India-Tibet frontier, known as the McMahon Line, was similarly determined, through an exchange of letters between the British and Tibetan Plenipotentiaries, A. H. McMahon and Lonchen Shatra, and subsequently confirmed by the Convention of July 1914. This Convention between Great Britain, China and Tibet was agreed to and initialled by the representatives of Great Britain, China and Tibet on April 27, 1914, at Simla. The proceedings of the Simla Conference make it clear that not only did the Chinese representative fully participate in them but that the Tibetan representative took part in the discussions on an equal footing with the Chinese and the British Indian representatives. The fact that China was prepared to conclude a treaty jointly with Tibet clearly confirms the contention made earlier that Tibet had the power to conclude treaties not only with Great Britain but also with China. The Chinese later withdrew from the Convention not because they challenged Tibet's rights in the matter or because they did not agree with the Indo-Tibetan boundary as laid down in the Convention but because they could not agree to the boundary between Inner and Outer Tibet. On July 3, 1914, along with the Convention, were signed the Anglo-Tibetan Trade Regulations between the representatives of Great Britain and Tibet which cancelled the Regulations regarding Trade, Communication and Pasturage of 1893 and the Indo-Tibetan Trade Agreement of 1908, this again confirming the right of Tibet to conclude agreements with foreign states. The very fact that the Treaty signed between China and Nepal in 1956 implied the renunciation by Nepal of the extra-territorial privileges granted by Tibet and enjoyed by Nepal by virtue of the 1856 Treaty of Peace between Tibet and Nepal proves beyond doubt that People's Republic of China was accepting the legal position that the treaties concluded by Tibet without the mediation of China had continued validity until abrogated and replaced by other agreements in regard to the same subject. It further proves that Tibet had the power to conclude treaties with foreign states without the intermediacy of China.

This was the situation inherited by the free government of India in 1947. India was maintaining with Tibet, her neighbour in the north, close cultural and trade relations. She had the right to station an Indian political agent at Lhasa, and to maintain trade agencies at Gyantse, Gartok and Yatung, as well as post and telegraph offices

along the trade routes up to Gyantse and the right to station a small military escort at Gyantse to protect this commercial highway. All that the Chinese were able to achieve by way of a change in their position between 1919 and 1949 was the permission to station a Chinese mission at Lhasa, from 1934 onwards. This mission, in fact, had come to Lhasa under the pretext of conveying China's condolences at the death of the Dalai Lama, and had just stayed on. The mission was expelled by the Tibetans in July 1949. The Communists were now almost on the way to power. The meeting of the Communist People's Political Conference, held at Peking in July 1949, adopted a resolution to the effect that Tibet would be retained as part of the People's Republic of China, Chou En-lai declaring later that the principle of self-determination would be applied.⁵ On September 24, 1949, Chu Teh, the Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese Army, said in a speech at the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference that the "common programme demands the waging of the revolutionary war to the very end, the liberation of all territory of China, including Formosa, the Pascadores, Hainan and Tibet."⁶ India seems to have quietly acquiesced in the position.⁷ Jawaharlal Nehru correctly described the British policy towards Tibet, which independent India had inherited, when he told a press conference in London in November 1949 that India had always recognized Chinese sovereignty of Tibet but had regarded Tibet as an autonomous unit and had dealt with her all along on this basis. The new government of India, he said, had no desire to follow the old British imperial policy, but they would like to preserve their country's trade and cultural interests in Tibet.

On the New Year's day, 1950, Marshal Chu Teh, Vice-Chairman of People's Republic of China declared the "liberation" of Tibet as one of the "basic tasks" of the People's Liberation Army. The use of the term "liberation" came as a surprise to India. It was difficult to understand, Nehru exclaimed, as to from whom Tibet was going to be "liberated".⁸ However, he was convinced, as he told pressmen in Delhi on January 8, 1950, that "he did not suppose the Chinese Communist Government wanted to or could deprive Tibet of local autonomy". In March 1950, the Chinese occupied Tachienlu, traditional gateway to Lhasa. A large-scale programme of building roads from China to Tibet was simultaneously started. In May, the Peking Radio called upon the Dalai Lama to accept "peaceful liberation of Tibet". In June 1950, Mao himself spoke of the forthcoming invasion of Tibet, which, in his view, had become necessary on account of the growing rebelliousness in Tibet. In the light of Nehru's clear statement made in London, and the position consistently taken by the Indian Ambassador in Peking, China had no reason to suspect that India was abetting the movement inside Tibet for reasserting its independence. It is, however, clear that China continued to express that suspicion. In fact, it appears that Communist China had been harbouring this suspicion for a long

time. Her strong diatribes against India, from July 1949 onwards, had been occasioned by her proclaimed fear that Nehru was prepared to serve 'as the hireling of Anglo-American imperialism in the attempt to invade Tibet'. Mao Tse-tung was, however, good enough to add that China was anxious to secure her ends by negotiations and not by military action. In an article in the *New Construction* (Shanghai), September 22, 1949, a Chinese writer referred to the Asian Relations Conference of 1947, which had been attended by a Tibetan delegation and in which Tibet had been shown on a wall-map decorating the Conference hall as 'located outside the national boundaries of China', and on that basis argued that Tibet (which this article frankly described as 'the national barrier to India') had been earmarked, like Taiwan, as part of the Anglo-American defence system. "To preserve their rule over India, they must control Tibet".

Early in August 1950, General Liu Po-chang, Chairman of the Southwest China Military Affairs Commission was reported to have said that 'the People's Army would soon enter Tibet with the object of wiping out British and American influence there'. Following this the Indian Ambassador in Peking, in several conversations with Chou En-lai, expressed the hope that the Chinese Government would follow a policy of peace in regard to Tibet, to which Chou En-lai replied that he regarded the "liberation" of Tibet as a "sacred duty" of the Peking Government. On September 13, 1950, the *People's Daily* made a violent attack on India, and accused her of being a party to an international plot, on the basis that on July 27 Nehru had made a statement to the effect that Tibet had never recognized Chinese ~~sovereignty~~ and on the same day British authoritative aides had told the United Press that, if China attempted to force her rule on Tibet, Tibet could seek British intervention. "The Nehru Government cannot deny", it said, "that it had sent men to Lhasa". The announcement made by the Government of India on August 8, re-iterating the fact of India's protectorate over Bhutan, also was fully exploited by the journal. "Since the Nehru Government has announced its sovereignty over Bhutan and declared that Tibet had never recognized Chinese sovereignty, will it not declare suzerainty over Tibet?...The Nehru Government has no legal right to announce its protectorate over Bhutan". On September 30, 1950, the first anniversary of the founding of the Chinese People's Republic, Chou En-lai formally proclaimed his government's determination to "liberate the people of Tibet and *stand on guard at the Chinese frontiers*". In the meantime, there started, in September 1950, talks between the Chinese Ambassador in New Delhi and a Tibetan delegation present there over the future relations between China and Tibet. The talks were soon broken off, as the Chinese Ambassador declined to commit himself, and the Tibetan delegation left for Peking. The military invasion of Tibet by China was now not far off.

On October 7, 1950, while the Tibetan delegation was in Calcutta on its way to Peking, the Peking Radio announced that the process of "liberating" of Tibet had begun⁹. Without warning or ultimatum some 40,000 of Chinese troops crossed into Tibet at several points along its eastern border and overwhelmed the Tibetan border forces. By October 19, they had captured the Tibetan fortress town of Chamdo, 300 miles east of Lhasa, and by October 22 were in control of Lhodzong and other major eastern passes into Tibet. China did not think it necessary to take India into confidence. "To add to my troubles", wrote K.M. Panikkar, "by the middle of the month (October) rumours of Chinese invasion of Tibet began to circulate. Visits and representations to the Foreign Office brought no results. The Wai Chiaopu (Foreign Office) officials were polite but silent"¹⁰. It was on October 25 that the Chinese News Agency announced that the People's Liberation Army had entered Tibet "to liberate the peoples of Tibet, to complete the unification of China, to prevent imperialism from invading an inch of the territory of the father-land and to safeguard and build up the frontier regions of the country". To India, China's behaviour appeared as particularly strange. It was clear that neither Great Britain nor the United States was interested in Tibet: the Western powers were, in fact, so preoccupied with the Korean crisis that they had hardly any time to think of Tibet. On October 26, the Government of India sent a note of protest to Peking describing the whole episode as "most surprising and regrettable", more so in view of the fact that China had assured India that the question would be solved peacefully. India vainly remonstrated to China that her action was neither in her own interest nor in the interest of peace, particularly at a time when efforts were being made to settle the Korean War and to get China admitted to the United Nations. On October 30, 1950, the Foreign Minister of China, in reply to Government of India's Note, declared Tibet to be "an integral part of Chinese territory" and "entirely the domestic problem of China". "The Chinese People's Liberation Army must enter Tibet, liberate the Tibetan people and defend the frontiers of China". The Chinese Government further proclaimed that in the settlement of the Tibetan question "no foreign interference will be tolerated". Declaring that they regarded the Government of India's viewpoint as 'deplorable' they alleged that it had been "affected by foreign influences hostile to China".

On November 1, 1950, India addressed another Note to China categorically repudiating the charge that she was under any foreign influence hostile to China and re-iterating that all that she wanted was to see the problem settled peacefully, "adjusting the legitimate Tibetan claim to autonomy within the framework of Chinese suzerainty". "There has been no allegation", the Note emphasised, "that there has been any provocation or any resort to non-peaceful methods on the part of the Tibetans. Hence there is no justification whatever for such military operations against them. Such a step

involving an attempt to impose a decision by force could not possibly be reconciled with peaceful settlement." It was clearly of the opinion that recent developments in Tibet had affected friendly relations between India and China and the interests of peace the world over. A few more Notes were exchanged but nothing concrete was accomplished: to quote Panikkar, "both parties had made their point of view clear and were content to let it rest there...". The Chinese Government clinched the issue in a statement on November 16, 1950: "The problem of Tibet is entirely a domestic problem of China. The Chinese People's Liberation Army must enter Tibet, liberate the Tibetan people, and defend the frontiers of China. This is the firm policy of the Chinese Government..." On November 7, 1950, Tibet carried the issue to the United Nations, repudiating China's claim that Tibet was a part of China and describing the Chinese attack as clear aggression. Both India and the United Kingdom, the two countries which could be expected to support her claims on legalistic grounds, desisted from doing so. When the Republic of El Salvador brought forward a resolution condemning the Chinese action, they both advised a deferring of the issue and expressed the hope that the matter could be settled by peaceful means. The Tibetans sent a couple of agonized telegrams, requesting the United Nations at least to send a fact-finding commission to Tibet, but they proved of no avail. It was interesting to note that the recommendation of the Indian delegate was finally instrumental in convincing the members of the General Assembly of the advisability of a course of non-intervention. Jam Sahib of Nawanagar, the Indian representative, told the steering committee of the United Nations General Assembly, which had met to consider whether an appeal from Tibet should be put on the Assembly agenda, that his government had been informed by Peking that the Chinese forces had ceased to advance after the fall of Chamdo, and believed that a peaceful settlement of the Tibetan problem, safeguarding Tibetan autonomy and the maintenance of her historical association with China, was still possible.¹¹

Late in April 1951, a Tibetan delegation arrived in Peking and on May 23, a 17-Point Agreement was signed, between Tibet and China,¹² the local Government of Tibet undertaking 'to unite and drive out imperialist aggressive forces from Tibet, to return to the big family of the motherland—the People's Republic of China' (Art. I), to 'actively assist the People's Liberation Army to enter Tibet and consolidate the national defence (Art. II), and to cede to China full control over Tibetan external affairs (Art. XIV). The Chinese also secured the integration by stages of the Tibetan army with the People's Liberation Army (Art. VIII). In return, China promised not to alter the existing political system in Tibet or effect any change in the established status, functions and powers of the Dalai Lama. She further promised (Art. VII) to respect the religious beliefs, customs and habits of the Tibetan people and protect the Lama monasteries. "In matters relating to various reforms in

Tibet," ran Art. XI, "there will be no compulsion on the part of the central authorities. The Local Government of Tibet should carry out reforms of its own accord, and when the people raise demands for reforms, they shall be settled by means of negotiations with the leading personnel of Tibet." Dalai Lama himself reached Lhasa only on August 17, more than a week after the Chinese general Chang Ching-wu had entered it. The Tibetan Assembly delayed the ratification of the agreement for some more time but had to do it on November 19 when larger Chinese forces entered the capital.

Jam Sahib was certainly not trying to deceive the United Nations when he informed them about the Chinese armies stopping at Chamdo. The People's Liberation Army, having entered Chamdo on October 29, 1950, remained there for several months before advancing further into Tibet. What could have been their motive? Did they want to test the will, and the strength, of India and the United Nations? There is some reason to think that if stronger support had been given to the Tibetan cause by the outside world, Peking would have desisted from her onward march. China accused the United States of planning to take a unilateral stand on Tibet. Lowell Thomas' visit to Tibet in 1949, circulation in Kalimpong of copies of a booklet on top-secret military briefing for American troops on Tibet in 1950, and the escape of the Dalai Lama's brother, Taktser Rimpoche, better known as Thubten Norbu, to America in July 1951, gave excellent grounds to China to justify a more rigorous policy in Tibet. In order to forestall foreign intervention and discourage possibilities of 'counter-revolution' engineered by Tibetan exiles in India, she claimed, she had to take a quick action. Beginning in August 1951, vast hordes of Chinese troops started pouring into the country. They entered not from the east but from the far northwest. Armed Chinese units penetrated Tibet from the Sinkiang area and took the Tibetan defences completely by surprise. Not that the Tibetans could have done much if they had been better prepared. The well-organized, well-trained Chinese armies were more than a match for the primitive Tibetan bands. Small Tibetan garrisons at Rudok and Gartok were quickly overpowered, and a quick move of the Chinese armies towards Shigatse not only closed the western passes to India but threatened to cut the main route to the south of Lhasa. By November 1951, as the Peking Radio boasted, the Chinese army engineering units had completed a highway from Sinkiang Province in Southwest China over the 15,000 feet Brahmaban mountain, over some of the roughest terrain in the world, and large supplies of goods were pouring through these roads. High-ranking Chinese officers and troops, including cavalry, were at the same time collecting in Gyantse, presumably to take security measures in connection with Panchen Lama's arrival in Shigatse but clearly to establish check-posts on the Indo-Tibet trade road in Yatung and along the entire southern frontiers. "With the occupation of Tibet's second largest town (Shigatse) and the concentration of troops in eastern and

western Tibet," wrote the *Statesman*, November 27, 1951, "military control of the whole of Tibet was virtually established."¹³ The establishment of check-posts along Tibet's southern frontier with India, Nepal and Sikkim was now expected to be 'a matter of days'. By December 1951, the total Chinese garrison in the city of Lhasa alone numbered 8,000, and more troops were moving towards the Himalayas. A radio station set up in Phari, 80 miles from Kalimpong, became an active link in the Communist network covering Southern Tibet. In January 1952, some 15,000 Chinese families were reported to be on the move for being settled in the thinly populated areas of Tibet, where they were to be provided with houses and cultivable lands. The 9,000-strong old fashioned army of Tibet was disbanded and replaced by a small force of strictly trained young Tibetan elements. The old police force also was disarmed and gradually replaced with newly trained Tibetans, mostly from the Chinese-influenced eastern province of Tibet. In the face of these large-scale military threats from the east as well as from the west and the northwest, the young Dalai Lama fled south to Yatung, on the Sikkim border, hesitating for some time whether to go into exile or come to terms with the Chinese. In the end, saner counsels prevailed and he decided to return.

What made Communist China attack Tibet? The Peking Government talked of the necessity of eliminating the "western imperialist" influence. If it meant by that American influence, it was a charge impossible to substantiate.¹⁴ There was some talk of Russian interest in the area. There were reports of a couple of Russian parties thoroughly surveying large areas of Western Tibet in April, May and part of June 1950, and choosing sites for air bases. Were the Chinese trying to forestall them?¹⁵ Had the British also not tried to protect Tibet from Russian, rather than Chinese, encroachment? Was the occupation of Tibet by China a matter of strategic or defensive necessity? Or, did China do so in her search for more living space? There were also reports of uranium having been discovered in Tibet. If true, this certainly could have assumed importance in the light of the possibilities of China developing the atomic power. Or, was it just naked military conquest? Whatever the causes, the Chinese continued to pour into Tibet, their number soon rising to hundred thousand strong, with the Buddhist monks fleeing rapidly before them as promises of autonomy and protection of Buddhist sanctuaries, and of steps to be taken "to improve the people's livelihood by developing Tibet's industry and commerce", fell into their ears. Tibet being of importance only to China and India, India alone could be expected to come to her aid. The Western powers were not interested. Preoccupied with the Korean crisis, both Britain and the United States made it clear that they would follow India's lead in dealing with the question. On the United Nations voting for adjournment of a discussion of the Tibetan issue, Ernest Gross of the United States made it clear that he had supported it in view of the fact that the Government of India, whose territory bor-

dered on Tibet and was therefore an interested party, had told the General Committee that it hoped that the Tibetan question would be peacefully and honourably settled. India stubbornly continued to hope that a settlement could be brought about with China which might enable Tibet to retain its autonomy and its character of a buffer state between the two countries.

What rendered India so immobile in the face of the Chinese aggression in Tibet? India was presumably discouraged from playing a more active role on account of the Korean War which was in full swing at this time and also by the eruption of a revolt in Nepal against the rule of the Rana family. India, as Norman Palmer points out, was "sub-consciously or unconsciously forced on the side of the Communist regime by the fear...that the Korean War was going to be used—or, at least, the threat was there that it might be used—as an instrument by the United States to re-open the Chinese civil war and perhaps a general war would result". Addressing a public meeting in Bombay on November 7, 1950, Pandit Nehru expressed the fear that "another disastrous global war might break out in the next fifteen months and plunge the world into irrecoverable chaos." India's efforts throughout the Korean War were aimed at a peaceful settlement of the problem. "India has a rather special responsibility with regard to China", Nehru told the Lok Sabha on December 6, 1950, "because, apart from the countries of the Soviet group, India is the only country which could find through its Ambassador what the reaction of the Chinese Government is to developing events." The anxiety to save the world from another war prompted India to retain China's friendship even at the cost of Tibet's independence. Even when Communist China sent its armed forces into Korea, and the tide of the war was turning against the United Nations, India strongly advised against branding China an aggressor, her representative arguing that the participation of the Chinese forces in the war was not due to any aggressive intention but because it threatened the territorial integrity of China. The Government of India at this time were strongly of the opinion that the trouble in Asia was due to the failure of the Western powers, and particularly of the United States, to recognize China as a Great Power. India was also deceived by the assurance persistently given by the Chinese to Tibet with regard to the safeguarding of her autonomy. As early as 1931, in a proposed constitution of a "Chinese Soviet Republic", to be organised on the same lines as the U.S.S.R., Tibetans had been mentioned as those who would "enjoy the full right to self-determination *i.e.* they may either join the Union of Chinese Soviets or secede from it and form their own state as they may prefer". The Communists had repeated this promise several times after coming to power. Under the 17-Point Agreement of May 23, 1951 also, they acknowledged (Art. III) the Tibetan people's "right of exercising natural regional autonomy", and promised (Art. IV) that the central authorities "will not alter the existing political system in Tibet...also will not alter

the established status, functions and powers of the Dalai Lama." They gave similar assurances to India with regard to the safeguarding of her interests in Tibet. On September 27, 1951, Chou En-lai informally assured the Indian Ambassador at Peking that China intended in every way to safeguard Indian interests in Tibet, adding that "there was no territorial dispute or controversy between India and China".¹⁶ An agreement signed between the two governments on September 15, 1952, converted the Indian Mission at Lhasa into a Consulate General, the Indian Government agreeing to the opening of a Chinese Consulate General in Bombay in return. It was late in 1953 that, on Indian initiative, formal discussions were started between Indian and Chinese representatives for an agreement between the two countries on Tibet. India for the moment was more worried about what appeared to be an imminent danger to peace in East Asia than what might develop into a Chinese menace to Indian security in some remote future.

CONSOLIDATION OF INDIAN FRONTIERS

India's attitude to China, as Quincy Wright has pointed out, was governed by the twin ideas of admiration and fear. Whatever might have been China's approach to Indian freedom, India looked upon the Chinese revolution as part of the resurgence of Asia, and the general tendency in the country was to regard China more as an emergent Asian country than as a Communist power. There was a great deal of sympathy, and a certain amount of appreciation, for the courageous way in which China, like India, though by different methods, was trying to solve her immense problems of economic backwardness and poverty. There was at the same time some apprehension regarding the revolution in China spilling over into the countries bordering India. While India conceded to Communist China her claims for the over-lordship of Tibet, she had already started, perhaps in view of the impending eventuality, taking some steps towards the strengthening of her border defences against a likely Chinese expansionism, which were accelerated after the Chinese moved into Tibet. As early as August 8, 1949 India and Bhutan had signed a treaty at Darjeeling, replacing previous ones signed by the British government in 1865 and 1910. While this treaty guaranteed internal autonomy to Bhutan, and promised substantial increase in her annual subsidy of five hundred thousand rupees established by the British in lieu of commitments entered into in the old treaties, it also obligated Bhutan "to be guided by the advice of the Government of India in regard to its external relations", which, according to Indian interpretation, included matters of defence. The Indian political officer in Sikkim was designated as the channel through which all relations between Bhutan and India were to pass. In view of the fact that there was a hundred and ninety miles of common frontier between Bhutan and Tibet, the Government of India took up the responsibility of helping Bhutan in the improvement of her defences and in the building up of strategic roads linking it with India. Frontier guards were subsequently posted on the passes and roads leading into Tibet. Bhutan had always been a quiet area, with a fairly homogeneous population presenting no problems of sectional rivalry and no pretensions to political activity. Bhutan was effectively shut off from the world by natural barriers.

Before the Chinese marched into Tibet, India had entered into a Treaty of Friendship with Nepal, from the strategic standpoint the most important frontier state, which during the period of British rule in India was not permitted to have any direct relations with any foreign power. Nehru had enunciated the Indian Government's policy towards Nepal much earlier. In a speech made in the Indian Parliament on March 17, 1950, following a visit from Prime Minister Rana Mohan Shamsheer, he had said, "...it was clear that, in so far as certain developments in Asia are concerned (he was clearly referring to the emergence of Communist China), the interests of India and Nepal are identical. For instance, to mention one point, it is not possible for the Indian Government to tolerate any violation of Nepal from anywhere, even though there is no military alliance between the two countries. Any possible invasion of Nepal...would immediately involve the safety of India". Nehru had also then advised the Government of Nepal 'in all earnestness', through Mohan Shamsheer, "to bring themselves into line with democratic forces that are striving in the world today. Not to do so is not only wrong but also unwise from the point of view of what is happening in the world today." "Frankly", Nehru told the Indian Parliament, on December 6, 1950, "we do not like and shall not brook any foreign interference in Nepal. We recognise Nepal as an independent country and wish her well. But even a child knows that one cannot go to Nepal without passing through India. Therefore, no other country can have as intimate a relationship with Nepal as ours is. We would like every other country to appreciate the intimate geographical and cultural relationship that exists between India and Nepal".¹ Nehru also pointed out that India stood for progressive democracy, 'not only in our own country but in other countries also,' 'especially so, when one of our neighbouring countries is concerned'. He had, therefore, pointed out to Nepal 'in as friendly a way as possible', that the world was changing rapidly and that if she did not make an effort to keep pace with it, circumstances were bound to force her to do so. "We did not wish to interfere with Nepal in any way, but at the same time realized that, unless some steps were taken in her internal sphere, difficulties might arise". This 'friendly advice' did not produce any immediate result.

The Indo-Nepalese Treaty of Peace and Friendship, referred to above, was signed on July 31, 1950, and was followed by a trade treaty between the two countries. Some time later there broke out a revolt in Nepal against the ruling Rana group. The revolt had been organized by the Nepalese Congress Party and could be regarded as a continuation of the struggle carried out in India for democratic control over the government. It had the secret support of King Tribhuvan, who refused to sign the death warrants of a number of persons guilty of complicity in a conspiracy to murder the Prime Minister, Rana Mohan Shamsheer, and the Commander-in-Chief. On November, 6, 1950,

the royal family was granted asylum at the Indian Embassy in Kathmandu, and later flown to India. As the King flew to New Delhi, the Nepalese rebels, who had long been preparing for the event, moved into Birganj, the second largest town in Nepal, and set up a parallel government. This was followed by several months of fighting in Nepal.² As the revolution was in progress in Nepal, the President of India said in his address to Parliament that India would like to see the Nepalese people make "political and economic progress". "We assured Nepal of our desire", said Nehru, "that Nepal should be a strong and independent country and, we always added, 'a progressive country'." Nepal's independence was to be respected, but Nepal was also to be advised that the world was changing fast and if she would not change with it "there might be some pushing about later."³

By December, 1950, due to India's tactful intervention, the end of the civil war in Nepal seemed to be in sight. A compromise settlement was reached between the King, the Nepalese Congress and the Ranas, described by Nehru as 'a statesmanlike act on the part of all concerned' and marking 'the beginning of a new era in the history of our sister country', and was subsequently embodied in an agreement signed on February 12, 1951 between the three parties. As a result of this agreement, an interim coalition government was brought into existence in Nepal. The immediate task before the interim government was to take charge of the administration of the country and to establish peace and order. It did not prove to be an easy task. Within a week, the two factions—one representing the Ranas and the other the King and the Nepalese Congress—had a major clash over the question of precedence in the seating arrangements at the swearing-in ceremony. One of the rebel groups, led by Dr. K.I. Singh, refused to surrender arms at the time of amnesty, and could be arrested only with the help of Indian police. By the autumn of 1951, when the Communist rule was being consolidated in Tibet, a kind of constitutional monarchy under King Tribhuvan had been established in Nepal, and an era of liberal reforms had started. On January 22, 1952, Singh, with the help of some leaders of the Raksha Dal, staged a *coup d'état*. Again, the Indian troops had to be called in, and it was presumably the news that the troops were on their way, coupled with the stubborn refusal of the King to yield, which made him capitulate. K. I. Singh subsequently escaped to Peking. Conditions in the country continued to be so unstable that the King had to declare a state of emergency, ban political processions and meetings, declare the Communist Party illegal and disband the Raksha Dal. Serious rifts broke out within the Nepalese Congress, the Prime Minister himself resigning and forming another political party, the Nepal Democratic Party, and called back again to head the government. There was serious agrarian unrest, to deal with which troops had to be rushed in from Kathmandu.

There was much internal dissatisfaction in Nepal at what was

represented to be "the Nepalese sellout to India." The feeling that the Nepalese Congress and the Gurkha Parishad had their leanings towards India was responsible for their defeat in the municipal elections in Kathmandu at the hands of the (illegal) Communist Party, which won nearly 50 per cent of the total votes cast and the majority of the seats in the municipality. Robert Trumbell wrote in the *New York Times*: "Nepal appears to fear India's encroachment on its ancient freedom more than Communist infiltration from its northern neighbour...Anti-Indian feeling is intensified by the consciousness of every Nepalese that India could, if she wished, throw an economic stranglehold on the country by its geographical position". The introduction of a military mission gave rise to the belief that India was controlling the army, and the assistance given by India in reorganizing the administrative machinery was attributed to her desire to bring Nepal under her complete control. It was said openly in Kathmandu that the Indian Ambassador was the real ruler of the country and that India was trying to monopolize Nepal's foreign relations. The crescendo of hatred against India rose so high that even the Nepalese Congress demanded in 1954 that both the Indian civilian experts and military mission be withdrawn in the interest of 'the healthy relations between India and Nepal'. "There are enough educated and experienced Nepalese who are capable of carrying out reforms in our mode of administration...". The same year when an Indian parliamentary delegation visited Kathmandu on a goodwill mission, it was greeted by hostile crowds lining the route from the airport to the city and the car of the Indian Ambassador was stoned. India, however, went ahead with her policy of doing everything to strengthen Nepal and to forge stronger ties with that country. Her multi-purpose Kosi and Gandak projects brought large areas of Nepal under irrigation, while her help with several other projects was designed to increase the over-all agricultural efficiency and food production. She helped her in setting up the very rudiments of industrialization.

To India, civil peace in Nepal was a matter of national security. "Our interest in the internal conditions of Nepal has become still more acute and personal, in view of the developments across our borders, in China and Tibet". "Apart from our sympathetic interest in Nepal," said Nehru, "we are also interested in the security of our own country." From time immemorial the Himalayas have provided us with a magnificent frontier...We cannot allow that barrier to be penetrated, for it is also the principal barrier to India. Much as we stand for the independence for Nepal we cannot allow anything to go wrong in Nepal or permit that barrier to be crossed or weakened because that would be a risk to our own security."⁴ India's attitude in the matter could not have been more unequivocally declared.

An attempt was made to bring another tiny state on the frontier, Sikkim, closer within the Indian orbit of influence. Treaties between Britain and China going back to 1890 and 1893 had given the British

a protectorate over Sikkim. India had inherited these treaties and had the right to send a "political officer" to assist the Maharaja in the administration of the country. In the early part of 1949 considerable unrest and occasional rioting prevailed in the country. This was due to the dissatisfaction of the people with the landlord and lessee system. The Maharaja was forced to call upon the Indian Political Officer for help, and this officer assumed for all practical purposes the responsibility for the country's administration "in the interest of law and order." This was followed by substantial reforms. The worst features of the landholding system were eliminated, and the first steps towards democratic government taken. Following this a treaty was signed, on December 5, 1950, between India and Sikkim, under which Sikkim's old position as an Indian protectorate was recognized and, while confirming the internal autonomy of Sikkim "subject to the provisions of the treaty", India was authorized to take up the responsibility of Sikkim's external affairs, communications and defence. India was further permitted to station troops in the state, build air-fields and roads and do other things which would give her effective control in any national emergency. This clearly underlined the strategic importance of the area, the principal routes to Tibet all being through Sikkim. The Government of India also took up the construction of new roads linking up India with Sikkim.

India had, thus, clearly taken up the responsibility of strengthening her relations with the three border states which were likely to be affected by China's establishing her domination over Tibet. Relations with Burma, another crucial area on India's northern border, were also greatly influenced by the establishment of the Communist power across the Himalayas. India and Burma had close ties, extending back into history and strengthened by economic inter-dependence and political community of interest. Following independence, Burma was faced with insurrectionary movements led by the Communists and the Karens. The Government of India initiated discussions with members of the Commonwealth countries in the region and then raised the issue in the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London in April 1949, and it was as a result of these efforts that it was decided to give coordinated aid to Burma in the form of arms and loans, and a Burma Aid Committee was set up to implement the decision. A final aid programme was drawn up in 1950. The financial as well as military assistance given to Burma was clearly directed against the Communist threat⁵. While the independent Burmese Government had severed all connections with the Commonwealth, she was prepared to accept arms aid from India and the latter was able to secure for her economic aid worth nearly eight crores of rupees.

Besides entering into treaties and agreements with the border states of Bhutan, Nepal and Sikkim, and forging closer ties with Burma, the Government of India was also active in the tightening up of its administrative set-up on the frontier. Effective political and

administrative control was extended over the tribes living in the forest-covered mountain terrain of the North East Frontier Agency lying South of the McMahon line. Roads and airstrips were constructed, schools and hospitals set up and army units established at strategic points along the frontier, the number of major posts and outposts going up from 18 and 15 in 1951 to 44 and 56 respectively in 1954. "The McMahon line is our boundary, map or no map", Nehru announced in the Parliament, "we will not allow anybody to come across that boundary". To keep watch along the frontier to the west and north-west of Nepal, the government of Uttar Pradesh created a special constabulary force with the help of the central government. In the northwestern section small army units were placed to guard the border between Ladakh and western Tibet. "The activities of the Indian Government, along the whole length of its border, from northwest to the northeast," wrote Werner Levi, summing up the situation as it existed in 1952, "are evidence that the nation's security is not permitted to rest upon fine speeches and the exchange of cultural missions or upon optimistic interpretations of Communist theory or practice alone."

While India was taking some necessary steps towards strengthening its inner line of Himalayan defences, China was engaged in rapid consolidation of her power over Tibet and setting up military posts all along Tibet's border with India. By August 1951, the Chinese had garrisoned Gartok, on the main trade route from Simla to Tibet, and deployed well-equipped troops at places of strategic importance near the Indian frontier. During 1951, they also started constructing a 800-mile motorable road to connect Gartok with Lhasa. They were also setting up a network of wireless and constructing air-strips to connect their strategic strongholds on the Tibetan borders. While converting Tibet into a forward base for a diplomatic and military offensive against India, they started exploring the possibilities of a closer collaboration with Nepal. Disregarding India's special relationship with Nepal, the Chinese Communist Party sent a message to the Nepalese Communist Party, in the summer of 1951, expressive of the hope that "after the liberation of Tibet, the Chinese people and the Nepalese people will unite in closer solidarity in the common struggle for the sake of defending Asia and world peace." Early in 1952, under encouragement from Tibet, the Nepalese Communist Party made an attempt to seize power. The insurrection, however, proved unsuccessful and its leader, Dr. K. I. Singh, was given a respectful asylum in Tibet. Following the failure of the Nepalese Communist attempt to seize power, Chou En-lai, in April 1952, asked for India's "good offices for the establishment of direct diplomatic relations with Nepal." Panikkar put the matter off by saying that "the position in Nepal was a little confused and uncertain and that it would be better to wait for a time before taking up the matter".⁶ India, however, was not averse to Communist China establishing direct diplomatic relations with Nepal. In fact, after she had entered into an agreement with China with regard to Tibet, it became inevitable that Nepal should also straighten out her relations with her northern neighbour.

SINO-INDIAN AGREEMENT ON TIBET

The Chinese occupation of Tibet, to which a seal of approval had been placed by the Sino-Tibetan agreement of 1951, brought about a basic alteration in the relations between India and Tibet. Indian representatives continued to stay at Lhasa, Gyantse and Yatung, with escorts of Indian troops, for sometime. The post and telegraph service between Sikkim and Gyantse, as well as some rest-houses within the Tibetan border, remained under Indian control. The announcement in New Delhi in September 1952, changing the designation of the Indian representative at Lhasa into Consul-General and the placing of all Indian trade agencies in Tibet under his control, marked a further recognition, on the part of India, of the change that had taken place in the status of Tibet. The special rights which the British and the Indian governments had enjoyed for half a century in Tibet remained in suspense for some more time till the Government of India took the initiative, in December 1953, in proposing negotiations at Peking to settle outstanding issues between the two countries. On April 29, 1954, an agreement regulating trade and pilgrim traffic between India and the "Tibet Region of China" and fixing the number and location of trade agencies which each government was to be permitted to establish within the territory of the other was signed in Peking between the representatives of the Government of India and of the People's Republic of China, conceding to the Chinese the right to open trade agencies at New Delhi, Calcutta and Kalimpong in return for the Indian right to similar agencies at Gyantse, Yatung and Gartok.¹ Arrangements were made, under Supplementary Notes, for the withdrawal of Indian military escorts, and the transfer to the Chinese of the rest houses and post and telephone installations which Britain had handed over to the independent Indian Government, on the payment of a "reasonable price", the Government of India finally deciding to hand them over "free of cost and without compensation", "as a gesture of good will".² The remarkable point about the Sino-Indian Agreement on Tibet was India's formal recognition of Tibet as 'the Tibet Region of China'—something which no Indian Government had previously admitted.³ Added to the declaration of *Panchsheel*, under which the two governments had pledged themselves to respect the territorial integrity, and to refrain from interference in the internal affairs, of each other,

India also signed away her right to ask the Government of China now or in future for Tibet's autonomy, in which she had displayed a great interest in 1950, and which the Chinese, under the Sino-Tibetan Agreement of 1951, were pledged to maintain.

It is interesting to note that the negotiations, which culminated in the Sino-Indian Agreement regarding Tibet, were undertaken at India's request. It is also necessary to keep in mind that the Government of India seems to have started these negotiations with the assumption that they would in any case have to give up "most of their privileges" in Tibet. There was some faint hope that, in return for the giving up of these privileges, India might be permitted to reopen her consulate at Kashgar in Sinkiang. But, on being told by China that Sinkiang was to be considered as a closed area, India decided to drop the demand from the agenda. The negotiations began in Peking on December 31, 1953 and were unexpectedly dragged on for a period of four months. The delay seems to have been partly on account of the Chinese "refusal to be hustled." They insisted on exactitude and the draft translations had to be changed several times. While India was supposed to have asked for facilities "that go beyond the usual routine diplomatic relation", the Peking Government was anxious "to show that India cannot inherit the traditions left behind in Tibet by British imperialism." If China had not been keen to create a favourable impression on the members of the Conference on Korea and Indo-China, which had already started its sessions in Geneva, and on the Colombo Powers, the Prime Ministers of which had just concluded their session, the negotiations might have been protracted still further. It was revealed later that Peking had asked for a mathematical parity in the matter of trading posts and since India had three trading posts in Tibet and China only two, one in Bombay and the other in Calcutta, China wanted to add a third one and there had been a good deal of discussion of the Chinese demand to establish the third post at Almora or Simla. It was after some toughness shown on the part of India that Peking had agreed to having the trading post at Delhi, which could function under the direct scrutiny of the Indian Government.

The Sino-Indian Agreement with regard to Tibet was favourably received in India. Working within the realization that free India did not want to continue the same privileges in Tibet which the British had exercised, India was satisfied that she would be able to maintain her trade and cultural relations with Tibet. Wrote the *National Herald*, "With Tibet having become 'the Tibetan region of China' changes became inevitable and since India does not seek extra-territorial advantages in any country she was willing to regularize relationship with Tibet through Peking." The paper continued, "India does so without any mortification or regret, for she was maintaining army pickets and communications for the safety of pilgrim routes and for purposes connected purely with trade. There were no political or other motives. She had to assume these functions be-

cause Tibet could not perform them. When these functions are taken over and can be effectively performed by China, India's main purpose is achieved."⁴ This seems to have been the general appraisal of the Agreement by the Indian public opinion. While some people in India tried to eulogise the agreement between India and China as "an object lesson to those assembled at Geneva", "an instrument for preserving peace in Asia", "an object lesson for other countries", the general view was that Peking "with its firm control over Tibet" could not be expected to acquiesce in India's retention of rights and privileges which had been "rendered obsolete", and that India's "vital trade and cultural interests" had been "safeguarded by putting them on a more stable basis."⁵ The Agreement was supposed to have satisfied "in a very large measure the requirements of both the countries."⁶

On a deeper study of the Sino-Indian Agreement it could be seen that the Tibetans, and ultimately the Chinese, were the principal beneficiaries of the agreement. The geographical position was such that India had necessarily to continue to serve both as a source of supply for a variety of products which Tibet needed, particularly food, and as an outlet for Tibetan exports. The imports from India, particularly the food supplies, were likely to be of immense advantage to the Chinese army of occupation in Tibet. The Communist system now established in Tibet involving the taking over by the Peking Government of all private trade from the Tibetan hands, the Indian traders were now compelled to deal with a monopolistic organization and could hardly expect any gains out of it.

The signing of the Sino-Indian Agreement with regard to Tibet in 1954 was perhaps the proper occasion when the question of a categorical acceptance by China of the traditional frontiers between India and Tibet should have been raised and settled once for all.⁷ One, therefore, looks back with surprise at the fact that the problem was not even mentioned during the course of these negotiations. "There has been no reference to maps and disputes about the border," wrote the *National Herald*, and added, "there could have been none." The explanation given was: "The frontier, as Prime Minister Nehru had occasion to remind the House of the People a few weeks ago, remains fixed and cannot be altered. From Sikkim and Bhutan to the northeast extremity of Assam, the frontier follows the McMahon line laid down at Simla in 1914 and in the north and northwest to the northern-most part of Ladakh, the frontier, though undefined, has followed too clear a customary line to be considered changeable."⁸ The agreement on the part of China "to respect the territorial integrity of India" under the declaration of the *Panchsheel* was regarded as sufficient, the general view in India being that the traditional frontiers of India were well-known and beyond any challenge. Nehru himself was not completely oblivious of the importance of good relations with China from the point of view of maintaining India's frontiers secure. To him, the signing of the *Panchsheel* agreement meant

that India and China, "which have now almost above 1800 miles of frontier, should live in terms of peace and friendliness and should respect each other's sovereignty and integrity, should agree not to interfere with each other in any way and not to commit aggression on each other."⁹ Some people, in fact, looked upon the agreement as, in a sense, a non-aggression pact securing the long Himalayan border. It was on this assumption that the *Hindustan Times* wrote that "the agreement has much larger significance than the regulations of Indo-Tibetan arrangements for travel and trade."¹⁰ Since Nehru had "time and time again" re-iterated India's contention that the McMahon line marked her border with China, "where was the need", it was asked, "to raise the border line question all over again?" In any case, 'the reference to territorial integrity' in the preamble of the agreement clearly proved that China was expected to have respected India's stand with respect to the boundary." One may, however, not resist the conclusion that, in view of the Chinese maps persistently showing important chunks of Indian territory as Chinese, it would have been advisable to have obtained "formal abandonment" of Chinese claims against them. The *Pioneer* was one of the few papers in India which thought it to be "a pity that territorial integrity was not clearly defined" and expressed the opinion that a clear unequivocal undertaking" should have been obtained from Peking that "old claims would not be revived" and that "an agreed map of China" would be officially prepared, hoping further that Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim would not "succumb to the threats or cajolery of their more powerful neighbour on the north." The *Pioneer* warned that "India has yet to wake to the reality on her north-eastern frontier and to events which are likely to follow."¹¹

On a second look at the Sino-Indian Agreement many people in India felt rather unhappy at the fact that the delicate balance of power in Tibet had been disturbed "by letting China do what it will with Tibet." Wrote a right-wing paper, "We have exposed ourselves to potentially serious infiltration."¹² There was an expression of regret for the fact that there had been no Tibetan representation at a conference whose sole agenda was Tibet. Nobody seems to have thought at that time that there was no Czechoslovak representation at the Munich Pact where also the sole agenda was Czechoslovakia. While commending the agreement one of the Praja Socialist weeklies wrote, "Yet a tear must be shed for the autonomy of Tibet. Could this not be saved somehow? Could not a way be found to make Tibetans also a party to the treaty? There never was an occasion for questioning of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. Could not its autonomy be made to fit in with that suzerainty? It is rather an irony that a treaty which guarantees, between India and China, peaceful co-existence and their mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, should be the first international document to set a seal on the abolition of Tibet's autonomy."¹³ It was a "highly pertinent point" to ask as to why, when India was

committed to a plebiscite in Kashmir “any day more rightfully Indian than Tibet was Chinese,” a similar referendum should not have been held in Tibet.¹⁴ It was remarked by at least one writer that India by her acquiescence into Chinese aggression had become, “the co-murderer of the Tibetan independence.”¹⁵

The Sino-Indian Agreement was clearly a one-way traffic. While India conceded almost all that China wanted, she hardly asked for, or received, anything in return. She could retain her consulates in Tibet, sanctified by long usage and international agreement, only by conceding to the Chinese an additional consulate in Delhi. She obtained the right to retain the lease to lands within the trade agency compounds at Yatung and Gyantse, the Chinese further agreeing to provide “every possible assistance for housing the Indian trading agency at Gartok.” No assistance was, in fact, ever provided, with the result that no permanent agency could ever be established at Gartok. While conceding to the Chinese the rights that India had acquired under the British rule, there was perhaps no justification for conceding the rights of opening trade commissions in the leading cities of India as a *quid pro quo* in a gesture of goodwill. The appraisal of the Agreement made by the *Statesman* correspondent perhaps came nearest to truth. “The gain to India from the Peking agreement on Tibet may appear slight in comparison to what she has surrendered, but that should cause no surprise or disappointment. It was mainly at India’s suggestion that the talks with China were arranged and India started the discussions not to get advantages for herself but to straighten out a relationship which, under the changed conditions of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, needed to be re-stated in the larger interest of the two countries.”¹⁶ Accepting all this, there was reason to think that, with Tibet under the Chinese grip, India had been exposed on her northern frontiers and that, under the changed conditions, it had become necessary for India to strengthen her Himalayan frontiers still further against the danger of Chinese infiltrations. As a result of Chinese action, it had become impossible for India to “maintain the old balance of power which the British had left behind.” But in the case of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim, the position was different, and their security was part of India’s security.

The Sino-Indian Agreement on Tibet included the famous “Five Principles”, or the *Panchsheel*, namely : (1) mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, (2) mutual non-aggression, (3) mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, (4) equality and mutual benefit, and (5) peaceful co-existence. The term *Panchsheel* seems to have been taken up from Indonesia, though the name appears in connection with the Buddhist literature also. The third and the fifth clauses appear as early as October 1949 in the communique of the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China and were subsequently described by a Chinese writer as “the guiding principles of the foreign policy” consistently pursued by the People’s Republic of China since its

birth. These phrases were also used in the statement of China's "Common Programme" and in the Sino-Tibetan Agreement signed at Peking on May 23, 1951, but it was after the conclusion of the Sino-Indian Agreement of 1954 that the *Panchsheel* began to be used in a number of declarations and agreements signed between India and other nations. It is interesting to note that, while signing the joint declaration in Moscow on June 23, 1955, Nehru and Bulganin amplified the third principle into "non-interference in each other's internal affairs for any reasons of an economic, political or ideological character." The *Panchsheel*, it may be noted, forms a kind of preamble, something like the League Covenant in the treaties signed after the First World War, and has no other significance or binding except moral. It would be wrong to treat *Panchsheel* as synonymous with India's foreign policy. Even when the doctrine was being included for the first time in an international agreement, fear had been expressed that the "five high sounding principles" might be "scattered to the high Tibetan winds." Nehru himself was conscious of the fact that one could get out of the moral obligation implied in the doctrine if one wanted to do so, in which case he would merely expose himself as one violating international agreements or committing aggression. India did not seem to be completely oblivious of the danger of China some day challenging the "territorial integrity" of India. The "liberation" of Tibet, which China had carried out as a "sacred duty" in the name of "territorial integrity and sovereignty" was there as the index. While India regarded that there was "no doubt about the northern international borders of India," China was still circulating maps which included Nepal, Bhutan and large chunks of Indian territory in China. One also wondered whether there could be real co-existence between a democratic India dedicated to the ideal of the world peace and a Communist China intent on spreading communism by force or subversion. How could a "peace area" be evolved in conjunction with China which blatantly believed in force? While "Asianism" was a "true, vital and a courageous factor in current international affairs", there was, India seemed to realize, "a danger of making too much of it."

Despite all these doubts and tribulations, the Sino-Indian Agreement on Tibet contributed a great deal towards the improvement of relations between the two countries. China now seemed to give up her old attitude of hostility and contempt for the leaders of India. Official Chinese publications did not describe, for a long time to come, Nehru as a 'running dog' of imperialism, nor asked the Communist Party of India to overthrow him. The change in China's attitude towards India, which had begun, hazily and hesitantly, with the signing of trade contracts and exchange of visits in 1951, became confirmed by 1954. There were now frequent statements by leaders of the two countries expressing their common approach to problems of colonialism, military pacts and the policies of Western

countries in Asia. Chou En-lai's visit to India in June 1954 was followed by Nehru's visit to Peking in October the same year. The two leaders acted hand-in-glove at the Bandung Conference in 1955, and Chou En-lai again visited India in November-December 1956. India supported the Chinese claim to Taiwan and China supported the Indian case on Goa¹⁷. Nevertheless, the seeds of future tension between the two countries could be seen sprouting even at the beginning of this period of goodwill and amity. In July 1954, within three months of the signing of the Sino-Indian Agreement on Tibet, Chinese armed forces had committed aggression against the Indian territory of Bara Hoti in the Central Sector, and early in November 1954, China started, with the publication by her Government of a map showing large chunks of Indian territory as Chinese, what Barnett has described as the Chinese game of mapmanship and the cartographic aggression against India.¹⁸ This was followed by the publication of a series of maps in *People's China*, each showing larger areas of Indian territory as Chinese. For a long time, however, whenever the Government of India protested against it, the Chinese Government gave the stock reply that they were *old maps of the Kuomintang regime and would be corrected as soon as they had time to do so*.

INDIA'S CHINA POLICY : AN ANALYSIS

India did not seem to realize in 1950 that by taking over Tibet China had strengthened her position so much that if she decided to encroach further towards the Himalayas, India would not be able to resist her aggression. India's policy towards China was one of constant, even enthusiastic, support, in spite of the fact that she had to face some hard and unexpected rebuffs from her. Many people in India thought that the Government need not have been in such a great hurry to give recognition to Communist China. As Panikkar has revealed, "while there was no difference of opinion as to the necessity of recognising the new China, there was a difference of opinion among the leaders about its timing". Raja-gopalachari and Sardar Patel wanted "to go slow in the matter" and "were supported in this attitude by a powerful section of the Civil Service", including some of the senior officials in the Foreign Office.¹ The ultimate decision, it seems, was that of Nehru. His view was, whether we liked China's new system or not, "a great nation has been reborn and is conscious of her new strength". In her newly found strength China had "acted sometimes in a manner which I deeply regret", "but we have to remember the background of China as of other Asian countries, the long period of struggle and frustration, the insolent treatment they received from imperialist powers and the latter's refusal to deal with them on the terms of equality". In his exuberance for China, Nehru was prepared to overlook her shortcomings, and even justify them in the name of circumstances.

Taking up an issue with China over Tibet would also have obliged India to move closer to the United States—which she did not want to do. It is interesting that during his visit to the United States early in 1950, Pandit Nehru did not at all mention the impending threat to Tibet or the dire consequences to India's security in case it took a concrete shape. If he had done so, the United States would perhaps have gladly decided to help India—though not without a price in terms of India's independence in judging world happenings from her own angle. When the Chinese occupation of Tibet came, India was not in a position to take a hard line with China over Tibet or any other issue. She did not

have the military strength to push back the Chinese armies from Tibet. Following the signing of an armistice with Pakistan in January 1949, there had been an uneasy truce between the two countries, and most of the Indian armies had remained locked on the Indo-Pakistan borders. By way of sheer precaution, India entered into new treaties with Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal and re-organized her administration in the NEFA but, with a view not to provoke China, she virtually decided to write off Tibet from the very beginning.² She would have been glad if China had followed peaceful methods, but she was helpless when China chose the path of aggression.³

India's policy seems to be that of keeping her fingers crossed and hoping for the best. Even before the Chinese aggression against Tibet (in October 1950), the Korean War had broken out (in June 1950). India was impressed by the overwhelming nature of the evidence brought before the United Nations proving that North Korea was the aggressor and supported the resolution branding her as such. But she was at the same time most reluctant to support the corrupt America-sponsored government of Syngman Rhee. The way in which the Korean War developed placed China in a most difficult situation. If the American armies, now marching under the United Nations flag, moved into the mainland (MacArthur's bellicose attitude seemed to be confirming that) China would be forced into a military confrontation with the United States, for which she was least prepared. She, therefore, chose the more tactful alternative of pushing India into the role of a mediator. K. M. Panikkar, the Indian Ambassador in Peking, was summoned at midnight on October 2, 1950 into Chou En-lai's bed-room and, after the customary cup of tea had been served and the first two minutes had been spent in normal courtesies, Chou told him that while no country's need for peace was greater than that of China there were occasions when peace would only be defended by determination to resist aggression and that if the Americans crossed the 38th Parallel China would be forced to intervene in Korea. Visions of a global war flared up before the imaginative mind of this pacific ambassador of a pacific country, and he immediately communicated the news to his Prime Minister, who communicated it to the United Nations.

India has sometimes been criticised for allowing herself to be used as a tool by Communist China for the advancement of her interests in Asia during the Korean War. Chou's midnight invitation to Panikkar is regarded as a part of China's astute diplomacy to keep Asian public opinion on her side, using India's naivete to her fullest advantage. This, however, minimises the important role as a mediator that India had already begun to play in world politics with distinction. Chou's invitation was merely the consummation of the position India had systematically built up for herself. Even in the case of the Korean War, as early

as July 1, 1950, Panikkar had called at the Chinese Foreign Office and had a long talk with Chang Han-fu, the Vice-Foreign Minister, in which he had impressed on him the necessity of localizing the Korean conflict and put forward tentatively the suggestion that the question could probably be solved by referring it to the Security Council with China taking her legitimate place and, consequently, the Soviets giving up their boycott and returning to their vacant seat. Nehru had already moved the British Foreign Minister in this matter. On July 10, the Chinese Government officially expressed appreciation of the line India had taken and conveyed general agreement with Indian proposals. Following this, Nehru wrote to Stalin and Acheson. Russia immediately accepted the Indian proposal 'on the indispensable condition of the Peking Government being given its seat on the Security Council'. Acheson, as expected by the Indian Government itself (which was not so *naive* as some Western writers seemed to imagine), turned down the proposal for Peking's membership of the Security Council as 'unrelated to the Korean issue'.

India's stand, however, won for her the deep appreciation and regard of the smaller nations of Asia and Africa, which were equally afraid of a global war breaking over the Korean issue and regarded India as the voice of the uncommitted nations seeking mediation and peace in a troubled world. India also refused to support the U.S. draft resolution in the U.N. General Assembly branding China as an aggressor, on the ground that China's action emanated more out of a threat to her territorial integrity than to any aggressive intention. It was finally a resolution put forward by India, in consultation with various Arab-Asian delegations, on November 17, 1952, before the United Nations which enabled the war in Korea to be wound up without loss of face to any concerned party and led to the signing, on June 5, 1953, of an agreement on repatriation of prisoners-of-war. In fact, India had gained such a prominent position for herself in the realm of international politics that there was a great pressure not only from Communist countries—for her inclusion in the Political Conference to be held as a result of this agreement, and while India withdrew her candidature (so as not to create a division in the General Assembly) she was appointed Chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. The majority of the Asian nations lined up behind India in the United Nations and, on Liberia and Ethiopia joining the Arab-Asian countries, there evolved in the United Nations the Afro-Asian group. While India was playing for high stakes in Korea, and trying her best to limit the conflict, China (placed somewhat at ease there) started her conquest of Tibet. India—seemed to have been mainly guided in her Tibetan policy by the fear of U.S. intervention in yet another region in Asia, this time on her close borders. Now that China was riding on the waves of resurgence to her historic glory, India felt, her claims to Tibet could not be held back for a long time.

Although China had earlier questioned India's *bona fides* with regard to Tibet, she now at least appeared to be satisfied with the favourable impression India had created on her by her Korean policies. Consequently there developed a closer association between India and China and, by implication, between India and the Soviet Union and other Communist countries. In December 1952, a five-year trade agreement was concluded with Russia, and a change could be noticed in the attitude of the Soviet Government and the Soviet Press towards India even before Stalin died in March 1953. However, it was with Peking that India's relations became intimate and warm. Early in 1951, an 'India-China Friendship Association, was formed in Calcutta and a number of its branches were quickly established in the important cities of the country. In September—October 1951, an important Indian goodwill mission, led by Pandit Sundarlal, made a conducted tour of China, and returned with a deep sense of appreciation of what was happening there.⁵ In November 1951, a Chinese cultural delegation of 15 scholars, artists and scientists, led by China's Vice-Minister for Culture, came to India. This was one of the first Chinese delegations to visit a non-Communist country. What had started as a trickle in 1951 developed into a mighty stream in the subsequent years.⁶ In 1952, several hundred Indians visited China in various delegations. There were trade union delegations for the May Day celebrations, the first Government-sponsored Cultural Goodwill Mission, headed by Vijayalaxmi Pandit, and a 60-member delegation to the Asian and Pacific Peace Conference.⁷ There were many individual visits on the special invitation of the Chinese Government. In the meantime, India's differences with the United States were becoming accentuated, mainly on account of the latter's growing friendship with Pakistan. In August 1953, Pakistan supported the United States in its moves in the United Nations to keep India out of the proposed Political Conference on Korea. By November, the atmosphere was so thick with rumours of an impending military pact between the United States and Pakistan that Nehru had to express his public concern over them. In February 1954, the American decision to give military aid to Pakistan, despite India's protests, was announced. These trends in international affairs—particularly the flirtations between the United States and Pakistan—had their impact on India's policy towards China and proved an important factor in drawing the two countries closer. By now, China also seemed to have realized the importance of her friendship with India. Within two months of the United State's decision to give military aid to Pakistan, the Sino-Indian Agreement on Tibet was signed. It was partly with a view to counter-balancing the growing ties between the U.S.A. and Pakistan that India tried to build up better relations with the Communist countries.

India's policy of supporting China in all her legitimate demands manifested itself on various fronts. While pleading for a peaceful

solution of the Formosa question, India all along supported the Chinese claims to the island. At the outbreak of the Korean War, although accepting the United Nations' resolution on Korea, India had dissociated herself from American action with regard to Formosa. India had insisted on the decision arrived at in the Cairo and Potsdam Conferences being accepted as the basis of discussion and future action with regard to Korea. It was at Nehru's initiative that the Commonwealth Ministers' Conference in London declared, in its final communique on January 15, 1951, that the problem of Formosa would be settled "with due regard to international obligations."⁸ India took up the same stand with regard to the invitations to participate in the San Francisco Conference and the signing of the Japanese Peace Treaty.⁹ She refused both the invitations and, besides Burma, was the only country to do so. While pressing for an early conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan, India took up the stand that Asian countries, particularly those in the neighbourhood of Japan, and more particularly Communist China, were to be associated with such a treaty in all stages.¹⁰ India further thought that no lasting peace could be established in East Asia without the co-operation and concurrence of China and unless the relations between Japan and China were normalized. "To leave the future of the island (Formosa) undetermined, in spite of past international agreements, in a document which attempts to regulate the relations of all governments that were engaged in the last war with her, does not appear to the Government of India to be either just or expedient."¹¹ The United States, on the other hand, was determined, as the *New York Times* pointed out, "to get on with the business on hand and not allow it to be hamstrung by India's feelings on the defence of Japan or the disposition of Formosa."

It would not be correct to say that India's attitude of sympathy and friendship with China did not bring any response from her. Even if the Chinese offer of one million tons of food grains to meet India's shortages in food early in 1951 was guided by considerations of propaganda (at a time when the United States seemed to be making political capital out of the supplies she promised), Communist China appeared to be gradually realizing, and appreciating, the genuineness of the independent foreign policy of India. On January 26, 1951, at the Indian Embassy reception in Peking, Mao Tse-tung "spoke in warm terms about Nehru and said that he hoped to be able to see him in China soon". He described the Indian people as "a fine people" and spoke of "thousands of years of friendship between the people of India and China." Following India's mediatory role in Korea, the Chinese press started eulogising India as a peace-loving, anti-imperialist, neutral country and praising Nehru for his statesmanship and efforts for world peace. At the same time it would be incorrect to say that China ever completely gave up her suspicions of India. As late as May 22, 1953, when the two countries were moving towards the high tide of friendship the *People's Daily* had described India's industry as 'totally subservient to Britain's industry'

and India's economy as 'still a colonial economy', and India being 'not an industrialized country'.

We might pause here for a moment and try to have a closer look at India's China policy as evolved in the early years. The most impelling factor in shaping this policy, as Michael Brecher points out, was geography. India and China shared a common border for more than two thousand miles, some of it not clearly demarcated and most of it impregnable until recently. In her present position of weakness, India was determined not to become entangled in a dangerous conflict with her neighbour unless her vital interests were threatened, Tibet not being regarded as quite so vital. Much was also made of the two thousand years of peace prevailing between Asia's two great civilizations, even though this might have been due to reasons other than peaceful disposition on the part of China out of grateful acknowledgement of contribution made by Buddhism towards its cultural development. The most important point, however, was the way in which India looked at the Chinese revolution. For India the establishment of the Communist regime in Peking was more a part of the resurgence of Asia than of Communist expansionism. India stressed upon the agrarian character of the Chinese revolution and was happy at the fact that "for the first time after thirty or forty years of civil war and the domination of the war-lords, China has a strong centralized government and internal order." Many Indians were fascinated by the rapid pace of economic rehabilitation in China and by the reported honesty and incorruptibility of the new Chinese leadership. The fact that China had taken to the Communist road was explained by her historical background, something which was well beyond India's concern. "It is not a question of approving or disapproving", said Nehru before the Indian Parliament, on March 17, 1950, "it is a question of recognizing a major event in history, of appreciating it and dealing with it". For most Indians, as Brecher points out, the events of 1948-49 represented the re-birth of a united China after a lengthy period of disorder, something to be welcomed as part of the decline of colonial and Western influence all over Asia.

A sense of Asian solidarity took precedence over divergence in ideologies and social, economic and political systems. Many Indians besides Nehru were convinced that Chinese nationalism was a far more potent force in Chinese policy than Communism, that Chinese civilization was too old and too deeply rooted to succumb to Marxist dogma and that the Chinese Communists would adapt Marxism to suit Chinese needs and traditions. It was generally felt in India that China needed sympathy, understanding and appreciation rather than criticism or condemnation. India strongly believed that a strong China, irrespective of the methods she adopted to strengthen herself, would be a great asset to Asia and that India's best interests would be served by a close and intimate friendship with her. In fact, while India would have been glad to keep away both from

the United States and the Soviet Union and just maintain her existing relationship with the United Kingdom and Commonwealth nations, she hoped to draw closer to China and to draw China closer to her and thus establish a relationship in Asia which might be able to tilt the balance of world forces in Asia's favour. Some Western writers have called it the 'two-Great-Powers-in-Asia policy', which China abhorred from the very beginning.¹² Since she looked upon herself as the legitimate leader of Asia, such a concept was clearly an anathema to her. China's main objective always was to exploit India's friendly attitude towards her for re-building her influence in Asia and first to sabotage and later to challenge by force of arms whatever pretensions to Asian leadership India might have. Nehru strongly believed that, for good or ill, the vast land mass comprising China would influence the course of events in Asia and the world. With the rise of China, and India pushing her into the forefront, the Western powers would no longer enjoy a preponderance of strength. China's strength for the moment depended on her close alliance with the Soviet Union. India believed that China had been forced to enter into such a close bond of unity, even dependence, on account of the Western policy of "containing the Peking regime." If China was recognised by Western powers (and recognition by the Asian countries might be a prelude to that), this would help in the weakening of the ties that bound her to the Soviet Union.¹³ "Given India's basic assumption—that the Peking regime is more nationalist than Communist—the logic of this thesis", wrote Michael Brecher, "is unassailable and it is clearly in India's interest to reduce China's reliance on the Soviet Union."¹⁴ India regarded it as a thoroughly mistaken policy to try to ostracize China. This would merely put her under extreme revolutionary strains and throw her completely into the arms of Russia. In course of time, India believed, her revolution would be stabilized. It was India's duty as a good neighbour and as the mouthpiece of Asian voice to help China in this process of stabilization. Above all, China had to be trusted. The crux of Indian policy, thus, was to reduce China's dependence on the Soviet Union and bring her into closer contact with non-Communist countries and thus to encourage a certain normalization of her revolution, "From a negative point of view", to quote again from Brecher, "this would ease the pressure flowing from the massive weight of a Moscow-Peking bloc surrounding India with enormous military power and eight hundred million people. From a positive view point it would enhance the prestige and power of Asia in world politics and might lead to an expanded third area of peace based on Sino-Indian leadership. India and China together could then conceivably play the role of balancer. In any event, a loosening of the Sino-Soviet link would reduce the threat of world war by adding another imponderable to the balance of world political and military forces. From India's perspective, everything is to be gained by its China policy."¹⁵

The policy was further based on the assumption that Peking, pre-occupied as she was, like India, with internal problems of economic and social change, required a long and unhampered period of peace for her economic growth and could not be expected to indulge in military adventurism. China, therefore, did not represent a threat to Indian interests in the foreseeable future, certainly not for a generation. Moreover, if the Peking regime were brought into a closer contact with the non-Soviet world in general and with the Asian countries in particular, and if India played an important role in this transformation of China's foreign relations, it might both reduce the prospects and the likelihood of China's expansionism and strengthen the will and desire of the Chinese people and Government to cultivate friendly relations with India. The Indian leaders, clearly, did not think in the early fifties that the Chinese would ever encroach on the Himalayan border states of India or try to nibble at India's frontiers. India for the moment also seems to have ignored what was being realized more and more in the West that, representing as she did a democratic system of government, she would be looked upon by the Asian countries as a kind of rival to China achieving her greatness by Communistic methods or that China would, in no remote future, try to prove the superiority of her way of life by challenging India to a military confrontation.

FROM GENEVA TO BANDUNG : HIGH TIDE OF SINO-INDIAN FRIENDSHIP

While negotiations between India and China regarding Tibet were slowly proceeding at Peking (having been started on December 31, 1953), news was received that the Big Four at the Berlin Conference (from January 25 to February 18, 1954) had agreed to meet with representatives of Communist China to discuss the problems of Korea and Indo-China. The announcement was welcomed in India, since it provided an opportunity of personal meetings of Western powers with China. Nehru started taking immediate interest in the problem. He suggested, in a statement to the Indian Parliament on February 22, 1954, the desirability of "some kind of cease-fire line without any party giving up its own position." In a speech on March 23, Nehru tried to distinguish between the forces of nationalism and Communism in Indo-China, and pointed out that the struggle there had started before the Communists came to power in China. There was a view expressed in certain quarters that the Chinese Communists might as well like to wash their hands off Indo-China in order to concentrate on internal development. India, however, seemed to be more elated by the prospect of Communist China being represented in the councils of the world. India did not seem to mind her own exclusion from the Geneva Conference, despite Chou En-lai's insistence. She resented the fact that China was not accorded a Great Power status at the Conference. However, she was keen that something should come out of the Conference. On April, 24, Nehru made an important foreign policy statement in the Parliament in which he emphasized the colonial aspect, as distinguished from the Communist aspect, of the struggle going on in Indo-China, a statement which was quoted by Chou En-lai with approval in the Geneva Conference. The conflict in Indo-China, Nehru said, was in its "origin and essential character" a movement of resistance to colonialism and attempts to deal with such resistance by "the traditional methods of suppression and divide and rule."¹ It was during this speech that Nehru unfolded his six-point plan (1) suggesting, in order that a climate of peace and negotiation may be promoted, that the concerned parties desisted from threats and the combatants refrained from stepping up the tempo of war, (2) proposing a cease fire,

(3) suggesting the termination of French sovereignty and the complete independence of Indo-China, (4) advising that direct negotiations be initiated by the Conference between the parties immediately and principally concerned, (5) asking for solemn agreement on non-intervention, to be guaranteed by the U.S.S.R., U.K. and China and, finally, (6) suggesting that the good offices of the United Nations be utilized for purposes of conciliation.

India's approach, as could be seen, was different from the Western approach. While the Western approach was based on the aggressive character of Communism, India looked upon China more as an Asian country than a Communist. India looked at the war in Indo-China also from a different angle. The war, as Nehru pointed out, had been going on for five or six years before the culmination of the Chinese revolution and, it was clear, for the first year or two or more, that what had happened in Indo-China had no relationship with China. Again, while the Western powers believed that China, being Communist, was bound to be aggressive, India thought that the possibility that she might be interested in peace, for the purpose of internal re-construction, could not be ruled out. It was suggested that the Chinese Communists might even be prepared to sacrifice Ho Chi Minh for normal relations with the Western powers. Nehru was clearly opposed to the effort being made by the Western powers to contain China by force or a show of force. In any case, China was to be allowed a chance to prove her *bona fides*. India was also aware of the fact that the United States and Great Britain were engaged at this time in finding out ways and means for organizing a system of collective security for Asia on the lines on which the NATO was working in Europe. It was on account of this grim background of international politics that India was happy an China being invited to participate in an international gathering. The fact that China's delegation to the Geneva Conference was to be led by Chou En-lai, the country's cleverest and most accomplished diplomat, and that the Western powers would be able to see through him the "face and mind of China", sent a wave of satisfaction throughout India.

India did not sit back and merely hope for the best. She made deliberate efforts towards the solution of the problem. While the Geneva Conference was in session, the Colombo Powers, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma and Indonesia, represented by their Prime Ministers, were holding a meeting at Colombo (from April 28 to May 2, 1954). It was clearly at Nehru's initiative that the Colombo Conference suggested a plan for the consideration of the Geneva Conference, which was substantially the same as Nehru had presented to the Indian Parliament. The Colombo Powers proposed an immediate cease-fire and further emphasized the advisability of recognizing Communist China, which, they thought, "would promote the stability in Asia, ease world tension and

assist in bringing about a more realistic approach concerning the world, particularly in the Far East." The Western powers, in particular the United Kingdom, were in constant touch with the Colombo Powers in general and with Nehru in particular, and it was clear that Nehru's point of view, as confirmed by the Colombo Powers, had a tremendous influence on the final decisions at Geneva. The Colombo Powers had, by and large, accepted Nehru's analysis that "denial of freedom in backward countries promoted the growth of Communism" and reaffirmed their faith in democracy and in the "right of every people to choose its own form of government."

India's role at the Geneva Conference was widely recognized. Nehru's statements in the Indian Parliament appealing for a cease-fire in Indo-China and his six-point proposals had a significant impact upon proceedings at Geneva. There was at least one meeting between Chou En-lai and the Indian Ambassador in Switzerland, and it was believed that the latter had communicated to Chou En-lai Nehru's six-point plan for a settlement of the Indo-China problem. To these were added Krishna Menon's activities at Geneva during some of the most critical weeks. Krishna Menon was staying at Geneva for no apparent reason—it was officially denied that he was acting as an observer on India's part—but the ease with which he could move in and out of the two camps without ceremonial announcement helped in creating a climate of understanding between the groups of powers confronting each other. Writing of Krishna Menon's role, Shelvankar, the correspondent of the *Hindu*, wrote from Geneva: "The main purpose of his mission seems to be to promote dispassionate consideration of the various problems that have been tabled and attempts to bring together diverse points of view. In this he is, of course, greatly helped by the intrinsic weight of India and general recognition of the indispensable and mediatory role which India in the existing circumstances is in a position to fulfil." The British Foreign Minister, Sir Anthony Eden, it seems, was in 'daily' contact with Nehru during the sessions of the Geneva Conference and keeping him informed. While the Conference was still in session, R.K. Nehru, on a visit to Paris, broke his journey at Geneva and had a long consultation with Chou En-lai. All this clearly had its impact. There was reason to believe that to the statesmen in search of a solution at Geneva the Colombo Conference's substantial endorsement of Nehru's six-point plan had suggested an approach. It was recognized by many as strengthening the hands of Eden at Geneva. In fact, it was due to his appreciation of the stand taken by the Colombo Powers that Eden had gone to the extent of proposing that the Colombo Powers be requested to constitute the supervisory commission in Indo-China.

While having the greatest admiration for the personality of Chou En-lai, India had some anxiety about the role which Communist China might play at the Geneva Conference. For a moment

it appeared that India's fears might come true. The Conference started with sharp disagreement between the Western powers and China over the composition of an armistice in Indo-China. Eden proposed that the Indo-China Armistice Commission might consist largely of Colombo Powers. China, on the other hand, pressed for the inclusion of Communists. Chou En-lai's demand for the recognition of the so-called "liberation movements" in Laos and Cambodia also created suspicion. The impression seemed to be confirmed in Geneva that Russia and China were not serious about co-existence but had agreed to negotiate merely because this suited them better for the time being. At one stage it appeared that the Conference was going to end in smoke. While the Conference failed to come to an agreement with regard to Korea, Chou En-lai came forward with new and conciliatory proposals with regard to Indo-China. He agreed to arrangements guaranteeing both Laos and Cambodia "something like a neutral status". This raised hopes in Geneva that a cease-fire might eventually be achieved. He also left an impression on the members of the Geneva Conference that China was sincerely interested in peace and would possibly like to concentrate on problems of internal reconstruction rather than continue to follow the road to aggression in Asia.

On June 22, 1954 the news that Chou En-lai was shortly going to visit India was received everywhere with astonishment and surprise. It was revealed later that, while at Geneva, Krishna Menon had extended an invitation to Chou En-lai to visit India, but neither Krishna Menon nor Nehru nor any one else in India thought that Chou En-lai would fix up such an early date for the visit. In fact, Nehru was planning to spend a week in the Himalayas and had to postpone the trip. Elaborate arrangements were quickly made for the visit of the Chinese Prime Minister. K. M. Panikkar, former Indian Ambassador to China, was hurriedly called to the capital from Bangalore in the far south. T.N. Kaul, Joint Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs, who had been Minister Counsellor in the Indian Embassy at Peking, was asked to cancel his leave and stay on. Arrangements were made—and the Communist Party of India took the leading part in making these arrangements—for extending a grand reception to the Chinese Prime Minister. Much was made in the Indian press of the traditional friendship between the two countries going back to two thousand years—a friendship which had grown out of "the community of ideals". Both had "always worked for spiritual ends, honoured the saint and the scholar and held the acquisition of wealth and territorial aggrandizement as unworthy of pursuit," and while they had, in recent years, developed "totally different ways of political living and thinking, the differences in political ideology could not be permitted to come in the way of the paramount need for cooperation between them." "Asia must be free to shape its own destinies. India and China must make their contribution to

this freedom." Chou En-lai's visit to India came in the wake of a great diplomatic triumph at Geneva and after he had created a deep impression in the Geneva circles with his personal qualities. He was held by many as the person "who saved the Conference from collapse." He was also generally regarded as a formidable negotiator. At Geneva, it was pointed out, he had "stayed on, talked his way through, bargained and bargained with a determination and intensity of purpose which surprised most of the delegations".

What could be the purpose of Chou En-lai's visit to India? While the answer will remain a mystery until some documents unravel it at some future date, there can be some speculation into the motives. While the Western Powers were discussing Indo-China with China at Geneva, they were also seriously engaged in exploring the possibilities of organizing a military pact for Southeast Asia. In other words, what they had already done to contain the Soviet Union in Europe, they seemed to be planning to do to contain Communist China in Asia. India had established its *bona fides* as a neutral power. How neutral she actually was, it was worth while for Chou En-lai to explore through a personal visit. The withdrawal of the European empires from Southeast Asia had left a power vacuum in the region. The two countries which were emerging into importance in Asia were India and China. Would India like to join hands with China in sharing the responsibility of filling up this power vacuum? Or, would India continue to remain passively neutral and, by and large, throw her moral support in China's favour, as the latter went on in its task of spreading the light of Communism to more and more countries in Asia? These questions needed answers for China's future policies. In any case, if India's cooperation, or neutrality, was secured, China could play a more active role in Asia and also strike out a path of independence for her from the enforced dependence on the Soviet Union.

While addressing the Geneva Conference on April 28, 1954, Chou En-lai had harped on the note of Asian unity and it had struck a vibrant cord in the hearts of people all over Asia. He had further suggested that the Government of Communist China would welcome consultations by Asian countries among themselves, "with a view to seeking common measures to safe-guard peace and security in Asia, by means of respective mutual obligations". Chou En-lai had also re-iterated in one of his press interviews at Geneva his view that "the Asian countries should consult among themselves with a view to seeking common measures to safe-guard peace and security in Asia by assuming obligations mutually and respectively." It is interesting to note that the Communist newspapers in India as well as the newspapers oriented toward Communist thinking, expanded on a similar theme. "Forward to a pact of security of Asian nations," was the slogan sub-title of the leading article, of the *New Age* (June 27, 1954), the weekly

organ of the Communist Party. The *Blitz*, June 26 1954, called for a series of mutual security pacts between "China, India and other nations of Asia".

However, in Chou En-lai's speeches and press conferences there was no mention of any security pact of Asian countries. On the other hand, he seemed to be more concerned with forging stronger links with India alone. "The peace and friendship of the nine hundred sixty million people of China and India", he said, "constitute an important factor in maintaining the peace of Asia and of the world." It appears, from the talks that Chou En-lai had with Dr. Radhakrishnan, then India's Vice-President, that he was prepared to enter into closer relations with India without any insistence on his part on India loosening her links with the Commonwealth of Nations. Chou En-lai also seemed intent to dispel the suspicion prevailing in the Southeast Asian countries that China had any designs to upset their national security. It was at New Delhi that Chou En-lai developed his theory of peaceful co-existence with Asian countries. "Revolution", he said, "cannot be exported. At the same time, outside interference with the common will expressed by the people of any nation should not be permitted". "The rights of the people of each nation to national independence and self-determination must be respected. The people of each nation have the right to choose their own state system, without interference from other nations." Singing the praises of the *Panchsheel*, Chou En-lai said, "If all the nations of the world put their mutual relations on the basis of these principles, intimidation and aggression by one nation against another would not happen and peaceful co-existence of all nations of the world could be turned from a possibility into a reality."

While Chou En-lai did not positively suggest any closer alliance with India which went beyond the moral principles of the *Panchsheel*, or ask India to enter into any system of collective security in Asia in which she had to work hand in hand with Communist China, Nehru went a little out of his way to declare that India would *not* be a party to any such efforts. In fact, while Chou En-lai emphasized the common interests of the two countries, and Nehru accepted this as a fact which ought to bring China and India closer together on a plane of understanding, friendship and cooperation, the latter clearly mentioned that the two countries were attempting their gigantic tasks of raising millions out of the sloth of poverty "in their different ways", just as the Indian freedom had been achieved "under different circumstances and by different methods" from those of China. Nehru also seemed to suggest, and this aspect was later emphasized by Indian public opinion to a greater extent, that India would not like to go beyond the *Panchsheel* agreement and that it was "a matter of interest and significance" not only to India and China but to Asia and even the world "*how these countries behaved to each other.*" Nehru's emphasis on the principles

of *Panchsheel* seems to have been more on the negative side. While Chou En-lai had mentioned them as indicative of closer cooperation between countries, Nehru talked of these as principles which gave each country the freedom "to follow its own policy and work out its own destiny." The main purpose of the talks between Chou En-lai and Nehru, as the joint statement pointed out, "was to arrive at a clearer understanding of each other's point of view in order to help in maintenance of peace, both in cooperation with each other and with other countries." It is interesting to note that in their joint statement the two leaders found it necessary to reiterate confidence in the friendship between India and China and to declare that their respective countries "should maintain close contacts so that there should continue to be full understanding between them...." Of course, they were to continue, in common with other countries of the world, to make efforts to do their best to solve the problems of Asia in a peaceful and cooperative manner. The Nehru-Chou meeting at Delhi, followed by a meeting between Chou and U Nu at Rangoon was, a further confirmation of the principle which was beginning to emerge at Geneva that Asian affairs could no longer be solved by Western Powers to the exclusion of the newly emergent Asian nations. Within the Asian context, China's willingness to recognize the independence of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam was interpreted as "an undertaking by China not to interfere in the internal affairs of these three states."

While the meeting between the Prime Ministers of the two great Asian countries could easily be regarded as an historic occasion, and naturally played a very important part in bringing the two countries together and closer, it cannot be denied that if Chou En-lai had visited India with any purpose of drawing India closer to China in any political or military alignment, he did not succeed. India was cool towards any suggestion for an Asian bloc. Even though India was opposed to SEATO, she made it clear that she was not prepared to go beyond the "five principles", and it was clear that these principles did not constitute "even a beginning of the consultative machinery among leading statesmen of Asia." Nehru had clearly "refused to take the jump from peaceful co-existence to active cooperation among nations with different social and political systems." The supporters of a collective Asian system of security, perhaps with China as the leading light, did not lose hope of winning India over to the idea, but they certainly had no valid reason to continue to maintain such a hope. The *National Herald*, a paper close to Nehru, June 30, 1954, criticized strongly the idea of a collective defence organization in Southeast Asia and asserted that "at least a majority of the Colombo Powers will have nothing to do with this organization." If any doubts were left in anybody's mind that India would consider participation in any collective defence organization for Southeast Asia, they should have been dispelled by

Nehru's utterances on the occasion of his visit to Peking, which came in the following October. The visit had been planned in response to Chou En-lai's invitation personally extended to him at Delhi. A two-year trade agreement between India and China was signed on the eve of Nehru's departure from India. On his way to China, Nehru paid brief, friendly visits to Burma, North Vietnam and Laos. Reaching Canton on October 18, 1955, he was greeted by thousands of cheering Chinese. The same warm greeting was extended to him at Hankow and Peking—described as the biggest welcome ever extended in Communist China to a visiting statesman. Although there was no specific agenda for the talks between Nehru and the Chinese leaders, reports from Peking indicated that in the latter's discussion of the general question of preserving peace in Asia "an alternative to SEATO had figured predominantly". China was said to be prepared "to extend the five principles of co-existence and non-interference even with such Asian countries as Pakistan which are aligned with SEATO." Nehru hardly took any notice of this. On the other hand, he indicated to the Chinese the importance of allaying the fears of the Burmese and the Indonesians about the large Chinese overseas populations in their countries. In fact, following Nehru's visit to Peking, it was being generally expected that China would soon make a firm, conciliatory statement on the position of the overseas Chinese. He seemed to be primarily concerned with efforts "to improve China's relations with the outside world, including the nations unfriendly to China". There were reasons to conclude, from Nehru's utterances in Peking and other places in China, that he had made it clear that India's refusal to enter into alliances with the West, as in SEATO, did not mean that she was ready to ally herself with the Communist powers and that while India was resolutely opposed to outside interference in Asian affairs, she was equally opposed to any development of "pan-Asianism" based on active hostility to the West. Nehru was able to maintain in a remarkably good shape the cherished policy of non-alignment through his encounters both with the Chinese Prime Minister in Delhi and the swaying Chinese masses in China. Nehru also returned with his faith in democracy unshaken. In China he had seen "the enormous activity, vitality, enthusiasm and hard work of the people." He was also impressed by the fact that "whatever the Chinese Government was called, it was getting results in the progress and development of the nation"—though, he confessed, "only time would show whether the price paid by the Chinese was worth it". "In the final analysis that system is best which pays dividends best from the point of view of human welfare". "I have great respect for the Chinese system of working", he said on another occasion, "I do not oppose it. But if anybody tells me to copy the Chinese method or the American or the Russian way, then I do not understand it and ascribe it to lack of intelligence".

Chou En-lai's visit to India was followed by the signing of the armistice agreement on Indo-China in Geneva. This was hailed by

Nehru as a "historic change in the relationship of forces in Asia." It amounted, in a way, to the recognition by Western Powers of the Chinese revolution. It was regarded as of great significance that India had played a part in obtaining this recognition for China and that India and China, the two great countries of Asia, in spite of differences in ideology and systems of government, had declared their friendship, based on the five principles, to the whole world. China had chosen Communism. But her Communism did not seem to cancel out the fact that she was an Asian power. In a joint statement issued by Nehru and Ho Chi Minh on the occasion of the former's visit to Vietnam in October 1954, the latter expressed his keenness "to solve all remaining problems peacefully and cooperatively" and his wish to apply the principles of *Panchsheel* in relation with Laos and Cambodia as well as with other countries. The fact that China and India were gaining in importance and strength in the councils of the world was looked upon with satisfaction in the other countries of Asia. India, in particular, gained prestige on account of the important role she had played in influencing China, as well as the West, towards conciliatory policies and, finally, in the acceptance of the Geneva settlement by them all. The Geneva Conference was described by Nehru as holding 'a memorable place in history'. It was significant, he said, that China was present at the Geneva Conference. The solution of "important problems of the world today", whether they were "Asian or European, Eastern or Western", required the recognition of the place of Asia in the modern world. The growing importance of Asia in world affairs was soon to receive another recognition in Bandung.

THE BANDUNG CONFERENCE : CHINA'S RETURN TO ASIA

The idea of convening a conference of Asian and African nations to deal with common problems was first suggested by Ali Sastroamidjojo, Prime Minister of Indonesia, in his opening address at the Colombo Conference¹. It received a general approval of the Conference. Nehru at first seemed to be sceptical of holding such a conference. It was, however, during the visits of Sastroamidjojo to India and Burma in September 1954, that the plans were finalized in consultation with Nehru and U Nu. Both Nehru and U Nu seem to have emphasized the necessity and importance of inviting China to the Conference. A preliminary meeting of the Colombo Powers was held in Bogor to chalk out the details. The joint communique issued at Bogor on December 29, 1954, defined the aims of the projected Asian-African Conference and also listed the countries to be invited. Among the objectives enumerated were: (1) to encourage cooperation among the nations of Asia and Africa; (2) to discuss economic, social and cultural questions affecting them; (3) to take up matters of particular interest to Asian and African peoples, such as national sovereignty, racialism and colonialism; (4) to review the status of Asia and Africa in the contemporary world and to consider what contribution they could make to the promotion of world peace. The initiative for the Conference having been taken by the Colombo Powers, they laid down criteria for the countries to be invited. The basic consideration was that they should have independent governments, although it was recognized that there could be "minor variations and modifications" in the process of selection.² It was hoped that representation at the Conference would be on the ministerial level with either the Prime Minister or Foreign Minister of a country heading the delegation. The Bogor communique made it clear that acceptance of an invitation by a government did not necessarily imply its recognition of other participants and did not involve any obligation on its part to accept the views of other countries. It also declared that the sponsoring countries were not actuated by any desire that "the participating countries should build themselves into a regional bloc." It would, however, not be correct to say that the Colombo Powers did not take up any definite positions. They expressed "gratification at the results of the Geneva Con-

ference on Indo-China" and hoped "that there would be no outside interference which would hinder their successful implementation". They supported Indonesia's position on West Irian, and the "legitimate right to self-determination of the peoples of Tunisia and Morocco". They further appealed to the Great Powers to end "nuclear and thermonuclear explosions for experimental purposes."³

The most important problem in Asia, according to Nehru, was the growing rift between China and the United States of America. The United States seemed bent on building up a system of military alliances in Asia to checkmate any expansion of Communist China's power. This, according to Nehru, and not so much the fact of China being a Communist power, was responsible for China's growing intransigence and also for her dependence on the Soviet Union. It was this dependence on Russia which kept China away from the other Asian countries. Nehru seems to have thought on the following lines: if Communist China was drawn closer to other Asian powers and was able to develop better understanding of them, as well as dispel their fears of her subversive designs against them, she would not be required to lean so much on the Soviet Union; if she became more independent of the Soviet Union, and developed more as an Asian rather than as a Communist country, there was the prospect of her relations with the United States improving; and this, according to Nehru, would be the best way of securing peace in Asia. On the other hand, if China continued to remain isolated from the rest of Asia and depended more on the Soviet Union, the United States would keep engaged in the furious activity of building up military alliances in Asia. In the wake of building up these military alliances, there was the fear, the Western Powers might try to revive their lost hold on Asia. Nehru's view was that the Asian nations were afraid of China because they did not really know her and that if they knew her better they would not be so afraid of her. India, which was able to deal with her Communist insurrections in an effective way, did not quite understand why the smaller countries bothered so much about Communism. India at any rate did not think that the danger of Communist subversion in these countries was really so great as to force them into the arms of the colonial powers. India did not rule out the possibility of China taking up an aggressive attitude towards her Asian neighbours but she believed that instead of getting aligned with the Western Powers in military pacts or organizing themselves in a provocative manner it was better to establish direct contacts with China. This might enable them to put a kind of moral pressure on China. In short, if China was trusted, she would become trustworthy. India's desire at this time, to quote Kahin, was "to lay a firmer foundation for China's peaceful relations with the rest of the world, not only with the West but equally with themselves and other areas of Southeast Asia parallel to China."

The Bandung Conference, thus, started with three important objectives, each one of them having something to do with China: (1) the avoidance of war, most immediately between Communist China and the United States; (2) development of Communist China's diplomatic independence of the Soviet Union; and (3) containment of Chinese and Vietminh military power and political influence at the southern borders of China and the eastern boundaries of Laos and Cambodia. India aimed, in particular, at dissuading Cambodia and Laos from developing closer relations with either SEATO or the United States and to associate themselves more closely with the uncommitted neutral group. It is interesting to observe at this point that India, like the United States, believed that China had to be 'contained' but Nehru, in the best Gandhian tradition, wanted to exert a moral pressure on China rather than to join or encourage military combinations against her. Just as Gandhi had believed that the British were gentlemen and through persistent moral pressure a change of heart could be brought about in them, Nehru also believed that China was basically interested in peace and, if the right appeal was made to her in the right way, she could be expected to change her aggressive military posture and to fall in line with the neutral countries of Asia, which were helping Nehru in his efforts to carve out and extend an area of peace. The fact that Asianism appealed to China had been made manifestly clear by Chou En-lai's speeches at Geneva and also in New Delhi. To Nehru China's being Communist did not matter so much as the fact of China being an Asian power. In a conference of Asian powers like the one that was being held at Bandung, China's presence was likely to be of great value. Nehru was also confident that Chou En-lai would be able to impress the Conference, with his charm and persuasiveness, of the pacific intentions of Communist China. The Bandung Conference was expected to be a great educational device expected, on the one hand, to enlighten the Chinese as to the realities of their international environment and, on the other, to educate leaders of those non-Communist Asian and African states, which had little or no contacts with Communist China, as to the actualities of Peking's real intentions towards both non-Communist Asia and the West.

The organisers of the Conference seemed to have underestimated the apprehension which a number of Asian countries had about China. India herself was worried over the development of Chinese power in Tibet and possibilities of Communist subversion in adjacent Indian-controlled areas, particularly in Sikkim and Bhutan, but she had faced no particular difficulty in dealing with her own Communist movement. The Peking line which the Communist Party of India tried to follow in Telangana and other parts of the country had clearly failed. But the other countries could not look at things with an equally reassured mind. In Burma,

while not intervening openly or directly, the Chinese Communists were giving sufficient material aid to the Burmese guerillas fighting against the legitimate government of the country and Burmese Communists were not merely being given sanctuary but also military training in the Yunnan province adjacent to Burma. Indonesia was worried over the considerable financial support made available to the Indonesian Communist Party through the good offices of Peking as a result of levies by the Chinese Embassy and consulates on the wealthy Chinese nationals in Indonesia. The Communist movements in Malaya, Singapore and Thailand, from their very inception, had been Chinese-inspired, Chinese-oriented and Chinese in composition. The Communist movement in North Vietnam, under the leadership of the French-inspired and Moscow-trained Ho Chi Minh, always had strong links with China and was infiltrating into South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. In South Vietnam the Communist movement had to be declared unconstitutional at a later stage. In Laos, aided by the Vietminh military invasion, Pathet Lao had developed strong guerilla resistance forces, and by 1954 had established control over the two northern provinces of Phong Saly and Sam Neua, adjacent to both North Vietnam and Communist China. The material support and advisors from the Vietminh, in addition to the training of personnel in North Vietnam, enabled the Pathet Lao to prevent the integration of these two provinces into the new state, as had been specified in the Geneva agreements. Cambodia, being geographically separated from North Vietnam, could feel a greater sense of security, but the Communist infiltration had affected Thailand which had large Vietnamese minority in her northeastern districts. A number of Asian countries were, thus, seriously worried about Communist China's support, direct or indirect, to the anti-government Communist activities in their countries.

India's panacea for the problem was *Panchsheel*, a doctrine which had been sanctified by Communist China's seal of approval and was calculated to encourage China to follow a peaceful course. Explaining it to the Congress Party in India, Nehru made it very clear that the Peking Government had to be given a chance to prove whether or not it would honour the agreement and he later developed the thesis that Peking's disposition to do so might be increased if "an environment" could be created which would make it difficult, or at least awkward, for China to flout these principles. The Asian-African Conference at Bandung was envisaged as providing optimal conditions for building up this environment. In a speech that he made in the Indian Parliament on March 31, 1955, Nehru reaffirmed the soundness of *Panchsheel* as a guide for the conduct of nations, describing the system as "the challenge of Asia to the rest of the world." The *Panchsheel* was to be Asia's alternative to military pacts. It was a kind of ultimatum to the rest of the world to keep out of Asia. The real issue in Asia not being Communism

or anti-Communism but racialism and colonialism, all military alliances were to be kept out of Asia. During the seventeen days between Nehru's Parliamentary speech and opening of the Bandung Conference, a series of state visitors arrived in New Delhi for consultations with Nehru, which were invariably followed by joint declarations. *Panchsheel* agreements were signed with Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia and Foreign Minister Pham Van Dong of North Vietnam. President Nasser of the U.A.R., who arrived in Delhi on April 24, 1955 on his way to Bandung, did not then understand what *Panchsheel* was, but was found supporting it later at Bandung. Thailand and Pakistan expressed disapproval of the principle, and the Arabs decided to "keep their minds open" but were prepared to place "very great importance" on anything Nehru might say. At the Conference, Nasser "presented the five principles of co-existence for the world's adoption", and Prince Norodom of Cambodia "came out outspokenly in favour of *Panchsheel* and applauded India's contribution to world peace." Addressing the Conference the Indonesian President Soekarno dealt at length with the five principles, observing that "the essential prerequisite for peace" was "willingness and determination to live as neighbours irrespective of their social, religious and political ideologies." The *Panchsheel* seems to have spread itself like a wide umbrella under which the Bandung Conference was to carry on its deliberations.

The Bandung Conference consisted of two groups of powers. On the one side there were countries like Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, Thailand, Ceylon and the Philippines which regarded Communist China as an aggressive force which could be resisted only by forming military alliances under the United States leadership.⁴ On the other hand, there were countries like India, Burma and Indonesia which believed that co-existence with Communist states was possible and were prepared to accept China's adherence to the principles of non-interference and respect of the sovereignty of neighbouring countries. The clash between the two groups came up immediately after the representative of Pakistan reached the Conference and tried to upset the decision which had been arrived at earlier, at Nehru's suggestion, that the Conference would do away with formal introductory addresses by various heads of governments and settle down to business. The opening addresses made by the pro-Western delegations were full of expressions of distrust for China. Mohammad Ali, Prime Minister of Pakistan, tried to counter the Nehru-Chou doctrine of five principles of peaceful co-existence with a new set of seven principles which, among other things, attempted to justify Pakistan's membership of SEATO by proclaiming the right of all nations to self-defence collectively or individually. Many other delegations expressed similar sentiments. India and the other countries which had suggested a dropping of introductory speeches stuck to their old decision and did not speak. It was against this background of challenge to China's motives, intentions and objectives that

Chou En-lai delivered his first major address to the Conference on the second day. Chou En-lai expressed himself on a wide variety of current issues, emphasising China's willingness to make conciliatory gestures towards its Asian neighbours and reaffirming Chinese allegiance to *Panchsheel*. His assurance that "the Chinese delegation has come here to seek common ground and not create divergence" made a deep impact on the Conference. The Chinese Prime Minister's speech earned appreciation from all quarters for its moderation, friendly sentiments and constructive approach and was held as "a most significant contribution calculated to arrest any drift towards muddy waters." He was credited with having prevented the degeneration of these sessions into a bitter and divided replica of the United Nations.

Despite Chou En-lai's conciliatory gestures, sharp cleavage on the issues of colonialism and world peace continued to threaten the Conference to disruption. The sentiments of the pro-Western group of countries were high-lighted in a very controversial speech made by Sir John Kotelawala, Ceylon's Prime Minister. Sir John demanded from China two concessions as prerequisites to a discussion of co-existence: first, that China should call on all local Communist parties in Asia and Africa to disband and, second, that China should use her influence with the Soviet Union to press for immediate dissolution of the Cominform. This speech was very much resented by the other group. There was a general feeling that Communist China's attitude towards her neighbouring countries and to the *Panchsheel*, as clarified by Chou En-lai, should have kept the Ceylon Prime Minister and his supporters from introducing these controversial and infructuous topics into the discussion. Turkey, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq supported the Kotelawala proposal while India, China, Burma and Syria opposed the move. Chou En-lai refused to be provoked. He confined his reply to the statement that he could easily hit back but would not. It was left to Nehru to argue the case for the other side and he did it with both logic and passion. After Chou En-lai had briefly announced, in a long and impassioned speech to the Political Committee in support of co-existence, that he did not wish to disrupt the Conference by emphasising on differences, Nehru deprecated the kind of thinking expressed by the pro-Western delegations and reiterated India's determination not to allow any country or bloc to enter her territories. India, he repeated, was neither for Communism nor for anti-Communism, and it was only through non-alignment with power blocs that Asian countries could throw their influence on the side of peace.

As the Conference proceeded the innumerable conflicts that divided Asian countries one from another—over Israel, over colonialism and over so many other issues—came up and Nehru reacted to the positions taken up by Ceylon, Pakistan and Turkey in a growingly sharp, rather intemperate, way. India, he repeated

again and again, would join neither power bloc. Despite her lack of military power she could not be conquered and could face any danger. She relied on herself and on none else. Countries which joined power blocs lost their identity and their capacity to contribute to world peace. "If all the world were to be divided up between these two big power blocs," Nehru repeated his old thesis, "the inevitable result would be war." Turning down Mohammad Ali's principle of collective defence and attacking it with vigour he condemned SEATO, NATO and all military blocs in the strongest language. Nehru's sincerity might have impressed the Conference but his logic seemed to have left the smaller countries relatively untouched. While representatives from countries like Pakistan and Turkey entered into sharp debates with Nehru, those from smaller countries like Iraq, Lebanon and the Philippines pointed out with all earnestness that lacking India's size and strength they could not afford the luxury of standing alone. Fadhil Jamali of Iraq asked Nehru whether as an alternative to the smaller nations joining one of the two power blocs India was prepared to bring them together as a third bloc which would give them the protection they needed. Malik of Lebanon asked Nehru whether he claimed to know more about the security of other countries than they themselves. Romulo of the Philippines referred directly to the "vast energies" India and Pakistan were spending, not for purposes of aggression against each other "but for the purpose of protecting themselves if some incident quite outside the calculations of the parties should touch off an explosion leading to a calamity". Nehru refused to answer these specific questions.

"Into the arena of increasing tension and discord," writes Kahin, "stepped Chou En-lai in an effort to demonstrate the reasonableness and peacefulness of China and, ironically, to bridge the widening gap between the positions of India and the Western-aligned states. He was remarkably successful in altering the attitudes of many of the non-Communist delegations, pro-Western as well as anti-Communist, towards a more favourable view of the international posture of the state he represented." The charm and persuasiveness and preparedness to compromise and conciliate which Chou En-lai displayed at Bandung was remarkable. "Throughout the Conference", as a writer has pointed out, "he was at his most charming, most moderate, most considerate. China had evil intentions towards none, he declared, and had nothing to hide. Anyone was welcome to visit China to see how they were tackling the problems facing every country in Asia—even their enemies were welcome." While Nehru had seemed to take a rigid position in defence of China, Chou En-lai appeared prepared to go to any length in his flexibility. He was even prepared to drop the term 'peaceful co-existence' if it was objectionable to some delegates because it had been so frequently endorsed by Communists. Why not adopt, he asked, in place of peaceful co-existence, the expression used in the Preamble of the United Nations Charter "live together in peace"? As for the five

principles, there was nothing sacrosanct about them. They could be added to, subtracted from and reformulated so as to make them agreeable to all the delegates. The important thing was to establish a set of principles with a view to safeguarding collective peace. He suggested a set of principles which, on the one hand, were calculated to make the position of those nations easier which were already members of military alliances and, on the other, to create a sense of reassurance in the minds of China's uneasy neighbours. With regard to the problem of dual nationality which was creating anxiety in a number of Southeast Asian countries, Chou pointed out "that it was something left behind by old China" and expressed his government's readiness to solve the problem in consultation with governments concerned. Negotiations for a treaty with Indonesia, providing for an ending of dual nationality, were started during the course of the Conference. Prince Wan Waithayakon was assured that China was prepared to negotiate with Thailand a nationality agreement such as was being concluded with Indonesia. An offer of a similar nationality agreement between China and the Philippines was made to Romulo. Chou-En lai invited Norodom to lunch and assured him "that China would always faithfully adhere to the five principles (of co-existence) in its relations with Cambodia." As the climax to this theme of reasonableness and peaceful intent, Chou En-lai made what seemed to be an historic declaration and which created a tremendous impression on the delegates assembled at Bandung: "The Chinese people do not want a war with the United States. We are willing to settle international disputes by peaceful means. If those of you here would like to facilitate the settlement of disputes between the United States and China by peaceful means, it would be most beneficial to the relaxation of tension in the Far East and also to the postponement and prevention of a world war."

The Bandung Conference ended in an atmosphere of satisfaction and joy with a lengthy communique on the results of the deliberations embodying the famous ten point declaration—which was clearly a compromise formula, based essentially on the five principles of peaceful co-existence and adding some more to them.⁵ These additions, however, are significant. The right of each nation singly or collectively to defend itself was conceded but with a series of provisions: (1) it was to be in conformity with the United Nations' Charter; (2) arrangements for collective defence were not to be used to serve the interests of big powers; (3) countries were to abstain from acts or threats of aggression or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country. The suggestion made by the pro-Western powers for settlement of international disputes by peaceful means like negotiation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement was accepted, again with a provision, namely that these would be done by the "parties' own choice" in conformity with the United Nations' Charter.

Many of the delegates returned from the Conference greatly impressed with Chou En-lai's conciliatory behaviour. There was a general agreement that he had emerged as the "outstanding personality" of the Conference. Many regarded him as "the hero" of the Conference. Some even expressed the view that Nehru had been relegated into the background. This, however, would not be a correct conclusion to reach. It was perhaps natural that the less well-known Prime Minister of China should have attracted more attention from Western correspondents. Moreover, it was Nehru's policy to steer the Conference "from behind the scenes." "Mr. Nehru had no need to push himself forward and had no problems to pose before the Conference. On the contrary, Mr. Chou En-lai's principal mission was to cultivate various countries, to clear suspicions and to impress on others the absence of a bamboo or other curtain in the country and convince them of China's *bona fides* with regard to ideas of peace and co-existence." India's part, as the *Eastern Economist*, April 29, 1955, pointed out, "was that of an honest broker reconciling the Communists with the anti-Communists." Nehru, in fact, was playing for high stakes—to create an Afro-Asian area of peace which would include China. Nehru, U Nu and Nasser acted as shock absorbers. In fact, "the trio were there to sell China to the rest of the Asian-African fraternity and the Western world, and Mr. Chou En-lai throughout displayed an accommodating attitude to help the statesmen. That strategy was essential for reducing international tensions and promoting the cause of peace. Indeed, once it was decided to invite China to Bandung, that was the only way to insure success." It was, thus, due to this spirit of *Panchsheel* that Chou En-lai was enabled to emerge in a completely new role at Bandung, the role of the representative of a great power being forced to belligerency by the hostility of the United States but inclined to help maintenance of peaceful relations with her Asian neighbours.

The Bandung Conference was widely regarded as "an historically unique gathering." "Bandung proclaimed," Nehru said in his report to the Indian Parliament, "the political emergence in world affairs of over half the world's population. It presented no unfriendly challenge or hostility to anyone but proclaimed a new and rich contribution...not by way of threat of force or the creation of new power blocs. Bandung proclaimed to the world the capacity of the new nations of Asia and Africa for practical idealism, for we conducted our business in a short time and reached agreements of practical value, not quite usual with international conferences...." There was a further unanimity on two points: that the Conference had achieved something notable and that this success, to a large extent, was due to the role played by Chou En-lai. Most Asian countries had looked upon China as an aggressor power. As they came into closer contact with its accredited representative, Chou En-lai, his pleasant manners, friendly attitude,

constructive approach, readiness to resile and willingness to accommodate, registered a "deep impression on all."⁶ The fact that such diverse forces as China and Turkey had been brought to an agreement, of howsoever general a character, was in itself a remarkable achievement. The Bandung Conference had "broken a mental blockade" and set up a new pattern of international behaviourism, "of talking to instead of at your ideological opponent". The Conference had made China somewhat less distant to a number of the participating countries. "It would be untrue to claim," wrote the *Statesman*, April 25, 1955, that Mr. Chou En-lai has disarmed the fears and suspicions of all nations outside the 'collective security' group. He, however, succeeded in making a visible dent in their previous mental attitudes."⁷

More countries of Asia than ever before had now begun to look upon China as not so much a member of the Russian bloc but a country within the Asian orbit. People's China had once again, as she had done at Geneva, demonstrated her willingness to steer clear of the Moscow axis, at least and so far as Asian affairs were concerned. It was rather too early to say whether the Chinese offer was sincere or not, but the general feeling among the Asian and African participants of the Bandung Conference was that nothing would be lost by giving her a chance to prove her *bona fides*. In any case, even if China turned out to be an aggressor, for the moment she appeared so much absorbed with her internal reconstruction programmes that it could be safely predicted that "at least for a generation if not more" she would be prepared to work hand in hand with the other Asian powers and this, it was hoped, would be adequate for making her stand on her own legs, independent of the Soviet Union, and to weaken the American resolve to keep her confined to the mainland by force. The fact that Communist China had entered into the five principles of co-existence with a number of Asian countries, and also had reassured the countries of South-east Asia that she was prepared to resolve all her differences with them by peaceful means, had created for China an atmosphere of warmth and affection in the whole of Asia. There were some doubting Thomases whose apprehensions were not set at complete rest. They thought that India was merely "pulling Peking's chestnuts out of fire", only to get her fingers burned as a consequence, and that the Chinese dragon could not be converted into a peaceful lamb by mere moral declarations, but theirs was a cry in the wilderness. Chou En-lai's conduct at Bandung, writes Kahin, "had done much to convince previously sceptical delegates that Nehru's thesis was plausible and that peaceful co-existence with Communist China might be possible after all. Even such strong supporters of American policy as Mohammad Ali, Prince Wan and General Romulo had become persuaded at least for the near future that China wanted peace."

SHIFT IN CHINA'S POLICY IN ASIA

Following the Bandung Conference, which seems to have suddenly revealed to Peking's leaders advantages of an active, positive diplomacy in Asia, Chou En-lai launched a free-wheeling drive to broaden and strengthen China's influence, particularly among the non-aligned countries of South and Southeast Asia, trying by this policy to corrode the U.S.-supported anti-Communist alignment of nations in Asia which was taking shape in reaction to China's "hard policy". Chou En-lai's activities began right with the country he was visiting. While the Conference was still going on, on April 22, 1955, Chou En-lai signed with Indonesia a treaty on the citizenship problem of the Chinese residents in Indonesia. This treaty on dual citizenship was very significant, since it set a precedent for similar agreements between Communist China and neighbouring states with substantial Chinese minorities. In a sense the treaty provided for a choice by Chinese residents, who had dual citizenship, within a period of two years from the time the agreement came into effect. The choice, as Article I of the treaty indicated, was to be completely voluntary. Article XI made it obligatory for both China and Indonesia to encourage their citizens residing in the other country "to abide by the laws and customs of the state in which they reside and not to participate in political activities where they reside." The contracting parties further agreed "to give mutual protection according to the laws of the respective country to the legal rights and interests of the respective citizens in the country of each contracting party." This was "a clear declaration and a pledge on the part of China not to interfere in the affairs of Indonesia through its citizens residing there and a declaration and pledge on the part of the Indonesian Government not to discriminate against the Chinese living in Indonesia." At the end of the Bandung Conference, Chou En-lai paid an official visit to Djakarta where on April 28, 1955 he and Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo issued a joint statement on Indonesian-Chinese relations, expressing "satisfaction over the fact that Indonesia and China are living peacefully together as good neighbours on the basis of the principles of mutual respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit." The visit of Chou En-lai to Indonesia was followed by a visit of Sastroamidjojo to China. The

relations between the two countries were brought closer by the Chinese Communist Government giving its strong support to Indonesia's claims to West Irian and by further exchange of visits between Indonesian and Chinese leaders. In October 1956, President Soekarno himself undertook a state visit to the People's Republic of China, was given an enthusiastic reception and was greatly impressed by what he saw, though he returned to his country determined to maintain its independent foreign policy.

The relations between Communist China and Burma had continued to remain strained until Prime Minister Chou En-lai broke his journey at Rangoon on his way back from his visit to India, in June 1954.² During this visit Chou En-lai had been plainly told by the Burmese leaders about the resentment they felt at the sanctuary and training the Chinese Communists were giving to some of the armed rebels in Burma, which was followed by documentations being sent to Peking on the subject. In an official visit made by U Nu to China in December 1954, it had been agreed that Burma and China would make plans to increase their trade and improve their communications, while U Nu on his part had given assurances that Burma would never allow bases on her soil for the enemies of China. However, dispute regarding the borders had continued, and the Chinese had continued to claim large chunks of Burmese territory as their own. At Bandung, Chou En-lai and U Nu had many opportunities to come closer to each other. After Bandung relations between Communist China and Burma improved rapidly. The role played by Chou En-lai at Bandung created the impression in Burma that there was now greater hope for settling the problems between the two countries peacefully. There was a brisk exchange of goodwill missions. During September 1955, Burma sent a Buddhist, a cultural, and a military delegation to China. Madame Sun Yat Sen visited Burma in early 1956. On December 29, 1955, a trade agreement involving Burmese rice and Chinese products had already been concluded. In terms of frontier problems, a conference was held at Lweje, east of Bhamo, in February 1956, having as one of its aims the promotion of friendlier relations among the border peoples of China and Burma. In late October, U Nu went to Peking to discuss the border dispute with Chinese officials and in a joint communique on November 10, 1956 it was stated that "a favourable basis" for settling the controversy had been found. U Nu, in a broadcast the same day, revealed that the People's Republic of China was prepared to accept the McMahon and Iselin lines as well as the watershed boundary, provided certain territories were accepted as Chinese. U Nu said that he considered the proposal as "fair and just." This was followed by a visit by Premier Chou En-lai to Burma in December 1956, during which U Ba Swe the new Premier, accompanied him to Mangshih in Yunnan for a conference, which ended in a stalemate. In March 1957, soon after taking over again as Premier, U Nu went to Kunming on a goodwill visit to discuss the border

issue with Chou En-lai. While differences on the border dispute continued, the two countries basked in the sunshine of each other's affection and regard.

While at Bandung, Chou En-lai had entered into informal discussions with Prince Wan Waithayakon, Foreign Minister of Thailand. Prince Wan, in his opening address, had brought to the attention of the Conference the issues between Thailand and the People's Republic of China. In his informal discussions with the Prince, Chou En-lai indicated that his government wanted to settle the matter of the citizenship of the Chinese minority in Thailand by negotiations and suggested the Sino-Indonesian agreement as a model. He made it clear that he would be prepared to do so irrespective of the fact whether the Thai Government recognized the People's Republic as government of China or not. He further invited Prince Wan to visit China and assured him that Pridi Banomyong was not in Yunnan organizing local Thais but in Peking as a political exile and that he would not be allowed to broadcast in future over the Peking Radio. However, Thailand was not so easily assured as Indonesia and Burma and refused to open negotiations with Communist China on the question of citizenship. Members of an informal Thai mission to China were arrested in Bangkok upon their return in February 1956. All that Thailand conceded to China was to lift her ban on non-strategic goods to that country. Thailand subsequently became involved in a closer alliance with the West. Bangkok, its capital, was chosen as the seat of the SEATO. The example of Thailand, followed by South Vietnam and Laos, made it clear that countries in the closer neighbourhood of Communist China and, therefore, more completely exposed to the dangers of infiltration, subversion and aggression from her, were not prepared to walk into her parlour.

Communist China's relations with North Vietnam have been of a special character. Ho Chi Minh owed his rise, to some extent, to the help received directly from the Chinese Communists. A number of roads and railway lines had been built up to connect Hanoi and Haiphong with Nanning and Kunming, and Communist China had provided training facilities as well as supplies to Ho's regime. It was clearly on account of the help received from China that Ho Chi Minh was able to win a major military as well as strategic victory at Dien Bien Phu. A Chinese Friendship Association had been working for some time in North Vietnam. On December 24, 1954, a number of agreements were reached between Hanoi and Peking governments under which a joint railroad and highway construction programme was to be undertaken and the Hanoi-Dong Dang railway line was to be extended to Nanning in China; civil air traffic was to be established between the two countries together with the necessary airports and meteorological facilities;

tele-communications and postal services were to be set up, and China was to help in the restoration of agricultural hydraulic facilities in North Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh visited Peking and issued a joint communique on June 25, 1955, in which the United States was strongly criticized and a demand was made for the union of the two Vietnams through national elections. In July 1955, a Treaty of Friendship and Aid was concluded between the two countries under which North Vietnam received from the People's Republic of China as a gift the equivalent of about 325 million dollars for factory, road, and railway construction, for supplying textiles and textile machinery, and for electrical, agricultural and medical equipment. China furnished a good deal of technical help to North Vietnam and also provided facilities for the training of her personnel. In April 1956, the Chinese People's Republic Airline started a regular service on the Canton-Nanning-Hanoi route. Chou En-lai visited Hanoi in November 1956 and used the occasion to observe that China and North Vietnam were members of a family headed by the Soviet Union. He called for the peaceful unification of Vietnam and criticized the policy of the United States in supporting South Vietnam. Communist China played a significant role in the building up of the armed strength of North Vietnam. Since the Geneva Settlement, it was pointed out by the British Foreign Minister, Sir Anthony Eden, in the House of Commons, there had been 'considerable reorganization and rapid expansion of the Vietminh regular army'³. By the end of 1954, North Vietnam had twice as many regular field formations as at the time of the Geneva Settlement, an army which was already larger than that of Pakistan or Indonesia, each with five times as great a population. It had increased its strength from seven divisions to twenty.⁴ The Vietminh had further imported voluminous quantity of arms from China and there was a constant stream of Chinese Communist personnel flowing into North Vietnam to work on roads, railroads, and airports and other projects contributing to the growth of the military potential of the country.

North Vietnamese, clearly with Chinese backing, were infiltrating into Laos in large numbers. Even when the Vietminh left the country they left behind them several thousand political and military agents who trained and organized Laotian peasants into guerilla units. As Senator Mansfield pointed out in October 1955, the strength of the Pathet Lao armed forces had increased from about one thousand at the time of the truce to four to six thousand, and there was evidence that North Vietnamese officers and cadres held key positions in these forces. Laotian cadres received their training in both North Vietnam and China. Laos suffered from a series of Vietminh invasions. All this, however, was expected to change after Bandung. At Bandung, through the intercession of Nehru and Chou En-lai, an agreement was signed between North Vietnamese and Laotian leaders under which the two governments promised to "develop and harmonise the good neighbourly relations

which tie, and should tie, each other within the framework of the five principles defined in the Sino-Indian Agreement in April 1951". This statement, Chou En-lai commented later, was bound to "contribute to the thorough implementation of the agreements of the Geneva Conference and in the consolidation of peace in Indo-China." During his visit to Peking in the summer of 1955, Ho Chi Minh asserted that his government wanted to set up relations on the basis of peaceful co-existence with all countries, and especially with Laos, Cambodia and other Southeast Asian states. However, since the Pathet Lao continued to indulge in insurrectionary activities, the relations of Laos with North Vietnam and China could not be completely friendly. The Laotians feared that the Vietminh had specific designs on not only Phong Saly and Sam Neua but also on Luang Prabang and Hueisai. In August 1956, a settlement was reached between the Laotian Government and Pathet Lao, which was followed by Prince Souvanna Phouma going to Peking and Hanoi. On August 29, he signed an agreement with North Vietnam in which he promised not to enter into any military alliance as long as the security of Laos was not threatened and not to allow foreign military bases in the country in addition to those which were existing. The relations with Communist China continued to be strained on account of recurrent incidents on the common frontier, the presence of ten thousand overseas Chinese in Laos, the links between the Pathet Lao and Communist China, and the latter's growing military power. Some improvement in these relations could be seen in the joint communique which was issued by Prince Souvanna Phouma and Chou En-lai during the former's visit to Peking and Communist China's recognition of Laos' policy as a "policy of peace and neutrality". Laos' however, continued to refuse economic aid from Communist China or establish any closer links on the economic or diplomatic level. "Ours is a position," declared Souvanna Phouma, "of complete neutrality like Switzerland." Situated as she was between two worlds, the Chinese and the Western, neutrality for Laos was neutrality not between two philosophies but between two military blocs.

Cambodia was another country which suffered from Vietminh infiltrations, a situation which was made more complicated by the fact that there were living in Cambodia some 300,000 Vietnamese. The Khmer People's Congress, working under Son Ngoc Minh was clearly a Communist-led organization. It was with the help of the Khmer People's Liberation Army that the Vietminh had launched an invasion of Northeast Cambodia in April 1954. After the Geneva Conference, however, Ho Chi Minh announced that he wanted to apply the five principles to the relations of North Vietnam with Cambodia. Assurances on these lines were given to Nehru in October 1954

and again in April 1955. At the Bandung Conference Pham Van Dong reiterated the readiness of his government to establish relations with Cambodia on the basis of "the five principles of co-existence." A little later, in an informal meeting which included Nehru and Chou En-lai, Pham Van Dong assured the Cambodian representative that his government did not want to interfere in Cambodia's domestic affairs. This did not bring all misunderstandings to an end. Cambodia continued to complain about the Vietminh military encroachments and the propaganda carried out by North Vietnam through the Hanoi Radio. The International Commission tried to bring about better understanding between the two countries. Her relations with China, however, continued to be strained on account of the existence of some 250,000 Chinese living in Cambodia. At the Bandung Conference Chou En-lai went out of his way to assure Cambodia of Communist China's good intentions. He invited Norodom Sihanouk to lunch and, as the latter put it, "personally assured me that China would always faithfully adhere to the five principles of co-existence in its relations with Cambodia and for a friendly feeling towards my country." This assurance was repeated in the presence of Nehru and again in the Political Committee of the Conference on April 23, 1955. On April 26, the Prince told newsmen that "as far as Cambodia is concerned, China and North Vietnam have assured me that they would respect the independence, political ideologies and sovereignty of my country," In January 1956, Prince Norodom visited Peking and a joint communique issued by him with Chou En-lai called for the steady cultivation of direct contacts between the two countries and emphasised the importance of economic and cultural relations. China expressed her respect for Cambodia's neutrality. In April 1956, a trade and payments pact was signed between the two countries, involving 14 million dollars worth of business each way for a year. On June 21, an economic aid agreement was concluded under which Cambodia was to receive from China in goods and services over a period of two years the equivalent of 22.4 million dollars. Textile, paper, plywood and cement factories were to be built as part of the programme. Cambodia seemed completely re-assured that the aid for the first time extended by Communist China to a non-Communist country was without political strings. Prince Norodom was developing his relations with China on the basis that if Ho Chi Minh ever developed hostile designs against his country Communist China would be able to restrain him. In November 1956, Chou En-lai paid a visit to Phnom Penh and utilized the visit in further removing the fears about China being an aggressive power. A joint Chinese-Cambodian communique called for an observance of the five principles. The reassurance on the part of Communist China created a favourable background for Cambodia to enter into

more intimate contacts with the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia and other Communist countries.

Another Southeast Asian country which suffered from Communist terrorist activities was Malaya. Malaya expressed some misgivings when the United Kingdom recognized the Communist government of China. "Some people in Malaya ask," said Malcolm MacDonald, the British Commissioner General in Malaya, "whether Britain's recognition of it implies that the British authorities are growing sympathetic to Communism. Does it, for example, mean that we shall adopt a more lenient attitude towards the Communist terrorists in Malaya?" His own answer to the question was an emphatic 'No.' He warned that Peking "must not interfere in the national affairs of peoples outside of China."⁵ Malaya refused to recognize Communist China. She dealt strongly with Communist terrorist activities. Tengku Abdul Rahman, the Chief Minister, made it clear that he did not want to see Malaya divided like Korea and Vietnam. While the governments of Singapore and the Federated Malaya continued to deal strongly with their local Communists, Communist China took all possible steps to improve its relations with Malaya and did her best to improve trade between the two countries, with the result that by the end of 1956 Malaya had considerably improved her trade not only with Communist China, to which she exported rice, but also with the other members of the Communist bloc, the Soviet Union making substantial purchases of rubber. Communist China gave credit to a number of Malayan business firms. In August 1956 an informal agreement was made for the export of 10,000 tons of rubber from Malaya to Communist China and the import of 20,000 tons of rice. David Marshall, the Chief Minister of Singapore, was convinced, as he said in a speech on January 24, 1957, "that the welfare of the overseas Chinese as well as China's own need for friendly relations requires that the overseas Chinese give genuinely of their loyalty to the land of their domicile."⁶ Peking's recognition of the newly independent Federation of Malaya also influenced the latter's attitude towards Communist China. By 1957, when her relations with India began to get strained, Communist China had obtained a respectable place among the Asian nations.

BOOK TWO : PRELUDE TO MILITARY INVASION

CHINA'S AGGRESSION AGAINST INDIA

In July 1954, within three months of the signing of the Sino-Indian Agreement on Tibet, Chinese armed forces entered the Bara Hoti area in the Central Sector and claimed that Bara Hoti (they called it Wu je) was 'traditional Chinese territory.' The Indian civil and military personnel, which had been visiting the place year after year (during the months of summer and returning with the advent of snow), collecting taxes and settling disputes, were naturally surprised. The Government of India, however, treated the Chinese intrusion as an act of misunderstanding on the part of the Chinese, and made the offer that if the place was north of Tunjun La, as the Chinese claimed, they would be prepared to concede it to them, but if it was to the south, as they had contended, the Chinese should be prepared to acknowledge the Indian claims. The Chinese brushed the offer aside. Since there was no historical record showing Tunjun La to be a border pass, the Chinese contended, any disputation of the Chinese claim over Wu je could not be sustained on the basis that it lay to the south of the pass.¹ While the dispute with regard to Bara Hoti was pending, in September 1955, the Chinese soldiers entered Damzan, some ten miles south of the Niti pass, recognized as one of the border passes by the 1954 treaty and 'clearly within Indian territory', and when the attention of the Chinese Government was drawn to this 'trespass' they coolly asserted that it was within the Tibet region of China; they were made to withdraw only when men of the Indian Border Police threatened to use force. In April 1956, an armed Chinese party entered the Nilang-Jadhang area, south of the Tsang Chokla pass, another recognised border pass, and camped half a mile east of Nilang. India now informed the Chinese Government that "failure of immediate withdrawal of the Chinese troops beyond Tsang Chokla may lead to serious incidents which would mar the friendly relations between India and China." Undeterred by the warning, in September 1956, the Chinese soldiers twice crossed the Shipki pass into Indian territory and claimed the

territory upto the Upsong Khad, and India had again to inform Peking that "crossing of this pass by armed personnel" was "aggression" which India would resist.

The Chinese intrusions into Indian territory gradually spread to other sectors of the Sino-Indian frontier. In October 1957, a Chinese party was seen at Walong in the Lohit Frontier Division of the North East Frontier Agency of India. The same year a Chinese survey party visited the Spiti area in Punjab and tried to place boundary stones in Indian territory east of the Spiti-Pare watershed. In July 1958, the Chinese soldiers occupied the Khurnak fort, about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles within Indian territory, in Ladakh. In September 1958, they arrested an Indian patrol party in the northern part of Aksai Chin and detained the members for five weeks. Rejecting an Indian proposal, that pending the settlement with regard to Bara Hoti neither of the governments was to send its civilian authorities into the region, the Chinese committed another military intrusion. As soon as the Indian civilian officers left Bara Hoti on September 9, 1958, on account of the advent of winter, a Chinese party, carrying with them arms and ammunition, entered the area, and was reinforced on September 26. Subsequently, they constructed outposts at Laphthal and Sangcha Malla—both on the Indian side of the Balcha Dhura pass—and there were reports of fresh infiltrations in the Lohit Division in the northeast.

The Indian Government, despite their strong notes to China, seemed to be acting on the assumption that this was all due to a misunderstanding on the part of the Government of China regarding their actual frontiers and that the situation would be resolved as soon as the facts were clearly explained to them. It was inconceivable for them that China, with whom they had maintained such close and intimate relations, would seriously challenge the traditional Indian boundaries which the Himalayan peaks and the watershed had delimited for centuries. The attitude of the Government of India on this question was one of such utter complacency that even when the Chinese cut the Yeh-cheng-Gartok road, or the Sinkiang Tibet highway, through Ladakh, removing a slice of 12,000 square miles of territory from Indian control, they expressed nothing but "surprise and regret" at the fact that "the Chinese Government should have constructed a road through what was indisputably Indian territory without first obtaining the permission of the Government of India and without even informing the Government of India".² The Government of India repeated in the protest note of October 18, 1958, their anxiety "to settle these petty frontier disputes so that the friendly relations between the two countries may not suffer." "I am anxious, as I am sure you are," wrote Nehru to Chou En-lai, "that the firm basis

of our friendship should not only be maintained but strengthened." While Nehru was writing this letter, an Indian party on a routine patrol near Shinglung in Aksai Chin had been reported as missing, and there were reasons to think that they had fallen in the hands of the Chinese. In its memorandum of November 3, 1958, the Chinese Foreign Office not only arrogantly replied that they had been "arrested" by the Chinese—something which the Chinese Ambassador in India had persistently denied—but brought the charge of aggression against India, claiming the entire Aksai Chin area as Chinese territory.

In July 1959, a Chinese armed detachment intruded into the region of the Western Pangong Lake in Ladakh, arrested six Indian policemen and established a camp at Spanggur. Early in August, an armed Chinese patrol, approximately 200 strong, crossed the Thagla Ridge, forming the traditional boundary in the NEFA area, into Khinzemane and pushed back the Indian patrol, consisting of ten or twelve policemen, which had been stationed there.³ Late in August, a strong Chinese detachment crossed into the Indian territory in the Subansiri Frontier Division of the North East Frontier Agency, at a place south of Migyitun, outflanking, and later occupying, the Indian frontier post at Longju. The Chinese Government subsequently justified their action by claiming that Longju was "indisputably a part of Chinese territory" and that the invasion and occupation of that place by the Indian troops constituted "a grave violation of China's territorial integrity."⁴ Following these armed infiltrations deep into Indian territories, both in the northwest and the northeast, Chou En-lai, in his letter of September 8, 1959, asserted that there had never been any formal delimitation of the frontiers between India and China and, for the first time, laid claims to 36,000 square miles of Indian territory in the NEFA and 15,000 square miles in Ladakh, the entire territory which had for all these years been shown as Chinese on the Chinese maps. He also made use of this opportunity to reject the "so-called McMahon Line" "set forth in the past by the British imperialists unilaterally", and accused India of "asserting its illegitimate territorial claims by force". Chou En-lai also suggested that the matter be decided by mutual negotiations. But it was clear that behind his demand for negotiations there was the physical presence of Chinese troops not only all along the Indian frontiers but also in some places several miles deep into the Indian territory.

Between 1954 and 1959, China had not only challenged, but had succeeded in unilaterally changing, the long existing state of the border between the two countries. In 1954, the year of the high tide of Sino-Indian friendship, she had disputed the ownership of the Niti pass and Bara Hoti. By the end of

1955, the Niti pass had been more or less lost to the Chinese, and they had asserted their claims over another pass, Tunjun La. Before the year 1956 closed, both Tunjun La and Shipki La passes had gone under Chinese possession, and they were claiming Tsang Chokla pass. In 1958, China had captured the Khurnak Fort and entrenched herself in the Aksai Chin area of Ladakh, besides her unilateral occupation of Bara Hoti and setting up of outposts in Lapthal and Sangcha Malla on the Indian side of Balcha Dhura pass. "I am sorry to have to say", Pandit Nehru wrote with great emotion to Chou En-lai on September 26, 1959, "that it is the Chinese Government who have been trying unilaterally to change the long-existing state of the border. There is no other explanation for the presence of Chinese personnel in Bara Hoti and of Chinese troops in the Aksai Chin area, Khurnak Fort, Mandal, Spanggur, Khinzemane and Longju. and for Chinese intrusions in the Spiti area, Shipki pass, the Nilang-Jadhang area, Sangcha, Lapthal, and the Dichu Valley". The Chinese demand for negotiations was backed up by more violent outbreaks. In October 1959, an Indian police party on patrol duty in Indian territory in the neighbourhood of Kongka Pass in Ladakh was apprehended by the Chinese and a second Indian party, out on search of the missing men, was fired upon by the Chinese armed forces using automatic weapons and hand-grenades. The Indian personnel fired back in self-defence but were overwhelmed by the strategic situation and the superior fire power of the Chinese troops. As many as nine persons belonging to the Indian party, including the officer-in-charge, lost their lives and many others suffered severe injuries. The Chinese, in reply to the Indian protest note, asserted that "the places to the south, north and east of the Kong Ka pass have always been Chinese territories, respectively under the jurisdiction of the Chinese local authorities in Tibet and Sinkiang".

Following the publication, in an official Chinese magazine, CHINA-PICTORIAL of July 1958, of a map of China which included within Chinese territory four of the five divisions of India's North East Frontier Agency, some areas in the north of Uttar Pradesh and large areas in Eastern Ladakh, besides the entire Tashiganj area of Eastern Bhutan and a considerable slice of territory in North-west Bhutan, the Government of India took a serious view of the matter and wrote a strong but polite note, on August 28, 1958, to the People's Government of China, suggesting that now that they had been in office for nearly nine years, necessary corrections in the Chinese maps should not be delayed any further. The Chinese Government replied, in their characteristic way, through a Memorandum dated November 3, 1958, that the boundary line in the

Chinese maps had "been drawn on the basis of old maps published in China before liberation", but this time they added, rather significantly, that they had so far not been able to undertake a survey of their boundary nor consult with the countries concerned, and that they would not make changes in the boundary on their own. "The Chinese Government believes", said the Memorandum, "that with elapse of time and after consultations with the various neighbouring countries and a survey of border regions, a new way of drawing the boundary of China will be decided in accordance with the results of the consultations and surveys." This made the Government of India realize for the first time that China regarded the boundary between India and China as an open issue and as the subject of discussions. Prime Minister Nehru, in a letter of December 14, 1953, took up a strong position and wrote to the Chinese Prime Minister: "There can be no question of these large parts of India being anything but India and there is no dispute about them. I do not know what kind of surveys can affect these well known and fixed boundaries." In his reply, sent on January 23, 1959, Chou En-lai took up the position that the Sino-Indian boundary had "never been formally delimited", that, historically, no treaty or agreement had been concluded between the two governments and that, "so far as the actual situation is concerned, there were certain differences between the two sides over the border question". However, he added, as if to assuage the feelings of the Indian Prime Minister, that in view of 'the great and encouraging changes in the situation'—attainment of freedom by India and Burma and their friendly relations with China—the Chinese Government would find it necessary to take a 'more or less realistic attitude towards the McMahon Line'. The Chinese Prime Minister further said that the boundary between the two countries could be determined only after surveys and mutual consultations and suggested that until this was gone through the two sides should maintain the *status quo*⁵.

Nehru, in his letter of March 22, 1959, made a further protest against the stand taken by Chou En-lai. The Chinese contention that the agreement in regard to the frontier between India and Tibet was concluded between the British representative and the representative of the Tibetan local authorities and that it had never been recognised by any Chinese Central Government was in direct contradiction of well-established facts. "The arrangements for the Simla Conference," Nehru wrote to Chou En-lai, "were made with the full knowledge and consent of the Government of China. The Foreign Minister of China wrote to the British representative on the 7th August 1913 that the Chinese plenipotentiary would proceed to India 'to open negotiations for a treaty jointly' with the Tibetan and British

plenipotentiaries. It is clear from the Conference that not only did the Chinese representative fully participate in the Conference but that the Tibetan representative took part in the discussions on an equal footing with the Chinese and the British Indian representative. Not only were the frontiers of India with Tibet discussed at the Conference, but also the boundaries between Inner Tibet and China and Inner Tibet and Outer Tibet. At no stage, either then or subsequently, did the Chinese Government object to the discussions on the boundary between India and Tibet at the Conference. In the circumstances the agreement which resulted from the Conference in regard to the McMahon Line boundary between India and Tibet must, in accordance with accepted international practice, be regarded as binding on both China and Tibet. In fact, this was not the first occasion when Tibet concluded an agreement with other countries. In 1856, Tibet concluded an agreement on its own with Nepal. The Convention signed by Britain and Tibet in 1904 was negotiated by the British and Tibetan representatives with the assistance of the Chinese Amban in Tibet."

"You have stated," continued Nehru in his letter to Chou, "that, for a long time after the exchange of so-called secret notes between Britain and Tibet, Britain did not dare to make public the related documents. You have also contended that the McMahon line 'was later marked on the map attached to the Simla Treaty.' I am afraid I cannot agree either with your facts or your conclusion. The Chinese representative at the Simla Conference was fully aware of the McMahon Line boundary between India and Tibet. This particular Line was discussed between the Tibetan and British Indian representatives, but when the draft convention emerging from the Conference was presented on the 22nd April 1914 for signature by the British, Tibetan and Chinese representatives, it had attached to it a map showing the McMahon Line boundary as well as the boundaries between Inner Tibet and China and Inner Tibet and Outer Tibet. Later, the Chinese Foreign Office in a memorandum, dated 25th April 1914, listed a number of objections to the boundaries between Inner Tibet and Outer Tibet and Inner Tibet and China. It did not raise any objection to the boundary between Tibet and India as shown in the map attached to the tripartite Simla Convention. Thereafter, on April 27, the Chinese representative initialled both the convention and the map without any objection. Subsequently, in their memorandum, dated June 13, 1914, the Chinese made fresh proposals regarding the boundaries of Inner Tibet and Outer Tibet. It is significant that no mention was at all made in this memorandum of the boundary between Tibet and India. Almost five years later, on May 30, 1919, the Government of China again suggested some modifications of the Simla Convention with a

view to reaching a final settlement. These modifications related only to the boundaries between Inner Tibet and China and Inner Tibet and Outer Tibet. No reference at all was made to the boundary between Tibet and India (McMahon Line). Looking into the old papers, we find that the British Government withheld the publication of the Simla Convention for several years in the hope that there would be an agreement about the status and boundary of Inner Tibet. The Simla Convention was published in the 1929 edition of Aitchison's *Treaties* and the McMahon Line was shown in the official maps from 1937 onwards. These maps were circulated widely but neither then nor subsequently was any objection raised by the Chinese authorities." The McMahon Line, Nehru pointed out, could not be regarded as arbitrary or expressive of British expansionist designs since it was drawn to coincide as nearly as possible with the watershed of the Himalayan range, which was treated as the natural dividing line between the Tibetan plateau and the valleys leading down to the plains of Assam.⁶

It was significant that Chou En-lai took nearly six months to reply to Nehru's letter of March 22, 1959, and now, in his letter of September 8, 1959, came out with a challenge to India's traditional boundaries all along the Indo-Tibetan frontiers and claims on more than 50,000 square miles of territory. In any re-drawing of the frontiers—and Chou En-lai was asking for nothing less than that—he wanted "the historical background of British aggression in China" to be taken into consideration. "The Sino-Indian boundary question", he wrote, "was a complicated question left over by history," particularly recent history when the "British conducted extensive territorial expansion into China's Tibet region and even the Sinkiang region."⁷ India's demands appeared to Chou En-lai to be arising out of her desire to capitalize on the situation created by British aggression in Tibet and, what was unpardonable in Chinese eyes, India had "applied all sorts of pressure" on China, "not even scrupling the use of force to support this demand." He repeated what he had written earlier, in his letter of January 23, 1959, that the Sino-Indian boundary had never been formally delimited and challenged what the Indian Prime Minister had "tried energetically to prove" that most part of the Sino-Indian boundary had the sanction of specific international agreements between the two governments. He emphasised that the 1842 peace treaty between Kashmir and Tibet was not ratified by China, was vague and did not formally delimit the boundary separating Sinkiang and Tibet regions from Ladakh, nor was the section between the Ari area of Tibet and Ladakh formally delimited by the two countries, and that in the case of the latter, certain areas (Sang and Tsurghsha, southwest of Tsaparang Dzong in Tibet), "which had always belonged to China",


had been (forcibly and illegally) occupied by the British thirty or forty years back. The so-called McMahon line, east of Bhutan, was similarly a product of the British policy of aggression against the Tibet region of China and had never been recognized by any Chinese Central Government, and was therefore illegal. This involved 9000 square miles of territory. "Mr. Prime Minister", Chou En-lai asked Nehru, "how could China agree to accept under coercion such an illegal line which would have it relinquish its rights and disgrace itself by selling out its territory—and such a large piece of territory as that?" Chou's letter ended in a statement of what he described as "a clear-cut policy on the Sino-Indian border questions." "On the one hand, it affirms the fact that the entire Sino-Indian boundary has not been delimited, while, on the other, it also faces reality and, taking specially into consideration the friendly relationship between China and India, actively seeks for a settlement fair and reasonable to both sides and never tries unilaterally to change the long-existing state of the border between the two countries pending the settlement of the boundary questions."

On November 7, 1959 the Chinese Government came forward with a proposal that the armed forces of each side withdraw twenty kilometers from the line of actual control along the entire Sino-Indian border and halt patrols, to which Nehru replied, on November 16, that the Government of India had not posted any armed personnel at or near the international boundary. He further informed Chou En-lai that the Indian border outposts already had instructions not to send out any forward patrols and if a similar decision was taken by the Chinese Government also, the risk of border clashes would be completely eliminated. The Government of India, however, refused to agree to any arrangement, even as an interim measure, which would maintain the forcible Chinese occupation of Lonjgu. As for Ladakh, Nehru came forward with the suggestion that the Government of India was prepared to withdraw all its personnel to the west of the line, which the Chinese Government had shown as the international boundary in their 1958 maps, if the Chinese Government withdrew their personnel to the east of the traditional boundary shown on official Indian maps. The Indian Government, clearly, was not prepared to apply the same principle on the eastern sector, where her boundaries were more clearly demarcated. Nehru's proposals were summarily rejected by Chou En-lai in his letter of December 17. Chou En-lai suggested at the same time that the two Prime Ministers should meet on December 26 either in China or Burma. This was regarded by the Government of India as likely to serve no useful purpose. It was clear that there could be no agreement on principle when there was such complete disagreement about facts. The Government of India, in the meantime, waited for a reply to the detailed

letters they had sent to China on November 4 and December 20, in which sufficient evidence had been produced to substantiate the traditional alignment of the Indian boundary as shown on Indian maps, hoping that this might give the Chinese a better understanding of the situation.

The scientific nature of the frontier is further confirmed by the fact that it practically divides the tribesmen on the basis of their ethnic stock. The tribes inhabiting the NEFA region, while resembling the Tibetans to some extent, are distinct from them. Early in the 18th century, Desideri, a European traveller visiting this part of the country (1716—29), mentioned that the Cong-bo region south of the river Tsangpo was inhabited by the people called Lhoba, meaning southern people, who maintained an attitude of superiority towards their northern neighbours and that "not even the Tibetans who are close neighbours and have many dealings with them are allowed to enter their country but are obliged to stop on the frontier to barter goods." Horace Della Penna, another traveller who visited Tibet in 1730, wrote that Tibet was bounded in the south by Lhoba (tribal territory). This is further testified by Chinese sources. Following the British occupation of Assam, in 1826, these 'southern people' had been gradually brought under the British administration. They had never belonged to China and no government of China had ever claimed any sovereignty over them till 1959. It is interesting to find that the boundary line now claimed by both India and China is regarded by them as "traditional and customary." "If this is argued as a matter of historical evidence of jurisdiction", writes G.F. Hudson after a detailed study of the various aspects of the problem, "neither side has a really strong case, for it is clear that the tribes, except for some occasional episodes of subordination to Assam or Tibet, were normally independent of anybody." "Since, however", Hudson continues, "modern international law does not recognize tribes like the Akas or Abors as having sovereign rights, the disputed area can only belong to the organized state which was the first to recognize jurisdiction there and this was India under the British *Raj*. There is no evidence of effective Chinese jurisdiction which was forcibly replaced by British encroachment, as China's propaganda would have it." From a strategic point of view also, India as a modern state, was bound to seek and maintain a frontier along the crest of the Himalayas. A cursory look at a relief map of the Himalayan region could convince even a layman of the great strategic disadvantages to India if the Chinese were in possession of all the high passes and their southward exits into the Indian lowlands. The frontier could be left undefined in old days when India was under the control of the mighty British empire and China was too weak to challenge either the Tibetan autonomy or the British

influence over Tibet. Moreover, communications were so difficult that no power could have thought of invading India through the Tibetan mountain ranges of the Himalayas. But, as Hudson puts it, "modern conditions of international life demand definite frontiers and the fixing of such a line should follow the well-marked natural boundary of the Himalayan watershed except in so far as there is clear evidence of a previously existing Chinese jurisdiction to the south of it. Such evidence is lacking."⁹



SINO-INDIAN FRONTIERS : (1) CLAIMS AND COUNTER-CLAIMS

India and China have a common boundary extending over 2,200 miles, in addition to which Sikkim, an Indian protectorate, and Bhutan, with its external affairs under the control of the Government of India, have a common boundary with China extending over 160 and 300 miles respectively. It is claimed by the Government of India that the entire length of this border has been "either defined by treaty or recognized by custom or both," and that the demarcation further follows the geographical principle of the watershed, which, in most cases but not in all, is the crest of the Himalayan mountains. "Determined by geography, confirmed by tradition and custom, sanctified by treaties and reinforced by continuous exercise through the centuries of administrative jurisdiction appropriate to the areas concerned", as K. Gopalachari has commented, "it runs along major and majestic watershed ranges such as the Aghil, Mustagh, the Kuenlun, the Kailash, the Zaskar, and the crest of the Himalayas, which constitute a geological and geographical unity."¹ In the extreme north-west it begins at a point near longitude 74° 34' east and latitude 37° 3' north, where the frontiers of Afghanistan and Sinkiang meet, and runs towards the east along an impassable range of the Hindukush mountains—determined by the watershed diverting the Hunza and the Qara Chukar rivers towards the Indus system in India on the one hand and the Yarkand system in Sinkiang on the other. The Indian frontier goes right upto the source of the Hunza river. As the frontier moves through the last of the five passes of the Hindukush, the Khunjerab,—the other four being the Kilik, the Mintaka, the Khachanai and the Paprik—it collides against the Aghil mountains, from the crest of which the river Aghil rises, and controls the mountain ranges upto the source of the river Aghil. On the east of the Aghil mountains, there is the Karakoram pass, from where the frontier runs on the line of Zoji La, north of Mount Meru, the "navel of the earth" according to Hindu mythology, and touches the majestic ranges of the Kuenlun mountains. East of the Kuenlun mountains, upto the upper reaches of the Indus, there is Ladakh, with its Aksai Chin ranges and the Chang Chenmo valley. Divided from Sinkiang by the Kuenlun mountains, Ladakh touches the Tibetan frontier on the east. The Chinese contention,

that Sinkiang's jurisdiction had extended over Aksai Chin, Lingzi Tang and the Chang Chenmo valley lying north of the Karakoram and south of the Kuenlun, has no basis in history.

South of Ladakh, there is the Spiti Valley, sprawling over the Kangra district of the Punjab into the Shipki pass, the ancient sentinel of the historic Bashahr state in the Himachal Pradesh. From the Shipki pass, the traditional Indian frontier moves through the passes of Tsang Chokla, Mana, Niti and Tunjun La, on the northern borders of Uttarkashi, Garhwal and the Almora districts of the Uttar Pradesh, to the Lipu Lekh pass—along the watershed of the Spiti and Pare Chu rivers, from Spiti to the Shipki pass, and between the Sutlej and the Ganges basins on the east. It is here that the Gangotri and the Kedarnath regions are situated, facing Mansarovar and Mount Kailash on the north. The Indo-Tibetan frontier is then broken up by the territories of Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan, beyond which there are 600 miles of the northern limits of the upper parts of the ancient Kamrupa, renamed the North East Frontier Agency in 1954, beginning at Towang in the extreme west of the Kameng division and, spreading eastwards through the Subansiri and Siang divisions, extending upto Walong in the Lohit division.

India's northern frontier, thus, as the talks between the Indian and the Chinese officials revealed for the first time, lay in an impressive and clearly marked natural alignment, along the Mustagh and the Aghil ranges, across the Karakoram pass, along the main Kuenlun range, across Lanak La, Kore La and Kepsang La, along the Chumesang river, between the two halves of the Pangong Lake, along the Kailash range and the Zaskar range, and across the Shipki pass, the Mana pass, and the Niti pass.² As early as the 1860's the British Government was making surveys in the Aksai Chin area and laying down boundary lines. The area was always included in official maps published by the Government of India and was shown even on an official Chinese map of 1893. The Chinese contention that they have been in the area for centuries is, at the face of it, preposterous. They first entered eastern Ladakh in 1957-58, when they constructed the road through Aksai Chin. By November 1959, they had pushed 60 miles further west, and by September 1962, another 40 miles west. The Indian alignment of the boundary in the Ladakh sector, running along the Kuenlun and other watershed ranges and across Lanak La and the Imiss pass and including Demchock, is the traditional boundary as borne out by the writings of chroniclers and travellers as well as by official records. There is evidence coming from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries of Demchock being in Ladakh, and travellers in the nineteenth century (Carey, 1885-87, and Bower, 1891) testify to the Indian territory running across the Lanak pass.³ In 1891, the British Government gave to the Chinese Government a description of the traditional boundaries of Kashmir as

running along the Kuenlun range to a point east of 80° which clearly establishes the fact of the Aksaj Chin area being within the Indian territory. Moreover, the area was regularly and effectively administered by the Indian authorities. Regular assessments and settlements of revenue were made from time to time, and revenue collected from all inhabited places upto the boundary by the Indian officials. Areas not inhabited were also shown on revenue maps, and control was exercised over them through the levy of duties on flocks and pastures, maintenance of caravan routes and rest-houses and supervision and control over trading routes.⁴

In the central sector, the traditional boundary runs along the watershed between the Sutlej and the Ganges, some 30 miles north of the High Himalayan Range. Here the principle of division seems to be the watershed principle and not the Himalayan ranges, though the territory claimed by India falls within a lower range (17,000 feet), which can be easily crossed from the Tibetan plateau. The Indian claims in the sector are supported by the revenue records of Garhwal district going back to as far as 1850 and further confirmed by the Chinese maps as late as 1958 showing the watershed as the frontier. Nilang, Jadhong, Bara Hoti, Lapthal and Sangchi Malla, all claimed by the Chinese to be within Tibet and forcibly captured by them, are within this area, north of the main Himalayan range but south of the watershed. Nilang and Jadhong are parts of the Taknore Patti in the Uttar-Kashi and Tehri Garhwal districts of Uttar Pradesh. Their people, the Jadhhs, are Garhwalis migrating from Gangotri and Dhunda, fifty miles further south. Bara Hoti is part of the village of Kurkuti. Nilang, Jadhong and Bara Hoti, all lie on the Indian side of the Sutlej-Ganges watershed.⁵ Nilang formed part of the Indian state of Bashahr (now in Himachal Pradesh) till 1667 A.D., when it was ceded to Tehri.⁶ Jadhong was already a part of Tehri when Nepal invaded its frontiers in 1804, and suffered heavy damages along with Nilang. Revenue records of Garhwal dating from 1815, as well as revenue reports of 1842 and 1866, clearly show Bara Hoti in India and south of the watershed pass of Tunjun La. Sangchi Malla and Lapthal being farther to the south, clearly belonged to India.⁷

The situation in the eastern sector was different from the one in Ladakh. While no other people intervened between the Ladakhese on one side and the Tibetans or Turkis (belonging to Sinkiang) on the other, and India had full claims on the territory rightfully belonging to Ladakh, the settling down of the frontier in the north eastern sector had taken place in a different way. Between Assam, which can legitimately be regarded as part of India, and Tibet, which India never claimed as a part of her territory, there lay an extensive area inhabited by primitive peoples, the Bhutias, Akas, Daflas, Mishmis, Abors, etc., which were described in the seven-

teenth century works as tributaries of the Ahom kings of Assam. For a long time after 1826, when the British took over Assam, most of this area was "in the indistinct penumbra of the undemarcated," and much of it was geographically unexplored. Agreements had been signed with the Akas in 1844 and 1888, the Abors in 1862-63 and 1866 and the Monbas in 1844 and 1853, extending the authority of the Government of India over them. It was true that, in accordance with their policy of generally leaving the tribes, more or less, to look after themselves, the British Government had not established any detailed administration of these areas, but British political officers had often visited them for settling disputes and such like purposes. Between 1906-1911 Chao Erh-feng made some inroads into this area, but in 1911 there broke out a revolution in China, which was followed by the Tibetans rising in revolt and destroying the Chinese garrison. It was as a reaction to Chao's intrusion in a tribal no man's land that the British operated a forward policy in the area which brought most of the tribes under their control. The Sadiyan Frontier Tract, approximately 10,000 square miles in area, was formed in 1912 and the Balipara Frontier Tract, also comprising about 10,000 square miles, was brought into being in 1913.⁸ The area was extensively surveyed in 1911-13⁹.

It was on the basis of this detailed information that the India-China frontiers in the eastern sector were formalized at a tripartite conference held at Simla, ~~from October 1913 to July 1914, between India, Tibet and China. This came to be known as the McMahon Line, after the British representative at the Conference, but what McMahon did was merely to confirm the natural traditional, ethnic and administrative boundary, running mostly along the crest of the higher Himalayan range forming the northern watershed of the Brahmaputra, and not along the foot-hills, as the Chinese claim. The border in the sector east of Bhutan, as confirmed by an exchange of notes between the Tibetan and Indian representatives, was delimited on two sheets of large maps, copies of which were signed and sealed by representatives of India and Tibet. This was further incorporated on a map attached to the draft convention. The agreement was duly approved by the Tibetan Government at Lhasa,¹⁰ and was not challenged by the Chinese representative at that time or afterwards.¹¹ The Simla Convention and the map attached to it were signed by Ivan Chen, the Chinese representative. The Chinese Government later repudiated the Convention and raised certain objections to the delimitation of the frontiers.¹² It is interesting to note that their objections were confined to the border between "Inner Tibet" and China and "Inner Tibet" and "Outer Tibet". In none of the memoranda submitted by the Chinese Government to the British between 1914 and 1919~~

they protested against the boundary laid down by the Convention between India and Tibet, nor did they seek any modification of it, by negotiations or force, until 1954. In fact, in 1956-57, in their agreement with regard to a border settlement with Burma, the Chinese Government confirmed all the one hundred twenty and odd miles of the eastern extension of the McMahon Line between Burma and China as a traditional boundary.

This, then, was the 'traditional' Indian frontier as recognized by the Government of India and the Indian people and published in innumerable maps during the last half a century. The Government of China never took any objection to it, nor for many years after 1949, when the People's Republic of China was established, it ever indicated any disagreement with the claims so loudly and repeatedly made by the Government of India. The fact that previous Chinese governments were weak is no argument. This weakness did not prevent them from protesting against the British settlement of the Burma-China boundary in 1906, 1911-13 and 1937. As early as 1950, following the Chinese occupation of Tibet, the Government of India informed the Chinese Government that "the recognized boundary between India and Tibet should remain inviolate," and the Chinese did not raise any objection to the demand. On a number of occasions, during 1951 and 1952, the Government of India discussed with China various matters with regard to Tibet, but the Chinese authorities neither suggested that they had any doubt regarding the border nor disputed the Indian claims. It is true that during these same years maps were being published in China which marked out some thirty-six thousand square miles of Indian territory on the north-eastern frontier and some fifteen thousand square miles of Indian territory in north-eastern Ladakh as falling within China. The Government of India repeatedly drew the attention of the Chinese Government to these maps, to which they always replied that they were old maps coming from the Kuomintang period which they had no occasion to study, implying that when they would have some time they would correct them. At the same time they neither accepted the Indian maps (for which there was no need) nor did they challenge them. In 1954, when the representatives of the two countries met at Peking for six long weeks and settled all kinds of problems touching on Tibet, the Chinese representatives never suggested, that, in addition to culture and trade, there were any frontier disputes which had to be settled. In fact, in October 1954, when Nehru visited Peking, he pointedly drew the attention of Chou En-lai to the fact that certain maps published in China were incorrect with regard to the boundary between the two countries, to which the Chinese Prime Minister replied that "these maps were really reproductions of old pre-liberation maps"

and that the Chinese Government had till then had no time to revise them. During the conversations with Nehru in 1956, Chou En-lai had an opportunity of discussing the subject at greater length. He held the view that the McMahon Line, "established by British imperialists, was not fair." "Nevertheless, because it was an accomplished fact and because of the friendly relations which existed between China and the countries concerned, namely India and Burma, the Chinese Government was of the opinion that they should give recognition to the McMahon Line." Chou En-lai pointed out that he would soon consult the Tibetan authorities in the matter and come to a settlement on this point. Following this assurance, the two Prime Ministers discussed some "minor border problems". At the end, Nehru remarked that there were no other disputes on the Sino-Indian boundary and the Chinese Prime Minister agreed.¹³

China has never directly repudiated the Indian claims to these territories. Their argument, on the other hand, has been that these boundary questions were largely created by the imperialists and colonialists before India and China attained independence and that, again, it was the imperialists and the colonialists who were trying to make use of these boundary questions to sow seeds of dispute between the newly independent states of Asia. The Chinese, with their characteristic attitude of looking at the world as divided between the Asian and African countries on the one side and the imperialist powers on the other, seemed to believe that the boundary question between India and China was an issue between Asian and African countries and the imperial powers. They also were not interested in finding out what the actual frontiers of India and China were in 1947, when India became independent, or in 1949, when Communists took over from the Nationalists in China. They wanted the problem to be resolved against the historical background—and, since history has a long stretch into the past, it always becomes difficult to decide as to what particular point in history has to be taken up as the point under discussion. What the Chinese meant by a 'traditional customary boundary line' was not what existed in 1947 but what existed at a point in history which was most favourable to them. They challenged Indian claims in all the three sectors. In the eastern sector, the traditional, customary boundary, according to China, ran along the southern foot of the Himalayas, whereas the Indians claimed it to be running along the crest of the Himalayan ranges. In the central sector, they challenged the Indian claims over the stretch of thirty miles north of the Himalayas based on the watershed principle and also on their actually administering that area since the middle of the 19th century. In the western sector, the Chinese claimed Aksai Chin to be within Sinkiang.

While asserting that the British had laid "covetous eyes" on Aksai Chin in 1860's, "dispatched military intelligence to infiltrate into the area for unlawful surveys" and, "in compliance with the will of British imperialism, these agents worked with an assessment of boundary lines for truncating Sinkiang," they desired to get undone what the British had done out of covetousness.

The Chinese, in other words, wanted to rip open the entire question of the frontiers between India and China and draw them afresh 'nearer to the heart's desire'. The Indian Government, on the other hand, contended that her frontiers had been determined by tradition, usage and geography and were not open to negotiations, unless it be in the matter of minor details here and there. India had been willing to withdraw from Tibet, on the basis that the British had extended their sway over that country under imperialist motives and India had no legitimate right of remaining in a position of domination with regard to that country, but having conceded that much, she stood for defending every inch of her territory all along her frontiers. The Chinese claimed that "up to the time when the British colonists and the Indians came to this area, the local authorities of China's Tibet region had always maintained administrative organs, etc.," but they were not in a position to substantiate their claims by any documentary evidence. In the central sector, they claimed some 2,000 square kilometers of territory on the basis that "the inhabitants are nearly all Tibetans." This was hardly a convincing argument, particularly when ethnic stocks have a strange tendency of running into each other. Nor was the Government of China in a position to challenge the proofs which the Government of India possessed of their actual administrative control of this region going back to the middle of the nineteenth century. In the western sector, they claimed the area on the ground that it "served as the traffic artery linking Sinkiang with Ari in Tibet" and that "the Karghiz and Bighur herdsmen of Sinkiang are in the custom of grazing their cattle here." From the second half of the 19th century to the beginning of the 20th, they alleged, British imperialism was "actively engaged in conspiratory activities of aggression against China's Tibet and Sinkiang." In 1911, taking advantage of the revolution in China, "British imperialism sought to negate Chinese *sovereignty* in Tibet by recognizing merely China's *suzerainty* there." The Chinese had always regarded the McMahon Line in the eastern sector as something illegal, but they did not say that the British were never in possession of the region and even acknowledged that during the last phase of the Second World War the British Government was actually exercising control over a small part

of this area. They admitted that from 1936 onwards "the illegal McMahon Line" in the eastern sector appeared on British and Indian maps and after 1953 it was no longer being designated as undemarcated, but they did not bring forward any evidence to suggest that any Chinese Government ever protested against this state of affairs.

Having started with these assumptions, the Chinese seemed to have expected that, on the Communists having come to power in China, the Indian Government should have "cast away the entire legacy of imperialism and established and developed their relations and mutual friendship on a completely new basis," and perhaps also that India, at her own initiative and out of her sense of jubilation at the Communists having come to power in China, should have made a survey of all the territories which at one time or the other in history, in some way or the other, were controlled by China, and presented them to China on a silver platter as a friendly gesture. Since India did not do so, they went to the extent of believing, or at least declaring from house-tops, what had been demonstrated as being palpably untrue by a plethora of evidence, that the Indian Government tried to obstruct the peaceful liberation of Tibet in 1950, and that in the subsequent years "pressed forward an all-out advance on the illegal McMahon Line in the eastern sector of the border".

They accused India of similar encroachments on Chinese territory in the middle and western sectors as well, and brought against the Indian Government the charge that they "aided and abetted" the revolt of Tibet in 1959. As against the Indian claims to Aksai Chin, they asserted that in 1950 it was through this area that units of the Chinese People's Liberation Army had advanced from Sinkiang to Ari. This is hardly tenable. While it is difficult to be too sure of the route actually followed by the Chinese, there is reason to think that they advanced into Tibet through a route which did not pass through the Indian territory. The Sinkiang-Tibet highway through Aksai Chin was actually constructed by China between 1956 and 1957 and the Indians came to know about it from a pictorial magazine published in China. The fact of India's ignorance in the matter came very handy to the Chinese Government. "If India had always exercised jurisdiction over this area," asked Chou En-lai, "it is beyond comprehension how India could have been unaware of the passing of the Chinese People's Liberation Army units through this area to Tibet and of the construction of the gigantic highway." While India's ignorance with regard to the construction of the road is inexcusable, there are reasons which can explain it. The work involved in constructing the road was minimal. As Nehru pointed out to the Indian Parliament on

August 31, 1959, roads in these desert areas "are of a peculiar type. The only thing you have to do to build a road is to even the ground a little and remove the stones and shrubs." All trade between Sinkiang and Ladakh had already been choked, thus removing the possibility of Indian traders readily observing the development of new traffic patterns beyond the Karakoram pass. Had the permanent Indian trade agency been established in Western Tibet, as provided by the Sino-Indian Treaty of 1954, the news of the road would have reached India earlier. The Chinese had contrived to reduce the period of operation of the agency to a few weeks in the year. The real reason, however, was that the Government of independent India had inherited the indifference of the earlier government towards the northwestern frontier, which was regarded as completely inviolable. During the Second World War, the northeastern frontier of India had suddenly become alive and the Government of India was devoting a good deal of its attention to the strengthening of defences in that region. Nehru was not wrong when he said in the Parliament with regard to the Ladakh region that this territory "has not been under any kind of administration and that during British rule this area was neither inhabited by any people nor were there any outposts." This, however, did not mean that India could be expected to renounce her legitimate claims in the region.

The Indian claims were certainly valid under international law. The very fact that China had never disputed the well established and openly proclaimed boundaries of India until December 1959 gives her a complete right to these territories under international law.¹⁴ From the nineteenth century onwards the Government of India had been active in all the areas right up to the boundary and several legislative enactments and documents had clearly recorded these areas as parts of India. Since 1947, particularly after 1949, the well known limits of Indian territory had been publicly affirmed by the Government of India on several occasions. The Indian constitution, which was openly discussed at the draft stage for many years, makes specific mention of vast areas claimed by China.¹⁵ Even according to the Chinese side there was no ambiguity about the alignment shown on Indian official maps since 1954. Nehru made a categorical statement in the Lok Sabha on November 20, 1950, to the effect that the McMahon Line was India's boundary in this sector. This was followed by several other statements of a similar nature. At no stage had the People's Republic of China registered any protest regarding any of these statements. On the other hand, whenever the Government of India had come to know of the erroneous depiction of the boundary alignment on Chinese maps, they had drawn the attention of the Government of China, to which the latter had either refrained from replying or said that they had no time to revise their maps.¹⁶ In October 1954

the Prime Minister of India had pointed out in his long talks with the Chinese Prime Minister in Peking that he "had seen some maps recently published in China which gave a wrong border line between the two countries" and made it clear that "so far as India was concerned, he was not much worried about the matter because our boundaries were quite clear, and were not a matter of argument." Nehru had again drawn the attention of Chou En-lai to the problem in 1956. Even when they were encroaching on Indian territory, and sometimes claiming it as their own, the Chinese had not challenged the general position taken by the Government of India. "It was only in December of 1959," the Government of India declared in a summary of the report of officials, "five years after the Indian Government had first raised the question of Chinese maps, that the Chinese Government, in glaring contradiction to their previous position and in sharp contrast to their long silence, justified, and upheld, these maps and claimed that they showed the traditional boundary of China." Having failed, in the face of open statements in Parliament, declarations outside and repeated official communications by the Government of India, to specify her claims or to protest, China, under the accepted international usage, must be held to have accepted and acquiesced in what India claimed to be the border. But it was not only a matter of international law. "Friendly relations between countries", the Government of India lamented, "presume a frank and forthright exchange of views in such vital matters concerning national territories; and it would unsettle the very basis of trust and amity between nations if such vast territorial claims are kept and disclosed and brought forward by a country at its own unilateral convenience when it regards them as 'ripe for solution'."

SINO-INDIAN FRONTIERS : (2) AN ANALYSIS OF CONFLICTING CLAIMS

A curious argument, which was first advanced by the Chinese but which has now found some support in academic circles in the West, is that the frontiers claimed by India today, both in the north-west and in the north-east, are the results of the imperialistic designs of the British, further implying that they were wrested out of China (or Tibet) at a time when she was weak. On these premises, false and unsubstantiated, an attempt is made to draw the conclusion that now since the British empire has receded and the Chinese are again united and strong, India, in consistency with her declared abhorrence for imperialism and friendship for the Chinese, must hand over these territories back to them. This argument ignores the basic fact that while the reasons for the British occupation of India were certainly imperialistic, the British were always most reluctant in getting deep into the Himalayas and becoming involved with the tribal people there. The one policy that they persistently followed in the entire Himalayan region from the north-west to the north-east was the policy of non-interference. They strictly adhered to what they regarded as the policy of minimum extension of their power in consistency with the requirements of national security. Following the defeat of the Gurkhas in 1816, the British could have easily annexed Nepal, but desisted from doing so, mainly because they wanted to avoid creating 'a frontier of seven or eight hundred miles between two powerful nations holding each other in mutual contempt'. In the case of Bhutan and Sikkim also, as in the case of Nepal, they limited themselves to merely exercising control over their external affairs.

Whatever new territory the British acquired in the later years of the 19th century in the north-west and in the early years of the 20th century in the north-east was out of their desire to consolidate the position against what they regarded as Russian imperialistic designs in both sectors, added to Chinese aggressiveness in the north-east. In no case did they encroach upon the territories of any other sovereign power.¹ What they brought under their control was more or less a net-work of tribal areas to

which the modern concept of state did not apply. In the north-east, it was Chinese expansionism, as expressed in Chao Erh-feng's campaigns of 1910, and the subsequent Chinese claims for domination over Tibet, that made them extend their influence to tribal areas, which never were under the political control of either China or Tibet but which in the hands of China could have become a source of weakness to India². An attempt is being made here to trace the story of the making of the Indian frontiers, which would make it very clear that they were not the outcome of imperialist motives nor were carved out at the cost of China or Tibet but that they were the frontiers which India needed for reasons of sheer self-interest and basic security, and which she evolved by methods sometimes forceful but always legitimate.

We may begin with Ladakh, in the northwest. It is sometimes pointed out that geographically and culturally Ladakh was a part of Western Tibet. The facts, however, are just the reverse. It is clearly established by Ladakhi chroniclers, by Western writers, like A.H. Francke³, Karl Marx, Luciano Petech⁴ and others, and by Chinese documents,⁵ that Ladakh was never politically a part of Tibet and that while it is a fact that Ladakh sometimes dominated over Western Tibet, the converse was never true. We now have available to us a monumental work on the history and strategic importance of Ladakh by Fisher, Rose and Huttenback, based on an exhaustive study of Indian, Tibetan and Chinese documents.⁶ It makes it clear that, while culturally linked up with Tibet, Ladakh has always had close political relations with some Indian state or the other. The cultural relations with Tibet also started very late. The Alchi inscriptions, regarded by Petech as the "earliest tangible tokens" of Tibetan cultural influence on Ladakh, go back to the 11th or 12th centuries. On the other hand, there are numerous instances, some dating back to third or second century B.C., found throughout Ladakh, which testify to the wide-spread contacts that existed with the Indo-Aryan cultures of Kashmir and the plains to the south. It was by the 14th century that the area was effectively 'Tibetanised'. Ladakh, however, continued to have close political ties with Kashmir, and when Kashmir came under Islamic influence, Ladakh was equally affected along with what is known as Chinese Turkestan. In 1405, King Sikandar of Kashmir invaded and conquered Baltistan, forcing its Buddhist population to embrace Islam. Armies were sent to Ladakh during the reigns of Zainul Abidin (1420-70), Hasan Khan (1480) and Abu Baker, Khan of Kashgar (end of the fifteenth century), the last of whom conquered Kafirstan, Gilgit and Baltistan. With the establishment of the Mughal rule over Kashgar, a successful attempt was made at the reconquest and re-annexation of Baltistan and Ladakh in 1598 by Mirza Haidar. From now on Ladakh was a part of the Mughal empire in India.

Following the weakening of the Mughal empire after Aurangzeb's death in 1707, both Ladakh and Tibet became subjected to the invasions of the Dsungar Mongols, rising to power in Turkestan. In 1718-19, the Tibetans, with the help of the Chinese armies, were able to expel the Mongols from their country. Following the help rendered to the Tibetans in expelling the Mongols, the Chinese, who had come as friends, threatened to settle down as rulers. Like the Tibetans, Ladakh also, under the threat of the Dsungar Mongols, had sent a number of missions to Peking (1737, 1738, 1743 and 1751) for help. Peking was not prepared to allow Ladakh to pass under the control of Dsungar Mongols, since this would have given the latter a valuable base for operations against Tibet, as well as control over all the major passes between Tibet and Turkestan. The Chinese interest in Ladakh, thus, was due to the latter's strategic position on the southern flank of the Dsungar empire in Turkestan. The Chinese contention that Ladakh was under Lhasa's (and therefore ultimately China's) political domination is not borne out by facts. Neither Chinese, nor even Tibetan, forces ever stayed in Ladakh. In 1753, a Tibetan incarnate lama of Kha-tok-pa was sent to Ladakh to mediate in a succession dispute. But this was at the request of the Ladakhi nobles and whatever be the Chinese interpretation, could not be regarded as an exercise of suzerain powers by Tibet. Ladakh's position was one of political allegiance to Kashmir and commercial and religious relations with Tibet.⁷ They were not always happy in their relations with Kashmir and sometimes struggled for freedom from its domination. But they certainly had no desire of falling under the Tibetan or Chinese political control.

With the conquest of Kashmir by Ranjit Singh in 1819, a new chapter started in the life of Ladakh. The Sikhs tried to exercise the same rights in Ladakh as the Mughal and the Afghan rulers of Kashmir had done earlier. Ladakh resisted for some time, appealing (it is interesting) to the British who were fast becoming the paramount power in India (and not to the Tibetans or the Chinese) for help. In 1834, Gulab Singh, the Dogra feudatory of Kashmir, with the help of 4000 men under his ablest general, Zorawar Singh, conquered Ladakh and by 1840, the Dogras had firmly established their authority throughout Ladakh and Baltistan. The Dogras turned out to be a very ambitious people. Spurred by a desire to carve out an empire for themselves in the bosom of the Himalayas, and interested in monopolising the wool trade in the area, they tried to revive Ladakh's ancient claims over West Tibet. In 1846, Zorawar Singh marched at the head of three divisions, by three different routes, into West Tibet, captured Rudok and Gartok and claimed, in the name of the Raja of Kashmir, all of Tibet west of the Mayum pass, on the ground that this territory had rightfully belonged, since ancient times, to the

ruler of Ladakh. One of his contingents actually reached Taklakot, now standing at the end of an important motor route cutting through Aksai Chin and connecting Sinkiang with Tibet, and a few miles away from the borders of Nepal. Zorawar Singh's conquests in Western Tibet frightened the British, partly for their interest in the wool trade and partly because of their fear of a Nepali-Dogra-Sikh combination. Zorawar Singh's campaign in Western Tibet soon reached its anti-climax. While the British were planning to bring pressure on Sikhs to recall the Dogras, Zorawar Singh was killed in a battle with the Tibetans, his army suffered a crushing defeat, all the forts in West Tibet captured by him were lost, and the Tibetans were threatening to capture Ladakh. Reinforcements from Kashmir saved the situation. The peace treaty of 1842 restored the *status quo*. While Ladakh relinquished its ancient claims to Tibet, the Tibetans accepted the Dogras as the legitimate authority in Ladakh. Without defining the frontiers, both the parties agreed to respect the old "established frontiers".

Ladakh's political subjugation to Jammu, and through Jammu to Lahore, and through Lahore to Calcutta, having been confirmed by Lhasa, and through Lhasa by Peking, the British influence was now extended to a remote region in the Himalayas. By the middle of the nineteenth century, lured by stories of its fabulous wealth, the British were also getting interested in trade with Central Asia. The Russians had, in the meantime, started advancing against the smaller principalities of Western Turkestan. The Chinese, who once were the dominating power in the region, were in a state of decline. Afraid that Russia might come too close to the British Indian frontiers and become a threat to their possessions in India, the British sent out a number of their agents—Johnson, Biddulph, Hayward and Shaw—to make extensive exploratory tours through the Hindu Kush and the Pamirs. In the meantime, under Yakub Beg, a new power had started consolidating itself in the Kashgar region of Central Asia. By the 1860's, under pressure from Yakub Beg, the Chinese rule in Eastern Turkestan had completely collapsed. As long as Yakub Beg was there, dexterously maintaining a policy of non-alignment between the British and the Russians, the latter were satisfied with treating Eastern Turkestan as a buffer state. The British did not have any immediate danger from Russia, and they were satisfied in restricting themselves to the Karakoram range of mountains, and had no interest in finding out whether their legitimate claims extended beyond them or not. Sir Henry Rawlinson had stated in 1867 that "no army would ever think of attempting to force a way...across the enormous mountain belt extending from Karakoram pass to the Punjab where you have a succession of passes varying from 15,000 to 19,000 feet in height. It is the most impassable of any part of the north-western frontier of India ; consequently the most unlikely to be the source of any collision between the two empires".⁸

Another area of conflicting claims is the Aksai Chin plateau. The controversy regarding its possession has recently been revived. It has been contended that the major part of the area, if not the entire area claimed by China in 1960, belongs to her and that the road that the Chinese built in 1956-57 passes through their own territory. This is, however, a very untenable contention. One of the causes of confusion is the widespread character of Aksai Chin. Aksai Chin is a very extensive area, not all of which is claimed by India. The Chinese officials have quoted some British writers in order to show that Aksai Chin belongs to them and have made much of the reference in their writings to the arrest, in 1841 of some Ladakhese trying to enter the area of the Aksai Chin Lake. Since there are no lakes in the part of Aksai Chin claimed by India, this must have happened in the part belonging to China. Aksai Chin is not so 'little known' as it is sometimes made out to be. A number of surveys had been conducted in this area under the auspices of the Government of India in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—under the leadership of Johnson (1862), Godwin-Austen (1862), Ryall (1862-63), Cayley (1870), Montgomerie (1871) and Trotter (1873), followed by surveys by Stein (1908) and De Filippi (1913-14). Indian officials claimed that survey parties and patrols "constantly visited" the area between 1911-1949. The Chinese now describe these as "illegal explorations and surveys" in Chinese territory, and part of a British plot to detach Sinkiang from China and join it to the British Indian empire. The Chinese were not able to produce any convincing evidence in support of their claims. The two surveys they referred to, one by Hai Yin and Li Yuangping in 1891 and another in 1940-41, were concerned with determining the south-western and south-eastern frontiers of Sinkiang (and not southern, where the Aksai Chin lay), and for exploring the Sino-Russian frontiers respectively.

Broadly speaking, this region can be divided into two parts : (1) the Chang Chenmo-Pangong region, south of Chang Chenmo and the Pangong lake, where the area of dispute is fairly small, and (2) north of Chang Chenmo. In Aksai Chin, south of Chang Chenmo and the Pangong lake, India has strong claims over the territory upto the Lanak pass, at the extreme eastern end of the Chang Chenmo valley. By 1864 the whole of the Chang Chenmo valley had passed under the effective control of the Kashmir Durbar who were beginning to open up trade routes. So far as the area north of Chang Chenmo, the main Aksai Chin region, is concerned, no European travellers had actually visited the region till 1856-57. It was, however, only after 1865, following a rebellion in Chinese Turkestan, that Kashmir started sending troops there. The Maharaja constructed a fort at a place called Shahidullah on the bank of the Karakash river, mainly in order to protect the caravans which plied between Yarkand and Leh, from attacks by the Kanjut raiders from Hunza. The territory, in fact, as was revealed later, was more properly speaking under the domain

of the Mir of Hunza, who was claimed to be a vassal of the Maharaja of Kashmir. It being mostly a pasture land, the Mir had not cared to set up any administrative posts in the region. Shahidullah, being clearly out of the region of Kashmir territory, the British persuaded the Maharaja to give it up in 1867. In the meantime, the British were rapidly developing their trade with Central Asia. In 1874, they entered into a commercial treaty with the ruler of Kashgar under which they obtained the right to trade and low duties (something Russia had already secured in the region). This was followed by the formation of the Central Asia Trade Company. In order to avoid the vexatious taxation by the Kashmir Government, the British tried to find out alternative trade routes east of the Karakoram range and this led them into the mountainous terrain of Aksai Chin. In 1864-65, Johnson made a survey north of the Karakoram pass and in 1865 he travelled through in Aksai Chin. What Johnson actually did in Aksai Chin was to find out how far the legitimate claims of the Kashmir Government had extended, and he merely laid down the frontiers as he discovered them. Johnson clearly had no interest in going beyond Kashmir's legitimate frontiers. The Johnson boundary, as it came to be known, modified as time went on by more accurate surveys, dominated British maps for many years to come.

The British, conservative as they were in their attitude towards any expansion of power in the Himalayas, hesitated for a long time in accepting this boundary, clearly established as coinciding with the legitimate claims of the Mir of Hunza or the Maharaja of Kashmir, and no evidence was ever brought to show that China or any other state had any claims to it. In 1870, Dr. Henderson wrote that the country north of Chang Chenmo, "being desert and uninhabited, can hardly be said to belong to India", and marked it as "Desert" on the map. The British refused to move beyond the Karakoram. There was even a map, prepared for the Foreign Office in London (1873), in which the region of Aksai Chin was shown as outside Kashmir. By the late 1870's the new trade routes opened by the British in the direction of Aksai Chin had faded out and the British had practically lost their interest in the area. Yakub Beg's death in 1877, followed by the Chinese recapturing Eastern Turkestan (now called Sinkiang), and the Russians rapidly moving towards the Pamirs, forced the British after 1880 to take a more active interest in the region. More concerned with Russian than with Chinese threats, for some time they tried to bolster up China against Russia. They tried to goad the Chinese in Sinkiang to push their outposts in the Pamir as far west as possible and it was only when China had clearly failed to organise itself as a buffer between British territories and Russian expansionism that they thought of adopting a more positive policy. The Chinese, in fact, could never reach beyond Suget, 60 miles south of Shahidullah. In the Pamirs the Chinese, encouraged by Younghusband and Macartney, sometimes moved towards

the west, but whenever they came into contact with the Russians they fell back. After 1895, when China suffered a major defeat at the hands of Japan, her strength on the western frontier began to ebb out very rapidly. In 1903, China did not hold any territory to the west of the Sarikat range and had only one Pamir district, namely the Taghdumbash Pamir, under her effective control.

It was the continued Russian advance in Central Asia after 1885 which alerted the British to the possibility of a Russian invasion of their dominion *via* Kashmir. Lockhart and Durand visited the frontiers. In 1889, Gilgit Agency was reopened, with Durand as Agent, with the object of "watching and control of the country south of the Hindu Kush."⁹ This was followed by agreements with the rulers of Hunza and Nagar to keep open the Kashgar route. When Safdar Ali, the Mir of Hunza, tried to contact Russia with a view to counter-acting the British influence he was ruthlessly crushed and replaced by his half-brother Nazim Khan. Gilgit was secured by 1888, Hunza and Nagar were brought under the British influence by 1892, and the status of Chitral was established to Britain's satisfaction by 1895. In order to keep well posted with what was happening in this difficult region, the Government of India sent a number of enterprising young British officers, including Francis Younghusband, into the remote corners of Central Asia. Russians also were not quiet. They sent men like Grombtchevsky and Yonoff. In order to avoid possibilities of clashes there was created the Wakhan tract, a thin strip of Afghanistan separating the British and Russian empires by a few miles of mountain.

What the British now set out to do was to consolidate that part of Central Asia which legitimately fell within the territorial claims of either the ruler of Kashmir or the Mir of Hunza. As discovered by Col. Lockhart's visit to Hunza in 1885, from 1860's onwards Hunza was a tributary of Kashmir. The Chinese claim that Hunza had been her tributary since eighteenth century is completely baseless. There was some kind of relationship between the two—Hunza made an annual payment of $1\frac{1}{2}$ oz. of gold-dust to China and accepted from her presents worth about ten times. But this could hardly be regarded as a symbol of vassalage. Until 1890 the only authority prevailing, and recognised, in a considerable part of the area north of the Muztagh-Karakoram range was that of the Mir of Hunza. By 1892, with a military expedition and a change of ruler, Hunza was completely brought by the British under Kashmir's suzerainty (though the Mir was allowed to continue to send the gold-dust to China and receive presents in return). After 1895, with the Chinese defeated at the hands of Japan, British policy in Central Asia naturally gained a new momentum. In view of China's collapse it had become necessary for the British to obtain a properly defined border, primarily with

a view to placing a definite limit to "possible extensions of Russian territory towards the Muztagh and Karakoram mountains". For some time they hesitated with regard to where the line could actually be laid down. Under the influence of George Macartney, who had been known for his sympathies with China and who had played an important role, though unsuccessfully, in inducing China to resist the Russian expansion in the region, the British seemed willing to accept the Karakoram range as their frontier. This was not because the British were not aware of how far the claims of Kashmir were extended but because they wanted to adopt a mild policy. Macartney was quite familiar with the map which the Chinese Minister in St. Petersburg, Hung Chun, had used as a basis for discussion of the alignment of the Sino-Russian boundary in the Pamirs and which showed the Sino-Indian boundary considerably to the north of the Karakoram range and clearly placed Aksai Chin within Indian territory. The rights of Hunza (and, therefore, by implication of Kashmir and of the British) over part of the Taghdumbash Pamir had been admitted by the Tao Tai of Kashgar in a letter to the Mir of Hunza, dated February 1896, and during negotiations at a later stage between Hunza and Sinkiang the latter had admitted that some part of Raskam land (Aksai Chin) was to be given to the Kanjuts.

In 1896, the Chinese officials in Sinkiang, on the basis of a British map of 1873 defining the limits of Aksai Chin and Tibet plateau, claimed Aksai Chin to be part of "Chinese Tibet". Afraid that this might involve "real risk of strained relations with China and might precipitate the actual intervention of Russia in Kashgaria", the Government of India, in October 1898, actually suggested to London that Aksai Chin and Karakash basin be conceded to the Chinese in exchange for their recognition of Hunza's claims to the western end of the Taghdumbash. The British Government agreed, and on March 18, 1899 an offer was actually made to Peking to demarcate the boundary on these lines. Great Britain, as Sir Claude Macdonald said in his letter to the Tsung-li Yamen, the Chinese Department of External Affairs at Peking, was prepared, on the basis of China relinquishing her "shadowy claims to suzerainty over the State of Kanjut," to give up her claims to most of the Taghdumbash and Raskam districts".

If accepted, this proposed border agreement would have entailed major territorial concessions by the British, involving the transfer to China of most of the territory currently in dispute between New Delhi and Peking. The Government of India had demonstrated, both on maps and through the exercise of authority in Aksai Chin, that they considered the Kuenlun range to be *de facto* boundary between Sinkiang and Kashmir. It was clear that this proposal was made not because the British had any serious doubts about the claims of the Mir of Hunza to this territory but because they wanted China to occupy it before the Russians did so and, thus,

interpose? Chinese territory between themselves and the Russians in the same way in which they had interposed Afghan territory in the west. The proposal emerging out of what is known as the 'Macartney-Macdonald line' had neither historical nor geographical basis. Louis Daine, Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in 1907, wondered "what on earth made Cunningham to recommend this boundary". The so-called Lak Tsong, or Lokzhung, which was supposed to be the dividing line between the Aksai Chin wasteland in the north and the Lingzithan plateau in the south, does not really exist on the ground and none of the modern maps shows this range. The Chinese, however, never formally replied to the British offer, thus missing an excellent opportunity, and the British never repeated the offer. Subsequent British maps continued to depict the boundary along with the Kuenlun range, as laid down by Johnson in 1865.

Even if the Chinese had acted quickly in their acceptance of the line, it is doubtful if the British would have adhered to it. A very important event had taken place in 1895 which had rendered the Macartney—Macdonald proposals completely out of date. In 1895, China had been signally defeated at the hands of Japan. Sir John Ardagh, the Director of British Military Intelligence in 1896-97, was in the meantime engaged in making a deep study of where the British frontiers should lie if Russian expansionism was to be effectively checked. What was now feared was that the whole of Kashgar would be occupied by Russia. "If the eventual accession of Kashgar by Russia is to be expected", wrote Sir Ardagh, "we may be sure that Russia, as in the past, will endeavour to push her boundary as fast as she can, for political reasons, even if no real military advantage is sought. It is evident, therefore, that sooner or later we shall have to conclude a definite agreement regarding the Northern Frontier of India." The problem, therefore, was that of fixing up the northern frontiers of India in such a way as to make them invulnerable to any aggression from the side of Russia. The Karakoram range, which could be reached only with great difficulty from the south but with comparative ease from the north, was not regarded as feasible from the military point of view. The British, therefore, wanted to hold the glacis on the northern slopes of the ranges extending to the crest of the Kuenlun range and enclosing within British territory the upper reaches of the Yarkand river and its tributaries and the Karakash river (the northern territorial limits of the Mir of Hunza and the Maharaja of Kashmir). These positive proposals, based on vital strategic needs, had been by-passed in 1897 by Lord Elgin, who wanted to follow a 'soft' line towards Russia, but were taken up by Lord Curzon in 1899. In the meantime, a small military outpost had actually been established by a Russian party in the Taghdumbash Pamir. Lord Curzon found that it was in British interest to support the claims of the Mir of Hunza, perhaps because they were now being raised against the territory

which Russia, and not China, was claiming. "If we do not stand by the Hunza men in a case when right is so obviously on their side". Curzon wrote to Lord George Hamilton, the Secretary of State for India, in December 1899, "we shall give the impression that Russia has only to threaten in order to carry the day, and shall forfeit much of the respect upon which, on the confines of empire, power so largely depends".¹⁰ Curzon's decision amounted, in fact, to a rejection of the Macartney-Macdonald boundary in favour of the Ardagh boundary. As the twentieth century advanced, the international scene began to show signs of a change in the pattern. Russia and England patched up their major differences in 1907. The Chinese Revolution of 1911, instead of giving her strength, threatened the collapse of her power in Central Asia. Mongolia became independent. Sinkiang passed under Russian influence and Tibet drove out the Chinese from her territory, reclaiming her complete independence. By 1918, the frontiers determined by Ardagh had already settled down as the final frontiers of the country, and included in such reputable maps as those contained in *The Times Atlas* and the *Oxford Atlas*.

In the northeastern frontier too, the British followed the same policy of non-interference throughout the nineteenth century. The eastern fringe of this region was occupied by a number of aboriginal hill tribes—the Akas, Daflas, Apa Tanis, Miris, Abors, Mishmis. The British made a number of explorations into the tribal areas but, except in the Mishmi country along the Lohit, their penetration was limited to a few miles. In order to keep peace on the frontiers they entered into agreements with the tribal chiefs, on the basis of the payment of a subsidy, *posa*, which could be withheld if the tribes misbehaved, and, if stronger action was needed, they subjected them to a 'blockade' denying them access to Assamese markets, or sent out punitive expeditions. Since these tribal areas were not under the sovereignty of any other country, the British regarded them as falling within their own sphere of influence. They did not seem to mind links with Tibet and China which the tribes, ethnologically closer to them, continued to maintain. There were areas, as on the upper reaches of the Subansiri, where the Tibetans made the *Ringkor*, 'Great Pilgrimage', deep into the tribal territory once every twelve years. A certain amount of trade passed between the Tibetans and the tribes. It would be absurd to think, on the basis of these superficial contacts, that Tibet exercised any rights of sovereignty over this area. It consisted of what Lamb has described, 'a real no man's land, a region where no Indian or British official and no Tibetan tax gatherer had ever penetrated.'¹¹ In 1911 the British were in most places the first *officials* ever to come in contact with the tribesmen. The economic interests of the British timber companies and tea planters wanted the British to move deeper into the Himalayas. The rulers, however, hesitated as long as the Chinese had not created for them a problem of security.

As late as June 1908, Lord Morley had rejected Lord Minto's advocacy of a forward move into the region and believed that 'a policy of non-interference is, in my opinion, essentially sound'. The establishment of British posts in the hills, he pointed out, "would mean practical annexation followed by further progressive annexation to which it would be difficult to set a limit". One of the Englishmen, Noel Williamson, Assistant Political Officer at Sadiya, however, had kept up his probings into the region since 1905 and was killed, along with Gregorson, at the hands of the tribesmen on March 30, 1911.

The so-called 'forward' policy in this region, however, was formulated not as a result of these murders but due to the same factors which were operating in the western sector, namely, the Russian expansion. Following the defeat of China at the hands of Japan in 1895, Russia had started extending her influence over Tibet. It was this which had carried Younghusband to Tibet and to the signing of an Anglo-Tibetan treaty in October 1904. Curzon, the maker of this policy, was over-ridden by the Home Government, which believed in confirming Chinese influence in Tibet and signed the Anglo-Chinese Convention with China in 1906 and refused to deal with Tibet in any way except through China (the Anglo Russian Convention of 1907). China, bursting with energy, which later erupted into the revolution of 1911, soon completed the subjugation of Tibet, reducing its status to that of a Chinese province. Chao Erh-feng, following in the steps of Tso Tsung-tang, subjugated the whole of Eastern Tibet, occupied Lhasa (which involved the flight of the Dalai Lama to India), and reasserted China's claims to Nepal and Bhutan. Chao Erh-feng was clearly trying to establish China's military control over an area which had never acknowledged her control. He subjugated Pome (Poyul), just to the north of the Abor tribal country along the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra river, and invited Chinese settlers in the region to come to Zayul, at the head of the Lohit valley, and in close neighbourhood of the Mishmis. The Chinese soon asserted their sovereignty over the Mishmis, and there were rumours of their activity among the Aka tribes.

This was clearly more than what the British could stand. "It seems to me", wrote Sir Lancelot Hare, Lt. Governor of Eastern Bengal and Assam, on November 24, 1910, "in view of the possibility of the Chinese pushing forward that it would be a mistake not to put ourselves in a position to take up suitable strategic points of defence" Yet the British hesitated for some more time. Maj. Gen. Hamilton Bower was ultimately sent at the head of a punitive expedition, with the clear aim of determining the extent of Chinese penetration and the correct line for a new boundary. Hamilton Bower's expedition was followed by the Miri Mission, the Mishmi Mission and a host of other surveys

conducted between 1911-13 exploring the area upto the limits of Tibetan control. What the British were thinking at this time was to define a border more or less along the mountain crests and main watersheds, and to exercise control 'of a loose political nature' upto that boundary. By the end of 1913, a great deal of information about the Assam Himalayas had been collected. The lower reaches of the Subansiri, the extreme limits of the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra outside the Tibetan control and the major part of the Mishmi country had been explored, and it was now possible to provide a good map of most of the Assam Himalayas.

In the meantime, following the revolution in China, Tibet had overthrown the Chinese rule in 1912. The collapse of the Chinese power in the region proved helpful to the British in delimiting their frontiers. However, there is no reason to think that the British went beyond where they thought the legitimate frontiers of the Indian sub-continent should lie. The Simla Conference of 1913-14 was designed not to secure frontiers for India but to bring about some understanding between the weak Chinese power and revolting Tibetans with regard to the nature of their political relationship and their common frontiers. By reducing the nature of Chinese claims over Tibet from sovereignty to suzerainty, they set about raising up Tibet as a buffer state between themselves and China, something they had tried to do with Sinkiang in the west. On the Chinese refusing to ratify the agreement, in spite of the fact that the Chinese delegate Chen I-fan at the tripartite convention had signed it, the British entered into a separate agreement with Lonchen Shatra, the chief Tibetan delegate, which was embodied in an exchange of notes on March 24-25, 1914. By a subsequent convention, signed on July 3, 1914, the Chinese were precluded from any rights under the former convention until they agreed. This was the famous McMahon Line.

The McMahon Line clearly included within it Towang on the west, and the Tsari district, in which Migyitun was situated, in the middle. The Towang tract included within it the Towang monastery as well as the winter residence of the Tsona Dzungpons. On the northeastern extremity, the Indian frontier extends considerably north of Walong. Much has been made of Tibetan influence in these areas. There is, however, considerable evidence to show that the nature of the Tibetan influence that prevailed in these areas was not such as to establish a territorial claim. The fact that the Tibetan traders came deep into Towang with their commodities of silver, wool, sword musks, etc., and purchased rice in the region, or that the Tibetan pilgrims made pilgrimages, annually or once in twelve years, did not constitute any valid evidence of their political control over the area. The existence of a monastery also really did not mean much. It is not clear what the Dzungpons did. They were appointed by the Towang monastery and were under its control. They seemed to

be officials of the church, and there was nothing to show that they owed any responsibility to the Lhasa Government. With regard to Towang, the information obtained in 1914, to which Lamb did not seem to have access, clearly shows that although the monastery was under Tibetan control, it had *always* retained its independence from Tibet in temporal matters. The Lonchen Shatra himself admitted this during the Simla Conference. In the Tsari area neither Tibetan administration nor Tibetan settlers had ever penetrated. Similarly, in Walong there was never any Tibetan administration. Some Tibetan immigrants had lately arrived there, but they were under Mishmi control.¹²

McMahon's note to Lonchen Shatra, dated March 24, 1914, makes it clear that all that Tibet could claim on the British side of the frontier was ownership of some private estates, and this was not disturbed. Similarly, it was agreed to that if the frontier places of Pso Karpo and Tsari Sarpa fell within a day's march from the British side of the frontier, they would be included in Tibetan territory. It was only when the British Government had agreed to these two conditions that Lonchen Shatra had put his signatures to the Convention. If Towang, Tsari and Walong areas had been under effective Tibetan control, Lonchen Shatra would never have accepted the British control over them. The agreement was not the result of a military defeat and could in no sense be regarded as imposed on the Tibetans. In fact, it had been made with their complete willingness. These territories, as the very attack of the Chinese armies against them in 1962 made it clear, are territories of strategic importance. As early as 1928, Nevill had stated that "there is no doubt that as soon as China settles down, this Tibetan frontier will become of great importance. China still has its eyes on Tibet, and in Lhasa the pro-Chinese party is growing in influence and, should China gain control of Tibet, the Towang country is *particularly adapted for a secret and easy entrance into India*".

While the McMahon Line was accepted by the Tibetans in 1914, the British did not seem to be in a hurry to extend their actual control over the entire Line, partly on account of the intercession of the First World War and partly on account of their unwillingness to take any action *unless Chinese aggressiveness made it necessary*. As late as 1936, they had not brought Towang under their full control, with the result that certain false impressions had gained ground during recent years. "The continued exercise of jurisdiction of Tibet in Towang and the area north of Towang", wrote the Assam Government to the Government of India in September 1936, "might enable China, or still worse, might enable any other power which may in future be in a position to assert authority over Tibet, to claim prescriptive rights over a part of the territory recognised as within India by the 1914 Convention". While deciding to implement the McMahon Line, the Assam Government also made it very clear that there was 'no

intention to interfere with the purely monastic collection of the 'Towang monastery'. The same was true of the other areas. In the Dihang valley, deep into the Abor country, British Political Officers started touring only after 1937, following refusal by the Abor inhabitants to pay taxes to the Tibetans. Lohit began to be opened up, to the great delight of the local people, in 1940, when it was decided to construct a road through Rima to the Tibetan border. But this was action by fits and starts. The British might have continued the same policy of vacillation and drift had the Second World War not suddenly exposed the vulnerability of the entire northeastern frontier. It was in 1943 that it was resolved to set in hand 'the task of making the (Simla) Convention boundary good'. The British now placed armed posts up the Lohit to the McMahon border, and examined plans for the construction of a road from Sadiya to Rima. It was in the subsequent years that British officers extended their administrative control to the Lohit valley, the Dihang area, the Subansiri region and the Towang tract. They carried out detailed study of the tribes in the region, sent military patrols, established government trading posts and set up armed posts. Even then the work had not been quite completed by the time when they parted with power. It fell upon the Government of independent India to complete the task left by the British. The rise of a powerful China with a growingly aggressive foreign policy made it necessary for the Government of India to take up the work in all earnestness. Within a few years, the entire Assam frontier area was reorganized, and the North East Frontier Agency was created, dedicated, as Nehru declared, to the determination 'to help the tribal people to grow according to their own genius and traditions'. In 1951, Towang, the last pocket of Tibetan rule south of the McMahon Line, was brought under Indian administrative control.

REVOLT IN TIBET AND ITS AFTERMATH

The attitude of the Government of India towards the growing estrangement between India and China was not one of unawareness of the danger but one of caution. Nehru regarded a war with China "one of those peak events of history when a plunge has to be taken in some direction which may have powerful and far reaching effects not only on our country but on Asia and even the world". Nehru never claimed that he would not be prepared to fight for India's stand or even to give up a policy of non-alignment if it became necessary. Non-alignment was for him "basically a right policy under all circumstances, whatever happens," but "not, of course, if there is a war." "If peace is broken we will deal with the situation in so far as we can. The policy itself remains good all the same and it applies to the rest of the world and later to that part of the world too, because war is a bad thing—anyhow it is not a permanent phenomenon." "If this unfortunate thing (meaning a war between India and China) occurs," said Nehru, "we have to face it and we shall become a nation in arms; let there be no mistake about it." "If two giant countries, the biggest countries of Asia, are involved in conflict, it will shake Asia and shake the world." Nehru was aware of the fact that the issues surrounding the problem were "so huge, vague, deep-seated and far-reaching, intertwined even, that one has to think about them with all the clarity and strength at one's command, and not be swept away by passion which may harm us instead of doing us good." A war with China would be "the biggest challenge we could have, a challenge which would make history for good or bad... China is no small country, nor is India. They are both big Asian countries and, in perhaps somewhat different ways, strong countries. It is absurd for the Government of China to imagine that they can sit on India or crush India. It is equally absurd for anyone in India to think that we can sit on China or crush China...basically when these two giant countries come into a conflict, into a life-and-death struggle, no one gives in, certainly India does not give in."

Nehru avoided carrying the border issue to the stage of open

conflict, fully realizing that "such a conflict, such a war between India and China will be bad, terribly bad, a tragedy of the deepest kind—a tragedy for us, a tragedy for China too and a tragedy for Asia and the world." Nehru's attitude towards China was one of mild persuasion. He tried his best to avoid hurting China's susceptibilities, fully realizing that China as a great nation could not be treated in any other way. He had a sympathetic—perhaps too sympathetic—understanding of China's position. The new government being a child of revolution would take time to settle down and mature, this was what Nehru thought. He knew that China had a one-track mind—"encouraged or developed or conditioned even more by the semi-isolation in which this revolutionary China has grown up in the last ten years with no contacts with others except a limited circle of nations." There was no misunderstanding on India's part about what China was. "We knew enough history to realize that a strong China is normally an expansionist China...and we said, or we felt, that two factors, the great push towards industrialization of that country and the amazing pace of its population increase taken together, would create a most dangerous situation." India was neither unaware of the forces that were at work in China nor afraid of her. "There is no question of fear of China. There has been an appraisal of the situation, of the consequences, and of the further action to be taken, which helps to prevent a dangerous development."

Nehru did not agree with critics when they said that his China policy had been wrong. He thought it was right that India, despite provocations on China's part, had tried to be friendly to her. He decided to continue his policy of peace and friendship with China, at the same time adhering to the fundamentals of his position. He did not quite realize what China wanted—"whether it is just local aggressiveness, or a desire to show us our place, if I may use a colloquial phrase, so that we may not get uppish, or something deeper, I do not know." With regard to the McMahon Line he was prepared to discuss on the conference table any interpretation of it—"minor interpretations here and there on the evidence available, such as facts and maps." He was prepared to have "any kind of conciliatory, mediatory process to consider this." He was prepared "to have arbitration from any authority agreed to by the two parties about these minor rectifications, where they are challenged by them or by us. But the McMahon Line has to be broadly accepted." With regard to Ladakh he held that the border had been governed by ancient treaties over a hundred years old, between the then ruler of Kashmir on the one hand and the ruler of Lhasa and the representative of the emperor of China on the other, under which Ladakh had been recognized as a part of the Kashmir State. The actual boundary, of course, had never been carefully defined, even though the line had been marked all along in the

Indian maps. Regarding this too, Nehru said, "we are prepared to sit down and discuss these minor things." However, he asked, "But discuss it on what terms? First, the treaties, existing maps, etc. Secondly, geography. By geography I mean physical features like watershed and ridges of a mountain." He was, however, not prepared to accept the preposterous Chinese claim to some 36,000 square miles of territory in the northeast and 15,000 square miles in the northwest—"a claim which it is quite impossible for India or for any Indian to admit, whatever the consequences. There is no question of mediation, conciliation or arbitration about it...it involves a fundamental change in the whole geography of our country, the Himalayas being handed over as a gift to them. This is a claim which, whether India exists or does not exist, cannot be agreed to. There the matter ends." "It is a strange turn of circumstances", Nehru bemoaned, "that we in India who stood for peace and worked for it with all our might should suddenly be drawn into this dangerous situation and be faced with the possibility even of war." He tried to wish away, not with much success, the dangerous predicament. "I do not think war will come. I do not think that any country is foolish enough to jump over the precipice into war. But I say that such possibilities come into our minds..."

In fact, Nehru was gradually coming to realize that conflict with China might become inevitable. A historical change of great magnitude was taking place. For the first time two major powers of Asia faced each other on an armed border. For the first time a world power or a would-be world power sat near the borders and frontiers of India. With a hundred per cent friendship on the part of India the fact of a mighty power sitting on her borders could not be completely forgotten. India was not expected to accept the conditions arrogantly laid down by China. She was not a mean or weak country. If China had gone through one of the most fundamental revolutions in history, something which convulsed her six hundred million people, in India too mighty changes had taken place in her four hundred million people, changes not brought about by abrupt and violent methods, nevertheless, big changes. "We have got here to face a situation," Nehru said, "which can only be faced by strength. We have to build up that strength as rapidly as possible." India was not in a hurry to take up the cudgels. Nehru did his best to keep down the war hysteria among the people. He went to the extent of saying to his people, "Nothing can be more amazing than for two great countries like India and China to move into a major conflict and war for the possession of a few mountain peaks, however beautiful the mountain peaks might be." "Beyond the problems of today stretches the vista of the future ...taking shelter in jingoistic and chauvinistic cries...would be a tragedy, because we shall become a nation not of depth but of effervescence." Nehru decided that "we should hold our position," and

hoped "that the lapse of time and events would confirm it, and by the time the challenge came we would be in a much stronger position to face it." Clearly, he did not realize how soon the challenge would come.¹

The Government of India seems to have taken for a long time a hazy view of the strategic importance of Ladakh, which had become all the greater on account of the Chinese control over Tibet. Nehru was not wrong when he said about Aksai Chin that this was an area "where no people lived and no blade of grass grew." However, this was the area where the frontiers of Tibet, Sinkiang and Ladakh met and, even if the potentialities of oil, gold and uranium were not taken into consideration, the strategic realities and potentialities of Ladakh were very great. Historically speaking, this was the area through which vast hordes of people had moved through centuries from Central Asia and had scattered themselves far and wide, spreading disaster either directly or by chain reaction and, while China had been the main sufferer from these migratory incursions, India, despite the Himalayan wall, had not entirely escaped. However, times had changed, and three expanding empires, Chinese, Indian and Russian, seemed to be converging on this point, subduing disorders on their respective frontiers through conquest, subsidy, or intimidation, and leaving no possibility for any buffer states to thrive. Of the three great powers interested in the region, China, following her annexation of Tibet, seemed to have developed a special interest. It is interesting to note that while Tibet had common frontiers with China both in the north and the east, the easiest access into the country lay only from the south and the west, through India and Ladakh. If China had not already built a road across Aksai Chin in Ladakh in 1956-57 she would have found it difficult to suppress the revolt of the Khampas in Tibet in 1959. In fact, the road had been constructed on account of its military importance, and served as the main artery through which tighter control could be maintained over a sullen Tibet. The original route by which the Chinese invaded Tibet in 1950 had by-passed the Indian territories by a short distance. The road through Aksai Chin was a supplementary road which was linked up with the road originally planned to connect Sinkiang with Rudok, Gartok and Taklakot. It is difficult to understand why the Government of India did not fully comprehend the strategic significance of Ladakh to the defence of India. The area certainly was not of much strategic value at a time when China was weak and divided and its mainland was largely under foreign control. The Karakoram pass was far too rugged to permit the passage of an armed force of any magnitude and there existed no better route between Sinkiang and Ladakh. The British had depended on their control of the area through their position in Leh. The Chinese, however, with their intimate knowledge of this region,

knew that Leh had been by-passed before and could be by-passed again. China, therefore, constructed, through the high alkaline plains of Aksai Chin, an important all weather communication system route. With Sinkiang and Tibet already under her control, the addition of the Aksai Chin area of Ladakh to the Chinese empire completely outflanked Leh and offered the Government of China immense strategic possibilities.²

It would not be correct to think that the news of the construction of the road did not arouse deepest apprehensions in the Indian mind. But India had just successfully completed her First Five Year Plan, overshooting some of her targets, and emerged from the second general elections in the country, which marked another significant triumph for democracy, and was well set on her more ambitious Second Five Year Plan. She refused to be deflected from the path of economic development, which, in the long run, was bound to strengthen her defence position, and continued to keep faith in a peaceful settlement of the problem with China. Was China not engaged at this very time in improving her relations with the Asian countries? Was China not aware of the policy of friendship and support which India had so consistently followed towards her? Was India not getting more and more friendly towards the Soviet Union, China's great ally? Could anyone conceive, under the circumstances, that China would be prepared to go to the length of a war with India for the sake of barren mountain peaks, however important they might be to China, which India had sincerely claimed to belong to her traditionally? It was the 1959 revolt in Tibet which brought about a radical change in the situation.

In spite of the 17-point Agreement of May 1951 signed between the Chinese Government and the Tibet region of China, the Tibetans do not seem to have taken kindly to the Chinese rule. The Chinese did some heart-searching and tried to probe into the 'numerous short-comings and errors on the part of the Chinese personnel working in Tibet' and 'the lack of due respect to the religious beliefs, customs and habits of the Tibetans.'³ "Great-Han chauvinism in Tibet", reports Fan Ming, "is manifested in the superiority of the Han race, repugnance at the backwardness of Tibet, failure to respect the freedom of religious belief and traditional customs of the Tibetan people".⁴ Revolt in the Kham region of China broke out almost simultaneously with the setting up by the Chinese in September 1955 of a Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region for the inauguration of reforms. Late in 1955, the Khampas broke into a revolt, and by July 1956 the revolt had covered the whole of Kham and Ando, and the Tibetans had formed a resistance organization to fight the Chinese. As a Chinese newspaper, *Kanze Pao*, reported, "When the reform was first launched, a few short-sighted feudal lords and landlords, acting at the instigation of

counter-revolutionary elements, organised armed revolts in an attempt to resist the reform. Under nationalistic and religious pretences, the reactionary feudal lords and landlords burnt government stores and warehouses, disrupted communications, robbed the masses, killed cadres, attacked the People's Liberation Army and cruelly mutilated those activists who wanted reform by gouging their eyes, cutting off their noses and hamstringing them, causing great losses to the people in life and property". The Chinese Government was compelled to gauge the depth and intensity of the Tibetan feelings and the extent of the revolt. This undoubtedly impressed upon them the necessity to postpone the 'reforms', "Because conditions in Tibet are not ripe", Mao Tse-tung announced in his famous 'contradictions' speech of February 27, 1957, "democratic reforms have not yet been carried out there." "When this can be done", he further said, "can only be decided when the great majority of the people of Tibet and their leading figures consider it practicable. It has now been decided not to proceed with democratic reforms in Tibet during the period of the Second Five Year Plan (1958-1962) and we can only decide whether it will be done in the period of the Third Five Year Plan in the light of the situation obtaining at that time."

The Tibetan happenings did not immediately ruffle the relations between India and China. The Dalai Lama was allowed to visit India in November 1956 at the invitation of the Indian Government to participate in the Buddha Parinirvana celebrations, but he was constantly accompanied everywhere by Chinese officials. The Chinese Government made a gift of 500 rare Chinese volumes on Buddhism and 10 volumes of a comprehensive dictionary of Sanskrit-Chinese Buddhist terms. to the Nalanda Pali Research Institute. The Dalai Lama presented 1335 volumes of translations of Buddhist works by Huen-tsang. It was reported later that the Dalai Lama had expressed a desire to stay on in India, but was persuaded by Nehru to go back to Tibet. During his visit to India, in December 1956, Chou En-lai had gone out of his way to tell Nehru that "while Tibet had long been a part of the Chinese State, they (the Chinese Government) did not consider Tibet as a province of China". The people being "different", they "considered Tibet an autonomous region which would enjoy autonomy". "It was absurd for anyone to imagine", Chou had added, "that China was going to force communism on Tibet. Communism could not be enforced in this way on a backward country".⁵ India had nothing to complain at what was described as attempts "to lift the burden of medievalism from their shoulders and help them chart their path to a broad future."⁶ Yet, some minor strains and irritants were creeping in. Chou had talked to Nehru about the Tibetan rebellion in a way which should have aroused the suspicions of the Indian Prime Minister. "We do not wish to interfere with the Tibetans, with their internal structure, customs or religion," Chou En-lai told Nehru, "but we will not tolerate

rebellion and foreign interference.” “I do not know what he meant when he said foreign interference,” Nehru told the Parliament, “but I find that they have some kind of a link in their minds, not so much of India having anything to do with it, but of the United Kingdom and America somehow making incursions into Tibet.”⁷ It was clear, as Nehru himself told the Parliament, that the United Kingdom had absolutely no interest in Tibet since she left India, nor had the United States. The hint was clearly not taken by Nehru.

During his visit to India, the Dalai Lama had extended an invitation to Prime Minister Nehru to visit Tibet. On April 8, 1958, a Delhi announcement confirmed the invitation. It was thought that Nehru would visit Tibet sometime in September 1958. But the Tibetan revolt was spreading so fast that late in July 1958 Nehru had to decide to cancel the proposed visit. A little earlier, on July 10, the Foreign Office of China had sent a note to the Counsellor of India ‘regarding the exigency of the stepped up subversive and disruptive activities against China’s Tibet region carried out by the U.S. and the Chiang Kai-shek clique in collusion with fugitive reactionaries from Tibet using India’s Kalimpong as a base.’ Replying to the note, on August 2, 1958, the Government of India’s Ministry of External Affairs said that ‘the statement contained in this note must have been based on a complete misunderstanding of facts. The Government of India have no evidence that the U. S. Government and the Kuomintang regime are using Kalimpong as a base for disruptive activities against China’s Tibetan region’.⁸ The Government of India further assured Peking that “India does not and will not permit any activities on its territories directed against the People’s Republic of China” and that “India was determined to take action under the law of the country against those who indulge in any such illegal activities.”⁹

The revolt in Tibet spread month after month, year after year, and it extended from the east towards the west. There was little doubt that the great majority of Tibetans sympathized with it. Early in March 1959, riots broke out in Lhasa itself, involving considerable damage to some of the old monasteries and some valued manuscripts. On March 17, when some mortar shells fell on the Norbulingka Palace, the Dalai Lama escaped from Lhasa along with some of his trusted officials. This was followed by a large-scale armed uprising in the city and other areas of Tibet, on March 19. On March 31, the Dalai Lama crossed into the Indian territory, followed by some 13,000 refugees, and was given political asylum by the Government of India. There was no infringement of any rules of political conduct in giving asylum to a person who asked for it. “They sought asylum”, said Nehru in the Parliament, “and we agreed...you couldn’t leave these refugees to their own sources. Apart from the humanitarian considerations involved there was also the law and order problem to be considered.”¹⁰ It was clear that the Dalai Lama had entered India entirely of his own volition. It was

after the departure of the Dalai Lama from Tibet that the revolution had broken out in its full fury. The Chinese contention was that the revolt, brewing for a long time, had been the work of 'the reactionary clique of the upper social strata' in collaboration with 'the external enemy and serf-owners in Sinkiang and Tibet', that the rebellion was 'engineered by the imperialists, the Chiang Kai-shek bands and foreign reactionaries', 'and that the commanding centre of the rebellion was in Kalimpong' and 'many of their arms were brought in from abroad.' This was not borne out by facts. Two-thirds of Tibet and almost 80 per cent of its population was involved in the revolt. The Chinese, however, admitted that 'the local Government of Tibet and the reactionary clique of the upper social strata took the magnanimity of the Central People's Government for a sign of weakness...refused to do their duty to check the ravages of the rebel bandits, but instead actively stepped up their treacherous intrigues.' With the aid of the patriotic Tibetan monks and laymen, the Chinese Government communique announced, 'the People's Liberation Army completely crushed the rebellion in the city of Lhasa after more than two days of fighting'. With the ruthless suppression of the revolt, and the flight of thousands of Tibetan refugees into India, stories of the Chinese atrocities in Tibet started reaching India. The Dalai Lama's statement in Delhi on August 30, 1959, reminds one of the poignant words of Haile Selassie on Abyssinia's subjugation by Mussolini in 1935. "The picture of Tibet has become immeasurably darker and gloomier," said the Dalai Lama, "and the sufferings of my people are beyond description. I take this opportunity to make a personal appeal to all civilized countries of the world to lend their fullest support to our cause of freedom and justice."

With the entry of the Dalai Lama into India, the Chinese started a campaign of vilification against her, using language "which cannot but worsen the situation and our relations with our northern neighbour". The Chinese radio and newspapers accused Kalimpong of being 'the commanding centre of the revolt', alleged that the Dalai Lama had been abducted from Tibet by rebels at the instigation of certain Indian elements and was being held in India 'under duress', and repeatedly 'warned the imperialists and Indian expansionists not to meddle in China's internal affairs'. They went to the extent of accusing India of wanting to 'turn Tibet into their colony for protection'. "Judging by the recent vociferations of the Indian expansionists", wrote China's official newspaper, "there is reason to believe that some new schemes are now afoot that would endanger the five principles of peaceful co-existence and intervene further in the internal affairs of China". Nehru again advised his countrymen to exercise "restraint, wisdom and use language which is moderate and precise"¹¹. "It is not for me to make any similar appeal to the leaders, the Press and the people of China. All I can say is that I have been greatly distressed at the tone of the comments and the charges.

made against India by responsible people in China. They have used the language of the cold war regardless of truth and propriety. This is peculiarly distressing in a great nation with thousands of years of culture behind it, noted for its restrained and polite behaviour".¹² The Indian feelings were also considerably aroused by the ruthless manner in which China was dealing with the Tibetan rebels and her allegation of India's complicity. The Dalai Lama, on his arrival in India, said that over 10,000 Tibetans had been killed in the fighting in Lhasa and about 90,000 throughout Tibet during the whole revolt. Nehru advised his countrymen to keep caution and not to do anything in excitement which might lead India into difficulties. On September 4, 1959, a non-official resolution was moved in the Indian Parliament urging that India should take the Tibetan issue to the United Nations. While acknowledging that everyone in the House had a feeling of the deepest sympathy at the sufferings of the Tibetan people, Nehru told the Parliament, "It is easy enough to talk about them and it is easy enough to find many faults in the ways the countries behave. But if a country like India has to function, we have to function in a mature way, in a considered way, in a way which at least promises some kind of results. It is absolutely pointless for us to make brave gestures and it is worse than pointless if these brave gestures react and rebound on us and injure the cause which we seek to promote". His approach was immensely practical. He knew that an appeal to the United Nations would lead to nothing. "Suppose we get over the legal quibbles and legal difficulties. It may lead to a debate in the General Assembly or the Security Council wherever it is taken up, a debate which will be an acrimonious debate, an angry debate, a debate which will be after the fashion of cold war. Having had the debate, what then will the promoters of that debate and that motion do? Nothing more. They will return home. After having brought matters to a higher temperature, fever heat, they will go home." "Obviously", the Prime Minister added, "nobody is going to send an army to Tibet or China for that was not done in the case of Hungary which is a part of Europe and which is more allied to European nations. It is fantastic to think they will move in that way in Tibet". Nehru's tone was clearly one of a stark realistic and calculating politician in whom the last flames of idealism had been burnt out.¹³ Irrespective of his advice, the Dalai Lama sent, on September 9, 1959, a petition to the U.N. seeking 'intervention' on 'humanitarian ground' saying that the Chinese 'have committed offences against the universally accepted laws of international conduct'. In November 1959, a three-member Tibetan delegation went to the United Nations to request that the question be put on the agenda. In sheer deference to India, the major powers desisted from taking action. It fell to Ireland and Malaya to sponsor the question. The International Commission of Jurists, to whom

the charge of genocide was referred, found it completely substantiated. But with India unwilling to take any interest, no headway could be made.

The Government of India's policy with regard to Tibet all through the years was clear and unequivocal. As early as 1954, Nehru had regarded the stationing of Indian troops in Tibet as wrong. "Is it proper", he had asked in Parliament on May 18, 1954, "that the troops of one country should be stationed in another country? What right does India have to keep a part of her army in Tibet, whether Tibet is independent or a part of China?" The troops had subsequently been withdrawn under the Sino-Indian Agreement of 1954. Whenever allegations regarding anti-Chinese activities being organized in Kalimpong had been received from China, the Government of India had made investigations and taken necessary action. It was, however, not possible for Nehru to agree with the Chinese view that the rebellion had been organized by 'upper strata reactionaries'. "Even according to the accounts received through Chinese sources", he told the Parliament on April 27, 1959, "the revolt in Tibet was of considerable magnitude and the basis of it must have been a strong feeling of nationalism which affects not only upper class people but others also".¹⁴ Nehru made it clear that it was open to the Dalai Lama at any time to go back to Tibet or wherever he wanted to. He invited Panchen Lama to come to India and meet the Dalai Lama. The Chinese ambassador or any other member of the Chinese Government could come to India and meet the Dalai Lama: "There is no barrier against anyone coming peacefully to India, and whether we agree with him or not, we shall treat him with the courtesy due to a guest." There was a wild talk of "Indian expansionism" in China, which India was alleged to have inherited from the British, in complete disregard of the friendly attitude that the Government of India had taken in the matter of China's occupation of Tibet. Said Nehru, "The five principles have laid down *inter alia* mutual respect for each other. Such mutual respect is gravely impaired if unfounded charges are made and the language of the cold war used."¹⁵ It soon became clear that China was not prepared to limit her anger against India to wordy warfare. On August 25, 1959, there came the Chinese intrusion into the Indian territory at Longju and firing at the Indian frontier guards stationed there. Nehru continued to play down the significance of this and the other intrusions. "I do not want anyone to imagine", he told the Lok Sabha on September 12, 1959, "that something serious is going to happen in our frontiers. I do not at all accept it—it is not an easy matter to happen either..." He did not think there was any 'major idea behind them.' "I am inclined to think that all these are tagged on to Tibet". This was followed by firing in Ladakh. Nehru had now to admit, in a speech at Delhi on November 1, 1959, that "the border question was a big one and

had possibilities of becoming bigger in the future", and that a new chapter had been opened in the relations between the two countries when the Chinese opened fire in Longju and in Ladakh.

The crisis in ~~Sino-Indian relations~~ in the wake of the 1959 revolt in Tibet necessarily enhanced the importance of their Himalayan frontiers in the eyes of both Governments, and serious clashes now started for the possession of the bleak and barren mountain peaks. At one point, it appears, Peking was prepared to drop all other territorial claims in return for India's concession with regard to Aksai Chin. In the meantime, negotiations between the two countries continued. The Government of China rejected the proposal of the Government of India for a withdrawal of troops on the part of both the countries in Ladakh, and the Government of India refused to follow the same policy with regard to the northeastern frontier. Nehru invited Chou-En-lai to visit New Delhi so that they could make every effort to explore avenues which might lead to a peaceful settlement. On April 19, 1960 Chou En-lai arrived in New Delhi and the two Prime Ministers sat together for six days thrashing out the proposals brought forward by the two sides. On Chou En-lai's six-point formula being found unacceptable by Nehru, the talks broke down and the Chinese Prime Minister, on returning to his country, declared that India had been "unwilling to recognise (even the objective fact) that there exist disputes between the two sides with regard to the boundary". He further accused Nehru of making "claims which even British imperialism dared not put before the Chinese governments." This was, however, followed by a meeting of the officials of the two countries in Peking between June 15 and July 25, in Delhi from August 19 to October 5 and at Rangoon from November 7 to December 12, 1960. The sessions ended in a stalemate. China claimed that she had "proved with a large volume of conclusive data that the traditional customary boundary line, as pointed out by her, had a historical and factual basis," the Indian side, in her opinion, "mainly relying on obviously valueless material from British travellers and adventurers." The Government of India, on the other hand, claimed that the report had made clear "on the basis of a vast amount of evidence that the traditional delimited boundary between the two countries was that shown by India and that China had made their unwarranted claims to about 50,000 square miles of Indian territory and was in unlawful possession of about 12,000 square miles of this." "The telling contrast between the wealth of consistent and conclusive evidence produced by the Indian side, and the sketchy and contradictory material put forth by the Chinese side," the Indian Government claimed, "leave no doubt that the true boundary is that claimed by India and that no major disputes regarding it existed until December 1959".

Leaving aside the claims and counter-claims of the two countries, we can rely on the conclusion reached by two political scientists of the University of California, Berkeley, who have made a deep study of the problem. "The case presented by the Peking authorities," write Fisher and Rose, "was so self-contradictory and disingenuous that it can only be interpreted as a demonstration of complete disdain for documentary justification of Chinese claims. India, on the contrary, carefully prepared an impressive case drawing upon the extensive and widely varied documentation. The conclusion could not be but embarrassing to China, and Peking's exhibition of rage and pain when New Delhi published the complete text of both reports is understandable."¹⁵ The Government of China for long did not even acknowledge the existence of the report. Finally, in May 1962, they published a garbled and truncated version of the Chinese section of the report. The sinister nature of China's objectives was being revealed not only by continued aggression but by her diplomatic posture. At the meeting of the officials, China refused to include the Sino-Indian frontier "west of Karakoram" within the scope of their talks, the argument given by them being that "the western sector of the Sino-Indian boundary as mutually understood by the two sides starts from the Karakoram pass eastward." When the Indian officials protested, the Chinese side clearly said that "in view of the present actual situation in Kashmir, it was also inappropriate for the two sides—China and India—to discuss the boundary west of the Karakoram pass". This was a challenge to India's legal status in Kashmir, which had been recognised by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries and which had not been contradicted by China herself so far. The Chinese officials, further, refused to discuss the Sino-Sikkimese and Sino-Bhutanese sectors of the Sino-Indian boundary on the ground that "...the Chinese Government has always declared that they do not fall within the scope of the Sino-Indian boundary question." This was a point which Chou En-lai himself had raised in his letter of September 8, 1959, and which Nehru had contradicted in his reply of September 26. "Under treaty relationship with Bhutan", Nehru had written, "the Government of India are the only competent authority to take up with other Governments matters concerning Bhutan's external relations... The rectification of errors in Chinese maps regarding the boundary of Bhutan with Tibet is therefore a matter which has to be discussed along with the boundary of India with the Tibet region of China in the same sector." Nehru also reminded Chou of the 1890 Sino-Indian Convention on Sikkim and the recognition by China that the Government of India "has direct and exclusive control over the internal administration and foreign relations of that state." However, it produced no effect on the rigid attitude of China in the matter. China's new orientation of policy on the accession of Kashmir on the one hand and the special relations of India with Bhutan and Sikkim on the other was, to say the least, ominous.

The border talks between the officials of the two countries, thus, made no positive contribution to the lessening of tension. Both sides, in fact, had continued to strengthen their respective positions even when talks had been going on, establishing new military posts in the disputed area and strengthening them with new and improved communication systems. The Chinese displayed arrogance not only in a disdainful attitude towards the documentation of their traditional claims but also in, what Fisher and Rose have described as, "the subtle variation of Hitlerian technique in which these territorial claims were advanced."¹⁶ A series of "final demands" were made. The Chinese method was a nibbling process which not only refused to clarify final demands but began with a denial that any but the most trivial and easily settled differences existed. "Under cover of this air of complete reasonableness, chunks of territory were quickly seized." In the meantime, the use of maps as a technique of aggression continued. The Chinese maps continued to change despite assurances, one of which was explicitly given to Nehru by Chou En-lai himself in 1956, when he had pointed out that the map under discussion accurately represented the Chinese concept of the border. During 1960 talks the Chinese officials presented a new map incorporating an additional 1,800 to 2,000 square miles of territory in Ladakh. On their attention being drawn to this inconsistency, they first dismissed the differences as "trivial" and then took up the position that they regarded both boundaries "equally valid". There could be only one interpretation of this attitude—that neither of the maps represented anything more than a stage in a campaign, the ultimate aims of which Peking had no intention at that time to reveal. It is also interesting to note that the Chinese forces had already established military posts along this 1960 line prior to the presentation of the new map to Indian officials. Between 1960-62, a number of new Chinese posts were established and new roads constructed deeper into the Aksai Chin area.

STRATEGY AND MILITARY BUILD-UP BEHIND CHINA'S AGGRESSIVENESS

A review of the Chinese aggression on India's Himalayan frontiers makes it clear that China has been engaged, since her occupation of Tibet in 1950, in systematically building up a position of strategic advantage against India. By 1953, all the important towns in Tibet had been connected by telegraph wires with China and the Chinese garrisons in Tibet linked efficiently by radio telephone. By 1954, two roads connecting Tibet with China had been completed. The first of these roads started from Sining in Inner Tibet, moved westward, then turned south and entered Outer Tibet to the north of Nagchu Ka to reach Lhasa. By 1955, the entire stretch of this 2160-kilometres road was motorable. The second road started from Tatsienlu and moved *via* Kantse to Chamdo and from there to Lhasa, from where it turned south to join the main trade route *via* Phari and Yatung and came within sixty kilometres of the NEFA border. Sagging far to the south, it was constructed with the help of Russian engineers and passed through more difficult terrain than the old caravan route. From these two highways, there branched out innumerable spur roads linking them up with strategic points on the Indian border. "The new roads in Tibet", as Lowell Thomas Jr. pointed out, "could not be for the purpose of trade...They were not the type that the local traffic of caravans and light vehicles would require. Instead, they were constructed to take the heaviest trucks which in that part of the world were available only to the armed forces."¹

The Khampa revolt of 1956-59 gave the Chinese a pretext to construct more roads and amass larger armies on the Indian frontiers. The motor road which the Chinese had built in 1956-57 through Aksai Chin, cutting away some 12,000 sq. miles of Indian territory not only provided them with a link between Sinkiang and Tibet but placed them in a threatening posture with regard to the entire northern defence line of India. This road, as the Government of India Note of October 18, 1958 pointed out, entered Indian territory just east of Sarigh Jilgnang, ran northwest to Amtogar and, striking the western bank of the Amtogar lake, ran northwest through Yangpas, Khitai Dawan and Haji Langar, which

were all in indisputable Indian territory. With the completion of this road, China was able to control the entire chain of roads from Sinkiang through Rudok to Gartok and beyond Gartok to Taklakot so as to outflank the western and the central sectors, and was in a position to extend its military establishments to the borders of Sikkim, Bhutan and NEFA. The Chinese, thus, controlled the entire region from Gartok to Mt. Kailash (22,028 feet high) and the (46 miles) Mansarovar lake, situated some 100 miles to the southeast. The religious-minded Hindus had treated this region as the abode of gods and travelled to these places for thousands of years, and the Bhotias from Almora region had constantly moved there during the summer months to barter cotton goods, rice and onions for wool, salt hides, musk-deer glands, etc. In their agreement with India, signed on April 29, 1954, the Chinese had agreed to permit pilgrims from India of Lamaist, Hindu and Buddhist faiths to visit Kailash and Mansarovar, in accordance with custom (Article III, Clause 1), and had also accepted (Article IV) that traders and pilgrims of both countries would be able to travel by the Shipki, Mana, Niti, Kungri Bingri, Darma and Lipu Lekh passes, all of which belonged to India, were under Indian control and had been freely used by Indian nationals for centuries. But only two months later 'border disputes' had broken out over the possession of these passes and, in the summer of 1954, the Chinese troops had already gone into offensive in the Bara Hoti plain lying further south of the Niti pass.

Only 300 miles by air to Delhi, on a flat plateau lying 14,000 feet high, where air fields could be constructed with great ease. Gartok was an ideal base for the Chinese to operate from and inflict serious blows on important Indian cities and industrial establishments. Gartok also commanded an ideal road junction in Parkha to the southeast, which was connected by high roads with Lhasa, with the high Tibetan plateau at Shangtang, with Ladakh, and with India. Closing all trade and pilgrim traffic with the Kailash-Mansarovar area and strongly entrenched on the Gartok-Mansarovar line, China took up diplomatic offensive by accusing India of creating border disputes and blaming the Indian troops for crossing the Niti pass and intruding into Wuje (Bara Hoti), whereas the truth was that the Chinese themselves were engineering all these troubles. Any military base built in this area could dominate the entire Gangetic plain. Metaphorically speaking, China, standing across high and sacred mountain peaks like Gangotri, Badrinath, Kedarnath, Kamet and Nanda Devi, was trying to thrust her right fist into the Shipki pass, on the Himachal Pradesh border, and the left through the Darma pass and the Garbyang-Taklakot section near the border of Nepal, across into Indian territory. Her main target, clearly, was the Shipki pass, 200 miles from Simla, to which they could easily reach from Gartok. Any one in control of the Spiti valley and the

Shipki pass from the Tibetan side of the fertile Sutlej valley could walk across the northern borders of Punjab and the Himachal Pradesh and find an easy road to Simla and Delhi. With the Aksai Chin motor road and its extension to Taklakot in their possession, the Chinese were, by the end of 1958, in a position to threaten the heart-land of India consisting of Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and Delhi.

Beyond Taklakot there is the 700 miles-long frontier between Tibet and Nepal, which is strongly guarded by some of the highest mountain peaks in the world. The long and rugged frontier between Tibet and Nepal has only four soft spots from where the Chinese can attempt to penetrate into Nepal. First, there is the Tinker pass, only 12 miles from Taklakot one of the most important Chinese military bases in West Tibet. The Chinese, however, would find it very difficult to push very far through this pass. Secondly, there is the 14,000 feet high Kore pass, in the Mustang area, about 300 miles east of the Tinker pass and 40 miles away from the Chinese base at Tradom. From the Kore pass down to the Kali river and Mustang, the passage is sharp and steep. Once the Chinese came down to Mustang, they would be in control of luxurious vegetations and plentiful supply of timber and fertile lands. But the entrance here also would be difficult. Thirdly, there is the Neelam-Djong pass, 200 miles farther east of the Kore pass. This could form the shortest route for the Chinese to reach the most fertile valley of Kathmandu in Nepal. Finally, there is the eastern 'gate', east of the Everest (29,002 feet) and the Makalu (27,790 feet) peaks, opened by the Arun river. This might be the easiest entrance for the Chinese into Nepal. If the Chinese ever succeed in establishing their control over Nepal, they would be able to hold the northern, western and eastern states of India to ransom. But the Chinese were afraid that if they challenged the freedom of Nepal, they would merely provoke her to rise to the height of her patriotism and enter into closer military alliances with India and, perhaps, with the Western Powers. They, therefore, tried to create insurrections within the country and, failing in that, to bring about dissensions between Nepal and India. They also provided loans to Nepal. But, at the same time, they continued to carry on the important task of constructing military bases on the borders of Nepal.

Moving to the east of Nepal we come to the Sikkim-Bhutan border. Here the communications between Tibet and the plains of northern India are easiest, and the Indian position is more vulnerable than in any other sector. The Sikkim ranges are of great strategic importance. The Chumbi valley between Sikkim and Bhutan opens an easy gateway into the Indian territory. On the pretext of supervising the transport of Chinese rice into Tibet, the Chinese experts were able to move

about freely in the region during the hey-day of India-China friendship and seemed to have made a good study of the exact topography of the passes and ranges between India and Tibet. Later, they built up offensive bases in the Chumbi valley. When India constructed a motor road from Gangtok to Natula pass, the Chinese constructed the Lhasa-Yatung motor road. Their avowed objective was to stop the trade between India and Tibet through the Natula pass. It may be noted that 90 per cent of the Indo-Tibetan trade was passing through the Natula pass, connecting the Chumbi valley with Gangtok in Sikkim. The Chinese set up their divisional headquarters in the small town of Yatung and converted the Chumbi valley into a strong military base threatening the Himalayan defences of India at their most vulnerable spot. There had never been a doubt as to where the Natula pass had belonged. The top of the pass as well as a part of the southern slope towards the Chumbi valley had always been under Indian control.

China, which has laid claims to more than 51,000 square miles of Indian territory in the Himalayas, has made no claims against Sikkim. But the cartographical claims made by China cover two of the eastern districts of Bhutan, bordering the Kameng division of NEFA and about 200 square miles in area. It is also of great significance that China has persistently refused to discuss the Sikkim-Bhutan sector with the Indian Government. Both Sikkim and Bhutan are under the protection of India, and have consistently refused to have any direct dealings with China. China had offered to give financial aid to Bhutan and sent official experts for a direct settlement of their borders. But the Maharaja of Bhutan refused to enter into any direct negotiations. All of Bhutan's foreign aid comes from India, which in recent years has totalled nearly two hundred million rupees per year. However, the racial texture of the people of Bhutan creates some difficulty. While the physical aspects of Bhutan—the Dooar jungles and coniferous forests of the Inner Himalayas—are not very different from adjacent parts of India, the cultural aspects are distinct. The people are predominantly Tibetan in features and have been traditionally oriented towards Tibet. The Chinese tried to strengthen their position *vis-a-vis* Bhutan by raising military fortifications on her northern borders and by snapping the easy route from India to Punakha, the capital of Bhutan. Starting from her Indian borders, this route passed through Gangtok and the Natula pass, through Tibetan territory for about 8 miles, and then entered Bhutan. In 1959, the Chinese blocked the communication tracks through the Tibetan section. However, by the end of 1961, India had built up an alternative motor road from Panchholing to Paro without touching Tibetan territory anywhere. By offering to purchase from the Bhutanese their

rice at a price fifteen times the Indian price and by assuming a threatening military posture, the Chinese seemed to be aiming at the possession of the Towang route, which, from the point of view of military strategy, appeared to be only second to the Yatung-Natula-Gangtok route in Sikkim. The Chinese also seemed to be interested in gaining the two districts of Bhutan lying south of the McMahon line. The fact that the Sikkim-Bhutan sector forms the most important plank of the northern defences of India seems to be the reason why China had been concentrating for a long time her armed strength in the Chumbi valley.

Moving farther east, we come to the Brahmaputra bend. It was along the Tibetan part of Brahmaputra, known as Tsangpo, that the Chinese entry into Tibet was blocked by the Khampas in 1950. It was indeed difficult for the Chinese to reach Lhasa along the Tsangpo, as the narrow path in this region passed over some very high cliffs blocked by snow throughout winter. The Chinese, therefore, were keen to find out an easier way. The communications from China into Tibet along the Indian side of the Brahmaputra were definitely easier, since by taking this route at the north-eastern end of the Indo-Tibetan frontiers they could reach the rear of the Kham and Lhasa forces. If the Chinese could take into their possession four NEFA divisions, they could reach Bhutan borders and then, moving on to the Towang route, get an easy entrance into Tibet.

By April 1960, the Chinese had constructed a new road in Ladakh, which ran to the west of the Aksai Chin highway and entering into Indian territory at Haji Langar—the same place where the Aksai Chin highway had entered—turned westwards, traversing about 200 miles of Indian territory and cutting off an area of 8 to 10 thousand square miles. It linked up Malikshah and Shahidullah in Sinkiang, both military cantonments, with Rudok an important military centre in Western Tibet. By strengthening links with Rudok, it put the Chinese in a better position to probe into the Indian frontiers, Rudok having served for a long time, along with Gartok, as an important base for such activities. On the NEFA border also, a road with a capacity of carrying three ton vehicles, connected with a number of feeder roads, was constructed slightly to the north of the McMahon Line. Whatever purpose these important highways, extending from Ladakh to NEFA, might serve in another large-scale military invasion of India at some distant future or in intensifying Chinese probings into the Indian frontiers in the immediate present, they also facilitated the carrying on of the Chinese propaganda. In many villages along the border as well as in the interior, propaganda posts fitted with microphones and radio receiving sets were installed. There were reports of the infiltration of Chinese agents across the border.

China, by her collusion with Pakistan, has more recently secured another strategic position of vantage. On the northern reaches of the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, at the far extremity of the Hunza-Gilgit region, there is the convergence of mighty mountains, the Great Pamir of Russia, the Little Pamir of Afghanistan and the Mustagh Ata Range belonging to Sinkiang. As the mountain peaks whisper to each other in hushed, snowy silence, there passes under them the route connecting Kashgar with Gilgit through the Mintaka pass at a height of 10,000 feet. There are two other passes through which an entry can be made into the Indian territory, the Kilik on the west and Parpik on the east of Mintaka, but they meet the same road. On the west of the Mintaka pass, there lie the 23,434 feet high Kampire Dior ranges and on the east the 300 miles stretch of the Aghil mountains leading to Karakoram (18,290 ft.). It is this 300 miles of virtually impenetrable territory which divides the Pakistan-held part of Kashmir from China's Sinkiang region. But, if Pakistan so allows, Chinese armies can enter the Hunza valley down the Mintaka pass and move to Gilgit and from there threaten the Indian defences on the northwestern part of Kashmir, thus creating still another front.

Chinese military concentrations in Tibet went on even after the revolt in Tibet had been crushed.² By November 1960, at least eight divisions of the Chinese troops hovered along the Sikkim and Bhutan borders. To military concentrations was added the Chinese propaganda among the tribals through loudspeakers and radio receiving sets. In the Chumbi valley, as the Shillong correspondent of *The Statesman* reported, the Chinese had started using these propaganda media within a few days of their full occupation of the area and the blare of loudspeakers used to reach the Sikkimese homes near the border. In November 1961, a road was reported to have been constructed connecting Gympoa with Tsona Dzong, about 11 miles east of the Bhutanese border and 25 miles north of Towang. The Chinese also speeded up the construction of air-fields. An airfield was built near Narayumtso, less than 50 miles from Bum La, on the border of the Kameng Frontier Division in NEFA, and was linked by road with Marmang, only 18 miles from the McMahan line. Airfields were also constructed at Damshung, Tingri, Nagehu Ka, Shigatse, Gyantse and Tuna, the last only 28 miles as crow flies from the Sikkim border. It was reported that, in all, 25 airfields had been built in Tibet—some of them linked by road with the Bhutan and the NEFA borders. Eight of these air-fields were facing Nepal and Sikkim. Some of them were located in the Chumbi valley, between Sikkim and Bhutan. What could be the purpose of constructing such a large number of air-strips so close to the Indian border? If they were not to be used for a large

scale air-borne invasion of India, the only other purpose could be to facilitate the despatching of supplies and reinforcements to military forces right upto the border.

The number of Chinese troops now in Tibet was reckoned as ten divisions—1,50,000 soldiers—half of these based in the Sinkiang military area and the other half in Tibet under Gen. Chang Ko-hua, of the Korea fame. Even if three of them could be left out to man the long lines of communications and two to deal with the Tibetans, there were five divisions poised all along the Indian border. In fact, six divisions, along with Chinese airforce and paratroopers were reported to have participated in a big military exercise at a place 50 miles northwest of Lhasa. This had to be viewed against the total military power of China.³ In 1961-62, China was estimated to have 2.5 million men of the People's Liberation Army under arms organized in about 115 combat divisions of infantry, exclusive of some 7,00,000 troops of the Public Security Forces. Another estimate put the strength of the Chinese standing army at 4 to 4.5 million men consisting of 2.5 million combatants, over a million transport corps and some 300,000 personnel in the line of communication units. In addition, there were the militia, composed of all able-bodied men between 16 and 60, totalling nearly 250 million. The Chinese airforce, the fourth largest in the world as early as 1955, was equally formidable. It had at least 3000 "fighter interceptors" and nearly a thousand light jet bombers and transport aircrafts. The bulk of the fighters were MIG 15s and bombers Ilyushin 28s. China was producing her own MIG 17s with Russian help. She was expected to have her atomic bomb by 1964, though not the sophisticated aircraft to carry and drop the bombs. The navy was small, and concentrated mostly on sub-marines, motor torpedo-boats and a large number of civilian junks which could be turned into adequate transport and landing craft if needed. But for China's complete lack of high-grade aviation fuel and the growing Sino-Soviet rift since 1959, which led to the withdrawal of Russian technicians from China in 1960, the Chinese could have developed their military strength at a much faster pace. Yet, when we place the present Chinese military strength and build-up against what she had started with, we have to admit that it has been rapidly growing in efficiency and effectiveness.

It was from 1954 onwards that certain elements in the People's Liberation Army command, headed by Su Yu, began to display a growing awareness of the implications of international nuclear warfare. Both Chu Teh and Su Yu in their Army Day celebration speeches on August 1, 1954, stressed the importance of learning advanced Soviet military science and cited the Soviet armed forces as the model for the P.L.A.'s reorganization. In November, Su Yu was appointed Chief of General Staff, with Chien Keng, Chang Tsung-hsun, Chang Ai-ping, Li Ko-nung.

and Peng Shao-hui as deputies. Su Yu seems to have taken keen interest in the regularization and technological advancement of the P.L.A., and persistently stressed upon the need for powerful nuclear capability. It seems that Peng Teh-huai, Minister of National Defence, represented a different approach, and wanted to keep the modernization of China's armed forces geared to the broad revolutionary mission rather than to the narrow viewpoint of the professional military. The Party, it seems, tried to combine the best features of both schools of thought by encouraging the efforts towards an independent nuclear capability along with reduction in defence expenditure and concentration of resources on economic development. There were clear indications of a growing Chinese interest in scientific and technological developments, including their applicability to national defence. By 1956, while economic development was accepted as the main national objective, a new emphasis was being placed on the raising of scientific and technological levels in China. "We must catch up with this advanced level of world science", Chou En-lai declared on January 14, 1956, "Only by mastering the most advanced sciences can we ensure ourselves of an impregnable national defence, a powerful and up-to-date economy, and adequate means to join the Soviet Union and other People's Democracies in defeating the imperialist powers, either in peaceful competition or in any aggressive war which the enemy may unleash". On March 15, 1958, an Academy of Military Science was established in Peking and Marshal Yeh Chien-Ying was appointed its president and political commissar. "We must", wrote Marshal Nieh Jung-Chen, Chairman of the Scientific Planning Committee, in *Jen-min Jih-pao*, August 2, 1958, "focus our efforts on stepping up research work in the newest branches of modern science and technology. We should and, absolutely can, master, in not too long a time, the newest technique concerning atomic fission, thermonuclear reaction, the use of atomic energy in all fields, radio and electronics, jet propulsion, rockets and the conquest of outer space."

The Chinese Red Army has a long history of evolution and fighting behind it. Its origin can be traced back to August 1, 1927 when the Communist officers in the Nationalist Army—Yeh Ting, Ho Lung and Chu Teh—revolted at Nanchang. Growing under the military guidance of Chu Teh and political leadership of Mao Tse-tung, and fighting against the Nationalist forces, it effected a successful withdrawal to the provinces of Yen-an and Sikiang in the northwest in 1934-35. Fighting between the Communist and Nationalist armies continued sporadically during the next fourteen years.⁴ Securing control over Manchuria in 1945, subsequent to the Soviet withdrawal from the region, they successively defeated the Nationalist troops and helped the Communist Party in coming to power in 1949. Even before the Army had time to reorganize itself, it was thrown into Korea on a narrow front.

against an enemy vastly superior in manpower. In 1953-54, there came the reorganization and modernization of the People's Liberation Army along Soviet lines and with Soviet aid. A Ministry of National Defence was formed in 1954 and conscription inaugurated in 1955, under the Military Service Law of the People's Republic of China. Regular ranks, decorations and terms of service for officers were established. The "Great Leap Forward", which began in 1958, had a deep impact on the P.L.A. Some of its members were sent into the newly formed "people's communes". The commitment gradually grew, till P.L.A. officers were required to serve in the ranks for one month a year and the entire P.L.A. was told to perform labour for up to two months a year. It was clear that discontent against this kind of military involvement in civilian affairs was becoming a source of weakness to the Communist Army.

In September 1959, when the Sino-Indian border conflict seemed to be approaching a critical stage, there took place the most striking shift within Communist China's military leadership since the founding of the Chinese People's Republic. Marshal Peng Teh-huai, credited with originating guerilla warfare tactics and the commander of Chinese People's Volunteers in Korea and Minister of National Defence since 1954, was relieved of his post and was replaced by Lin Piao, a noted battle strategist, who had apparently played no part in China's politics since 1951. Similarly, Huang Ko-cheng who had replaced Su Yu as Chief of General Staff in October 1958 and was also holding the post of Vice-Minister of National Defence, was relieved of both these posts and replaced as Chief of General staff by Lo Jui-ching, who had so far been working as Minister of Public Security. Two other Vice-Ministers of National Defence, Hsiao Ko and Li Ta, were made to give up their positions in the Ministry of National Defence, and five new Vice-Ministers of National Defence were appointed. They were Lo Jui-ching, Su Yu, Liu Ya-lou, Chen Keng and Hsu Shih-yu. Lin Piao had played important military roles before 1951, when he was incapacitated by ill health, and his return by itself might not have been a very striking thing in itself. But other changes, and Lin's subsequent announcements, made it clear that China was now engaged in a stupendous reorganisation of her military forces. This re-organization had to be done under the leadership of the Communist Party and along with an accelerated process of industrialization.

More than a year back, China had made a public announcement of her intention to produce her own nuclear weapons. A steady move in that direction implied the re-organization of the army and the re-establishment of fuller Party control over the army—a task which might well have been beyond the capabilities of Peng Teh-huai. The army had been involved during

the preceding years in a number of economic reconstruction programmes, including the setting up of communes, but it was suspected that, due to their peasant origin, many of its officers and men looked at the problems from a bourgeois and petty-bourgeois angle. Many in the army had started questioning whether "there was any need for the army to take part in national economic construction—in 'civilian' business". Referring to the view taken by some, Lin wrote in an article on September 29, 1959, "They say that modern warfare is a war of technique, of steel and machinery, and that in the face of these things, man's role has to be relegated to a secondary place. They attach importance only to machinery and want to turn revolutionary soldiers into robots of revolutionary initiative. Contrary to these people, we believe that while equipment and technique are important, the human factor is even more so...Men and material must form a unity with men as the leading factor".⁵ What Lin was planning to do was 'to underscore the authority of the Party over the armed forces, the subordination of the purely military point of view to broader political considerations, and the correctness of decisions that imposed immediate restraints on China's military policies in favour of a slower, but fuller development of her military production capabilities'. "In reiterating the man-over-weapons theme", as Alice Langley Hsieh points out, "he was not criticizing the need to take into account modern weaponry, but warning that the pace of military modernization was to proceed in the manner prescribed by the Party".⁶

Lin's ultimate objective—which was also the objective of the Chinese Communist Party—was enhancement of China's military power. The modernization of the P. L. A. and the development of a modern defence system were to be pressed forward, and the technical equipment of the armed forces to be increasingly improved. Lin found it necessary to re-iterate what Mao Tse-tung had said in 1938 about the army being 'the chief component of the political power of a state'—'whoever wants to seize the political power of the state and to maintain it must have a strong army'. Lin was clearly thinking in terms of the establishment of a powerful military force as a key Chinese objective. With Lin's appointment as Minister of National Defence, the powers of the Ministry of National Defence were also considerably enlarged, the General Staff having been effectively subordinated to the MND. His colleagues, like Su Yu and Hsu Shih-yu, had stood all along for a rapid modernization of China's defence forces. The latter, in fact, had been emphasising the necessity for China to consider the strategic problems in a world where "modern warfare calls for the use of massive and destructive weapons such as nuclear and chemical war-heads, rockets and missiles". Whatever might have been the contributory factors which determined this vital shift in China's military leadership—and many theories have been

advanced—the over-riding objective was the strengthening of China's military establishment.

By the beginning of 1960, China was clearly thinking in terms of striking out a path for herself independent of the Soviet Union. As long as the Soviet Union had not developed her inter-continental missiles, China was quietly following the policy of economic development at home and peaceful coexistence abroad. The over-all military balance had clearly been in favour of the United States, which had first developed the atom bomb and since then had been engaged in adding to her nuclear stock-pile and delivery capability. Behind the shield of Soviet nuclear power, China now hoped to find new and more flexible areas for political and military manoeuvre. This alone can explain the growing bellicosity of China's attitudes and politics beginning in late 1957. But China was soon faced with disillusionment. Instead of sharing a finished nuclear weapons capability with China, Russia was talking in terms of an Asian atom-free zone. Russia's attitude in the Quemoy crisis of 1958 made it clear that, while she would use her atomic power to bring pressure on the West for the solution of long-range problems which divided the West from the East, she would not use it recklessly. In fact, the possession of the missile power by Russia made her burdened with a new sense of responsibility and, while China was now in a more threatening military posture and talked of the inevitability of war, she began to move in the direction of *detente* and international conciliation. On January 14, 1960, in their speeches before the Supreme Soviet, Premier Khrushchev and Malinovsky, the Soviet Minister of Defence, announced a unilateral substantial reduction of Soviet armed forces. China took care to make it clear, through a resolution of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, on January 21, 1960, that she would not regard herself as bound by any disarmament agreement in which she herself had not formally participated and to which she had not formally adhered. What frustrated and irritated the Chinese was that they had not gained anything by their good ally's stupendous accretion of atomic power. As pointed out by Herbert Dinerstein, the Chinese had not been given a blank cheque by Russia, enabling them to involve at will the Soviet Union's massive-retaliation threat.⁷ Both Khrushchev and Malinovsky had made an important reservation when they threatened instant retaliation to a direct attack on the U.S.S.R. but in case of an attack on "the socialist countries" they went only to the extent of saying that it *could* bring massive retaliation.⁸ Faced with this situation, China had no alternative but to build up her own atomic power.

The beginning of Communist China's nuclear programme could be traced to the Sino-Soviet technical cooperation agreement of October 1954, under which China was to ship uranium to the Soviet Union and to receive a research reactor, enriched uranium

and limited technical assistance in the nuclear field. With the Soviet I.C.B.M. test in August 1957, and the launching of the sputnik in October, China began to press the Soviet Union for the transfer of an operational nuclear capability. Russia, it seems, turned back the Chinese military mission under Peng Teh-huai with the impression that while she might get missiles from the Soviet Union she could not expect any nuclear warheads. China's first research reactor was formally inaugurated on September 27, 1958. Reports of reactors being built in Northern Manchuria, at Sion in Central China and at Chungking on the Yangtze river, were prevalent in the beginning of 1960.⁹ The Chinese and Russians were also said to be operating jointly a factory at Urumchi in Sinkiang to refine uranium ore from Tibet and Sinkiang. It was expected that China would be able to produce enough plutonium from her 10,000 kilowatt heavy-water reactor to enable her to explode a nuclear device in 1964. But it was not enough for a country to produce just one atomic bomb. Even the testing of the first bomb would involve numerous other facilities so utterly lacking in China, and the experts thought that China could not hope to become a nuclear power before 1966 or 1967. This too would depend on continuation of Soviet technical assistance. Russia appeared to be quite unenthusiastic about the prospects of China becoming a nuclear power. As is well known, in July and August 1960 she recalled her two or three hundred technicians from China. This, however, could merely delay China's programme but not prevent it. Within the next few years Communist China could be expected to hold her first nuclear test, and she could then proceed to build up a modest stock-pile of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons.¹⁰

With all this mechanization of armed forces Communist China could hardly be regarded as a great military power. Of the army—infantry, air force and navy—China had made progress mainly in the infantry wing. There too she lacked real strategic capability which a country could acquire by the possession of heavy bombers, ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. In 1962, China was not in a position to produce any of these weapons. Historically, the Chinese army was well-accustomed to guerilla tactics, more useful in winning a war against the ill-organised hordes of a country having a politically unstable government, or in securing quick victories in a mountainous terrain. But the Chinese armies were no match for a well-organized, modern European or American army. It was for the first time in Korea that the Chinese army had a taste of a modern war, when it fought against the armed forces of the United States of America. It was an entirely new experience for the Chinese which made them realize that their armed forces needed to be modernized and brought upto the standards of a well-equipped modern army. The process of modernization, however, had been difficult, partly due to the non-

availability of the necessary resources and also because of the schism that developed between China and the Soviet Union. Although China could aspire to be a nuclear Power in the near future, she could not, by exploding a few bombs, be in a position, at least in the foreseeable future, to stock-pile nuclear weapons. The Chinese armies could hope to deal effectively with problems of internal security or to repel any non-nuclear attack on the country or, as mentioned earlier, win a few preliminary victories on her frontiers, but could not do very much more than that. The Chinese Airforce too was not altogether inadequate to meet the normal peace-time needs of national security, but its offensive potential seemed to be considerably restricted by the persisting fuel shortage. China was also short in ammunition. For most of her radar and precision equipment she had to depend on the Soviet Union. China had constructed a large number of motorable roads, particularly on her borders, but her motor vehicles industry was still in a primitive stage. China's shortage of fuel was proverbial. With all her military posture, China was hardly in a position, in the autumn of 1962, to provoke and fight a world war. But she could certainly hope to achieve some notable successes in her military probings into an unguarded Indian frontier.

CHINA'S DIPLOMACY, 1959-1962 : PRELUDE TO INVASION

Between 1959 and 1962 China concentrated all her energies in patching up her quarrels with neighbouring states and entering into closer relationship with distant countries with a view to strengthening her diplomatic position. In 1959, when relations with India reached a danger point, China had border disputes also with Burma and Nepal, and there was a bitter argument with Indonesia on the question of overseas Chinese traders. Indonesia went to the extent of saying, "If a big country is employing its strength to sacrifice the interests of a neighbour, a small country, to achieve its objectives, then such an attitude harbours the seeds of menace. They should be scrupulously watched". China's relations with the United Arab Republic were strained on account of her providing Khaled Baghdash a platform in Peking. Treating India as the main problem, the greatest obstacle in their way to achieve their objective in Asia, the Chinese now seemed prepared to come to terms with all others. They entered into treaties of friendship, non-aggression and economic cooperation with a number of countries in rapid succession. China came to terms with Burma and Nepal on the border question, recognizing their claims to large chunks of territory which she for a long time had claimed to be her own. She moved towards a rapprochement with Indonesia by bringing into force the 1955 treaty on dual nationality—the instruments of ratification were exchanged in January 1960. She offered an 'explanation' to the U.A.R. regarding the Baghdash incident. A large number of reciprocal good-will visits by cultural delegations were arranged. Trade was greatly stimulated. China purchased large quantities of rice from Burma at a time when she was finding its export rice market dull, and cotton from the U.A.R. She gave economic aid and technical assistance to a number of countries. The Radio Peking became extraordinarily active. The Chinese Press and other agencies for external propaganda concentrated on cultivating friendly relations with various countries. China at this time proposed a non-aggression treaty with Nepal, and while Nepal was not prepared to go to that extent a treaty of friendship was actually signed. She made overtures to Bhutan with regard to her common frontier with that country, having earlier refused to discuss the

borders of Bhutan with Indian officials. She virtually sealed off Tibet. Larger quantities of arms began to reach the Nagas from across the border in Burma. What was most dangerous to India, China also began to cultivate relations with Pakistan and agreed to negotiate the border west of the Karakoram pass with her.

The period of 1959-1962 is marked by a rapid expansion of the Chinese activities in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Till 1956, China had taken practically no interest in West Asia. She suddenly started taking interest in the area during the Suez crisis of 1956, which was continued through the Turkish-Syrian crisis of 1957, the Iraq revolution in 1958 and the landing of the American forces in Beirut. She fully exploited the intense anti-British feelings in Arab states. She actually offered troops to Egypt, which the latter refused, while gladly accepting a gift of five million dollars in Suez francs. In January 1958, China had signed a treaty of friendship with Yemen and pushed into the unwilling hands of its Crown Prince, who was on a visit to Peking, a seventeen million dollar loan for building a textile plant and a modern highway, which was followed by a few hundred Chinese technicians turning up to help the Yemenese in their anti-imperialist struggle. Within ten days of American landing at Beirut, 164 million Chinese had participated in organized demonstrations of protest—the demonstrators including students, house-wives, factory workers, peasants, teachers, doctors, scientists, poets and artists, marching past the building of the British Charge d' Affaires in Peking in unbroken file for 34 hours. Within 24 days the *People's Daily* had published 20 special editions "condemning the aggressors and calling for support for the Arab people", and the New China Printing Press brought out a million copies of books and pamphlets on West Asia. China could make an appeal to the West Asian countries in the name of Islam. With over ten million Chinese Muslims, linked in the Chinese Islamic Association founded in 1953 to take "an active part in the world wide struggle for peace," she could claim to be an Islamic nation and on that basis claim a direct interest in developments affecting the larger Islamic world. She was spending a great deal of money in carrying on propaganda in Arabic, English and French all over the West Asian world. She could proclaim to them that the Muslims in China enjoyed complete religious freedom, that China respected the cultural life of "minority nationalities," and that China had emancipated her women from the yoke of social tyranny, which could be a model for the Muslim world. Religious and revolutionary themes were, thus, blended in the Communist programme directed at the Arab world.

By 1960, as Denis Warner has pointed out, an early trickle of delegations from Africa and Latin America had become a flood.¹ Mao Tse-tung proved himself to be an urbane host and an ardent proselytizer. To one visiting group representing fourteen countries

he said, "Our common enemy is U.S. imperialism. We all stand on the same front and need to unite with and support each other". To another group of Africans from twelve different countries he promised that "ultimate victory will certainly be won in the common struggle against imperialism and colonialism". He emphasised the affinities between Communist China and the Latin American States when he said that "the struggles of the people of Cuba and other Latin American countries have helped the Chinese people and the struggle of the Chinese people have helped the people of Cuba and other Latin American countries". To a mixed group of Japanese, Cubans, Brazilians and Argentines he said, "We should unite and drive U.S. imperialism from Asia, Africa and Latin America back to where it came from". The revolution in Algeria and Cuba, added to Guinea's differences with France, provided an excellent opportunity to Peking to carry on the struggle against the West into Africa and Latin America. "The hundred million people of the Chinese People's Republic", declared the politbureau member, Mayor Peng Chen, "stand on the same front with all the peoples fighting for independence and freedom in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Their enemy is our enemy; their struggle is our struggle. In our common struggle against imperialism we shall always stand united."

Beginning with the year 1960, which is regarded as a turning point in African history and is marked with the emergence of new nationalist regimes throughout Africa south of the Sahara, the Chinese intensified their activities in that part of the world. In April 1960, there was established a Chinese-African People's Friendship Association. China participated in the second Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference which was held in Conakry, capital of Guinea. A mass rally was subsequently held in Peking to focus attention on the new drive to consolidate Peking's position with the older African states and to gain diplomatic support from the new. There was a growing number of Chinese delegations to Africa and, in return, there was a spectacular flow of Africans to Peking. In the sphere of diplomatic relations, Peking had stationed an ambassador in Khartoum in the Sudan since mid-1959. She now established diplomatic relations with Ghana, Guinea, Mali and the Somali Republic. Sekou Toure, the President of Guinea, visited Peking in the autumn of 1960. In 1960, the Peking Radio was giving out 70 hours of weekly broadcasts in English, French and Portuguese for the consumption of the Africans, besides sending out films to Africa in large numbers. China, in fact, seemed to have entered into a competition with the Soviet Union for currying the favour of the neutral and the non-aligned, and had reasons to think that she might have still better results. "From Senegal through the bulge of Africa and the Congo to Somalia", as Howard L. Boorman pointed out, "Peking's case was plausible and potentially persuasive. The industrial-technological level of both the United

States and the Soviet Union being outside the realistic reach of the capital-poor newly-independent nations of Africa, the Chinese technique—of reliance on native resources, investment in education, training of native manpower—had a greater appeal.”²

“At Peking’s invitation”, writes Denis Warner, “and with all expenses paid, delegations of trade unionists, students, teachers, Communists, non-Communists, cultural groups, politicians and others swarmed into China. Many were impressed with China’s material development; some were appalled by the totalitarian methods by which it was achieved. But since all were carefully shepherded away from regions and projects that Peking preferred them not to see, the majority went home believing that the Chinese model contained much that was worth-while.”³ The Chinese propaganda constantly drew the attention of the Africans towards their vast potential resources—which were in danger of being taken over by the new imperialists if they did not take extra care in keeping them out. It was not enough, the Chinese warned the Africans, to get rid of the British, French and the Belgians. There were now the neo-colonialists of the United States penetrating Africa under the guise of ‘aid’ and ‘development’, a colonialism more ferocious, more treacherous, and more skilful. Wrote the *Red Flag*, November 1, 1960: “The primary task of the people of the various countries of the world is to form the broadest united front against imperialism headed by the United States, resolutely oppose the United States imperialist policies of aggression and war, firmly oppose colonialism, promote the growth of the national liberation movements and stimulate the development of the revolutionary struggle of the working people in the imperialist countries.” “The Communist Chinese thrust into Africa”, noted another observer, “has been, characteristically, on all fronts: diplomatic and clandestine, conventional and unconventional; political, economic, social and cultural. Perhaps above all it has been revolutionary...”⁴ At the end of 1961, there were nine Chinese Communist organisations dealing with Africa, of which perhaps the most important were the African Affairs Committee within the secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese-African Friendship Association, with Liu Chang-sheng as its President.

As early as September 22, 1958 the Chinese Government had recognized the Provisional Government of Algeria. At Peking’s invitation an Algerian military delegation visited China early in 1959, and returned loaded with a substantial amount of cash, technical and military advice and feelings of gratefulness for China’s friendship. Algeria, however, did not appear willing at this stage to accept direct military aid or help from China. It was only a year later that the Vice-Premier of Algeria visited Peking and put down his signatures on a joint communique with Marshal Chen Yi, the Foreign Minister, announcing that “as long as colonialists,

oppressors and imperialist aggressors were not eliminated... genuine and permanent peace will be impossible". Four months later, Ferhat Abbas, the Premier of the Algerian Provisional Government, visited Peking and was given a right royal reception there. "We will do everything we can", declared Chou-En-lai, "to support the Algerian people's struggle for national liberation." "The hour of active solidarity has struck", said Ferhat Abbas in his reply, "the Algerian people will remain in the fight and it is not in vain that they appeal to the Chinese people to put an end to a war of extermination of a people determined to win its independence." This was followed by the Chinese aid programme. By "active solidarity," as Ferhat Abbas said in Moscow on his way home, was meant "total aid" and "the intensification of the armed struggle in Algeria".

Guinea, which had broken away from the French Community, was accorded the same warm welcome. Recognized by China in October 1958, Guinea received from her in 1959 an initial gift of 5,000 tons of rice and a second large shipment of 10,000 tons early in 1960. In October 1959, a cultural cooperation agreement had been signed between the two countries under which China provided ten scholarships for Guinean students taking education in China. This was followed by an exchange of teachers and students. Undaunted by Guinea's receiving a Nationalist Chinese delegation, Communist China sent a further gift of 10,000 tons of rice and invited President Sekou Toure to Peking to discuss other matters of common interest. Treaties of friendship and trade were signed at Peking on the occasion of Sekou Toure's visit, under which the two countries were to exchange 4.92 million dollars worth of goods each year. The Pact also provided for the granting of a Chinese interest-free loan for the value of twenty-five million U.S. dollars, "without any conditions or privileges attached", the repayment of which was to start only after ten years and could be made in ten annual instalments. China sent experts, technicians and skilled workers to Guinea, and provided equipment, machinery and tools as well as training to the technicians and skilled workers from Guinea. Since "all threats and obstacles to world peace come from the side of imperialism", the joint statement of Liu Shao-chi and Sekou Toure announced, "the two parties solemnly declare their resolute support for the just struggle of national liberation of the people of Algeria, the Congo, South Africa and other countries." Sekou Toure, in return, offered "his warmest thanks" for all the contributions China had made to the struggle of the African people and assured his audience that "even though many slanders have been directed against your people, whom the imperialists wish to isolate from African political consciousness, we can assure you that the Africans know where the truth lies...they know also the lesson they can draw from your history—to unite more effectively in the anti-imperialistic struggle."⁵

This was the first treaty of friendship signed by China with an African state, described by the *People's Daily* "as a momentous event not only in the history of Chinese-Guinea relations but also in the history of relations between China and Africa." Mali too, after breaking away from Senegal, moved closer to China. The National Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee and the Chinese-African People's Friendship Association carried forward the work, at the unofficial level, of coordinating support in China for the African peoples "in their struggle against imperialism and colonialism." Some twenty-six major Chinese delegations visited Africa during 1959 and the first six months of 1960, and about a hundred African delegations visited China during the same period. The Peking Radio increased its broadcasting hours in English for Africa to 35, and branches of the New China News Agency were established in Cairo, Conakry, Rabat and Accra. French, Arabic, and Turkish broadcasts too were directed at Africa, and there was a special seven-hour broadcast for the Congo. Subsequently, Portuguese too was included in the broadcast lists.

China tried to extend its influence to Latin America also. The Chinese propaganda there was directed against the twin evils of foreign (that is, American) "imperialism" and domestic "feudalism" and "militarism". The peasant societies of Latin America, resting on the shaky foundations of economic distress, social ferment and political radicalism, seemed to be providing the ideal conditions in which the Chinese could establish their roots. For the Latin American states, as for the states of Africa, China was different from the United States as well as the Soviet Union and yet familiar. It was a country, like so many Latin American states, kept crushed for a long time under imperialistic pressure and now emerging into the freedom of political independence and economic advancement. The rise of Castro in Cuba gave China the opportunity to rush in. "The struggle of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America for national independence and against colonial oppressions had become an irresistible torrent", said Chou En-lai in celebration of Castro's coming to power in Havana in January 1959. "The overthrow of the United States-sponsored regime by the Cuban people and the angry roar raised by the people of the Congo against colonialism are indicators that these struggles will continue to develop vigorously this year." The Peking Radio was at this time devoting twenty-one hours of broadcast time to Latin America each week. Nothing gave greater happiness to China than the establishment of a Communist regime in Cuba right in the heart of the American hemisphere. Chou En-lai could now hope that the United States for its crimes of aggression would be "dealt doubly powerful counter-blows by the iron fist of the mighty socialist camp." The China-Latin American Friendship Association was formed in Peking on March 16, 1960 with a great deal of trumpeting and fanfare. As Denis Warner points

out, one out of every five delegations that visited China during the first six months of 1960 was from Latin America.⁶ Brazil sent eleven delegations, Cuba eight, Chile seven, and Argentina five. On July 23, 1960, China and Cuba signed a trade and payments agreement on scientific and technical cooperation and an agreement on cultural cooperation. Two months later formal diplomatic relations were established between the two countries and by November 1960 nearly 10,000 tons of Chinese rice and beans were exported to Havana and some 350 tons of Cuban sugar had arrived in China.

The Chinese diplomacy was most active in Southeast Asia. On October 2, 1960, the border dispute between China and Burma was settled. China finally abrogated the perpetual lease of the Namwan Assigned Tract, an area of special significance to all of northern Burma since it had the only motorable road linking the Kachin state in the northwest and the Shan state in the east. In exchange, China acquired a highly strategic position on the Burmese side of the Hpimaw pass which gave her direct access into northern Burma, opening the way northwards into eastern Tibet, westwards into Assam and southwards into central Burma. Burma, which had lived under the mortal fear of Communist China's recurring threats of aggression, heaved a sigh of relief over the fact that "a solution that is not too humiliating has been found."⁷ A Chinese interest-free ten-year loan of 85 million dollars sealed the new agreement. China strengthened her relations with Cambodia and signed with her a treaty of friendship and non-aggression in 1960. "All schemes to isolate China in the world", said Prince Norodom Sihanouk (the greatest advocate of neutralism in Southeast Asia), at a state banquet in Peking on the eve of the signing of the treaty, "will only isolate those who start these schemes...the Chinese People's Republic is taking great steps towards the world pinnacle. Long live the friendship between the Chinese and Cambodian people."⁸ Sihanouk received from China a twelve-million dollar aid to improve the equipment of the Chinese textile, plywood, cement and paper factories in Cambodia, another undeclared amount to build metallurgic foundry and a small mechanical engineering factory, and more technical aid to improve the organization of the state-owned cooperatives and rice-growing projects.⁹ The establishment of closer ties between China and Cambodia deprived Thailand of its anti-Communist outer shield, making its northeast provinces vulnerable to Communist influence.¹⁰ Thailand had been envisaged as a treaty centre for the SEATO, with, what Denis Warner describes, a semicircle of pro-Western and anti-Communist countries in Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam protecting it from Communist infiltration. However, with growing guerilla activities in South Vietnam and Laos, and continuous recurrence of Communist upheavals at Singapore, the task of SEATO was indeed rendered

very difficult. China's greatest victory in Southeast Asia, however, was its drawing Indonesia, home of the largest Communist Party outside the Communist bloc, away from Moscow and closer to Peking. For some time Dr. Subandrio, the Foreign Minister of Indonesia, hesitated and continued to talk of "China's expansion." "But thanks to a determined effort by Peking early in 1961, a visit by Foreign Minister Chen Yi to Jakarta, the offer of Chinese economic aid and some welcome advice on how to conduct a war of national liberation in West New Guinea, most of Indonesia's fears seemed to have been set aside."¹¹ The whole of Southeast Asia was now sandwiched between Communist China, daily growing more powerful, and Indonesia willing to give her all possible cooperation.

This brief review of the Chinese tactics and policies on a global scale clearly proves the falsity of the view held both in India and the U.S.A. that Peking had been virtually isolated, by the friendly approach of the one and the political, economic and military pressures of the other. The key fact, on the other hand, was that the People's Republic of China had "expanded her influence and authority at an unprecedented rate and in geographic areas (especially the Middle East, Africa and Latin America) where competent observers would not have predicted such activity as recently as five years ago."¹²

TACTICS OF CONFRONTATION : FORWARD MILITARY MOVES

While China was, thus, engaged in winning friends and influencing people all over the world, in Asia, in Africa and in Latin America, her armies were engaged in carrying on increased intrusion into Indian territory. Border incidents and violations of India's air space continued throughout 1961.¹ In April 1961, Chinese personnel intruded into Sikkim near Jelepala pass. In May, there was an intrusion into Indian territory near Chushul in the western sector. In July, a Chinese patrol crossed the eastern sector in the Kameng Division of the North East Frontier Agency. In August, the Chinese forces in Ladakh established three new check-posts in Nyagzu and near Dambuguru. They also constructed roads linking these posts with rear bases. In the last week of October 1961, Chinese army units stationed on the opposite side of the NEFA border were reported to have made several incursions into the area. Repulsed from a place only a few miles away from Khinzemane, they made fresh incursions into the Sirang and Subansiri Divisions.² Establishment of military outposts on Ladakh territory also continued. It was only following the Chinese occupation of Longju that some steps were taken by the Government of India to strengthen the defences in NEFA. The number of check-posts was more than doubled, and some 'armed posts' also were set up. The development of communications was speeded up. A three-year plan costing Rs. 120 crores to build a network of communications in the border areas was drawn up and it was claimed that most of the administrative headquarters were connected to the plains by roads and that these lines of communications would soon be extended as near to the border as possible. A blue-print was prepared for intensification of welfare schemes and spreading of education in the area. Gradually, as a result of the reassuring statements made by the Indian Prime Minister and the despatches sent by press correspondents, Indian as well as foreign, from the border regions, a confidence began to grow in the country that, even if the Chinese dared undertake a military invasion of India, Indian armies were either equal to it or would soon be in that position.³ Consistent with this growing confidence, the Prime Minister told the Lok Sabha, on November 29, 1961, that the situation had "changed progressively" in

India's favour "though not as much as we want it but it is a fact that, in areas which they (have) occupied, progressively the situation has been changing from the military point of view and other points of view in our favour". "We shall continue to take steps to build up these things (military outposts and so on)", Nehru further assured the House, "so that ultimately we may be in a position to take action to recover such territory as is in their possession". By the latter half of 1961, the Indian Government was being forced to adopt a more forward policy, as could be seen from the fact that the Chinese Government lodged four protests against Indian intrusions into what they regarded as Chinese territory. They were, however, not thinking in terms of deploying regular troops in adequate numbers at the strategic outposts or of equipping them for effective border defence. Compared to the Chinese preparations, India's defence preparedness was inadequate. As the military correspondent of an Indian newspaper reported, one of the defence measures adopted by India was to post border guards close to the entrance of a pass, but the Chinese had gone further. Their scheme of operations included construction of underground bunkers scooped through rocky surfaces—bunkers spacious enough to accommodate between one and three dozen personnel and forming a self-contained unit capable of operating on its own—which served the double objective of defence and offence. Reviewing the military policies of the Government of India in the region, the military correspondent of the *Indian Express* wrote, on November 11, 1961, "Militarily the broad measures adopted (by India) for border defence include the construction of strategic roads under a high-powered board. Military operational commands have been strengthened and expanded and some units moved into forward areas. The air force has been reinforced with transport planes and helicopters. A number of posts, points and passes have been strengthened. All this, however, provides only the framework of border defence. The crux of the problem lies in having trained personnel for mountain warfare, who are given the necessary weapons, who have the lodging and equipment to live at high altitudes and of whom there are sufficient numbers."⁴

The Chinese now started a new violent campaign against the Government of India and Nehru personally. They now openly accused him of collusion with imperialists, and said that Nehru was prepared to give up his policy of non-alignment in return for economic aid from America to save India's tottering economy. They saw behind Nehru's 'growing intransigence' a conspiracy which the U.S.A. was hatching with South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and South Vietnam, and to which Nehru was now prepared to lend his hand, for the encirclement of Communist China as a prelude to attempting a military invasion. The rôle Nehru had played at Belgrade, the despatch of Indian troops to the Congo, Ikeda's visit to India, were all interpreted as parts of this conspiracy. India's action in Goa in December 1961 seemed to have China's approval, but

this did not affect India's attitude to China and Nehru made it clear, on December 28, that India would not agree to a renewal of the 1954 Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between India and Tibet till the Chinese had vacated Ladakh. The pace of Chinese intrusions into the Indian territory continued unabated. In January 1962, some Chinese civil and military personnel crossed the border in the eastern sector near Longju. In April and May, there was aggressive advance patrolling by the Chinese forces from their strongholds in the Chip Chap area of Ladakh, resulting in the establishment of a new post in Indian territory about ten miles southeast of Spanggur.

This was the time when both India and China were faced with great difficulties, on domestic and foreign policy fronts. India was getting worried about Nepal's drift towards China. A meeting between Prime Minister Nehru and King Mahendra was held in April 1962, but it was not clear whether it led to any change in Nepal's attitude. The Chinese were exploiting the suspicion Sikkim and Bhutan entertained of India and the discontent among the tribals. China herself was faced with great economic difficulties both in the agricultural and industrial sectors, and there was trouble in South China. Early in May 1962, the Chinese Government warned the Government of India that if it continued to refuse to withdraw its aggressive posts and persisted in carrying out provocations against the Chinese posts 'the Chinese frontier guards will be compelled to defend themselves'.⁵ China further announced that she was resuming patrols in the area between Karakoram pass and Kongka pass in Ladakh because of India's provocative actions and would resume patrols of the entire Sino-Indian frontier, if India continued to "invade and occupy China's territory".⁶ This was quickly followed by a Chinese Government announcement, made on May 3, 1962, that agreement had been reached with the Government of Pakistan that negotiations for a "provisional" agreement on border alignment would soon be started and a statement made by the President of the so-called Azad Kashmir Government, on May 8, 1962, that "a fight on the Algerian pattern" would be conducted to liberate Kashmir from India and that Chinese assistance would be asked for. India reiterated that she "does not want and dislikes very much a war with China", but said that was not within her control. The Government of India once again urged the Chinese Government to give serious consideration to their proposal of November 1959 for each party to the dispute to withdraw behind the line claimed by the other in Ladakh. The Government of India made a further offer, "in the interest of a peaceful settlement", to permit, pending negotiations and settlement of the boundary question, "continued use of the Aksai Chin road for Chinese civilian traffic". China rejected it. On June 2, 1962, the Sino-Indian Agreement of 1954, which India claimed had been violated both in letter and in spirit, was

allowed to lapse, and the Indian trade agencies in Gyantse, Yatung and Gartok were closed because, the Indian Government pointed out, the atmosphere in which the five principles were first initiated had to be restored before any new agreement could be considered.⁷

In the stream of protest notes that the Government of India continued to send to the Government of China, they repeatedly expressed their readiness to continue discussions on the boundary question on the basis of the report of the officials of the two sides, provided that China should agree to the restoration of the *status quo* which prevailed prior to the alteration of the boundary by force. As late as August 22, 1962, the Government of India suggested to the Government of China that they might send a representative to discuss "these essential preliminary measures." Since early April, however, the Indian troops also were increasingly carrying on activities against Chinese posts. While the Chinese Government demanded that India should withdraw its troops and evacuate her military strong-points, India not only did not withdraw her troops but, to the shock of the Chinese, made some ambitious advances. This activity was further accelerated in May 1962. The *London Times* reported on May 31 that "force or display of it is being brought to bear by the Indian troops on the Sino-Indian border", and foresaw "a grim battle ahead in Ladakh." On June 11, the *Washington Post* wrote of India's outflanking movement "boosting the morale" of her troops, and creating "a stir among the usually China-awed military circles of Asia". In June, in a statement before the Parliament, Nehru said that the Indian troops had established a large number of check-posts which "give us a certain advantage," "our movement sometimes going behind the Chinese position." "It is not proper for me to discuss these matters publicly, but I can assure the House that the position, as it is, is more advantageous to India than it was previously and advantage is growing." It was revealed that by the beginning of July, Indian forces in Ladakh had made a general advance towards the east on a wide front of 2,500 square miles and had established over half a dozen new check-posts, some of which were behind the Chinese lines. "We have taken risks," said Nehru, "and we moved forward." It appears that both India and China were engaged in a stupendous effort to strengthen their respective positions. Both seemed to be working on the assumption that the other would not challenge military positions directly. Rival posts came into closer proximity; patrol activities covered ever wider areas. In July 1962, when an Indian post had been established to cut the supply line to a new forward Chinese post on the Galwan River, a numerically superior Chinese force attempted to intimidate it into withdrawing. The Indians stood their ground. The Chinese soldiers advanced within fifteen yards of the post, but halted when Indians threatened to open fire. The situation remained tense for several days but the Indian Government

adopted firm attitude and the Chinese retired. This incident marked a critical point in the Sino-Indian controversy. "If the Chinese Government had hoped that control of Aksai Chin could be consolidated through a show of force," wrote Fisher and Rose, "any such hopes had been proved illusory." Indeed, the Indians had demonstrated that further Chinese intrusions into this area would almost certainly prove to be impossible without resort to arms.⁸

Throughout this period, the Chinese continued to extend threats to India. On June 2, 1962, a Chinese note charged that "India is determined to encroach on Chinese territory and does not scruple to provoke bloody conflicts...a border clash may be touched off at any moment". The Chinese protest note dated July 8, said, "If the Indian troops should persist in their intrusion and provocation India will be held responsible for all the consequences arising therefrom". An editorial in the *People's Daily* on July 9, 1962, asked India to withdraw from the newly established Indian outposts in the Galwan valley area of Ladakh. The Chinese forces continued to advance steadily in the western sector. They cleared new roads through Indian territory and established 13 new posts. On July 10, some 400 Chinese troops encircled an Indian post in the Galwan River area, cutting off the supply and communications line. A spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry at a Press conference on July 13 declared that Indian military movements in Ladakh "had created a situation there which had developed to a point where an explosion might be touched off at any moment". "It is still not too late", wrote the *Peking Review*, July 13, 1962, "to rein it on the brink of the precipice. The Indian authorities had better think twice on this matter". Clashes of arms occurred between the Chinese and Indian troops on July 16, 19 and 21.⁹ On August 14, there was a fresh clash in the Pangong Lake area between the Chinese intruders and the Indian troops.

By the end of July, the Chinese were threatening reprisals on the northeast. Why should the Chinese troops not enter and station themselves on what the *Peking Review*, July 27, described as "the Chinese territory south of the McMahon line which has been encroached upon by India?" "India", it complained, "taking advantage of the Chinese Government being too busy did what even British imperialism had not dared to do in the past, forcibly pushing India's northeastern boundary upto the so-called McMahon line...and seizing 90,000 square kilometres of Chinese territory on the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian boundary". It contrasted "the noble and just attitude on the Chinese side" with "the Indian side's arrogant stand of deliberately making provocative and repeated incursions" and described it as "an extremely dangerous political gamble from beginning to end." The Chinese Press was connecting "India's aggressiveness with "the Chiang Kai-shek gang's preparation, with

the support of the United States imperialism, to invade the mainland” and warned Indian authorities “not to miscalculate”. “If the Indian authorities insist on gambling despite the risk, then it is certain that they will gain absolutely nothing but will simply be picking up a rock only to drop it on their feet.”

The Chinese Government, in their note of August 4, 1962, brought forward the charge that, after the meeting of the officials of the two countries, the Indian troops had first stepped up their encroachment on the Demchok area and then, since last spring, successfully intruded into such areas as the Chip Chap valley, the source of the Karakash river, and the Galwan river valley and the Pangong and Spanggur lakes and that during this period they had successfully set up twenty-seven military strong points. Between the middle of July and the end of August the Indian troops were alleged to have set up seventeen additional strong points on the western sector—bringing to a total of thirty-four the number of strong points set up by India along this sector—some of which as close as two hundred metres to Chinese frontier posts, some wedged in between Chinese posts and some even at the rear of Chinese posts. The Indian troops were also alleged to have been engaged in outrageous provocations in the Lake Pangong area and to have made fresh intrusions along the middle and eastern sectors of the boundary. On the middle sector they were supposed to have intruded once again in the area of Wuje and set up a military strong point there. On the eastern sector they were charged with repeatedly crossing the “so-called” McMahon Line and making intrusions northwards. The Chinese at the same time suggested that they would like to have discussions “as soon as possible.”¹⁰ India replied to this note on August 22, still maintaining that no useful discussions could be held unless the *status quo* preceding Chinese occupation of the Ladakh area were restored, but at the same time expressing her willingness to “receive” a representative of the Government of China to discuss these essential preliminary measures. China’s reply to the Indian note of August 22 came on September 13, 1962, and proposed that discussions on the “Sino-Indian Boundary question” be started on October 15 in Peking and be held alternately in Peking and New Delhi thereafter. The Chinese completely ignored the Indian condition that the restoration of the *status quo* in Ladakh was to be treated as an ‘essential preliminary measure’, and India had to make this clear in her reply of September 19. On October 3, China rejected the idea of “setting any pre-conditions”. Since the Chinese had, in the meantime, occupied a locality in Chedong area, south of the McMahon Line, India insisted in her reply of October 6 that she would like the Chinese to withdraw both from Ladakh and NEFA before she could send her representatives to Peking.

Throughout August and September 1962, both the Indians and

the Chinese continued to build up their military outposts in Ladakh, the Chinese charging the Indians for having set up 22 new Indian military strong points since the spring and the Indians alleging that the Chinese had set up 34 new posts there since May 1962. On September 7, the *People's Daily* accused India of stealthily "nibbling away" at Chinese territory, strongly attacked her "dual policy" of "phoney negotiations and real incursions" and warned her to revise her attitude "before it is too late". By the beginning of September 1962, it was clear that the Chinese were aiming at a diversion of attention from Ladakh to the northeastern frontier. The first illegal crossing of the McMahon Line took place on September 8, 1962, near Towang in the Kameng Division of NEFA.¹¹ A Chinese armed patrol crept to the Indian outpost of Dhola, threw hand-grenades, and wounded three Indian soldiers. The Indian outpost returned fire, as a result of which one Chinese officer was killed and some soldiers were wounded¹². On September 12, the Armed Forces Eastern Command was reported to have been asked to adopt "prompt defensive measures", and get the border posts in the area reinforced.¹³ On September 14, Indian troops were reported to have "moved up in strength towards the Thag La ridge" in an "unmistakable show of force and were reported poised in full battle positions". The Indian Government, it seems, had decided to defend what it regarded as her legitimate territory and to push the Chinese back wherever new intrusions were attempted.¹⁴

By disturbing the *status quo* in a sector which had been quiet all these years, the Indian Government bemoaned in its note of September 19, the Chinese were destroying the "climate of confidence" necessary for "constructive discussions". The Government of India further announced in the note that "no amount of casuistry or threats of force will deter them (Government of India) from their resolve to maintain inviolate the territorial integrity of India." India's protests merely brought additional threats. In their notes of September 20 and 21, the Government of China not only threatened that "flames of war may break out" in the eastern sector but mentioned that they had already ordered their troops to undertake the same type of "measures...as in the western sector" in the "eastern and middle sectors," and admitted having set up "additional posts" and taken up patrolling in the western sector. Marshal Chen Yi, in referring to Lord Home's speech in the U.N. accusing China of "invasion" of India, did not hesitate in calling "Indian reactionaries and the British imperialists" as "jackals of the same lair." On September 20, 1962, the Chinese forces, which had hitherto made only isolated intrusions, crossed the established boundary of the North East Frontier Agency in the Thag La region, and started firing on a spot situated two miles east of Dhola. The firing went on for five days and nights. From the morning of September 26 until the afternoon of September 27, there was exchange of fire in the vicinity of a patrol post near Dhola. "In consequence of the

increasingly wanton nature of the Indian attacks," reported the *Peking Review*, September 28, "fighting is now in progress in this area." An intensified attack on September 29 was followed by an uneasy lull in fighting. Along with military intrusions, China intensified her propagandist offensive. She accused Indian armies of capturing places north of the Thag La ridge which simply did not exist, and threatened "retaliatory" measures in other parts of the NEFA sector.

By the end of September the entire northeastern frontier of India had become a live frontier. China was not only concentrating her troops in this region but constructing air fields. During the month following September 8, when they were first sighted in Indian territory south of the Thag La ridge, they had encroached on an area 15 miles in length and 3 to 6 miles in depth. On October 4, in a Cabinet meeting the Government of India decided to use armed force to deal with China, setting up a new army corps under the "eastern command". Following a massive Chinese invasion on Indian posts between Bhutan and Chinese-occupied Tibet on October 10, involving heavy casualties on both sides, Nehru authorized India's new commander-in-chief of the eastern border area "to fight a limited offensive operation", involving, what he clarified later in his instructions to the Indian armed forces, "the freeing of Indian territory in the North Eastern Frontier Agency of Chinese intruders." In the meantime, the Government of India had sent a note to China indicating their willingness to start discussions in Peking or Delhi "as soon as the latest intrusion by Chinese forces in Indian territory south of the McMahon Line has been terminated," and expressing their readiness "to hold further discussions at the appropriate level to define measures to restore the *status quo* in the western sector...and to remove the current tensions in that area."

The Government of India has at times been blamed for following what is sometimes described as a 'forward policy' in the NEFA. The facts of the situation, however, are different. The Chinese writing on the Himalayan wall was getting more and more clear, but the Government of India failed to read it for a long time. The Chinese had curtly rejected the Indian demand for withdrawal from the territory occupied in Ladakh as "absolutely unacceptable to the Chinese Government". In a subsequent note they stated that the McMahon Line was "null and void" and had "never been accepted by any Chinese Government." Reports were current from July onwards of military preparations and movement of troops in Tibet, and of heavy concentration of armed forces in areas just north of NEFA. On the pretext that the Indian troops were making "frenzied attacks" on Chinese frontier posts and the Indian "invasion of Chinese territory" was imminent, the Chinese had ordered their troops to launch offensive patrolling and to set up new military

posts¹⁵. Indian military preparations to meet the Chinese threat were far from adequate. "There is no apparent realisation here (New Delhi)", the *London Times* reported on October 11, 1962, "of the magnitude of the military contest which India may now have begun. Observers in a position to know better are still speaking lightly of a swift action to eject the '300 or 400' Chinese. Official accounts of continued strengthening of the original Chinese force have been ignored." When Nehru ordered the Chinese intruders to be 'thrown out' he was still thinking in terms of the Chinese being a few hundred in number. When fighting was resumed on October 9, the Chinese were reported to have used heavy mortar and medium machine-guns. India was hardly prepared mentally or militarily on October 10, or later, for a large-scale military invasion.¹⁶ As the news of the Chinese military concentrations splashed across the headlines in Indian newspapers, there was a growingly stronger demand in the country for stronger action. In a number of places organizations like Committees to Resist Chinese Aggression were set up, and there were demonstrations in front of the Chinese Embassy and Consulates.

A very precarious situation had been created by the fact of China selecting Thag La ridge, deep into the recess of territory dividing Bhutan from the North Eastern Frontier Agency, for the largest concentration of Chinese forces to date. Situated on the borders of the supersensitive NEFA, the Thag La faced directly on to the populous Ganges and Brahmaputra plains and strategically commanded entrance into India and Bhutan. It was no longer possible for New Delhi, as the *New Republic*, October 27, 1962, pointed out, "to continue to shirk a frontal engagement with Peking." The proximity of the new Chinese offensive to East Pakistan, with one hundred and sixty-five air miles of Indian territory separating the northern border of Pakistan's volatile eastern province from the Chinese, was also an object of great anxiety for the Government of India, particularly in view of China-Pakistan negotiations, which had opened on October 13, and the vague references of the officials of the two countries to the possibility of a subsequent treaty of friendship. Under these circumstances India was left with no alternative but to "fight to the last man" to oust the Chinese from the illegally occupied Indian soil. If China had decided to create a position of strength and of threat with a view to forcing India to negotiate from a position of disadvantage, India was not prepared to oblige her. The conflict with China, Dr. Radhakrishnan said in a message to the country on October 14, 1962, had assumed "somewhat large proportions, much to our sorrow and much against our will and we have been obliged to take part in it". Krishna Menon told the members of the Congress Party in a meeting at New Delhi on October 14, "We will fight to the last man, the last gun". "We are not interested in fighting," Nehru said at a Press conference in Colombo on October 15, 1962,

“but the difficulty is how to hold their advance into our country. We have to defend ourselves, otherwise they will march on”. “The attitude of the Chinese Government”, he said further, “is to seize territory and then have talks. India is not prepared for that. China cannot be permitted to occupy Indian territory and hold it for further bargaining”. India knew that the Chinese had equipment with heavy mortars and medium machine guns, and could call on reinforcements from major military bases from nearby southeast Tibet—the Chinese bases were at Tsona Dzong on high ground and easily accessible from the Thag La, whereas the nearest Indian supply depot was cut off from the scene of battle by a hundred and eighty miles of mule track. But India had no alternative. The decision to face the Chinese armed invasion by armed resistance was taken “only after India had exhausted its traditional policy of patience and friendship with China”.

BOOK THREE : CHINESE INVASION AND AFTER

CHINA'S MILITARY INVASION OF INDIA

On October 20, the Chinese started their "full-scale and wanton" military invasion of India. Pre-meditated and concerted attacks were simultaneously launched on the Indian posts of Khinzemane and Dhola areas in the northeast and the Chip Chap valley and the Pangong Lake areas in Ladakh. Equipped with heavy mortars and machine guns, the Chinese attacked in large numbers on all the forward posts in the Khinzemane-Dhola area. The Indian troops, resolutely meeting the attack and fighting back as best as they could, were out-numbered and outmanoeuvred and had to abandon Dhola and Khinzemane. Crossing the Namka Chu river, the Chinese spread themselves out over an attacking line from six to eight miles wide, and prevented the Indian troops from regrouping themselves. The Chinese at the same time attacked and occupied 11 of the 16 Indian posts in the northern sector of Ladakh, and 4 out of 5 posts in the southern sector. The Indian troops put up a brave and determined resistance, and in many cases successfully repulsed the Chinese attacks. But the Chinese were not only in possession of mountain guns and heavy mortars but were also logistically supported by a large fleet of trucks. On October 21, they launched an attack at Demchok at the southern end of the occupation line in Ladakh, and started massing troops for a frontal attack on the Daulat Beg Oldi and Chushul outposts. A grave situation had thus arisen on India's northern frontiers from NEFA to Ladakh on account of "continuing and unabashed aggression by Chinese forces". Explaining the Indian reverses, Krishna Menon said, "the Chinese have very considerable superiority in numbers and fire power." However, whatever the difficulties, he continued, "if we have to fall back we will fall back, but still we will continue to fight". "Whatever lies before us in the future", Nehru told the Indian nation in a broadcast speech on October 22, "I want you to hold your heads high and have full confidence in the great future of our country." He warned that there would be more reverses, and declared that India will "carry on the struggle... because we cannot submit to

the aggression or domination of others." More reverses came in quick succession.

On October 22, at 3 A.M., the Chinese launched a vigorous attack on the Indian post at Kibitoo, at the other end of the NEFA, on the tri-junction of India, Burma and Tibet, and also started concentrating at Longju, in the Subansiri District, in the central part of NEFA. Fighting was now taking place on five sectors, in the Chip Chap valley and the Pangong Lake regions of Ladakh, in the tri-junctions of India, Bhutan and Tibet on the western extreme of NEFA, in the tri-junction of India, Burma and Tibet on its eastern extreme, and at Longju in the middle. On the Khinzemane sector, crossing a pass east of Thag La, the Chinese captured, on October 23, Tsang-Dhar, a brigade headquarters, and four of the five Indian outposts in the region. From here they started pressing, on the one side, closer to the Bhutan border and, on the other, spreading in the direction of Bum La, north of Towang, the Indian administrative post in the area. This was followed by a rather sudden attack on Bum La. Since the Indian defensive positions were all on the west, close to the Bhutan border, the Chinese did not have much difficulty in capturing Bum La, thus strengthening their position in the Thag La region. By October 24, the Chinese had crossed the McMahon Line along a twenty-five mile front to a depth of eight miles on the Khinzemane sector and were in control of the entire section from the Bhutan border to Bum La. The capture of Lumpu on the same day further strengthened their position in the Thag La region and increased the threat to Towang. In the Lohit region, Kibitoo had fallen and Walong had been fully exposed to a Chinese attack. By October 25, the Chinese had captured Jang, to the east of Towang, and thus developed a three-pronged attack on Towang—from the northwest, from north and from east. The fall of Tsang-Dhar had badly shattered the defences of Towang. It was difficult to rush troops up from the divisional headquarters at Dirang in the southeast. In the meantime, the Chinese were pressing towards Walong, 85 aerial miles from the Digboi oilfields of Assam. With the Chinese occupying threatening positions at points of strategic advantage all over the Indian frontiers, the tempo of military onslaughts suddenly started slackening. Pushed back by the surprise Chinese onslaught in NEFA, the Indian troops had put up a dogged resistance. They had fought valiantly for every inch of ground and had not given up a single post till it became impossible to hold it. In Ladakh, the Demchok post, attacked by five times the number of Indian guards defending it, had repulsed three Chinese attacks in 46 hours and had finally surrendered in the face of Chinese tanks. Similarly, the post at Kibitoo in NEFA had held back the invaders, who outnumbered the guards by five to one, for two days, and had

given up only when the Chinese had rushed waves after waves of reinforcement. All through the fighting the Indian troops had inflicted heavy casualties on the Chinese : for every Indian soldier killed during the first ten days of fighting, there were at least four Chinese dead.

Declaring formally that "in order to prevent Indian troops from staging a comeback and launching fresh attacks, the Chinese frontier guards would no longer need to restrain themselves to the bounds of the McMahon Line", China made, on October 24, 1962, her first so-called peace offer. In a "three point proposal for the settlement of the boundary question" China asked both parties (1) to affirm that the Sino-Indian boundary question must be settled peacefully through negotiations, and that, pending a peaceful settlement, to respect the line of actual control between the two sides along the entire Sino-Indian border and to withdraw their armed forces 20 kilometres from this line, and disengage; (2) to undertake not to cross the line of actual control *i.e.* the traditional customary line in the middle and western sectors of the border; and (3) the Prime Ministers of India and China to hold talks once again. Matters relating to the disengagement of the armed forces of the two parties and the cessation of armed conflict were to be negotiated by officials designated by the Chinese and Indian Governments respectively. At a time considered to be appropriate by both parties, the Chinese Government would welcome the Indian Prime Minister in Peking. However, if this should be inconvenient to Indian Government, the Chinese Premier would be ready to go to Delhi for talks. "For thousands of years", Chou En-lai added, "the people of China and India have been friendly to each other, and they should remain so from generation to generation. Our two countries jointly initiated the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence and took part in the Bandung Conference of historic significance. Our two peoples' common interest in their struggle against imperialism outweigh by far all the differences between our two countries. We have a major responsibility for Sino-Indian friendship, Asian-African solidarity and Asian peace". "After all", Chou En-lai asked, with seeming innocence, in a public statement, "what issue is there between China and India which cannot be settled peacefully? What reason is there for bloody clashes to occur between China and India?" Reiterating that "China does not want a single inch of India's territory", China appealed to the governments of Asian and African countries to make "an effort to bring about the materialisation of the three proposals".¹ While Chou En-lai appealed to Nehru in the name of Sino-Indian friendship and Afro-Asian solidarity, his Government maintained its propaganda offensive against India in general and Nehru in particular at its full pitch. On October 27, *People's Daily* identified Nehru as a

“loyal representative of the interests of the big bourgeoisie and the big landlords of India”, charged his Government with ignoring the “sufferings of the Indian people,” who “are making meaningless sacrifices in the border clashes, while India’s big capitalists and big landlords are taking the opportunity to feather their own nests”, and expressed the hope that “the broad masses of India’s working people” will “free themselves from this lot...” The argument that Nehru’s Government was serving American imperialism, and had betrayed the Indian people’s struggle against imperialism and feudalism, as Chiang Kai-shek had betrayed the Chinese revolution, was repeated again and again.

India’s reply was clear and courageous. Pointing out that it was the Government of China which had “hurled its vast armies at various points on all sectors of the India-China boundary and enlarged the conflict”, and that it was the Chinese forces which had advanced in all sectors into Indian territory and were still advancing, Nehru demanded that if the Chinese professions of peace and peaceful settlement of differences were really genuine, they should go back “at least to the position where they were all along the boundary prior to September 8”. “India will then be prepared to undertake talks and discussions, at any level mutually agreed, to arrive at agreed measures which should be taken for the easing of tension and correction of the situation created by unilateral forcible alteration of the *status quo* along the India-China boundary”. “India is always prepared”, he said, “to resolve differences by talks and discussions, but on the basis of decency, dignity and self-respect and not under the threat of military might of any country, however strong it may be.” “There is no sense or meaning,” Nehru added, with some anger, “in the Chinese offer to withdraw 20 kilometres from what they call ‘line of actual control’. What is this line of actual control? Is this the line they have created by aggression since the beginning of September? Advancing 40 or 60 kilometres by blatant military aggression and offering to withdraw 20 kilometres provided both sides do this is a deceptive device which can fool no body.”² While China wanted to confuse the world public opinion about the exact location and definition of the line of actual control, and to enforce it upon India by force of arms, the Indian people were aroused as never before in their determination to defend the territorial integrity and independence of their country. United and fully prepared to pay the price of freedom, India was determined not to bend before military aggression. On October 26, a state of national emergency was proclaimed and troops were rushed from the Western Pakistan border to bolster defences on the plains of Assam.

By October, 31, 1962, when the Chinese offensive seemed to have been halted, they were already in control of riverheads, from

where they could push themselves further by moving south into the valleys. They had occupied positions of great strategic advantage. In the northwest, they were poised for an attack on the Chushul airstrip and in the northeast they were in possession, if not of any vast chunks of land, of small strategic pockets in the high terrains of the region. With the Chinese in possession of hill tops and looking across the mountain tops and valleys at the coveted prize, the promising Digboi oil fields of Assam, and perhaps beyond, the situation was indeed very serious. Once they entered Assam, the Chinese could cut off the narrow land corridor which linked up the rest of India with Assam. Another eighteen miles of thrust down the hills and into the plains would have left Assam high and dry. People all over the world were wondering when this next thrust would come. Nobody, however, expected that at a time when the Himalayan passes and valleys were getting buried under deep snow, the Chinese would be able to advance very much down the mountain valleys or into the Assam plains. The Press correspondents who visited this part of the world found the terrain almost impossible for any military movements—with valleys situated at an altitude of twelve to fourteen thousand feet, road building agonizing and slopes precipitous. From Towang to the Assam valley there was a deep track of some forty or fifty miles. At the end of it there was Tezpur on the plains. While the Chinese could always build roads if they had time to do so, as things stood, neither tanks nor heavy trucking could pierce the country between Towang and Tezpur. As military strategists pointed out, the standard warfare methods did not apply to this part of the world where about twenty persons were needed just to bring up supplies for one soldier. Nothing like divisions, brigades or battalions could be used. All that was needed was a widely dispersed group of men with small weapons. There, thus, did not appear to be any real threat to the Assam foothills and the Brahmaputra valley in the immediate present. Would the Chinese, then, wait for the spring to blossom forth? But one could not also forget that the Chinese were quite capable of fighting in winter. In fact, fighting in winter, when rivers were frozen, and the Chinese did not have to build heavy bridges, suited them very well. They had undertaken their first attack against Tibet in October 1950, and their second Tibetan campaign had been launched in the late autumn of 1953, and vigorous fighting had continued throughout the winter. The Chinese had got involved in the Korean war during the last week of November when the country lay buried under heavy snow, and while they entered the war against their wish, the winter did not deter them from fighting well and achieving remarkable success.

The second Chinese offensive, described as "one of the most brilliant operations in history", started with the fall of Towang on November 16, 1962. The brief cessation in fighting on the various fronts, never clearly explained, seems to be partly

due to the fact that the Chinese met with tougher resistance on the part of the Indian armies than they had expected and were forced to wait for further reinforcements. The fighting, however, never seemed to have completely stopped on the extreme northeastern frontiers where the town of Walong had been under constant heavy attacks by Chinese forces consisting of over two brigades since October 26. The fall of Towang on the India-Bhutan-Tibet border was followed up by a quick break-up of Indian resistance in other regions. In the northwest, the Chinese forces resumed their offensive with the shelling of Rezangle, a number of positions to the east and southeast of Chushul and the Chushul airfield area itself. Following a few hours of repeated heavy attacks in the early hours of November 18, the Chinese troops numbering over a thousand were able to capture the Indian defensive post at Rezangle. In the northeast, as the Indian defence in Walong was breaking up, the Indian position at Se La, 275 miles to the west, was attacked by Chinese troops of more than a division's strength. The Indian military had based all its hopes on the impregnability of Se La. Between Towang and Se La, there was a drop of a thousand feet and then a sharp incline of more than four thousand feet. The Indian troops, being in control of the valley, thought that, even though very much out-numbered, they would be able to stop the enemy from moving up the incline. Unless the Chinese constructed a road from Bum La to Towang they were not in a position to bring heavy equipment into the NEFA, and the Indian army commanders had estimated that they would take at least a month to do so. The Chinese had, however, completed the road within thirteen days. The Chinese completely avoided the deep terrain between Towang and Se La and, cutting through the Palit ranges of mountains, surprised the Indian armies at the rear. Another Chinese column bypassed Se La from the east and cut off the road between Se La and Bomdi La a few miles north of the latter and about eight miles to the south of Dirang, thus completely isolating Se La and cutting off all communications between Dirang and Bomdi La and between Se La and Bomdi La. This made it easy for the Chinese to capture Se La and Bomdi La almost simultaneously. The latter was situated over 40 miles within the Indian frontier.

The fact that the apparently strong Indian defence position at Se La on the ancient caravan route from Lhasa in Tibet across the mountains to India, despite the rugged terrain and an altitude of 13,000 feet, could be so easily forced by the Chinese, came as a great disappointment to the Indian army. With the fall of Se La and Bomdi La, the entire defence system in the area appeared to be disorganized and breaking up. A resumption of the "human sea" frontal attacks and of outflanking tactics, so characteristic of the Chinese strategy in the Korean War, easily dislodged the outnumbered and outmanoeuvred Indian armies from strong mountain

positions in the Kameng region of the NEFA. The India Army put up a stiffer resistance in Walong, where about 3000 officers and men, rising to their best traditions, fought in a spirit of true comradeship, patriotism and valour. For three days and nights, the Indian officers and men, hurriedly called to the front and completely unfamiliar with the terrain, held, on a seven mile front, a Chinese army five times larger in numbers preparing for this attack for months and possessing fire-power at least thrice more effective, and repulsed not less than fifteen fierce attacks, launched in quick succession. Descending from the high plateau of Rima on Kibitoo in the north, and entering the 16,850 feet high Diphu pass on the east, the Chinese established themselves on a 10,000 foot ridge on the west and planned to move up the two other ridges, and although they met with a tough resistance at the hands of a Kumaoni Company, by the time a Dogra Company was able to descend to the help of the latter, they had completely silenced it. No amount of bravery or heroism could save Walong from the Chinese. Within three days India had, thus, lost key positions along the Himalayan battlegrounds and the Chinese Communist armies were in possession of mountain gateways into the plains of Assam. The Chinese were in command of the natural approaches through the mountains to the Brahmaputra valley and threatened the whole of Assam and its oil fields. The entire North East Frontier Agency area now lay under the threat of the Chinese conquest. In the northwest, the Chinese completed the conquest of all the areas they had claimed and were preparing to capture Chushul, the Indian air strip exceedingly important for supply purposes. If captured, it was bound to complicate the supply of Indian forward positions in the Ladakh area and probably insure Chinese domination of Ladakh against any Indian attempt at reconquest. Thus, in both the areas under dispute, the Chinese in lightning conquest, had seized 'the crest lines' and now controlled the key passes and were moving down-hill, towards the crowded plains.³

The Indian army, despite its heroism, was unable to meet the Chinese offensive, partly because of the stupendous character of the offensive and its not being quite prepared to meet such an eventuality. The Government of India had never thought in terms of a full-scale Chinese invasion. They seemed to have depended too much on the Soviet capacity to restrain the Chinese and did not seem to be aware of the extent to which the Soviet Union had lost its hold on Communist China. They had watched the Chinese strategy of building up military outposts whenever this could be done without involving themselves in a direct conflict with Indian forces, and they (the Indians) seemed to think that a reply in the same terms might be an adequate solution of the problem they were faced with. The ease with which the Chinese had withdrawn from one of their advanced positions in Galwan valley seemed to have

convinced the Indian side that the Chinese would avoid direct military confrontation. The 'forward policy' in Ladakh seemed to have been governed by the determination not to allow the Chinese to take physical possession of their expanded claims of 1960, and the Government of India did not seem to realize the actual demands that would be made upon their ill-equipped forces to implement that forward policy. In Ladakh, India was maintaining a long line of communications, extending from the Kashmir valley through the Zojila pass on to Leh. Beyond Leh, there lay the mighty Ladakh range, to defend which all that the Indian armies could do was to maintain a series of outposts. Extending from the Karakoram pass in the north to Demchok in the south, these outposts could be maintained only with the help of helicopters and supply-dropping planes. These outposts, incapable of any serious fight, were meant only to demarcate Indian forward line so as to discourage the Chinese from advancing beyond them. Naturally, the garrisons holding them had no alternative but to withdraw to their bases under the pressure of the advancing Chinese armies. Chushul, however, was their strong-point and the Chinese could not capture it.

The Chinese concentration in the Thag La-Dhola area, which Peking had always claimed to be within the 'illegal McMahon Line', was taken by the Government of India to mean that the Chinese were trying to strengthen their claims over the territory for the talks which were scheduled to open between the two countries on October 15. The Government of India thought that the only counter-steps they could take was by pushing these troops out of the area. Here too, India had a series of small posts, chiefly manned by Assam Rifles. India also had a few strong-points acting as bases to and from which she was developing a communication system. From the foothills to Towang, India had constructed a jeep road which, passing through Bomdi La, divided Dzong and Se La. She was also beginning to establish a series of defensive posts to maintain and protect her line of communications. Farther east, her 'forward posts' had depended mainly on air-drops and helicopters, and, in the absence of any road communications in the region, the possibility of their being defended was the remotest. The Chinese allegation that India was making large scale preparations to attack them was, to say the least, absurd. The Prime Minister's orders to push the Chinese intruders out, perhaps contrary to expert military advice given to him, merely gave the Chinese a pretext to begin their offensive. The limited operation which the Government of India was undertaking might not have been so difficult to achieve if the Chinese had not decided to retaliate in full strength. The Chinese were reported to have brought three Divisions; two moved in the direction of Towang and one in the direction of Kibitoo, in their military offensive in the NEFA. Such a massive invasion must have been preceded by preparation extended over a long

stretch of time. Their attack on the Indian post in Dhola and occupation of Thag La was clearly meant to provoke the Indian army so as to give the Chinese armies a pretext for a large scale invasion, for which India was certainly not prepared. The Government of India did not have a clear idea of the strength of the concentrations, much less of the strategy, of the Chinese armies operating in the Himalayas, and were 'caught napping in a dangerous situation'.

The new army corps, the formation of which was announced with much fanfare, could hardly be put into proper shape by the time the Chinese started their offensive. Between the first week of September, when the first incident took place at Dhola and India realised that the Chinese were making large-scale concentrations, and October 20, when the Chinese launched their major offensive, it was not possible for India, as General Thimayya pointed out, to reinforce, equip and maintain her forces in this most difficult terrain, chiefly due to insufficiency in her logistics. The army staff in the north-western frontier hastily collected together two divisions. This was done with such speed that often the defence commander did not know the brigadier, and the brigadier did not know the colonels. Many of them fought on frozen ground in summer uniforms, not because the Government of India could not afford winter clothes for them but because, as Nehru put it, "we had to send our soldiers hurriedly from somewhere near sea-level to a height of 14,000 feet." The soldiers were given new weapons, but they preferred the old ones because the new ones were heavier, and difficult to carry; the military experts, too, testified to this preference. 303 rifles used by them were good enough for mountain fighting. Nothing but reckless courage could have induced the Indian army to take up defensive positions "as far north as possible and fight for every inch of territory." Perhaps it would have been better to stage a fighting withdrawal to the foot-hills overlooking the Brahamaputra where communications were reliable and where light armour could be brought into effective use. It was impossible to defend the Se La ridge.⁴ Again, if it had been possible to withdraw the 14 to 15 thousand mountain-trained soldiers from the Kashmir front, the Chinese could have been restrained. The Indian armies fought valiantly and magnificently in most difficult situations in Towang, in Walong and at Chushul, but they were not able to resist the Chinese onslaught. Given modern equipment and a certain minimum force and with better preparedness to meet the enemy, the military experts thought, Indian armies would have found it possible to stop the Chinese from their advances.⁵

The Chinese armies, on the other hand, started with great strategic advantages. They had been building frontier roads and airfields ever since their annexation of Tibet in 1950. Helped by their

road-building programmes extending over a long period, the Chinese could deploy their troops, select combat areas and time their tactical operations. China also had a large number of military leaders of all ranks seasoned by years of bitter fighting. The Chinese armies had emerged from the civil war "well-led, well-equipped with a surprisingly efficient administrative command, and thoroughly versed in the arts of war." In their campaign of the past ten years, in Korea, in Indo-China, in Laos, they had fought in the very extremes of climate and terrain, in snow-covered mountains and jungle-clad foot-hills. What little the Chinese general staff had to learn by way of mountain warfare was taught to them in their campaigns against the Tibetans three years ago. Conducted on two fronts simultaneously at a distance of more than a thousand miles from each other and planned with characteristic thoroughness to the last detail, the campaign was carried, presumably, under the overall direction of General Lin Piao, the veteran army General of Korea fame. It followed the usual Chinese 'human sea' tactics. Some 30,000 troops are reported to have taken part in the October 20 invasion of NEFA alone. Their superiority to the Indian forces was, in some cases, in the ratio of ten to one. They concentrated their attention on the capture of specific outposts so strategically situated as to make their further advances easier. The Indian army fought with its characteristic vigour, some of the contingents fighting to the last man and in all cases inflicting heavy casualties on the Chinese. Largely recruited from Tibetan youths under the leadership of Korean war veterans and stationed on the heights of some 16,000 feet, the Chinese, used as they were to the high altitudes and freezing cold of the terrain in which they were fighting, advanced in well-disciplined columns. On the other hand, India, not being prepared for the massive military assault, was forced to pick up its reinforcements from the plains and quickly transplant them on high altitudes. The Chinese also made an excellent use of guile and trickery. They disguised themselves as local tribals and often fell upon unprepared Indian soldiers with their heavy submachine guns firing. They used several Indian languages, calling on the outposts to surrender and explaining that Indians were their brothers and that their fight was only with the Indian Government which was under imperialist influence. They fired indiscriminately merely to create confusion in the Indian ranks. There is no doubt that it was a most unequal fight. Man to man, the Chinese soldier was in no way superior to the Indian soldier but, backed by powerful weapons, a long and calculated preparation and by the use of deceitful methods, the Chinese were able to win a number of victories in strategic positions in their first invasion.

The Chinese had a great deal of superiority in weapons too. Their earlier military combats had generally ended with their capturing a large number of weapons from adversaries. They were reported

to be in possession of 'American recoil-less rifles, self-propelled heavy artillery, automatic weapons of every description, jeeps, trucks, even tanks seized from the fleeing Chinese Nationalists and United Nations' forces at Yalu, and from the French in Indo-China.' They possessed MIG aircraft, rockets and electronically-controlled anti-aircraft supplied by the Soviet Union, as well as small arms, motorcycles, trucks and scout cars obtained from the Skoda works in Czechoslovakia and from East Germany. In the northwest, the Chinese forces consisted of mountain troops of the regular army accompanied by pack artillery and heavy mortars. In the northeast, they could overrun border posts which were manned by a kind of semi-military unit of the Indian army known as North East Frontier Forces. Under the cover of extremely heavy automatic weapons fire the Chinese rushed through indefensive tiny villages held by the state forces, the Assam rifles and provost units. The massive Chinese troops, in what came to be known as human waves, pressed forward in a series of long unbroken columns and while the forward ranks of the Chinese army were engaged in fighting with the Indian troops, the rear elements, with which they had continuous contact, provided replacements and served as a supply and communications column, passing forward ammunitions, food and special engineering equipment and taking charge of the wounded. "The Chinese operation", wrote Hanson W. Baldwin in the *New York Times*, "has been remarkable in its speed and effectiveness. This is particularly true because of the distance of the combat zones from the main centres of Chinese supply, the high altitudes and the rugged, almost trackless, region...The Chinese Communist armies fight, and are supplied, like a swarm of army ants. They force whole village populations to serve as human carriers, as they did in Korea, and by dint of awful exertion and at the cost of countless lives they conquer nearly any terrain."

CHINESE AGGRESSION : A STUDY IN MOTIVES

The important problem before India, following the massive Chinese invasion, was to find out how far China would go on her road to conquest, and whether the Chinese meant to do more than to "adjust the frontier" and occupy the areas that were vital to India and where they could subvert the loyalty of the local tribes as a prelude to further advances. The military moves of China could also be linked up with some of her far-reaching political aims. It was being said in the Western Press that China was possibly aiming at the "rice bowl" of South-east Asia and that by weakening the Indian defence in the northeast, she could bring greater pressure upon Burma and find a smoother passage for moving farther south on routes which did not involve confrontation with U.S. forces, as in South Vietnam. This was clearly based on the theory that China being expansionist would like to control the vulnerable continental land masses of Southeast Asia comprising Burma, Thailand and the remnants of the old Indo-Chinese territory. Being Communist she was also expected to be interested in bringing all these countries under the Communist way of life. But in extending the sphere of Communist influence even to insular parts of the Southeast Asian region, China had been harping on the theme that these territories had once belonged to her and that it was only a grabbing European imperialism, now happily in decline, which had deprived the celestial empire of China of these territories. Even if China was not interested in the immediate holding of the "rice bowl" within her firm hands by poisoning herself on India's eastern frontiers in a triumphant posture, she could serve as an inspiration, if not also as an instigation, to the Naga claims for independence and act as a time-bomb for Bengal to break away from the Indian Union.

If this was a little too far-fetched a speculation, there were reasons to think that China would some day, if not in the wake of the victories in the 1962 invasion, claim the possession of what it called the 'five fingers', later described as the

panchshool, or the five tridents. The theory of five fingers, it seems, had been widely prevalent in China. When the Indian officials were in Peking for discussion with the Chinese officials they had heard it and transmitted the information to the Government of India. It was being openly said in China, as Nehru pointed out to Chou En-lai in one of his letters, that China claimed Ladakh, Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim and the NEFA and that she might take them by force if it became necessary. China's intentions in Ladakh had been quite clear for a long time but her two-pronged invasion in the Dhola-Khinzemane-Towang region between Bhutan and NEFA on the triangle of the India-Bhutan-China border on the one side and in Walong on the triangle of the India-Burma-China border on the other, and her successive refusals in more recent years to accept India's claims to talk to her on behalf of Bhutan and Sikkim, added to her strengthening of ties, diplomatic as well as economic, with Nepal, gave significant indication of what the Chinese intentions could be. Used to devious and tortuous ways it was for China to decide how much she would like to take in her first bite.

There was another point of view which wanted to see the Chinese objectives in a limited way. China was immediately interested in Ladakh, which was of vital importance to her in view of her position in Tibet. China had been strengthening her position in this region for a long time. A network of highways and air-strips had been constructed in Sinkiang, which was now an expanding industrial area and a major centre for the production of ammunitions as well as for nuclear research and for training large military forces. China had constructed two important highways in this region—the Sinkiang-Tibet highway, which ran at an average height of 13,000 feet and the Pamir Road, linking Kashghar with Tashkurgan and the Karakoram pass in the Gilgit Agency of Pakistan—and they were both of significance and purpose to her. The protection of these strategic highways and the vital strip of territory between Ladakh and Sinkiang, it was pointed out, was the main Chinese preoccupation and that by invading the northeastern frontier, China was merely trying to disperse India's defences over a wider area. It could also be possible that China, under-estimating the strength of Indian public opinion, thought that by creating a crisis on the northeastern frontier she would be able to strike a terror in the hearts of the Indian people and this would reduce or minimize the pressure of public opinion in India on Nehru which was so far coming in his way to seek anything like negotiations or a compromise with China. In view of the attitude displayed by China in the past, it was argued, it could not be regarded as completely wide of the mark to think that Peking might agree on a com-

promise on the basis of India getting upto the McMahon Line in the northeast and China getting up to her claimed boundary in Ladakh.¹

There was another school of thought which believed that China's military offensive was guided more by considerations of prestige than by a desire to obtain territorial advantages of any kind anywhere. China's action was widely attributed to difficulties at home, the successive failures both in the agricultural and industrial sectors,² and the loss of face she had to put up with in Asian and African countries due to her growing rift with the Soviet Union. A diversion of domestic and international attention on the Indian frontier, where quick results could be envisaged on account of a long preparedness on China's part and a state of unpreparedness on India's, might be a help in creating an "impression" on the non-aligned countries of Asia and Africa and in forcing the Soviet Union to accept the Chinese view point. She could give them "proof" that despite her troubles China, was still a great power and capable of "punishing" India for not listening to her warnings. The lesson of superior military strength, it was argued, was intended not only for the non-aligned world, but was also intended for China's great neighbour, the Soviet Union. The Soviet aid to India was clearly a major disturbing factor for Peking and there were reasons to think that the imminent MIG jet fighter deal between the U.S.R. and India was one of the factors in the attack. The Soviet Union had been flirting with India far too long for the Chinese not to feel offended at a time when she was withdrawing her technicians from China and her aid to the latter in terms of money and equipment was shrinking into a trickle. The Soviet Union was not only giving increasingly large economic aid to India but also promising her all kinds of military weapons, including fighter planes of a later model than those given to China. China perhaps wanted the Soviet Union to declare her position. Would she go on supporting India even when India was at war with China? China had reasons to think that in case of such a flare-up, which China could produce at will, Moscow would be construed to stop her aid to India.³ If this forced India to throw herself into the arms of the West, China could not only convince Moscow that India had all along been in the imperialist camp but expose her claims to be non-aligned to ridicule all over Asia and Africa.⁴

On the other hand, it was speculated in certain circles that China was acting under fear.⁵ China was full of rumours (it is difficult to say how far they were engendered by the Chinese Government) that she faced a huge military pincer movement from the forces of Chiang-Kai-shek in Formosa and from India on her southwest, both instigated and supported by the United States (which, incidentally, was already maintaining large armies in South

Vietnam and Thailand).⁶ China was supposed to be afraid that India might take advantage of her weak economic situation and move into forward positions on the border as the Nationalists invaded the mainland⁷. The fact that India had not listened to the continuous threats extended by the Chinese during the last few months seemed to confirm them in their belief. The idea that China was sincerely convinced of the correctness of her claims to Himalayan territories also could not be ruled out. As Guy Wint put it, "China's main motive is to take back what she believes to be her own. The Communist revolution has restored her sense of strength, and she is determined to right the wrongs which she considers were done against her in the past. She wants to regain her old frontiers to the utmost extent."

To many it appeared that the conflict between China and India was basically one for supremacy in Asia. China and India were two massive Asian rivals for the development of effective economies and strong nationhood. China had followed the way of Communism whereas India had adopted a mixed system. While China seemed to be suffering more recently from some industrial and agricultural break-downs India seemed to be jogging along and making slow but steady progress, receiving substantial aid from the United States and the Soviet Union. India was not only engaged in developing her economy, but she seemed to be doing well with her experiment with democratic institutions. While democratic institutions had been discarded in many Asian countries, including Pakistan and Burma, India's closest neighbours, and were getting into a bad shape in Africa, and some of the Western thinkers had started wondering seriously whether democracy could be the way of life for the non-Western world, India had successfully gone through three general elections under a republican constitution based on universal adult franchise. With China knocking at the doors of Southeast Asia, influencing many countries in the region, the Indian success at democracy could very well be a challenge to her dogma of Communism. India, it was pointed out by analysts, was fast becoming a force in international gatherings. India had a prominent place in the United Nations. Its representatives were scattered throughout the world, in universities and other institutions, diligently learning what the world had to teach and assiduously contributing the best of what India had to offer. China, on the other hand, was virtually isolated and locked in, and relations with the Soviet Union, its only window to the world, were getting more and more strained. In view of all of this, one could very well imagine that the rulers in Peking, annoyed at India's progress, were determined to teach India a stern and costly lesson.⁸ A major objective of Chinese foreign policy during the preceding three years had been to demolish India's prestige. At the time of the Belgrade Conference, Peking had launched a furious campaign of personal abuse against Nehru as an "imperialist stooge" and

challenged India's right to leadership of 'non-aligned' nations. As the only non-White great power now challenging China, she was to be cut down to size and forced to acknowledge China's primacy, if not hegemony. The very diversion of resources from economic development to defence could be expected to put further strains on Indian economy and set back its everlasting battle to improve living standards. Economic collapse, in course of time, could be expected to lead to political collapse. The desire to bring down the prestige of India, to humiliate India in Asian eyes and to demonstrate to the world, and particularly to the Soviet Union, that whatever China's current economic difficulties, she remained militarily a major land power in Asia, seemed to be other major factors. All this was likely to create a deep impression on the countries of Southeast Asia and give a big jolt to policies of neutralism. Above all, Peking seemed to be serving notice, as the *New Republic* wrote on November 10, 1962 that not only Asia but the rest of the non-European world, with the possible exception of the Middle East, were to be treated as exclusively the Chinese preserve and beyond the competence of Soviet leadership in Communist affairs.

There were also reasons to think that Pakistan was quite an important factor in China's invasion on India. By pushing India into receiving American arms China could pull Pakistan out of the Western alliances and draw her closer to herself. If successful, this could be a revolutionary change in the diplomatic alignments in South Asia. Southeast Asia had already been displaying a restiveness to break away from the United States. Indonesia, Burma and Cambodia, which had all started with the policy of non-alignment, were no longer as non-aligned in 1962 as in 1959. They had all moved farther from Washington and closer to Peking. Laos in 1962 was under a neutralist government approved of at Geneva by the United States and other Western Powers. Thailand, which had been the centre of the United States sponsored military alliance in Southeast Asia, was talking of neutrality, and the Philippines, the long-term protege of the United States, of independence. If Pakistan, which was supposed to be the strongest supporter of the Western military alliances in West and Southeast Asia, could be induced to break away from them it was bound to be a great triumph for the diplomacy of China. So far as India was concerned, even when she depended on the U.S. military support, she could not be expected to fall in line with the United States policies in South Asia. The softening of resistance to Communism and to China in Pakistan was likely to enable the Chinese to encircle the vast complex of Indian territory, and push their two arms through the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal into the Indian Ocean, and throttle India from all sides. This kind of encirclement

was likely to weaken India's position in Kashmir and West Bengal and, if these territories defected, India's strength would be reduced all the more.

One could read back more clearly, in the light of the events of 1962, into the Chinese strategy since 1959, if not since 1947, when a Chinese professor at Szechwan University assessing the shifting balance in the Chinese civil war was said to have remarked, "There will be no Himalayas in a decade or so, and the writ will run from Moscow and Peking to New Delhi". Communist China had at one time regarded the nationalist leaders of Asia—Nehru, Thakin Nu and Soekarno—as the "horde of American imperialist running dogs", "betrayers of their respective nations" and "members of the political garbage group in Asia", and had selected Nehru in particular for the choice titles of "a blackguard who undermines the progress of the people's liberation movement," "a loyal slave of imperialism" and "the substitute of Chiang Kai-shek". Following the signing of the *Panchsheel*, their attitude had changed. But by 1959, China had reverted to her old position. By 1960, when the non-aligned nations met at Belgrade, China had actively taken up her campaign of vilifying Nehru, and her political analysts were describing him as a disguised agent for the colonial powers. India's voting with Canada against Poland in the International Commission on Vietnam in June 1962 was characterized as 'service rendered to the U.S. aggressors' and Nehru was castigated as 'a pawn of American imperialism in the campaign against China'. China's border agreements and treaties of friendship and non-aggression with Burma and Nepal and treaties of friendship and non-aggression with Cambodia, Afghanistan and Pakistan were in a way directed at isolating India. It was interesting to see that China had recognized the "so-called" and "illegal" McMahon Line as the Sino-Burmese boundary, yielding 25,000 square miles of territory she had been claiming from Burma, and, in the case of Nepal, the traditional watershed boundary was not only agreed to by China but in certain sectors, revised in Nepal's favour. As these countries moved under the Chinese penumbra, they were given a different treatment as "countries leaning towards the socialist camp," India alone remaining in the category of the "running dog" of imperialism. As time went on, China's pressure on India became progressively heavier. On the diplomatic level China tried fully to exploit India's differences with Pakistan over Kashmir. On the military level, her intrusions into Indian territory became more persistent. The Chinese policy of a continued diplomatic and military offensive against India reached its high watermark in May 1962, when China and Pakistan announced in a joint communique their Governments' agreement "to locate and align their common border."

The Government of India's reaction to persistent Chinese

aggression over the years was mild and, therefore, it misled the policy-makers in China. India, it seemed, had absorbed the first shock of the construction of the Aksai Chin road and taken the massacre of an Indian patrol party in Ladakh as an example of China's waywardness. The sincerity and vigour with which the Indian officials tried to marshal evidence in support of their contentions and to convince their Chinese counterparts of the correctness of their stand, and the repeated appeals from the Indian Government to start negotiations on the basis of the officers' report, naive as they might have appeared to the Chinese, must have also convinced them that India was desperately clinging to peaceful measures, and would be most unwilling to put up a military resistance to China's further aggressions. China's experience with her other neighbours, Burma and Nepal, seemed to be confirming this line of reasoning. R.K. Nehru's 'courtesy calls' to the political masters of China at Peking, following his visit to Outer Mongolia, at a time when China's official replies to Indian Government were crossing all limits of decency, might have further strengthened the Chinese conviction that strong and relentless pressure, military and political, would hasten the Indian Government along the path towards compromise.

Nothing but China's haughtiness can explain Chou En-lai's suggestion to 'tranquillize' the border area on the basis of the *de facto* situation, which amounted to asking the victim of aggression to agree with the aggressor who remained on the territory he had seized by force and to refrain from ever challenging the claims of the aggressor. Tapping India on her sorest diplomatic spot by flirtations with Pakistan, what China was doing in September 1962, was to bring her greatest military pressure to bear upon India on her most sensitive defence spot in the NEFA. A massive attack on NEFA, more serious than any attempted hitherto in Ladakh, the Chinese seemed to have argued, could add considerably to the pressure to which the Government of India had been subjected over the years. This could be expected to put Nehru in a tight corner. He would find it difficult to resist the well-planned Chinese offensive. He would find it still harder to seek aid from the West. Averse to any curtailment of India's development plans and to abandonment of his policy of non-alignment, Nehru could be expected to fall back on what appeared to be the only 'escape route', namely, seeking negotiations with the Chinese. If China's objective was to bring military pressure to bear on her diplomatic offensive, and secure her territorial claims by a negotiated settlement, she seemed to be getting Soviet support for it. This was clear from the hint thrown by Khrushchev on October 25 that India should accept the Chinese offer of October 24. India, frustrating all Communist calculations, Chinese or Soviet, refused to accept

the Chinese offer. Indian armies continued to resist the Chinese onslaught valiantly. It was at this stage that all the Chinese calculations started going wrong. Instead of exacerbating the divisions in Indian society created by the linguistic and regional differences, the impact of the Chinese invasion was that the country rose as one man to resist it. Though defeated on many a battle-field, the Indian armies refused to acknowledge defeat. Instead of appealing to China for mercy India asked for aid from all the countries of the world, and aid started coming quickly to her from her friends in the West. The Soviet Union fumbled for a while and then, resolved not to lose India's friendship, moved to an open criticism of Chinese policies.⁹ The Indian nation had awakened from her deep slumber into a 'world of reality' and was girding up its loins. Distraught by mounting pressures of economic break-down at home and widening breach with the Soviet Union, China was now faced with the prospects of a long drawn-out war on battle-fields deep into the Indian plains separated from her main sources of supplies by thousands of miles. What was worse, while India, despite her determination to follow a policy of non-alignment, appeared to have friends in both the camps, China was getting isolated—isolated even in the Communist camp. In the Italian Communist Party Congress which followed the cease-fire, differences between the Communist Parties led by the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist Party came into the open. It was, therefore, not surprising that China hesitated for a moment at the precipice of her military victories and then fell back to her old postures of diplomacy and military threats.

CEASE-FIRE AND AFTER : BATTLE OF DIPLOMACY

On November 21, when the Indian armies were reeling under the terrific Chinese offensives, the Government of China announced that it was ordering a cease-fire along the entire Indian border at midnight and would start pulling back its troops on December 1 in an effort to bring about a settlement in the hostilities between the two countries. A Government statement said that, starting from December 1, Chinese frontier guards would withdraw to positions twenty kilometres (12.43 miles) behind the lines of actual control which existed between China and India on November 7, 1959. The statement said that China was making the move to correct the present border situation and to bring about the realization of the three-point proposal it made on October 24, which had been rejected by India. The statement warned that China "reserved the right to fight back in self-defence" if Indian troops "continued their attacks" after the Chinese cease-fire or withdrawals. The withdrawal would move Chinese forces north of the McMahon Line on the eastern sector of the border and from their present positions in the other sectors of the two thousand mile Himalayan frontier, the statement said. The Chinese statement further said that provided the Indian Government agreed to take "corresponding measures" Indian and Chinese Governments could "immediately appoint officials to meet along the border to discuss the withdrawal." It said the two sides could also discuss the establishment of check-posts by each side and the return of personnel captured since major fighting broke out last month. The statement said that after the results of such talks had been implemented Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Premier Chou En-lai could meet either in Peking or New Delhi to discuss an overall border settlement. The Chinese Government expressed its "sincere hope" that the Indian Government will make "a positive response," and added that even if India "fails to make such a response" China would take the initiative.

The statement, as usual, brought forward accusations of aggression against India and represented that all that had happened on the Sino-Indian frontier was that, "pressed beyond the limits of endurance and left with no room for retreat, the Chinese frontier

guards finally had no choice but to strike back resolutely in self-defence." "The experience of many years shows that the Indian Government has invariably tried by hook or crook to block the path which was opened by the Chinese Government for a peaceful settlement of the Chinese-Indian boundary. This policy of the Indian Government runs diametrically counter to the fundamental interests of the Chinese and Indian peoples and the common desires of all the peoples of the world and serves only the interest of imperialism." This statement ended with a grandiose declaration leaving it to 'the people of the world' to see "who is undermining it, who is protecting the common interest of the Asian and African peoples in their struggle against imperialism and colonialism and who is violating and damaging these common interests." In a further appeal to the Asian sentiment the statement described the Chinese-Indian boundary question as an issue between two Asian countries which they should settle peacefully—"They should not cross swords on account of this issue and even less allow United States imperialism to poke in its hand and develop the present and unfortunate border conflict into a war in which Asians are made to fight Asians."

The Chinese declaration of cease-fire came so unexpectedly that for the moment it seemed to throw all speculations into confusion. The issue of war was straight-forward. If the Chinese had entered the plains of Assam, the Indian armies were perhaps better prepared to face them there than in the mountain altitudes. Nobody could know how deep the Chinese would be able to penetrate into the country, but there was no lack of determination on the part of the Indian forces to offer the toughest resistance. By this time a considerable amount of weapons of war had been received from friendly countries. The American and British missions, headed by Averell Harriman and Duncan Sandys, were on their way to New Delhi and there was no doubt that the Western Powers were determined to give all-out aid to India in her efforts to defend herself against China. The issue of war was clear, that of cease-fire misty. What did the Chinese want? If they started withdrawing their forces, as they had declared, would it be advisable for the Indian armies, in the situation in which they stood, to continue the fight? Would it not be better for India to take advantage of the offer of cease-fire, even if it involved only a pause in fighting? It did not seem to occur to many at the time that the Chinese were bound to stop their aggression sometime at a certain point after having gained their preliminary objectives, and this perhaps was the most suitable time for them to take this step. While the world was talking of Chinese expansionism, of the Chinese capturing the oil fields of Assam and rushing to Calcutta in search of warm waters, and while the countries of Southeast Asia felt more and more worried about ultimate Chinese intentions, China could stand in the posture of a *bodhisattva*, the very emblem of peaceful intentions, declaring her great

love for peace. In fact, as the Chinese seemed to have thought, the cease-fire was likely to cause greater consternation than any military victories they might have achieved. If the Government of India accepted the cease-fire, and it appeared difficult for them to reject it, the Chinese would have fully achieved their two main objectives: (1) of demonstrating the superiority of their military power in the East against a large and industrially advanced nation like India, and (2) of being able to dictate their terms to India and humiliating her into surrender. "If these two objectives could be achieved," wrote Peter Alvares in the *Hindustan Times*, "then the whole of Asia and Africa would have to accept its unchallenged leadership having all that it implies." "If the Chinese carry out their promise of withdrawal", wrote Kingsley Martin, "an entirely new situation will have arisen. India will have discovered that the Himalayas are not impregnable and the frontier states will make a new assessment of the relative strength of India and China...they will know the old British posts, which were primarily information posts and which they assumed once were adequate to defend them there, have no meaning today when they face not tribal people or peaceful Tibetans but one of the most powerful peoples on earth, ruthless, most intelligent in its leadership and militarily highly organized." If the Chinese really withdrew, the Indians were in no position to attack them and the likely prospect was that for an indefinite period the Chinese would remain in their chosen positions from which they could again launch an invasion whenever they wanted.

By announcing a cease-fire the Chinese in the classic manner were carrying their military initiative into the diplomatic field. "Whatever the justice of the claims and counterclaims," as the *New Statesman* wrote, "the particular subtlety of the Chinese move lay in the fact that it presented India with a cruel choice—to negotiate from a position of weakness, or dare refuse and thus provoke further unequal war."² Even though the cease-fire was "an announcement of Chinese intention, not a bargain," it was a fact of stunning importance and was bound to leave the Indians in a state of dilemma. "The Indians who thought that Assam was to be cut off, who thought they had to brace themselves for the possible bombing of Delhi, were ready with infinite reluctance to fight for years to regain the NEFA and to face, if necessary, a world war, are left to watch the voluntary withdrawal of the Chinese." Kingsley Martin described the psychological reactions of the Indians to the Chinese offer of a cease-fire: "They must feel some humiliation, they will not like to admit their immense relief, they will continue to say that they will fight to regain all their territory in Ladakh, though they know that this is not militarily feasible; they will continue to recruit soldiers and to regroup and strengthen their armies and to build bigger and stronger frontier posts, and to expect in the future renewed Chinese attacks. All this they will do and it will be of no harm but, in fact, many of their reactions will look like meaningless gestures once the Chinese have

actually withdrawn from the passes supposed to be impregnable, which they so quickly won and so bloodlessly restored.”³ The Chinese offer of a cease-fire, however great China’s original sin, was likely to commend China instantly to public opinion in non-aligned countries and even in some of the aligned countries. While India had suggested a reversion to September 8, 1962 positions, when the Chinese first crossed the McMahon Line, the Chinese asserted that they were prepared to go back to the ‘line of actual control’ not of September 8, 1962, but of November 1959, in the east, centre and west, *if India did the same* and if both sides agreed on a disengaged zone.

All this sounded very reasonable at first sight. It was only a closer look which revealed the snags. What China called the ‘line of actual control’ of November 1959, included much of what she held after her recent advances—India strenuously denying that China ever controlled as much before her encroachment in recent years. As the Indian note of January 9, 1963, pointed out, the Chinese were nowhere in 1959 along the line now being referred to by them as “the 7th November line of actual control”. If according to her own proposal, China withdrew twenty kilometres from the 1959 ‘line of actual control’ as defined by her, she still remained about a hundred kilometres within the territory claimed by India. “To take the so-called 1959 line as the base line for disengagement is”, the note further pointed out, “to quote the Chinese memorandum, not only ‘not fair and reasonable,’ but is a definite attempt to retain the wrongful gains of its latest massive aggression.” Besides this, more than forty military posts which India had set up in Ladakh, and which China had knocked out since September 8, would have to be permanently dismantled. These posts, as the note pointed out, were the result of limited defensive measures taken by the Indian Government in their own territory to prevent the continued aggression of Chinese troops. “It is indeed perverse thinking on the part of China to suggest”, it added, “that when a country puts up border defence posts within its own territory, it is guilty of aggression because it interferes with the aggressive designs of an expansionist power.”⁴ In the NEFA, where the Chinese proposed retreat north of the McMahon Line, if India accepted the corollary of staying twenty kilometres away from that line, she would have to leave the passes unguarded and within easy Chinese attack. Besides the problem of meeting the Chinese diplomatic offensive, India was also faced with a military dilemma—in the immediate future, that of deciding what to do when the Chinese had withdrawn and, in the long run, of deciding the extent of mobilization for a long and difficult struggle. From a closer scrutiny, one could easily see that the Chinese proposals of November 21 were worse than their earlier proposals of October 24, and if the Chinese sincerely believed that India would accept them it must have been on the basis that she expected her to accept military defeat.

The terms of the cease-fire in themselves were humiliating:

for India but to negotiate with the Chinese after having been subjected to a full-scale and massively prepared invasion would have been much more humiliating. Negotiations could take place between equals in status and not between those who had inflicted military reverses of a gigantic character and then decided to withdraw in order to avoid reverses and others who had been forced to withdraw for the time being under the impact of a sudden and unexpected invasion and had not yet availed themselves of an opportunity of offering a really effective resistance and pushing back the invaders. The most important aspect of the cease-fire, it was pointed out by those who favoured a downright rejection of the Chinese 'offer', was the humiliation that it sought to impose on a large and self-respecting nation. If India accepted it, the Chinese could prove that they were the dominant military power in Asia and none of the Asian countries was likely to remain under any illusion that India could protect them if they were threatened diplomatically or militarily by China. If India surrendered, which other country in Asia would be able to resist China? It would have made the whole of Southeast Asia more aware than before of the perpetual threat of an overwhelming assault from China and thus throw them more open to Chinese infiltration. China's victory, in case of India's acceptance of the cease-fire, it was pointed out by acute observers of the situation, would have first brought about a balance between the two foci of Communism in the world—the Chinese could now dominate the entire Asian continent and seek to extend their domination to Africa and Latin America—and next to tilt the balance in its favour and thus place her in a position to dominate the world Communist movement. If China with her present strength was so difficult to contain, what could not be expected from China with further accretion of power? Another argument which was brought forward in favour of the rejection of the proposals was that India could, in her present crisis, depend on help from the Western countries. On the other hand, if she was now prepared to purchase security by selling her honour, she could not have expected to get help to the same extent and with the same speed in some future crisis. Finally, there was also the danger of throwing away all the dynamics that had been released in the country as a result of the crisis. Before the war India was confronted with problems of national disintegration, inefficiency, corruption, all of which seemed to be disappearing overnight in the face of Chinese aggression. The nation had arisen from its slumber as one man with a dedicated purpose ready to make limitless sacrifices for the sake of its honour. The cease-fire was an invitation to abandon all that—“to acquiesce, to extinguish the only lamp of liberty and democracy that now burns steadily in Asia, to enslavement, to force and to the opening of the flood-gates of totalitarian expansionism”.

The policy of the Government of India was not affected by these various trends of public opinion in India and abroad. The Government of India, under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru, took up a clear, consistent, unequivocal and strong stand towards the Chinese proposal of disengagement. A cardinal principle to be implemented, as Nehru pointed out in his letter of October 27, 1962 to Chou En-lai was 'the restoration of at least the *status quo* that existed before the further Chinese aggressions on September 8, 1962. The same position was repeated by the Government of India in their notes of December 29, 1962 and January 9, 1963 to the Government of China, and by Jawaharlal Nehru in his letters of November 14, 1962 and December 1, 1962 to Chou-En-lai. While the Government of India made it clear that it was not going to negotiate with the Chinese until they went back to their positions of September 8, 1962, some of the non-aligned Afro-Asian countries tried to intervene as mediators between the two great Asian powers. Within a few hours of the massive Chinese attack, on October 21, President Nasser of the U. A. R. sent a message to Nehru suggesting that he might be of use by keeping in touch with both sides and putting forward mediatory and compromise proposals⁵. Nehru welcomed the suggestion. On October 25, President Nasser suggested a four-point plan which India, with some reservations, accepted and China rejected. The plan had included a return to the military positions held before September 8, 1962. On October 27, the U. A. R. subsequently urged China to modify her stand, which she refused to do⁶. The next move came after the second massive invasion starting on November 16, when Ceylon suggested a conference of six non-aligned nations and Burma's prompt response set it going. Ghana tried to shift its venue to Accra and the U. A. R. hesitated, until Ceylon, Burma and Cambodia, which had all decided to hold such a conference, seemed prepared to be going ahead without the U. A. R.

The Conference finally started on December 10 in Colombo.⁷ Ali Sabry of the U. A. R. in his opening speech initiated the principle that there must be no gain on account of military operations and that any solution proposed should not involve any reward for the aggression. The Burmese opposed it, and the other participants in the Colombo Conference seemed to be supporting Burma, with the result that the U. A. R., with a view not to wreck the Conference, fell in line with others and accepted the position taken up by the other members. The various circumstances in which the Conference was convened precluded any prior consultation among the participants. It started with differences not only on the likely solutions, but even on whether the Conference should try to suggest a solution at all, or content itself with creating a climate of peace. Prince Norodom and General Ne Win were in favour of the latter approach. There were suggestions

made for the expansion of the Conference, for the dispatch of a peace mission to Peking and New Delhi to mediate, and for the stationing of the troops of non-aligned countries on the frontier. The consensus of opinion, however, was that the Conference had not met to pass judgment on either side. There seemed to be a general agreement on the subject that the major objective was the creation of an atmosphere suitable to the resumption of direct negotiations. Mrs. Bandaranaike, the Prime Minister of Ceylon, said in Peking, on January 1, 1963, at a banquet given in her honour by the Chinese Premier Mr. Chou-En-lai, "At the time that I suggested this Conference I had in mind that the immediate purpose of the six-power conference was to create an atmosphere in which the problems created by the border dispute could be discussed amicably in a spirit of friendship between China and India."

The proposals for some time remained shrouded in mystery, though, as one of the correspondents put it, there was no real secrecy in Colombo. What the delegates thought they said privately and what they said privately was immediately known to the outside world. India's first reaction was one of scepticism. She was disturbed not so much at what the proposals were as at the approach the delegates had taken. India took the realistic view that the delegates were not expected to condemn Communist China as an aggressor, which would have prejudiced their effort at the very beginning, but she was shocked by the fact that they had refused to accept the principle that the fruits of aggression were to be relinquished by the aggressor, and had seemed to equate India and China. It was with anguish that Nehru remarked at a private executive committee meeting, "What is obvious to us does not seem to be obvious to the world." Whereas India had demanded that the Chinese withdrew in all sectors to the positions they held before September 8, 1962, the Colombo Conference was supposed to have asked for a compromise between the Indian and Chinese stands on border territory, a proposal which the Chinese had made and which India had already rejected, having made it clear that she was not prepared to compromise on any part of this area. There was some unexpected delay in Mrs. Bandaranaike starting on her mission of peace, even though she had said at one stage that the India-China problem was "so grave as to brook no delay." The suggestion was perhaps made in India that she should first go to Peking and call on Chou En-lai and then come to New Delhi. What Chou En-lai said, at the New Year's Day reception given to Mrs. Bandaranaike in Peking, was still more disappointing to India. While the border situation had eased "as a result of the measures taken by China on her own initiative", and Chou En-lai expressed his "heart-felt appreciation of the good offices of the six nation conference and the sincere efforts by Mrs. Bandaranaike," he deprecated "the failure of India to take corresponding measures in response to the peaceable efforts of the Chinese."

Government.” He quoted the border treaties which China had signed with Burma and Nepal and more recently with Mongolia and the ‘agreement in principle’ with Pakistan as models of China’s peaceful disposition and asked angrily, “Why is it that the Sino-Indian boundary dispute cannot be settled along the same line, but instead has led to armed conflict against the wishes of the two peoples ?” His ready answer was : “The imperialists are intensifying their efforts to make use of this situation to poison the Sino-Indian relations, fan up war hysteria and undermine Asian-African solidarity.”

The joint communique issued by the Prime Ministers of Ceylon and China at the end of the deliberations between the two, ascribing all the blame for the India-China conflict to imperialists, indicated the charm which Chou-En-lai seemed to exercise on Mrs. Bandaranaike. There were conflicting reports with regard to China’s reaction to the Colombo proposals. China’s response was described as “positive” in the beginning, but it was rumoured later that she had rejected the proposals. Mrs. Bandaranaike had an even more difficult task to perform in her negotiations with Nehru in New Delhi. She selected her colleagues with great tact and care. While she was supported in Peking by Subandrio of Indonesia, who was known for his pro-Chinese stand, she visited Delhi in the company of Aly Sabry of the U.A.R. and Kofi-Azante Afori-Atta, of Ghana. As the proposals became known, India’s first reaction was one of anxiety. While India could expect to re-establish fifteen to twenty of the forty-three posts which had fallen to the Chinese after October 20, the proposed Chinese withdrawal, while it took them behind the September 8 line at some points, kept the Chinese in occupation of sizable chunks of territory including some points of strategic importance that they had annexed during the recent phase of their aggression. During the course of the discussions, however, the representatives of Ceylon, U.A.R. and Ghana gave certain clarifications which were later made a part of the proposals. The Government of India took the view that, in the form in which they were now presented, the proposals were as close to India’s demands as possible.

The Colombo proposals were formally published on January 19, 1963⁸. They were based on the idea that the existing *de facto* cease-fire period was a good starting point for a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian conflict. *With regard to the western sector*, the Conference made an appeal to the Government of China to carry out the 20 kilometres withdrawal of their military posts as proposed by Chou En-lai himself in his letters to Nehru on November 21 and November 28, 1962, appealed to the Government of India to keep their existing military position and suggested that, pending a final solution of the border dispute, the area vacated by the Chinese military withdrawals be treated as a demilitarized zone to be administered by civilian posts of both sides to be agreed upon, without prejudice to the right of the previous presence of both India and

China in that area. *With regard to the eastern sector*, the Conference thought that the line of actual control in the area recognized by both the Governments could serve as a cease-fire line to their respective positions. *With regard to the middle sector* the Conference advised that the problem in this sector be resolved by peaceful means, without resorting to force. Once the cease-fire was consolidated, in the light of these proposals, discussions could be started between representatives of both parties for the purpose of solving problems entailed in the cease-fire position. A positive response for the proposed appeal, it was made clear, would not prejudice the position of either of the two Governments as regards its conception of the final alignment of the boundaries. Upon a request from the Government of India, a clarification of these proposals was given by the delegations of Ceylon, U.A.R and Ghana, in which it was suggested that the withdrawal of 20 kilometres by the Chinese armies in the western sector would be 'from the line of actual control between the two sides as of November 7, 1959, as defined in maps III and V circulated by the Government of China, that the existing military posts which the Indian armies would keep would be 'on and upto the line indicated above', and that the demilitarized zone of 20 kilometres would be administered by civilian posts of both sides. As regards the eastern sector, under the clarification given, the Indian forces could move right upto the south of the line of actual control, i.e., the McMahon Line, except for the two areas (Chedong or the Thagla ridge area and the Longju area), on which there was difference of opinion between the two Governments.

On January 21, it was announced by the Chinese Foreign Minister, Marshal Chen Yi, in Peking that his Government had accepted "in principle" the terms of the six nations Colombo Conference and that China was willing to use them "as a preliminary basis for direct talks between China and India". China, however, added Chen Yi, reserved the right to discuss with India the amendment of certain points contained in the Colombo proposals during the talks if India agreed to hold such talks. It was now for India to decide what she was going to do with the Colombo proposals. It was not an easy choice to make. The problem now was one of negotiating with the Chinese under certain conditions, which might not have been regarded as too unfavourable to India, or not negotiating at all. "A situation is sometimes created in a nation's life," wrote Krishan Bhatia in the *Statesman*, "in which a move cannot and should not be considered entirely on its merits. This is the occasion when national pride should be as strong a consideration as the practical implications of the proposal". To many it appeared that the issue was a much bigger one, namely whether in the context of China's behaviour the whole range of India's policies towards her was not to be drastically changed. There was a strong feeling in India that there should be no further negotiations with China. Many people

in India held the view that even if India rejected the proposals the Chinese were not likely to return to a full-scale offensive, but if they did so India could always depend on her friends. While acceptance by India of the Colombo proposals would save it from immediate problems of an active military campaign, argued C. Rajagopalachari, it would make China a continuing menace and her hegemony in Asia would become an accomplished fact. On the other hand, if the proposals were rejected, as in his opinion they deserved to be, it would mean renewed fighting against an enemy whose military strength at present was obviously bigger than India's. It gradually dawned on the majority of the members of the Indian Parliament, and Nehru and his aides played a very important role in making them see things in that light, that the Colombo proposals were after all not too bad. They were certainly an improvement over the Chinese cease-fire proposals and came much closer to the Indian demands. The most important concession was that instead of the forty kilometre zone of demilitarization demanded by the Chinese, there would now be a twenty kilometre zone of demilitarization. In fact, as Nehru pointed out, under the Colombo scheme India would be able to go as far, though with civilian posts, as she could have gone under the September 8 position with armed forces. The Chinese would have to withdraw under the Colombo scheme even a greater distance in Ladakh than under the Indian stand. Secondly, the Chinese would now have only civilian posts, on parity with India's, where otherwise they could have retained immensely superior military posts. More—over, Nehru argued, and this was a vital point in India's stand on the Colombo proposals, that it would be diplomatically wise on the part of India to show her appreciation for the efforts of the Colombo powers. Nehru re-affirmed his faith in the November resolution of the Indian Parliament, which had affirmed 'the firm resolve of the Indian people to drive out the aggressor from the sacred soil of India, however long and hard this struggle may be,' but pointed out that by accepting the Colombo proposals India was not giving up her objectives, but merely changing her tactics, 'from force whenever feasible to negotiations whenever useful.' Nehru's stand was supported by both the Houses of Parliament, and the ball was, thus, sent back into the Chinese court, nobody knowing in what shape or form or with what velocity it would be coming back, or when.⁹

India, thus, was able to acquire a little more time for setting her defences in order without compromising her honour or changing her traditional policies. But the nature of the opposition inside the Parliament and in the country made it very clear that there could not be a long-term settlement with China and the only way in which the situation could be dealt with, if not today or tomorrow, in some distant future, was by means of a war with China, unless China herself was prepared to back out, of

which there did not seem to be any signs. The opposition denounced Nehru for being "on bended knees," accused the Government of "a peaceful surrender under the guise of peaceful negotiations," called the Colombo powers "the cowering satellites of imperialist China" and their proposals as "the rule of the jungle" whose acceptance would mean "our reversion to slumber" and "partnership in perpetuity" with China as the negotiations dragged endlessly, bringing "disgrace, dishonour and disaster." They believed, as a correspondent put it, that agreement would never be reached or never respected by China, that negotiations would drag, that the September 8 line would in fact become the permanent frontier, that the stains of humiliation could only be washed with blood. It was clear that unless the negotiations with China, if they ever started, went amazingly in favour of the final border being where India wished it to be, the opposition, which had momentarily yielded to the Government persuasion, would have the upper hand.

The Chinese continued their military withdrawal with a threatening posture. India's demand for a clarification of the cease-fire proposals was taken up by China as "delaying tactics" which they were not prepared to tolerate. On December 9, they sent a strong note to the Government of India asking for a "clear and definite" reply and rejecting as "utterly unacceptable" India's "brazen demand" for the restoration of the *status quo* which prevailed before September 8, 1962. They made it clear that they had no intention of returning Dhola or Longju or Bara Hoti to India, and threatened that fighting might start again if India delayed accepting the cease-fire. In another note on December 30, 1962, the Chinese Government made it clear that India's implementation of the cease-fire was not the same as its formal acceptance, accused India of "provocation" on the border and peremptorily demanded an immediate holding of the meeting of officials to ratify the terms of cease-fire. Without any formal ratification of the cease-fire India continued to observe it. Even after the withdrawal of the Chinese army beyond the McMahon Line and twenty kilometres behind the so-called line of actual control, the Indian army did not move up and occupy the areas so vacated. In Ladakh even certain posts were not established, though in the eastern sector the Indian civil administration took over Bomdi La on December 16, 1962, and Walong a few days later. Whatever China's motives in declaring, and implementing the cease-fire, there was no doubt that she continued her military build-up in Tibet. The Chinese were reported to have completed, in the last week of December 1962, the construction of three aerodromes round about Lhasa, equipped with radar and huge runways and capable of receiving giant air-craft in addition to the three already existing there. They were stated to have constructed a road parallel to the McMahon Line, with diversions at short distances of

15 to 20 miles and raised an army unit of Tibetan youth. They were also reported to have moved about 70,000 troops along with huge quantities of arms and ammunition, armoured cars and T-84 Russian tanks towards the borders of north-eastern Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and NEFA, the heaviest concentration being reported on the borders of north-eastern Nepal and western Bhutan. Since there was no reason to believe that the Chinese would step down their military concentrations on the eastern sector, or would agree to withdraw from the area they had occupied in Ladakh without a major military defeat, it was clear that India had to prepare long and hard for putting her defences in a strong position.

IMPACT ON INDIA'S DOMESTIC POLITICS

The large-scale Chinese invasion of October 1962 overtook India like a mighty storm, plunging her in a state of shock and bewilderment. It was difficult to understand, as Nehru put it, why the Chinese had decided, by attacking India, to destroy the valuable friendship which had been existing between the two countries for thousands of years. "It is sad to think", he told the Lok Sabha, "that we in India, who have pleaded for peace all over the world, and who have sought the friendship of China and treated them with courtesy and consideration and pleaded their cause in the councils of the world, should now ourselves be victim of a new imperialism and expansionism by a country which says that it is against all imperialism."¹ "Nothing in my long political career," he wrote to Chou En-Lai, "has hurt and grieved me more than the fact that the hopes and aspirations for peaceful and friendly relations which we entertained, and to promote which my colleagues in the Government of India and myself worked so hard ever since the establishment of the People's Republic of China, should have been shattered by the hostile and unfriendly twist given in India—China relations during the past few years."² And once the fact of the Chinese aggression had been realized, India decided to accept China's challenge. Agonising and deeply painful though it was, the Chinese aggression came as a sudden shock which woke India up from her slumber. "We were getting out of touch with the realities of the modern world," Nehru said, "we were living in an artificial atmosphere of our own creation and we have been shocked out of it." "History has taken a new turn in Asia and perhaps the world," Nehru emphasised, "and we have to fight with all our might this menace to our freedom and integrity...No self-respecting country which loves its freedom and integrity can possibly submit to this challenge. Certainly, India, this dear land of ours, will never submit to it, whatever the consequences. We accept the challenge in all its consequences."³ India's domestic politics was, thus, going to be deeply affected under the impact of the Chinese aggression.

Nehru's call to the nation to steel its will and direct its energy

and resources to throw out the aggressor, found an answering echo in every Indian heart. China's invasion of India, in Nehru's words, "occasioned almost a new birth of Indian spirit." "From every part of the country, and from all ranks of the people came solemn assurances of the people's will to fight the aggressor. Differences of all kinds vanished in the hour of trial. If China had counted on finding a docile people, what it found was a nation vitally united to defend its freedom."⁴ On November 14, 1962, the Lok Sabha passed a resolution expressing deep regret at the betrayal by the People's Government of China of India's goodwill and friendship, and offering "with hope and faith the firm resolve of the Indian people to drive out the aggressor from the sacred soil of India, however long and hard the struggle may be." "The flame of liberty and sacrifice has been kindled anew," said the Lok Sabha resolution, "and a fresh dedication has taken place to the cause of India's freedom and integrity."⁵ Despite the many military reverses on India's far flung frontiers, Nehru spoke with confidence when he commended the above resolution to the nation. "During the last three weeks or a little more," he told the Lok Sabha, "we have had a glimpse of the strong and serene face of India, strong and yet calm and determined, that ancient face which is ever young and vibrant...This has been an experience worth having for all of us and it has been our high privilege to share in that emotion and experience. Whatever the future may bring, I do not think we shall ever forget this powerful emotional upheaval that India has had in which we all shared, whatever party or group we belong to..." "It seems to me, Nehru continued, "that no country with this kind of feeling in a moment of crisis can ever be suppressed or defeated."⁶

The way in which India reacted to the challenge was remarkable. The nation rose as one man to meet the aggression. All differences and disunities were drowned in one vast national effort. Differences of religion and language, of caste and region, were forgotten, and India under Nehru showed a will to resist which reminded keen foreign observers of how England, under the leadership of Churchill had faced the Battle of Britain in 1940. India in the wake of the Chinese invasion was not the same as India on the eve of the October invasion. "For years," wrote A.M. Rosenthal, *New York Times*, November 17 1962, "and perhaps decades to come the fact that on the morning of October 20, 1962, Chinese, Communist forces moved with power and planning into the northern reaches of the country that had lived the dream that it could never happen, will affect the thoughts and destiny of India." "So much has been happening since October 20"⁷, continued Rosenthal, "so many attitudes are in process of change that it seems sometimes that what went on before in India is part of a different world and different age. Time and events are racing through the historical camera in India, changing the way men think and act...The reel may slow and even may become stuck fast for a while, but it seems impossible for the moment that it will ever

move backward, that the lessons of the attack will be forgotten, that India will ever be as she was before October 20, 1962... Young men rush to enlistment centres and women organize knitting parties... The Indian soldier is the new hero and for him women strip off their gold bangles and blind children send their candy money to Government funds and Maharajas rummage about in the vaults for forgotten jewels." "No army", Rosenthal concluded, "was strong enough, no politician powerful enough, to wipe out an event of historical importance or its effect on the minds of nations and men."⁷

To say that the whole country responded to the Government efforts at resisting the Chinese aggression with a remarkable unity of will and determination and strength does not mean that there was no discussion among the people. Discussion is the very life-breath of democracy. At no stage during the crisis there was any suppression of public opinion in the country. While Nehru was advising the members of Parliament to take a calm view of the situation in the halls of the Lok Sabha, Kripalani was challenging his leadership at largely attended meetings held in the other parts of the capital. But since India's China policy during the years had not been marked by any major differences within the Indian political parties or leadership, the criticism was exceptional. The country as a whole tended to ignore this criticism, and gave all-out support to the Government's defence policies. The way in which the Indian people behaved during the crisis and the way in which they emerged out of it, shows the remarkable manner in which democracy functioned, and became strengthened, in India as a result of the Chinese invasion.

There was a sense of disillusionment with, and irritation over, a number of things. China, on which India had relied for so long, could no longer be trusted. Non-aligned powers, whom India had guided in their policies all these years, were left gaping and inactive, and were reluctant even to declare China as an aggressor. Pakistan seemed prepared to join hands with China in this hour of India's crisis. Russia was either not willing to restrain China or no longer able to do so. The Western Powers, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom, came forward to help India quickly and abundantly, bringing a kind of moral pressure on India to get aligned with them. Adding to all these disconcerting factors were the sharp and successive military reverses which directed the anger of a large section of Indian people to Krishna Menon, the Defence Minister, and to Prime Minister Nehru, when the latter tried to defend him, and it was suspected that the army commanders also had taken a fairly active role in the criticism. The Government policy of caution with regard to both prompt Western aid and the lukewarm Soviet attitude, and failure to respond sharply to either, caused greater consternation. The criticism grew as the Chinese launched their second offensive in November and won more successes, and when China declared a cease-fire the critics claimed that it was, perhaps,

due to prompt military aid from the West.

Strong sections of Indian public opinion were in favour of carrying the war with China to the finish. They talked of inviting all-out aid from the West and of pushing back the Chinese across the Himalayas from where they came. Some talked of liberating Tibet. Rajagopalachari wanted the Government of India to consult the United States and the United Kingdom before entering into negotiations with China. Jayaprakash Narayan wanted that negotiations should take place only when the last Chinese soldier had left the soil of India. Both he and Rajaji were stoutly opposed to talks even if the Chinese withdrew to the positions they held before September 8, 1962. Asoka Mehta, otherwise moderate in his outlook, called for "ceaseless fighting" and opposed "the talk of opening negotiations with China, even if they withdrew to the positions occupied before September 8". The opposition was against any dependence on Russia and seemed to think that all Communists were bad. Most of them supported alignment with the West, even if the West did not ask for it. Rajaji thought that the Western Powers were not asking India to join with them in a military alliance because of India's loss of moral stature. "The old stand of neutrality is factually untenable and clearly out of date," shouted N. G. Goray of the PSP. "An 'imperialist' who comes to your help with a bucket of water when your house is on fire is any day better than a 'comrade' who offers to photograph the scene". There was an outcry for settlement with Pakistan even at the cost of major interests and for patching up of relations with India's other neighbours. The main burden of the arguments advanced by the opposition seemed to be that India must strengthen her position by whatever means available and teach China a lesson irrespective of the fact whether, the effort would lead to a world war.

The basic difference between the Right-wing opposition and the Nehru line was that while the leaders of the opposition were prepared to go to any length in building up national power, including maximum dependence on the West, Nehru wanted to depend mainly on the strength of the Indian people. He emphasised the fact, at a moment when very few in India seemed to realize it, that there was no alternative to India paying the price of her defence herself. While it was gracious on the part of friendly powers to come with their offers of help, and while it was necessary for India to accept these offers and even to ask for greater aid, she could not expect to rely on the Western Powers in defending herself. The crisis had merely confirmed Nehru in his faith in non-alignment. He was prepared to go to the greatest possible length in establishing friendship with the West but not at the cost of India's policy of non-alignment. He was prepared to negotiate with Pakistan, even in the face of continuous provocations, but was not prepared to compromise India's basic stand with regard to Kashmir under external pressure. He knew more than anybody else the seriousness and intricacies of the Kashmir problem and was not

prepared to throw away Kashmir to Pakistan for an uncertain and unpredictable friendship in the future. He was prepared to improve relations with other neighbouring countries, like Ceylon and Burma. In fact, this had always been a part of his belief, but he was now willing to make greater efforts in this direction.

The Government, including Nehru, who had been the undisputed leader of the country for over 30 years and now at 73 stood at the height of his career, seemed to have been shaken up, though when he talked of our being "out of touch with reality" he was not castigating his own policies but merely sharing the blame with everyone else. With him it was obviously a great personal tragedy. The Chinese were forcing him to undertake measures which went against his own grain and which jeopardized the goals he had been fighting for throughout his life. In his appearances at public functions, parliamentary meetings or press conferences, he sometimes appeared 'tired, dispirited, indecisive', but on other occasions he appeared 'alert, inspiring, decisive'—these changes of mood and spirit personifying the feelings of the majority of his countrymen. One of the important casualties of the crisis was Krishna Menon. He had been one of the key personalities in the Indian Government and had been closely associated with the country's defence and foreign policies. He had suffered much for the country and, in spite of curtness of manners and lack of tact, achieved a great deal for his country in the international gatherings. Nehru was sorry to part company with him but the pressure of public opinion and political leadership was so great that he was left with no alternative.

Nehru's own leadership was never in question. Reports carried to the United States by an NBC correspondent about certain members of the Cabinet threatening to take away the leadership from him, if he did not rise to the demands of the crisis, and of the army getting ready to stage a take-over if the Chinese continued to advance, were without any basis. In fact, while suffering from severe jolts, Nehru's personality was able to emerge successfully out of the crisis, and he not only voiced the new national spirit at this "crossroads of our history" but gave a sober lead to the country. While Nehru had contributed, in the past, a great deal to the various concepts of Indian politics—she was the first man to stand for complete independence, one of the two great architects of Indian secularism, a true parliamentarian and the greatest support to democracy in India—it was for the first time that he gave a clear lead to the nation in action. He refused to bend before the pressure of popular excitement. He seemed determined not to make any serious diversion from policies to which the country was committed for a long time. He believed in taking a hard line with China but only as far as vacating the aggression committed after September 8, 1962 was concerned, and refused to rule out honourable negotiations. He decided to adhere to a policy of friendship with, and faith in, the Soviet Union. This in

fact, was the sheet anchor of Nehru's policy. He did not want to take any steps which might alienate Russia from India and oblige her to go to the help of China, thus jeopardizing India's policy of non-alignment.

Nehru's position as the leader of the middle of the road political party, the Indian National Congress, had always been to try to bring about a balance of forces. In 1957, when the challenge was from the Left, Nehru and the Congress had almost pampered the forces of the Right. During the 1962 elections, the challenge was from the Right, from Jan Sangh and from the newly organized Swatantra Party. Nehru had criticised them vehemently in his election campaigns, but now that the Chinese invasion gave these parties an opportunity of taking up cudgels against the Government, Nehru's primary interest lay in maintaining a balance, but at the same time he found it difficult to give his whole-hearted support to the Left.

The most remarkable thing about this man of India's destiny was that he himself did not lose balance, except perhaps for an occasional moment or two, when his sensitive soul experienced the deep tremors of the crisis. The country passed through a great upsurge of emotion and excitement and anger, but by his arguments and persuasiveness, Nehru was gradually able to bring around, first the Congress and then the country, to his own point of view. Within a few weeks the excitement calmed down. By the time the cease-fire proposals with their interpretations were available to the Indian Parliament, the whole country was prepared to support the Prime Minister's point of view. This was a remarkable example of a truly democratic leadership asserting itself.

The way in which Nehru handled the diplomatic situation, which was created by the cease-fire and Colombo proposals, was remarkable. If he had allowed himself to be led by popular sentiments, instead of giving a lead to the nation, he might have refused to abide by the cease-fire offer and asked the army to push back the Chinese invaders. He might have asked for immediate and massive military aid from the West and got it. He might have ignored the friendly attitude of the Soviet Union, and he might even have risked converting the war between India and China, which was still technically a border dispute, into a world war. One shudders to think what the implications of such a policy could have been. Nehru, who had stood as an advocate of world peace for all these years, did not want to act as an instrument of world war.

With his deep insight into, and understanding of, the world forces, Nehru knew—what his critics did not seem to understand—that even if India had liked to do so the Western Powers would not have permitted her to convert the local conflict between India and China into a major world war. What had happened at the time of the

Cuban crisis was illustrative of the big powers' attitude towards a world conflagration. When military confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States seemed imminent, both Khrushchev and Kennedy had retreated from their positions and prevented the crisis from developing into a world war. Consistent with the international situation, therefore, Nehru continued to adhere to his policies. As one of the Indian commentators remarked of Nehru, "anyone surveying the recent debate in Parliament would have to admit that he is more attuned to these difficult times than any of his colleagues. He is sensitive to the subtleties of the situation now unfolding, conscious of the big power disengagements taking place and how these will have an impact on our relations with our neighbours, aware of the essential validity of the policies we have followed during these years of independence. His handling of the last session of Parliament was in many ways masterly. A less consistent espousal of the non-aligned nations' proposals might have weakened the diplomatic initiative, isolated us, and made us look thoroughly unreasonable and unbending. Now China is in the dock." The appropriateness of the Nehru line was completely substantiated by subsequent developments in India and the world.

In the darkest days of the crisis India did not lose sight of the two objectives to which she had dedicated all her efforts: economic development, aimed at securing for the masses better standards of living, and democracy, assuring the masses of fullest participation in the government of the country. The great task of building up democracy, which had been initiated with the Indian people giving to themselves a truly democratic constitution, which had survived the shocks generated by the stresses and storms of three general elections based on adult franchise, and which had been considerably broadened in its base and scope by the introduction of democratic decentralization, was maintained during the period of the crisis. But India now learnt, and she learnt it in the hardest possible way, that it was not enough to believe in freedom and free institutions. In order to remain free, a country had to be strong enough to protect its freedom. India's determination to protect this freedom was a reiteration of her faith in the value of free institutions.

The time has not yet come to make a complete assessment of the impact of the trans-Himalayan confrontation on Indian political parties. The Congress, never owning a clear-cut ideology, continued to represent a congeries of conflicting interests and view-points. At one stage it seemed to be on the point of splitting, but the wavering elements quickly got around and under Nehru's leadership its unity remained intact. The Rightist parties, the Swatantra, the Jan Sangh and others, as also the Socialists, tried to exploit the situation fully, challenging both India's foreign and domestic policies, but were quickly cut down to size by growing popular support to the Prime Minister's policies. The statement

made by the RSS Chief Golwalkar that "the collective will of the people" should be aroused for bringing about changes in the policies of the Government and that, if the "present rulers" were found unwilling to introduce these changes, they should "quit their gaddis", looked hollow. Even the RSS-Jan Sangh mouth-piece, *The Organiser*, expressed it as its "considered view" "that Sri Nehru must continue in office at least for the duration of the emergency", and wrote that "with all his faults", including "his neglect of the country's defences", he was "still by far the most popular leader at home and the best known leader abroad", and that "his exit at this stage could conceivably confuse the country". What was remarkable was that all the political parties of the country stood behind the ideology of national unity, and none challenged the validity of India's pledge to follow the path of democracy. Even the Dravida Munnetra Kazhgham, which had stood for the division of India and the creation of a separate state for Dravidian South, showed willingness to amend its constitution and redefine the party's objectives as "to promote greater political, economic, and cultural unity among the people of the southern states and secure greater political rights for the states of the Union," and to remove all references to "Dravida Nadu" or "Dravidasthan" from its constitution.

The most important change, however, came in the Communist Party of India. Never so deeply divided as in the fall of 1962, on ideological grounds as well as on regional basis, the Communist Party of India was slow to react to the crisis. An ambivalent statement issued by the Secretariat of the Party had earlier led to a virtual revolt on the part of the State Councils of Delhi, Maharashtra, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Tamilnad, Assam and Himachal, each of which passed strong resolutions condemning the "premeditated and un-provoked aggression by China" and promising "full support to all measures of the Government for the defence of India". The National Council of the Communist Party of India, meeting in Delhi, realized the gravity of the situation and unhesitatingly characterized the Chinese action of crossing the international frontier and launching big offensives as indisputably constituting "aggression and violation of territory," and extended its "full support to the position taken by Prime Minister Nehru in regard to the conditions for the opening of negotiations for the settlement of the border dispute," and called on "every member and supporter to intensify his efforts in support of the defence of the country." Never expecting "a socialist country like China to settle a border dispute with India by force of arms and make astounding claims against a country which is engaged in peaceful consolidation of its newly-won independence, which belongs to the peace camp, which follows a foreign policy of non-alignment, which has all along maintained friendship with China and whose government is run by a parliamentary democracy and not a military dictatorship," the National Council was of the

opinion that by its "wrong and mistaken attitude" the Chinese Government had facilitated the strengthening of the Right-wing reactionary parties and groups in the country and strengthened the opponents of non-alignment. The Communist Party stood for strengthening and building of the unity of all patriotic forces in the country and was not opposed to buying arms from any country on a commercial basis, though it was opposed to the import of foreign personnel to man the defences of the country.

The prominent members of the Communist Party were even more unequivocal in their statements. S.A. Dange, the Chairman of the Communist Party of India, said that the crisis had been precipitated by "the intrusion of the Chinese forces to the south of the McMahon Line, thus violating Indian territory...India is not aggressive nor is it expansionist and Nehru's foreign policy is not made either by dollar aid or rouble aid". On the other hand, it was the political attitude of the Chinese that was "conditioning their militarist and recalcitrant attitude in its settlement of the border question". A.K. Gopalan deeply deplored "the attack against India" and stated that "the attack against India is an attack on world peace". He termed Chinese aggression as "naked, treacherous and criminal", which had shocked the conscience of all those who value socialism and peace". Bhupesh Gupta, Hiren Mukherjee, M.N. Govindan Nair, Eswara Reddy, Mrs. Renu Chakravarty and several other Communist leaders made similar statements and pledged their "absolutely categorical support", on their own behalf as well as that of the Communist Party, to the Government policy. This attitude on the part of the 'great Communist Party of India' was naturally irritating to China. It was difficult for her to understand why "some self-styled Marxist-Leninists, such as S.A. Dange in India trailed closely behind Nehru and falsely accused China of 'encroachment' on Indian territory...Such people had departed from the interests of the Indian people, from the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism and from proletarian internationalism". The Indian Communists were urged by China to assume a bold role of leadership, "even if martyrdom resulted for individuals", and the Communist Party of India was reminded of the Chinese Communist Party which stood up time and again against the Kuomintang in defence of the people's interests.

The fact that the centre of ideological gravity, which had already registered a shift towards the Right during India's Third General Elections, further moved to the Right, surprised Mrs. Joan Robinson, the noted British economist, who happened to be in India at this time. In the wake of Hitler's war against England, the British politics had shifted to the Left and Churchill had been replaced by Attlee. Why should it have been different, she asked, in the case of India? The explanation was quite clear. In the case of England, the invasion had been by forces which represented an extreme Right wing ideology. The only strategy by which it

could be combated was by taking a position farther to the Left. In the case of India in 1962, the invasion was from radical, even sectarian, Left, and while the Soviet Union, which was now in a kind of central position so far as the Leftist ideology was concerned, did not join ranks with Left sectarianism and maintained its 'correct' relations with India, the Western capitalist countries quickly came over to the support of India and, under the pressure of the complex combination of circumstances, it became inevitable for Indian politics to move to the Right.

As the debate on non-alignment in the Indian Parliament made clear, the polarization of the parties, which had come into prominence during the 1962 elections, was further confirmed.⁹ As a total result of the strengthening of Nehru's position, the Congress, the party in power, was able to strengthen its position still further. The challenge from the Right was strong and, on the whole, the Rightist forces emerged stronger but not to the extent generally held.¹⁰ The fact that the Swatantra Party lost the backing of the country over its plea for the rejection of Colombo proposals and the giving up of the policy of non-alignment considerably weakened it. While trying to take cover under a stronger sense of nationalism, its policies appeared to be indifferent to the sapping of the vitality of the nation by dependence on foreign support. As it became more and more clear that the pursuit of a more vigorous policy against China would lead to greater dependence on the West, and a greater dependence on the West would weaken India's resolve to pursue a policy of independence in world affairs, and any abandonment of non-alignment would dry up the bubbling springs of vitality and nationalism which made a more vigorous anti-China policy so attractive to the Indian masses, the Rightist forces lost ground considerably. The country was also able to realize that, in view of the growing intransigence of Pakistan's attitude, it was not so easy to come to an agreement with her, as the leaders of the Right (who, with the exception of Rajaji, had been the strongest enemies of Pakistan) were now advocating (perhaps to fall in line with the Western approach).

The greatest achievement of the crisis was the forging of national unity. India in the days of the crisis stood more united than ever before in her long history, and the fact of national unity, so achieved, strengthened the foundations of democracy, razing all doubts and apprehensions about its survival in the country. The prophets of gloom and despair, who had talked of Indian nationalism breaking up into caste, regional, language and communal loyalties in the coming decades, which were regarded as dangerous, must have been surprised to find this nationalist upsurge. In fact, those who had taken up this view did not seem to realize how deep the foundations of the Indian nationalist movement were. India of 1947, which launched itself upon a democratic experiment, was no

longer the India of ancient and medieval times but an India already on the road to modernization and well-versed over a long period in the working of democratic institutions. India, thus, was strongly wedded to both nationalism and democracy, though patterns of development were bound to be different from those in the West on account of differences in social structure and the stage of growth. The way in which the common man responded to the crisis—the rush at the recruiting centres, the willingness to make sacrifices, the preparedness to lay down one's life at the altar of the country—surprised even the Chinese who were taken aback at this tremendous rise of popular upsurge.

The fact of survival during the last crisis may lead one to think that India's nationalism and democracy would be able to survive the trials and tribulations in the coming years, which are bound to be much more challenging. The entire direction of the country's development is likely to change. There will be greater emphasis on defence, which will lead to growing taxation and larger economic burdens on the middle and poor classes than in the pre-aggression period. Political parties, being what they are, will take the full advantage of popular discontent in building up their own power. The central leadership, unless it adopts some drastic plans of revitalising the Congress and rejuvenating itself, may find it more difficult to weather the coming storms than earlier ones. (The Kamaraj plan may be a step in the direction. In case it succeeds, it will lead to a more stringent party control over Government and further enfeebling of the opposition, which may further strengthen the tendency towards one-party monopolisation of power, and centralization of authority and may not be regarded as altogether in the wider interests of democracy). There is hardly any danger of the army playing a decisive role in the future politics of the country, but after the defence mechanism of the country becomes more stabilized, it will have to be reckoned with as a voice at least in the determination of military affairs. The growing centralization, in its turn, is likely to be offset by the growing strength of the state-level leadership. The greatest danger to the future of India's democracy, however, would be a breakdown of India's economy. As China continues with her intransigent attitude and aggressive posture towards India, obliging her all the time to keep herself in a state of preparedness, as taxes increase, as prices go higher, as the opposition to the emergency measures becomes stronger, as relations between China and Pakistan become more intimate, as the warmth of the West cools down on account of India's continued emphasis on non-alignment, as it becomes increasingly difficult to reconcile the inevitable growth of centralization with political opposition to it, both at party and state levels, India may have to face more and more difficulties in retaining its institutions of democracy. While the future of democracy in India has great meaning for the Western world, the Soviet Union

has vital stakes in the policy of non-alignment and peaceful co-existence, and this can be expected to lead both the Western world and the Soviet Union to help India in maintaining her democratic system of government at home and the policy of non-alignment and peaceful co-existence in her foreign relations, by giving her maximum possible aid both in military and economic spheres. But, in the long run, like the national defence and national unity, the success of Indian democracy too will depend on the efforts and sacrifices of the Indian people themselves. If experience is a guide, it can be expected that the Indian nation will make a greater response to the future challenges to unity and democracy, which are also likely to be more severe than in the past.

PROBLEMS OF DEFENCE AND DEVELOPMENT

The massive breach of the Himalayan frontiers and the serious threat to India's territorial integrity made it clear that the basic premises of the policy of national defence needed a revision. It began to be realized effectively that the defence capabilities of the country were to be greatly strengthened and that the country was to maintain a high level of defence preparedness involving a large diversion of resources for military purposes. India had not been able to offer any strong resistance in the Himalayan terrains and found it extremely difficult to meet there the Chinese tactics of warfare. Why was it so? Some of the immediate causes of the Indian military reverses have been discussed earlier, but what we have to understand is that India had not so far organized its defences from the point of view of fighting a war with China. The Chinese attack on India in October 1962 has been compared to Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in December 1941. In both cases the attack was unexpected, and the defenders' guns were pointed the wrong way¹. The defence policy of a state is generally based on certain fundamental considerations, like the geographical location of the country, its political and economic relations with other states, particularly neighbours, the possible tasks the armed forces are expected to perform at home and abroad, the capacity of the state to maintain an effective fighting force, etc., and it is these considerations which determine the type of armed forces a country maintains as well as their size and equipment. In 1962, India was only spending between sixty and seventy million dollars a year on armed forces, and yet she was complaining that this badly affected her policies with regard to economic development. She, however, had the satisfaction of thinking that she would not be called upon to take part in any major war in the near future. India's policy of non-alignment was regarded as a safeguard against interference by any of the great powers. The only possibility was that of war with Pakistan or China. Since 1959, on account of the Chinese encroachments on Indian territory and the Chinese policy of building a two-way communication system across Tibet to the Indian frontiers, there was considerable tension. But generally

it was believed that there could hardly be any possibility of a total war with China.

A man of General Thimayya's insight into military affairs wrote as late as July 1962, "The country is a mass of mountains right up to the highest ridges of the Himalayas. The passes are practically impossible for crossing for over six months of the year...China is, therefore, deprived of the use of its overwhelming superiority in heavy equipment of every kind, that is, tanks, heavy calibre artillery". This was corroborated by another military expert, Field Marshal Ayub Khan of Pakistan, who thought that "to fight any decisive battles in the very difficult terrain of the Himalayas is military nonsense. No military man could really make a plan like that". If the Chinese, through their aggression, committed the folly of penetrating the Himalayas and were able to reach the plains and foothills, India could expect to be in a position to take advantage of her superior fire-power and manoeuvrability to defeat them and at the same time continue to harass their lines of communication by the use of commandos and guerillas. In any case, may be on these grounds, the Indian policy makers ruled out the possibility of a major war with China and thought that it would not be necessary for them to do anything more than maintaining some military outposts on the frontiers to cope with the possible armed skirmishes of a minor nature. It was clear at the same time that India did not have enough manpower, trained and well equipped militarily, to fight on the high Himalayan frontiers nor did she possess supersonic aircrafts to meet a full-scale invasion from China. This military deficiency, glaring though it was, did not worry India, perhaps because it was hoped that the Soviet Union would restrain China from her aggressive designs, and in case there was aggression she could safely depend on the Western Powers for military aid.

The Indian armies were, in fact, organized with a view to meeting any challenge from Pakistan. During the pre-Chinese invasion period, India's entire thinking with regard to defence was governed by the simple premise that if there was any war in which she was likely to get involved it could be a war with Pakistan. But for the constant aggressive propaganda kept alive by Pakistan's leaders and the recurring political instability in that country, India might never have developed a modern army. "Were it not for our strained relations with Pakistan ever since independence," wrote H.M. Patel, "we might well have adopted the rather tempting policy of more or less total disarmament, for that policy would have been wholly consistent with our loudly proclaimed policy of *Panchsheel*"². But for Pakistan's hostility, India would certainly not have released resources badly needed for implementing the country's policy for forcing the pace of its economy. "In fact," wrote Patel, "it is because of our Kashmir involve-

ment and our neighbour's undisguised dislike of us that we have had no alternative but to maintain a modern and well-equipped armed force of a size and quality which would enable us to cope with Pakistan and, of course, what our resources could permit us to maintain."³ The Indian armed forces were kept equipped as adequately as possible for this purpose and could be regarded as up-to-date in regard to equipment needed to face and repulse any aggression from Pakistan. But even with regard to Pakistan, India tried to maintain only a marginal superiority over her army. While India started with perhaps three times the armed strength of Pakistan, the latter had gradually and systematically increased and re-equipped her forces with American aid. If in 1962 Pakistan's army did not exceed that of India's in numbers, it certainly did so in some items of fighting equipment and, as General Thimayya thought, its fighting potential was likely to be equal to India's at the start of hostilities between the two countries. India, however, seemed not to take the idea of an attack from Pakistan seriously, and even if such an eventuality occurred, Pakistan could not be regarded as having the capacity to continue to wage war over an extended period. The United States could not be expected to come over to Pakistan's support in case of a war with India. The very fact that Pakistan was ruled by a military regime went against the possibility of her undertaking a military operation which did not have a reasonable chance of success. In fact, as long as Pakistan had a stable government, dictatorial or democratic, she could not be expected to invade India. But in view of the recent political history of Pakistan, one did not know when conditions might deteriorate and a set of fanatics might capture power and direct its military forces to *jihad* against India. India had to keep herself in a state of preparedness. In case Pakistan committed aggression, any idea of her trying to engage the Indian armies in the eastern sector could be easily ruled out. The only eventuality of Pakistan attacking India could be with a view to her capturing Kashmir, in which case the centre of attack had to be dealt with in Punjab where Pakistan, with a modern army and good equipment, could only be defeated by an equally modern Indian army. India was, therefore, maintaining some of the modern well-equipped portions of her army on the Indo-Pakistan border. The rest of the army, in the autumn of 1962, was most ill-equipped even in terms of light weapons to fight in the thick forests, or the lower slopes and valleys, of the Himalayan mountains in Assam or NEFA, and certainly not prepared to fight the Chinese in winter months, on the passes and heights covered with snow. In any case, her military posture being one of defence, India was bound to suffer a few military reverses in any war that she fought anywhere.

The Indian defence system had a long way to cover before India could modernize it. During the early days of the British Government in India the whole of the Indian army had been organized to meet the needs of the imperialist power. It was geared

to the supreme needs of defending Britain's imperial interests in India. The entire chain of naval bases from Gibraltar through Malta and Aden to Bombay and from Bombay through Colombo to Singapore, Hong Kong and Shanghai, and the military outposts and network of dependencies and protectorates, were designed with a view to securing the lines of communication from England to India and securing its outer defences against the real or imagined threats of a France under Napoleon, a Russia under the Czars, or a Japan under a resurgent militarism. All this had become absolutely out of date in the changed pattern of Asian and world politics. India's sea-coast continued to be immune from any dangers of foreign aggression, but new security problems had cropped up. India was not quite aware of these new problems, particularly of the Chinese danger, until very recently, but in any case the task of modernizing the Indian army presented its own problems. As late as the beginning of the Second World War, Indians had not been regarded as capable of handling modern equipment and weapons. It was only during the Second World War that the Indian army had suddenly to learn military techniques, like the handling of tank transporters, radar, the repairing of radio and precision instruments, etc. The partition of India at her very birth as a free nation had further complicated the task of her defences. Some of the best soldiers belonged to Punjab and the North Western Frontier Province, and they had elected to join the Pakistan army.

India, thus, had to start the process of modernization in her army from the scratch. Her entire military thinking and doctrine was regarded as incorrect by some of the military experts—"so wrong that we content ourselves with obsolete weapons and make provision to build them in our country without attempting to have modern weapons." Major General Habibulla was certainly not exaggerating the basic truth when he wrote "that not only in weapons but in organization, logistics and training we are in a dangerous state of bliss and profligate waste. Our military exercises with rare exceptions are based on the tactics and thoughts of World War II."⁴ Even while something was done in the direction of setting up a modern army since independence there was ~~practically no attempt made to build up a second line of defence.~~ The territorial army and the National Cadet Corps, as they stood in 1962, were in the most elementary stage of organization and hardly maintained any direct coordination with the military. The conflict with China was not likely to be settled early or easily. Even if China had agreed to vacate the aggression fully, of which there seemed to be no sign in the fall of 1964, there was no assurance that there would be no fresh aggression. In view of the complete transformation of the situation on India's Himalayan frontiers, the fact that China was going to be a long term menace, and the attitude of stiff resistance that the Indian nation was building up, it had become necessary to re-organize her defences.

In 1947 the total outlay on defence was below Rs.1,900 million per annum, which was about 2 per cent of the national income. It rose to Rs. 2,000 million in 1955-1956, and Rs. 3, 860 million in 1962-1963. This was nearly double of what India was spending in 1947, but in terms of percentage it was still 2.5% of the national income. While it was true that countries like Japan, New Zealand, Australia, Brazil, the Philippines, Austria, and Belgium were spending less than 3 per cent of their national income on defence, it had become incumbent on India to put herself in the category of countries like France, United Kingdom and the U.S.A. which, faced with constant danger, were spending 6, 8 and 10 per cent respectively of their national income. It was not impossible for India to increase her army to four times its existing strength. During the Second World War, Indian army had been raised to a size of 2,000,000, and the same size could now be achieved at an expenditure of 6 per cent. It was, however, clear that it was not necessary for India to build up as large an army. In view of the fact that China had her obligations in the Pacific, it could never be possible for her to deploy all her forces against India. What was, therefore, needed by India was to employ sufficiently strong defence forces which could be deployed as a deterrent to any possible armed attack. Of course, it had to be definitely superior, both in fire power and mobility, to the forces China may be able to deploy on the border.

The first line of defence would have to be organized in the mountain terrain of the Himalayas and the jungles and swamps of the foothills. This would make the building up of a supremely trained force as imperative--'a force capable of rapid movement on foot in difficult terrain and sustained operations even behind the Chinese lines, adapting quick dispersal and regrouping and used to decentralized command'. This force had to be given an intensive training of a rather unconventional type, different from the routine pattern of training given to the regular army. The Indian army might as well have to study the tactics followed by the Japanese in Burma and the Chinese in Korea in the past, and by the Pathet Lao and Vietcong in Laos and South Vietnam at present. A second line of defence also would have to be organized as the main base for maintaining counter-offensive in the plains, which would be capable of large-scale operations on conventional lines and would have to be placed at strategic positions. This army would have to be well equipped with tanks and artillery of the latest type and with effective air support and capable of deterring the Chinese forces from venturing beyond the mountainous terrain. As long as Pakistan continued to maintain the attitude of bitter hostility to India that she displayed during the last crisis, it would also be necessary to maintain armies on the Indo-Pakistan frontier. What India actually needed was to build up "a limited warfare capability," a force capable of dealing with something less than an all-out attack by land, sea and air. It was for the experts to

decide as to what would be the best size and composition for such a force, taking into account the relative cost of certain types of forces and the speed and certainty with which international help could be available in certain contingencies. In case of a future war with China, India would also have to be prepared for receiving air attacks and for retaliation.

The Government of India soon adopted active measures to strengthen considerably the nation's defence potential and fire power. Steps were taken to modernize army equipment and produce improved types of weapons, including semi-automatic rifles, within the country. Ordnance factories, with their technique of manufacturing modernized weapons, were working round the clock. It was decided to double the strength of the army, and to meet the entire requirements of the armed forces in small arms and equipment from internal production. Shri Chavan, the Defence Minister, described the budget of 1963-64 "as an index of our defence preparations...utilizing to the maximum extent our own resources." The new defence plan was to be a four-pronged drive: the army was to be expanded, with five specially trained and equipped divisions for mountain warfare to be established before the end of 1963; the air-force was to be expanded and modernized; the base of defence production in the country was to be broadened, and six new ordnance factories to be set up; ancillary communications and transport services were to be expanded. The expansion of navy, undoubtedly, was to have a lower priority, but that too was not to be neglected. The greatest importance was to be attached to the expansion of the air-force, since it was expected to play a very important role in keeping watch over a widely extended front covering over two thousand miles and also to act as a protective shield for the army. The defence budget for 1963-64 exceeded that of the preceding year by Rs. 4,910 million, the figure for the original budget of 1962-63 being Rs. 3,760 million.

The problem of increasing the defence potential of the country, however, had to be tackled with great caution. It was impossible for any country to think of defending itself completely on its own. India could take a lesson from the British who had tried to create from their own resources an all round defence force, consisting of army, navy, and air-force, and to develop all the latest weapons for it,—nuclear weapons, missiles, electronics and conventional weapons, etc.—till they found the cost too much. The Blue Streak missile, which was designed to carry nuclear weapons, had to be abandoned after £65,000,000 had been spent on the early stages of development alone: it would have cost an additional £500,000,000 to create an operational force for these missiles. When the long range bombers, which are employed at present by Britain for carrying the thermonuclear bombs, become obsolete, she will have to rely on missiles (Polaris and not Skybolt) supplied by the

United States. The operation would still be costly for her as she would have to build nuclear submarines to carry Polaris. In her quest for nuclear power, Britain has been obliged to reduce her conventional weapons, increase her dependence on the United States and keep herself satisfied with a low rate of economic growth. Even the United States, which has the resources to maintain forces of all kinds, conventional as well as nuclear, at times faces difficulties in deciding what new weapons systems to develop, especially when each new weapons system costs millions of dollars. When countries like the United Kingdom and the U.S.A. could not build up forces on which they might be able to depend completely, it would have been foolish on the part of India to think that she could carry on war against China absolutely on her own. In fact, even when the Chinese threat seemed to have come to stay, it was in the interest of India to continue to engage herself in extensive plans of economic development. Paradoxical though it may appear, the more rapid her economic development, the stronger India would be to face the Chinese danger.

"It is a truism," wrote Dr. B.R. Gadgil, one of India's leading social scientists, "that a rich and economically more developed country can defend itself better than a poor and less developed one. In the circumstances, it would be suicidal to cut the planned development expenditure in order to spend more on defence. One of the main objectives, it is said, of Chinese aggression is to upset India's planned economic programmes. Therefore, for us to take the position that defence effort requires a cutting down of our plans is to accept defeat tamely." Defence in modern times, as another writer pointed out, was not a matter of constructing a Maginot Line. It could be built only on the foundations of a strong economy. Operationally there was no hard and fast line between defence and development. "For building up our defence strength," wrote the *Economic Weekly*, "we need not only arms but an industrial economy. If tomorrow all the countries which have promised aid for our development plans offered us the freedom to use the foreign exchange to buy military hardware, it would be foolish on our part to scuttle the plans and import arms and ammunition. The aid that accrues to us to build our transport power, overheads, or our agricultural and metal industries is as much defence aid as the one which flows patently in that form." "While such diversions for defence are essential," the National Council of Applied Economic Research expressed the view, "long-term development goals must not be sacrificed. In the present conflict these have to be safeguarded as much as our frontiers. For eventually their achievement will form the sinews of our strength and the basis of our capacity to defend ourselves as a free nation. To plan for a defence effort which undermines the potential of economic expansion is, therefore, to vitiate the very object one strives to achieve."⁵ It would have been suicidal for India to formulate her

policies on the assumption that development was expendable in the hour of the crisis. Even from the point of view of effective defence effort, no important alterations leading to substantial economy could be made in the central or state plans. The main objective of the central planning for all these years was to prepare a socio-economic framework based on industrialization. Defence preparedness could be rooted in such a framework alone. In some respects, as in building up of transport system or expenditure on training of technicians and scientists, the central plan might, in fact, have needed larger allocations. Even the task of rapid agricultural production was something which could not be slowed down, agricultural production being not only the basis of industrial development but necessary also for sustaining the growing army and the growing population. Reduction in expenditure on road construction could retard development of existing backward areas and slow down division of general benefits of development. Even cutting down expenditure on education and public health, which the Government seemed to be doing with less of scrupulousness, was likely to have a disastrous effect in the long run.

All this did not mean that the third five-year plan was sacrosanct and could not be touched. Some schemes could be given a low priority in the context of the emergency, while others needed to be expanded. In fact, the plan had not been working too well when the crisis came.⁶ There had been considerable divergence between the planned allocation and actual investment due to the public sector's inability to mobilize adequate resources out of the additional income. There was imbalance between the development of the public and private sectors. Inequalities in income were also probably increasing. There could be no doubt about the fact that economic development was taking place, but it was more or less in a haphazard, unpredictable and largely unplanned manner. As a leading economist, Malenbaum, pointed out in 1961, "if present evidence of a clear margin for China is formed up or present uncertainty persists over the next plan as to the very fact of India's initiation of self-sustaining growth, India could be expected to lose its high position among the countries of Asia and Africa and its recognized status as a world power."⁷ Some other experts, like Professor John P. Lewis, had expressed similar views with regard to the way in which India's development plans were working. In view of the fact that India now was faced with a crisis, it had become necessary to rearrange the planning and put a great deal of life and action into it. Since the nation had shown a great cohesiveness, vitality and determination to face the crisis, this was not expected to be difficult.⁸ The crisis itself could have been turned to India's advantage. As Peacock and Wiseman pointed out in a study of the growth of government expenditure in the United Kingdom, "people will accept in a crisis taxes and manners of raising revenue that in quieter times they would have thought intolerable." The exigencies of the

period of crisis in England had made possible a comprehensive revision of the tax system producing far-reaching changes and experimentation with new tax sources. Scope for raising additional taxes in India was not so severely limited as some people seemed to have thought. As Nehru mentioned in an interview with Robert Sherwood of the *Saturday Evening Post*, "This crisis may be a good thing for India. We ought to achieve faster industrialization under its stimulus and improved agriculture. The economic balance under our third five-year plan must be upset for a while, because we must make the change-over to war production, but things in many ways could go faster with greater industrialization." The Standing Committee of the National Development Council seemed to be taking the same view. A paper prepared by the Planning Commission for the meeting of the Standing Committee said, "The challenge posed by the present Emergency will be met only if the twin objectives of higher defence preparedness and a higher tempo of development are pursued simultaneously and with the fullest determination." It estimated that 85 per cent of the third plan was "intimately connected with defence" and that what remained—social services and education—were no less important for defence and maintained that no one could argue that because of the changed circumstances India could do with fewer trained engineers and technical personnel. The Standing Committee fully endorsed the approach, as was borne out by the record plan outlay proposed by it for the year 1963-64—Rs. 17,500 million against Rs. 14,460 million in 1962-63 and Rs. 11,480 million in 1961-62.

The Government of India, it was clear, regarded the situation created by the Chinese invasion both as an opportunity and a challenge. There was to be no slackening of development effort in the Emergency. The tempo of development expenditures reached in the earlier plans was to be maintained. The core of the third plan was to be left unaffected; in fact, in some respects, as in the fields of transport and power and in certain kinds of industries and more especially in agriculture, it accepted the need for improvement in the targets as well as in their implementation. ~~Several necessary steps were taken to raise output of industry and production~~ in the months following the crisis. The steel industry was geared for achieving greater production and stepping up the output of those categories which were especially needed for defence. Particular attention was paid to the production of special steels, and new priorities were drawn up for the distribution of steel. The coal and automobile sectors were also strengthened. An attempt was made to harness the total capacity of machine tools and of engineering. The woollen textiles industry was given the raw materials needed to produce with full capacity. Power also received a high priority. Apart from Rs. 10,620 million earmarked in the third plan, a further increase of Rs. 340 million in the outlay of power programmes was provided, which included the setting up of a new

nuclear power plant and the expansion of conventional power schemes. The dates of commissioning some of the power projects were advanced. Systematic plans were drawn up in all fields for enlarging the capacity of training institutions and drafting trained personnel for new responsibilities. The Planning Commission's proposal for an outlay of Rs 17,440 million during 1963-64—Rs. 9,440 million for the centre, Rs. 7,500 million for the states, and Rs. 500 million for the Union territories—was duly approved by the National Development Council.

In fact, the defence requirements of the country involved deep-rooted changes in her economic policies. The import policy was to be re-adjusted in the light of India's need for raw materials, spare parts, machinery, etc. of those industries which catered to defence requirements directly or indirectly. In view of limited foreign exchange resources, this would clearly mean that other industries, existing or new, would have to wait for their requirements or be content with less. It also involved a curtailment of imports of consumer goods. This, added to an abnormal increase in the defence budget, a part of which also was expected to consume India's foreign exchange, was bound to add to the country's difficulties. In view of the responsibility of paying back interest on, and instalments of, earlier debts, it was necessary to accelerate exports, which depended on increased production, which, in its own turn, was affected by the diversion of a large part of the country's resources to unproductive uses. Above all, India needed additional resources both internally and externally to meet the new requirements of defence and development which could be met with by the usual methods of economy in administration, public cooperation (in the form of reduction in evasion of taxes, blackmarketing, unlawful gains, etc.), additional taxation, loans, foreign aid and deficit financing. From the point of view of India's long-term interests, the emphasis on the last two sources was to be kept at the minimum.

The main source of meeting the additional resources needed for defence and development was bound to be a heavy increase in the rate of taxation, both by the Central Government and by the states involving great hardships for the people. But if defence needs were to be met without sacrificing development goals—and there seemed to be no alternative to this—the only course of action before the nation was to assume a substantially larger tax burden. As Nehru had made it clear in his address before the standing committee of the National Development Council on January 18, 1963, the people would have to bear "extra burden" in view of the present emergency, and that such burden, "even if it hurts", was to be welcomed on larger considerations. It was expected that the Indian people would be able to stand this additional burden under the plan. If the third five-year plan was being implemented according to schedule, and all these steps were being taken with a

view to smoothening the machinery of implementation, national income could be expected to rise by about 30 per cent and per capita consumption by about 13 per cent by 1965-1966. If the defence effort now called for the diversion of another 4 per cent of the national income, it would still be possible to raise per capita consumption by about 7 per cent. The effect of the additional defence burden would, thus, be merely to reduce the rate of growth of per capita consumption from a little over 2% per annum, visualized earlier, to a little more than 1%, which would mean that no lowering of the absolute level of per capita consumption would be necessary. Of course, it might not have been possible to raise national income quickly enough to prevent a reduction in per capita consumption over the next two years, but as long as the national income target was realised by 1965-1966 any such lowering of consumption standards was to be temporary. The nation, however, had to prepare itself for at least two years of a hard life. This could be a test of the strength of democratic roots in the country.

**BOOK FOUR : A REASSESSMENT OF FOREIGN
POLICIES**

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INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY : DOCTRINAIRE OR PRAGMATIC ?

India's foreign policy is a classical example of a weak state playing a great role in world affairs. This is a paradox which can be understood only in terms of (a) Indian history, involving its traditional patterns, (b) geographical and strategical situations, and (c) the problems which India has been facing both occasionally and continually and their importance from the world point of view, and also the means by which she tries to solve them. Both from the economic and political points of view India is far from being a major power. She faces serious political and social problems which threaten her national unity and cultural cohesiveness. Yet she exercises great influence and has greater potential power. The most populous of the non-Communist, and the largest among the under-developed, countries, India exercises a greater influence on world affairs than she would have done if she had been more closely aligned with either of the "power blocs." Geographically and strategically, as Toynbee points out, "India occupies a key position in the world" and "has always done so ever since civilization began to fan out, east and west." She had been the central link in a chain of regional civilizations which extends from Japan in the far east to Ireland in the far north-west. Two of the four living higher religions of the world—Hinduism and Buddhism—are of Indian origin, and much of the economic development in the history of the world—of the Persian Empire—Darius I onwards, of the Graeco-Roman world, after the opening up of the sea-route between Egypt and India, of medieval Christendom, after the rise of Venice, of modern Western world since Vasco de Gama—obtained serious proportions only after coming into contact with India. Some of the principal problems confronting the whole human race today are conspicuously present within India's frontiers and are being attended to by India's national leaders by means which might be of use to the rest of the world¹.

India's foreign policy has been the result of a gradual evolution during the course of which a number of characteristics have emerged. It is a policy not of neutrality but one of "peace and freedom and avoidance of foreign entanglements." In spite of misunderstanding that it caused in the beginning, India has consistently followed the policy in the hope that, as it is understood more and

more, hostility to it would gradually wither away. The attitude with regard to the Palestine question that the first delegation of independent India adopted at the United Nations is a good illustration. India from the very beginning has been conscious of "ploughing a lonely furrow" and has shown a preparedness to face all difficulties for what she considers to be an "honourable and right position to take". But above all it has been a policy based on national interests—on "what is most advantageous to the country, not necessarily in the short run, but certainly in the long run."² Retrospectively speaking, it has been a policy in support of world peace. World peace, so essential to promote and safe-guard the larger interest of the country, the Indian statesmen thought, could not be brought about by siding with this bloc or that, both of which were exuding an atmosphere of war, but by trying to cultivate a climate of peace. The foreign policies of various countries and of blocs could not be regarded as satisfactory and successful by India, either from the wider point of view of securing world peace or avoiding world war or from the narrow point of view of their national self-interest. As such it was meaningless to follow in the footsteps of other countries. The ideological conflict, which plagued the foreign policies of world powers, it was contended, was of European or Western origin and could not preclude a country like India from following her own "way of doing things." There was need of looking at things from "a wider point of view."

There was no reason to think that India standing by herself could not contribute to world peace. In fact, it was only by standing by herself, outside the "climate of war", that she could contribute substantially to world peace. Then, there was the whole tradition of the Indian freedom movement. As a country with no hostile background in regard to any other country, it was natural for her to "approach the whole world on a friendly basis." There was no reason why she should have put herself at a disadvantage by being unfriendly to any group. A policy of friendship with all would not preclude India from being more friendly to some. India wanted to be particularly friendly with some countries. "Non-alignment", Nehru pointed out, "does not mean that we should not be closer in our relations with some countries than with others—which depends on economic, political, agricultural and many other factors. These close relations (with some countries of the Western world) will no doubt develop and we will encourage them to develop but we do not wish to place ourselves in a position where, politically speaking, we are lining up with a particular group or bound up to it in regard to our foreign policy activities."³ India was keen to have close and friendly relations with Asian countries. India believed in a policy of "standing up for the weak and the oppressed in various continents." This policy was regarded by Nehru as "not purely idealistic but opportunistic in the long run." This was also in keeping with the Indian traditional approach. "I do not think", said Nehru, the leading architect of India's foreign policy, "that anything could be more injurious to us

from any point of view—certainly from an idealistic and high moral point of view and also from the point of view of opportunism and national interest in the narrowest sense of the word—than for us to give up policies that we have pursued, namely, those of standing up for certain ideals in regard to the oppressed nations, and try to align ourselves with this great power or that and become its camp followers in the hope that some crumbs might fall from their table.” Any summary of the factors determining India’s foreign policy would not be complete unless we add to it the factor of national pride. One could understand some of the smaller countries of Europe or some of the smaller countries of Asia being forced by circumstances to bow down before some of the greater powers and becoming practically satellites of those powers. But this did not apply to India which was proud of her traditions and heritage. “We are not citizens of a weak or mean country,” Nehru declared, “after all, in the past, as a national movement, we oppose done of the greatest of world powers... and I have no doubt that if the worst comes to the worst—and in a military sense we cannot meet these great powers—it is better for us to fight in our own way than submit to them and lose all the ideals we have.”⁴ India was, however, not anxious to put her finger into every international pie, as far as circumstances allowed her to do so.

Some of the main characteristics of the foreign policy of India—anti-colonialism, anti-racialism, support to countries fighting for freedom—could be traced back into Indian history. As early as 1885, the year in which the Indian National Congress came into existence, it deprecated the annexation of Burma by the British Government. In 1895, the Congress objected to “military activities going on beyond the natural lines of the defences of this country” and objected to the use of India as a base for political manoeuvring or military moves against surrounding areas. In 1904, it deprecated an expedition to Tibet as being a “part of a general forward policy which ... threatens to involve India in foreign entanglements.” In 1920, the Congress sent a message of sympathy to the Irish people in their struggle for independence. In 1927, it objected to the use of Indian troops in China, Mesopotamia and Persia. In 1928, the Congress sent greetings to the people of Egypt, Syria, Persia and Iraq “in their struggle for emancipation from the grip of Western imperialism.”⁵ Moreover the tradition of *ahimsa*, which was the sheet-anchor of India’s freedom struggle, also influenced her foreign policy. “They (Indians) are not unaware of the dynamics of power politics” writes Michael Brecher, “or of the depth of disagreement and distrust between Communism and the West. But the most compelling aspect in the life of most Indian leaders was the achievement of freedom by non-violent means. They assume, therefore,—consciously or otherwise—that this technique of political action can serve to mitigate international tensions”⁶ Nehru played the most important role in evolving this policy. He was the philosopher, the architect, the engineer, the voice, the man at the steering wheel as it were, of his country’s policy towards the

outside world. He was 'minister, chief policy planner, and roving ambassador—a combination of roles which has no parallel anywhere.' His policies were supported by his cabinet, by the Congress party, by the Parliament, by the press as well as by most of the intellectuals in the country. But it does not mean that Nehru imposed his views in a hostile political environment or that he was not guided by other people's advice. Mountbatten, Radhakrishnan, Azad, Panikkar, Krishna Menon, have all contributed, in their own way, to the shaping of Nehru's views, but by and large these views have been developed out of the needs and interests of India and have been widely supported in the country.

Following the Chinese aggression, there has been a growing criticism of the basic approach behind India's foreign policy. Many Indian scholars, deeply steeped in the study of British diplomacy, have tried to test this approach on the anvil of the principles of pragmatism (*ad hoc* solutions of a practical nature to meet specific problems and situations), of opportunism (no permanent friends or enemies only permanent British interests), of finesse (masterly understatements)—the chief characteristics of British foreign policy, and have found it sadly wanting. According to them India has been taking in her foreign policy 'a rather doctrinaire stand, oblivious of the realities of current international affairs.'⁷ These charges, however, may not stand a closer scrutiny. India's foreign policy, as evolved since 1947, satisfies all the canons of political realism.⁸ It stands the test of a rational hypothesis against the actual facts of international relationship. Being based on the concept of national interest, it cannot be regarded as divorced from the concept of power. It has shown the capacity, from time to time, of adjusting itself with changes in the political and cultural environments and with shifts in the balance of policies and power. It has largely avoided sacrificing vital national interests for the sake of any moral or spiritual approach. It has also abstained from playing the role of a moral preacher to any excessive extent. Finally, it has taken a distinctive intellectual and moral attitude towards political matters.

As Pandit Nehru said in the Columbia University address on October 17, 1949, "Indian foreign policy combines idealism with national interest"⁹ While fully satisfying the criteria of a rationalistic, intellectual and realistic policy, it has been affected by other factors also. The traditions of Indian culture deeply rooted in the principles of *Ahimsa* and universal brotherhood as preached by our spiritual teachers from Buddha to Gandhi, an attitude of pacifism, sometimes carried to excess, the search, often frantically pursued, for world peace, trust in others, implicit, immaculate and at times carried to extremes, are other factors which have determined and shaped our foreign policy. India's foreign policy thus, like the foreign policy of every other country, has been a mixture of realism and idealism. Like other foreign policies, it has tried to strike a

balance between the two. A perfect balance being never possible, it has also, like other foreign policies, shown a tendency of sometimes getting a little more inclined towards idealism and on other occasions towards realism.

It is not possible to deny either the force of ideals or the practical wisdom of taking a realistic approach. Emphasis on realism or power politics, divorced from morality, has always ended in disaster. History is replete with examples of a mad search for power always ending in a catastrophe. Alexander, Napoleon, Hitler, Mussolini, Tojo have gone the same way through 'macht politik' to complete extinction. But limits of a purely idealistic approach also are great. A good foreign policy, therefore, tries to strike as perfect a balance between the two as possible. In the case of India's foreign policy, therefore, all that we can try to find out is whether the balance has been maintained or not and, if not fully maintained, to what extent it has been disturbed, to the limit of irretrievableness or only to that of an easy retreat.

In its concrete form India's foreign policy has found expression in the continued membership of the Commonwealth of Nations (in its revised form), emphasis on Asian solidarity, including support to Communist China's seating in the U.N., persistent efforts for world peace, believing firmly in the efficacy of the U.N. as an organ of international amity, scrupulous non-alignment with power blocs and keeping out of military pacts. Each one of these concrete aspects of India's foreign policy has added both to her security and prestige and has been conducive to the creation of a more favourable atmosphere for international understanding and peace. A rapid glance through India's participation in the solving of international tangles, such as in Korea and Indo-China, and her attitude of cordiality towards her neighbouring states, like Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma and Indonesia and intimate collaboration with her northern neighbours like Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan will make it clear that, while seeking security, she did not endanger peace and, while seeking prestige, she did not ignore the element of national power. In order further to balance her foreign policy with national power, she has concentrated hard on the increase of her agricultural production and industrial potential through her five year plans.

India's policy of non-alignment or neutrality—neutrality, not passive but dynamic—still remains unchallenged. A country, having no expansionist designs for which a conceding of military bases to others would have led to infringement of her own freedom, could not have followed any other policy. In fact, any extension of this neutrality, or area of peace, as Pandit Nehru put it, would be in the interest of world peace as well as strengthen the United Nations. Moreover, India has vast internal problems, political, economic and social, which could be solved only in a climate of peace and security. India in the earlier years of her independence could not afford to

annoy bigger powers. Not being sure that the Western imperialism had completely shed off its fangs and not being enamoured of the political and economic way of life in the Soviet Union, India could not afford any other policy than that of neutrality and non-alignment. What is most important is that this policy brought rich dividends to the country, and has been completely justified by results.¹⁰

At this stage it becomes necessary to make a distinction between the global and regional aspects of a country's foreign policy. While on the global level a country can afford to follow the policy of idealism rather than realism, on the regional level it becomes necessary to follow a more realistic policy. India, true to her international-mindedness, nurtured by her great leaders like Gandhi and Nehru, has quite often obliterated differences, which ought to have been there between the global and regional policies. A policy which may succeed in Korea or Indo-China or in Suez or Hungary may not be quite successful on one's own frontiers, which always impinge more vitally on a nation's security. A good summing up of India's foreign policy would be that whereas she has succeeded considerably at the global level, the same may not be regarded as equally true at the regional level. The fact also cannot be denied that while India has been extremely lucky with regard to the world environment in which her global policy was launched, on the regional level her problems have been extremely complex and difficult of solution. The fact that India had attained her freedom through non-violent struggle enabled her to start without bitterness and without any sense of hostility to any country in the world and with complete goodwill and trust and sympathy for the others. India also became a source of inspiration to all the other countries which had not yet attained their independence. Among the great powers, both the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union were widely mistrusted, the one as the supporter of rabid reaction as against progress and the other for its blind advocacy of force and unscrupulousness of methods. Due to this peculiar atmosphere prevailing in the world, India was able to build up more prestige than her power warranted and could become a kind of guide to the world along the new path of non-violence and international understanding. Her participation in Korea and Indo-China based on a correct appraisal of the world situation as well as of the attitudes and policies of the powers involved, further raised her prestige. But here, it appears, the balance between prestige and power, and between a global and regional outlook, began to be disturbed. India had by this time greater prestige in the international sphere than was warranted by her national power. This lack of national power was also partly responsible for her inability to solve problems nearer at hand. While India assumed the role of a pioneer of peace in the world, her relations with neighbouring countries left much to be desired. This was not completely due to her lack of will or ability. The problems like those of her relations with Pakistan had roots in a long history of communal bitterness,

deliberately bolstered up by an unscrupulous foreign power. With Burma and Ceylon, she had problems involving a large number of Indian immigrants in those countries, their economic and social interests and political rights. The attitude of the immigrants towards the native people not being always above board, the problems became too difficult to be solved. Perhaps with better diplomats, better information and better strategy India might have attained at least some success.

Another charge that can be brought against India's foreign policy is that she neglected certain probable factors. Perhaps she did not anticipate that if her relations with Pakistan continued to remain strained, she could be incorporated into a system of military pacts organised under the leadership of the U.S.A. covering West Asia as well as South Asia. The military pact between the U.S.A. and Pakistan was the first great shock that she received. Trying hard to make America understand the Russian point of view and Russia the American, she did not make sufficient efforts to make Pakistan understand her own point of view or herself to understand Pakistan's. While continuing to tackle the new situation on the diplomatic level, she increased her military strength and concentrated her defence forces on her common frontiers with Pakistan. This, as the later development showed, proved to be a wrong effort at a wrong place. Under the precariously balanced international relations of the post-war period, a war between India and Pakistan was simply impossible. In history, one has also to face factors which may not appear so probable and yet one has to keep ready for them. China's expansionism has been one such factor, and as future events were to prove, it was not as improbable as India thought it to be.

The year 1954 may be regarded by future historians as a turning point in India's foreign policy. India's acceptance of Chinese 'sovereignty' or 'suzerainty' over Tibet—the difference between sovereignty and suzerainty always remained blurred—in return of a weak confirmation of Tibetan autonomy and without any clear-cut recognition by China of the existing frontiers determined by the McMahon Line, exposed her to several thousand miles of arid, snow-ridden, largely inaccessible, mountainous common frontier with China. China slowly proceeded with the construction of roads, linking Sinkiang with Tibet, which completely diverted the flow of Tibetan trade from India to China, and detached Tibet strategically from India. India continued to believe all along, though after 1954, there was not enough ground or valid reason for this belief, that the bond of friendship between India and China was fairly strong. This made it clear that India was not quite alive to new developments like Chinese expansionism which, on the basis of Communist China's systematic expansion since 1950, should not have been regarded as completely improbable.

This had led to a crisis of diplomacy in Asia. It was strange that at a time when on the global level the world powers seemed coming

closer to each other, on the Asian level India and China, the two largest countries of Asia, and the pivotal centres of two different ideologies, were getting adrift from each other. On the world level, there was some attempt at East-West understanding immediately after the war, which was frustrated by 1948, and replaced by a breaking up of the world into two power blocs. But with the emergence of a somewhat well-knit Western Europe and the revival of Great Britain, West Germany and France in Europe, and the re-emergence of Japan and China in Asia, it was no longer a bi-polarised world. Both the Soviet Union and the United States seemed to have realised this change in the character of international politics and were readjusting their diplomacy to the changed circumstances. In Asia, on the other hand, a different picture had emerged. Asia started with two different patterns of foreign policy—India's, based on lack of bitterness for any country and goodwill for all, China's, based on intense hostility towards the United States and of positive leaning towards the Russian side, the one pacifist, almost abstemious and withdrawing, the other war--like, aggressive and expansionist. Till 1954, when the *Panch Sheel* was evolved there was a certain identity of approach between the two countries, but the basic difference was also there. For China, the *Panchsheel* was a diplomatic counter-part of the SEATO, and in her objective she was permanently successful. The SEATO when it actually came into existence, could get only two small countries out of this area, viz. Phillipines and Thailand. For India the *Panchsheel* was an expression of an idealistic approach to international relationship, motivated more by international goodwill than by national self-interest. Since then, the ways of the two countries have been at divergence to each other. After occupying Tibet, China embarked upon the process of political and military consolidation of the region, touching the northern frontiers of India. Anxious not to spoil her relations with her great neighbour, India depended more on optimism, hope, expectancy of a change of heart, appeal to Asian solidarity, etc. than on a realistic approach to the situation, and this involved many a step which has been described not incorrectly as appeasement. The tragedy of the situation was that at a time when the two great powers of the world, the United States and the U.S.S.R. seemed to be drawing closer to each other in understanding and friendship, the two Asian powers, through narrow national self-interest on the one side and high-minded idealism on the other, found themselves in hostile camps and in the grip of a cold war which always had dangers of being converted into a shooting war. The danger took a concrete shape when China launched her massive attack on India in October 1962. That such a precarious situation had come to exist was illustrative of the paradox inherent in India's foreign policy. There was no denying the fact that the thaw in the relations between the United States of America and the Soviet Union had been possible, maybe to some extent, due to the efforts of India, and because of her doctrinaire adherence to idealism coupled with a pragmatic appreciation of the international situation. The same

balance between idealism and pragmatism, perhaps, would have yielded better results as regards India's policy towards China, but in this case the former element clouded the latter, and instead of bringing the two great countries of Asia nearer to each other in friendship and understanding, emboldened the Chinese to push their relationship with India to the brink of a dangerous precipice. The question, therefore, was not whether India's policy was or should have been doctrinaire or pragmatic. A dynamic foreign policy had to be both. What was needed was a happy blending of the two elements, consistent with the prevailing international situation and the locale of their application. Only then the paradox could be resolved.

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF NON-ALIGNMENT

India's foreign policy has been variously described as "neutrality", "non-alignment" or "independence." Described as "neutrality" or "dynamic neutrality", in the early years, it came to be known as "neutralism", and then "non-alignment." Nehru, however, would prefer to call it a "positive policy for peace." Known as non-alignment in the international sphere it has been determined by the structure and dynamics of the contemporary world political scene. The bipolarization of the world, the emerging cold war, the fierce ideological crusades, the arms race and the relative weakness of India made the choice of non-alignment inevitable for her. Greatly misunderstood in the West, it was essential to the fulfilment of India's economic revolution since it permitted her free access to the technical skills and capital of all the great industrial powers. In Brecher's words, "India's economic weakness and the basic goal of development alone provide powerful inducements to the policy of non-alignment. The doors must be kept open to all possible sources of aid, Western and Soviet, if the desired economic revolution is to be achieved."¹ It avoided alienation of India from powerful neighbours, the Soviet Union and Communist China.

India has sincerely believed that her policy of non-alignment has contributed to the maintenance of peace and the relaxation of tension in the world—on the theory that the wider the "area of peace" the less likelihood of war among super powers. While India cannot play the positive role of a balancer because of the military and economic weakness, her size, population, and economic resources make her important enough to till the balance of power in the world, if she decides to move over to either side. An uncommitted India, on the other hand, can perform, and has performed in some measure, the necessary task of building a bridge between the two blocs which otherwise would not exist. Not being interested in any expansionist designs or hostility for which any support was needed, either offensive or defensive, she could afford to maintain the freedom of judging things on the basis of merit and not partisanship. India also has been extremely sensitive to

military or political commitments of a permanent nature and has believed that they are likely to compromise India's freedom in some way. On the other hand, extension of non-alignment has been regarded as a source of strength to world peace as well as the United Nations. Above everything, India has vast internal problems, economic and social, for which she badly needs a climate of security and peace. As Stephen Hugh Jones has commented, "non-alignment may sometimes seem to Americans simply an instrument for spiting the West. If it were, it could and would be abandoned by India tomorrow. But it is not. Behind the morality, India's attachment springs from a very simple and respectable cause : self-interest. The Russians have built India's finest steel works ; they have helped it beat down the Western oil monopoly ; Communist-bloc technicians and funds are involved in dozens of development projects ; exports to Communist countries and imports from them (on rupee payment) form a valuable and increasing part of India's foreign trade. In peacetime, alignment is a luxury which India cannot afford."

While India was a pioneer in laying down the policy of non-alignment, the policy has been accepted by almost all the newly emergent nations of Asia and Africa. The same factors—international situation and internal conditions—which made India choose the path of non-alignment made it a "natural" thing for countries having similar circumstances to reckon with. As new countries came up, disentangling themselves from the shackles of colonialism, they were hesitant in aligning themselves with their erstwhile masters. Rooted in Western political thinking and trying to set up Western political institutions in their own countries, the leaders of the emerging nations were not inclined either to join hands with the Communist bloc. There was also a general fear of being tied down to the apron-strings of great powers. It is interesting to note the close relation between the intensity of nationalism and the acceptance of non-alignment as foreign policy. Countries which passed through long periods of intense nationalist upsurge like India, Indonesia, the UAR and Ghana, were loudest in their advocacy of non-alignment. A country like Ceylon, where the growth of nationalism came rather slowly and in the wake of freedom, the transition from alignment to non-alignment was also slow. Countries like Morocco, Tunisia, and Cambodia moved towards non-alignment only as nationalism deepened. Another interesting phenomenon noticed by scholars in the field of non-alignment has been that countries under governments dedicated to modernization and the raising of economic and social standards have been more keen to remain non-aligned than countries without such commitments.²

The evolution of the policy of non-alignment has been slow but steady. While India, Burma, Indonesia, Yugoslavia and Pakistan to some extent, had taken to non-alignment by 1950, the period

1950-1954 may be described as the most formative period in the evolution of the policy. By the end of this period there came a change in the attitude of the two blocs towards India, and a clearer evaluation and understanding of the principles of non-alignment on their part was perceptible. India and Yugoslavia played the leading role among the non-aligned countries, but there also emerged an Afro-Asian group in the United Nations which by and large took up non-alignment as its approach to world problems and seemed to be working in unity on a number of occasions. Between 1954 and 1961 the policy came to full fruition. Starting with the Geneva Settlement of 1954, and moving through the Bandung Conference of 1955, it reached a climax of its conceptual growth and numerical support in the Belgrade Conference of Non-aligned Powers in September 1961.

The Belgrade Conference was attended by 25 countries, with observers from three more, representing Asia, Africa, Europe as well as Latin America. The real strength of the non-aligned world, however, did not lie in the number of governments that claimed to pursue the policy but in the tremendous popular basis which the policy had come to enjoy not only in those countries where non-alignment was pursued officially, but also in a number of other developing countries and in the liberal circles of some of the developed countries of Europe. At the conceptual level, a clear distinction was drawn at Belgrade between neutrality and non-alignment, the latter having been defined as "a matter of approaching positively the problems which confront the world at this hour." Nehru's famous words of 1949 could be heard reverberating in the Conference hall at Belgrade: "Where freedom is menaced or justice threatened or where aggression takes place we cannot and shall not be neutral." Even while the non-aligned nations would prefer to be neutral on problems like those of bloc formations, power politics of the big powers, questions of Communism and capitalism, etc. there could be no neutrality on questions of colonialism, racialism and peace. The Belgrade Conference resolved that "the non-aligned countries should participate in solving outstanding international issues concerning peace and security in the world as none of them can remain unaffected by or indifferent to these issues." The Belgrade Conference expressed its disapproval of "the existing military blocs which are growing into more and more powerful military, economic, and political groupings" and maintained that "by the logical nature of their mutual relations" they "necessarily provoke periodical aggravations of international relations." The Belgrade Conference further declared the principles of peaceful co-existence—"the right of peoples to self-determination, to independence, and to the free determination of the forms and methods of economic, social, and cultural development"—as "the only alternative to the cold war and to a possible nuclear general catastrophe."³

A change that had come over the years was in the attitude of the Communists as well as the Western Powers towards non-alignment. While in the case of the Soviet Union, the change had started with Khrushchev's report to the Twentieth Congress in which he spoke of the identity of views between the Soviet Union and non-aligned nations,⁴ the change in the attitude of the United States was reflected in Eisenhower's statement of June 7, 1956, when he said that the "neutralists" were not necessarily neutral between "right and wrong or decency and indecency." The tendency found better expression during the closing years of the Eisenhower administration and was highlighted by the visits of leaders of many non-aligned countries, including Nehru and Soekarno, to the United States and of Eisenhower to some of the non-aligned countries. American support to non-alignment became even more marked when Kennedy took over in 1961, and started conscious efforts to consolidate non-aligned opinion. There are reasons to think that this change in attitude on the part of the great powers was not so much the result of a fuller appreciation of the merits of the policy as one of accepting the facts of the situation and consequently adopting a new tactical line. Both blocs were interested in maintaining the closest possible contacts with non-aligned countries and in helping them. On the part of the non-aligned nations also it can be said that, despite occasional setbacks and compromises, the total impact of their policies has been towards contributing to the stability and maintenance of peace in the world as much as towards preserving their political stability and advancing their national interests. It would, however, be too tall a claim to make if it is said that they have played any decisive role in the maintenance of world peace. Their role has been secondary, but by no means a negligible one. Occasionally, they have been "able to make useful contributions to creating conditions for relaxation of tension and to evolve compromise formulae to tide over immediate crisis."

India's foreign policy, thus, is rooted in the concept of non-alignment. Non-alignment is a positive policy. But it works mainly in the context of the power blocs. It enjoins upon a country the responsibility of steering clear of alignment with either of the two blocs. It does not preclude a nation from following a policy of regional friendship and alliances. What India did was to maintain the best of relations with the Western Powers and the Soviet bloc, and stop there. She did not seem to attach the same importance to the problem of winning friends and influencing people nearer home or, to put it more concretely, of patching up her quarrels and building up better relations with her neighbours. China on the other hand, while treating the United States as 'enemy number one' and becoming growingly suspicious of the Soviet Union was engaged in acquiring the leadership of smaller countries all over the world. China's policy, following the Bandung Conference, was that of cultivating friendly relations with the

countries of South and Southeast Asia. She won remarkable success in her border settlements with Burma and Nepal and in tempting Pakistan away from her Western allies. While China consolidated her relations with India's neighbours, presumably with a view to isolating India, the latter did not seem to take any steps towards holding them closer. Between 1959 and 1962 when China could claim to have improved her relations with all the Asian powers, India could not have forwarded any such claims. Her conflicts with Burma and Ceylon had remained unresolved, and her relations with Pakistan had become much more estranged. Her prestige in Africa was no longer as great as in the past and differences over the Asian sports had drawn her into an ugly quarrel with Indonesia.

It is, however, interesting to note that during the period when her relations became estranged with China, India was able to establish very close relations with the two super powers. As early as April 1954, Malenkov had spoken of India in highest terms and talked of the Soviet people's desire for friendship with India. An important trade agreement signed between the two countries earlier had already opened the possibility of great expansion in their economic relations. In January 1955, *Pravda* editorially endorsed India's internal policies. In February, the Soviet Union agreed to extend credit and technical assistance to India for a steel plant. Khrushchev, almost immediately after he came to power, started showing the greatest appreciation of India's stand in world affairs. During his visit to India in 1955 he assured her Government and people that they could regard the Soviet Union as a friend "not only in good weather when the sun is shining pleasantly" but "in any weather", and that "if a breeze or draft should ever blow which is harmful to the health of the Indian people" they could depend on the Soviet Union. On his visit to Russia, Nehru made it very clear that the Indo-Soviet friendship was to be based on the fact that "we like each other and we wish to co-operate and not because we dislike others or wish to do them injury," and Khrushchev responded to Nehru's idea with equal warmth. He showed his willingness to develop and strengthen friendly relations between the two countries in a way which would not change the friendly relations of India or of the Soviet Union with other states. Talking of aid from capitalist countries to under-developed countries he said, "This is not a bad thing. Let the capitalist countries give such aid." He showed a remarkable understanding of the fact that the Russian experiment might not necessarily suit India and in this connection used one of his characteristic analogies, "It is impossible to force the buffalo to eat meat; it is impossible for the tiger to eat grass." The Soviet Union treated India as a great power and expressed her belief that she should occupy a prominent place among the great states of the world. She never made any serious attempt to prevent the growth of Indo-U.S. relations. Besides the Soviet Union.

financing and helping the construction of India's pride steel-works at Bhilai, India has also received a substantial amount of economic aid from her. She gave India farm machinery, aid to set up a heavy machine building plant, a drugs manufacturing plant, an optical glass manufacturing factory, and a plant to manufacture coal mining machines. She also rendered to India technical and financial aid in oil exploration and production. The total value of credit extended to India in the course of the last two plans came to nearly a billion dollars, which was not large as compared to what the West, particularly the United States, had given but it came to a substantial amount and what was more important, it increased India's leverage in dealing with terms for loans from other countries.

What is still more remarkable is the fact that the aid India has received from the Soviet Union is larger than what China has received from her, and that it has continued to flow in larger quantities after India became the target of Chinese military, political, and ideological offensive. In fact, as the relations between China and India have deteriorated sharply, relations between the Soviet Union and India have shown an upward trend. The Soviet Union has continued to follow its policy of neutrality with regard to the border conflict between India and China, and has shown a great understanding of the Indian position. Between 1959 and 1962 a number of Soviet leaders—Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Kozlov, Voroshilov, Suslov, Kosygin, Furtseva, Gromyko, Mikoyan—visited India and many Indian leaders—Rajendra Prasad, Nehru, Morarji Desai, Jagjiwan Ram—visited the Soviet Union. It was interesting to note that at the time when Communist China was celebrating the tenth anniversary of the signing of the Sino-Soviet treaty, Khrushchev was visiting India. The help to India has not been restricted to economic sphere only. The Russian helicopters were being freely used by India in sending her troops and military supplies to the Himalayan regions in the recent war against China and in getting road building equipment to make some of these areas approachable for the Indian army. In November 1960 the Soviet Union sold India several of the most modern high altitude transport aircraft, the AN-12s, which could clearly have been used only in the northern border where India confronted China. In May 1962, announcement was made that India would acquire from the Soviet Union a number of MIG 21 fighters and receive Soviet help in building a MIG factory. China was reported to have formally protested against this on August 28 and Indo-Soviet negotiations for the MIGs were still in progress when China launched her attack on October 20. There were more recent reports of a Soviet decision to sell India 12 additional AN-12 transports and six M-14 helicopters in addition to the previously promised MIGs.

The United States' recognition of India's position came later. While the Soviet Union had started appreciating the Indian policy of

non-alignment as early as 1954, a change had come over the United States' attitude also by 1956. India was very much impressed by the attitude taken by the United States in the Suez crisis. A meeting between Nehru and Eisenhower in December 1956 left a lasting impression on Nehru. "I have greatly benefited by these talks," said Nehru, "I shall treasure their memory and they will help me in many ways of my thinking." He had also come to realize, as he said at a press conference in Washington, that the policy of the United States towards "neutralist" nations like India was "not as rigid as I thought" but "a flexible policy adapting itself to circumstances." During his visit to India in December 1959, Eisenhower received an ovation in Delhi, the like of which had never been received before by a foreign dignitary. The election of Kennedy as President in 1960, was regarded with great satisfaction in Indian political circles. His attitude to India had been long regarded as one of great sincerity, understanding, and respect. His description of Nehru as "a world leader of the stature of Abraham Lincoln and Franklin D. Roosevelt," during the latter's visit to the United States in November 1961, not only expressed the President's personal regard for India's great leader but created a tremendous respect for the United States in India. Since the Congress approved of President Kennedy's plan for consolidating principal foreign aid programmes under the Agency of International Development, the American assistance to India has been considerably extended. Made available to India through the United States AID, public laws 480 and 665 (The Food for Peace Programme) and the Export-Import Bank) and consisting of both grants and loans, the amount of assistance before the Chinese invasion of 1962, totalled over 4.425 billion dollars. While India has been receiving assistance from other friendly countries, including the Soviet Union (and the assistance she receives from the AID India Club is considerable) the United States is by far the biggest contributor to India's Third Five-Year Plan.

There is, thus, a very interesting contrast between the Chinese and Indian diplomacy. While China started with a policy of dividing the world into two camps, the camp of capitalist-imperialist powers under the leadership of the United States and the socialist camp under the leadership of the Soviet Union, and a policy of "leaning to one side," and has currently found the precarious Soviet support slipping away from her and has to depend more and more on the support of the smaller nations of the world, India started with a policy of friendship with all, which implied an effort to bring reconciliation and better understanding among the great powers. In other words, she wanted to act as a bridge between the two. She now finds that, with the great powers developing their own channels of communication, her role has changed from that of a bridge to one of their areas of agreement. Nehru, in his policy-making has never ruled out the possibility of a rapprochement

between the United States and U.S.S.R. He once said that there was "so much in common between these great powers that all this business of the cold war is altogether artificial and unrealistic. Once they begin talking...the ground will be cleared of all the wreckage of ten years of suspicion and fear and what might be called areas of agreement might become visible." As Sisir Gupta has pointed out, India herself became the area of agreement. It is within this broad framework that the Indo-U.S. and the Soviet-Indian relations have grown in recent years. This also represents the basic contradiction between the foreign policies of China and India. "Unlike the inverse relationship that exists between Russo-American and Russo-Chinese relations," writes Sisir Gupta, "Indo-Russian relations can continue to improve only as part of a broad historical process: the replacement of the present conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union by a phase of co-operative existence. While China has believed in the inevitability of war between the two camps and her foreign policy is based on expediting this crisis, the foreign policy of India aims at the improvement of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union."

The Chinese invasion of India in the winter of 1962, thus, became a crucial test of India's foreign policy.

NON-ALIGNMENT : RESPONSE TO NEW CHALLENGES

As the Chinese started their massive invasion, India's Prime Minister wrote letters to all the governments of the world (of course, with the exception of Communist China) to help India in defending herself. The letters were sent to the United States and the United Kingdom, to members of the Commonwealth and also to the Soviet Union and the Communist countries of Eastern Europe. It was not surprising that the greatest support to India came from the United States and the United Kingdom and from members of the Commonwealth of Nations and the Western alliance. India received not only messages of sympathy but a great deal of military aid from the United States and the United Kingdom. They made no mention of the terms on which military weapons were sent to India in her hour of crisis. They quickly transported them and even hinted that India was not to think in terms of repayment. This was natural, not only because these were the powers which were in a position to give military aid to India, but because they were mainly interested in containing Communist China from any expansion into the Indian territories. The United States, being the leader of a group of countries determined to check Communist China from any expansionist design, took up the lead. The policy-makers in the United States Foreign Office anticipated a favourable change coming in the world situation as a result of India organizing its defences against Communist China with the help of the West. India, which had so far refused to see China as a prospective aggressor and, in fact, had played a leading role in creating for Communist China a position of respectability in the Asian world was now the helpless victim of cruel aggression. Now she had been through an experience she was not likely to forget, and this was expected to bring about a change in her attitude towards the Communist countries on the one hand and make her more inclined towards the Western Powers on the other. While the governments of Western countries did not suggest to India that she was to give up her policy of non-alignment, the Western press openly expressed the hope that India would not be able to stand out of the Western alliance for a long time, and were surprised to find that she was not taking any steps to seek a closer alliance with the West more quickly. A diplomatic

revolution nevertheless seemed to be on the move. The Sino-Soviet split was growing and the Soviet Union seemed to be taking a more constructive attitude in her relations with the West and adopted a policy of neutrality on Sino-Indian conflict. Communist China, it was clear, was getting more and more isolated. In the future the West, it was believed in certain circles, could hope to obtain not only the neutrality of the Soviet Union but the positive support of India in any direct confrontation with Communist China.

The rapid and generous aid extended to India by the United States and the United Kingdom created a deep impact on the Indian mind and many critics of India's non-alignment began to ask for a change in her foreign policy. If India had been a member of the Western military bloc, they argued, an invasion on India would have involved a major war with the Western Powers, which China could not have afforded. China had claims on Formosa and Hong Kong, but she dared not touch them for that would have meant direct confrontation with the West and she was not prepared for such an eventuality. It was clear, so they thought, that China was a perpetual menace and India could not defend herself solely on her own resources ; she could only depend on an alliance with the West for her security. The interests of national security, thus, demanded the abandonment of non-alignment. To the argument that any abandonment of the policy of non-alignment would have alienated the Soviet Union, it was pointed out that it was idle to expect too much from the Soviet Union in a war between China and India, the Soviet Union having already made a distinction between China, whom she treated as an ally and brother, and India whom she treated as a friend. Unless India gave up the policy of non-alignment she could not expect the Western Powers to give her unstinted aid. On the other hand, it was asserted if India joined the Western bloc they would be under an obligation to help her.

The lead in this campaign for giving up the policy of non-alignment was taken by India's octogenarian statesman, Rajagopalachari. He asked for a positive alliance with the West. India's fundamental aim, he pointed out, was to drive the invader out of the soil and for this purpose she must be ready to accept all help which could possibly be got from friends. The crisis had brought home to India who were the friends on whom she could rely in the hour of danger, and who were her enemies. Rajaji, (as Rajagopalachari is popularly known in India), regarded it as 'a silly argument' that India should remain non-aligned since the Western Powers had not asked for a change in policy. "It is great of them to act unilaterally and give us prompt assistance" he said, "but we should at the same time act far-sightedly and intelligently. We cannot thrive on isolation and coldness towards friends. We should react like good human beings with live emotions." He advocated the necessity of taking 'permanent measures to meet permanent situations.' The annual defence expenditure was bound

to increase steeply. It would be folly to imagine that the situation could be met 'by casual gifts and gestures of impassioned patriotism swelled by publicized eulogy.' There was no harm in India's sharing the liabilities and obligations arising out of this permanent situation with like-minded nations abroad. Entering into firm alliances with the Western Powers was not the same thing as joining the cold war. India could continue to be non-aligned in respect to the cold war, although Rajaji realized that it would be sometimes hard to reconcile it with the action to be taken by India now to meet the Chinese expansionism. "Communist China has humiliated us," Rajaji wrote in *Swarajya*, "and demonstrated its full power. We shall lose no time now but work earnestly in the diplomatic line for a firm defensive alliance which will bring into being an equilibrium in Asia."¹ "It would be folly to believe," Rajaji wrote in a letter to the press, "that China would give up her expansionism or opposition to co-existence in the conceivable future. To meet the menace which admittedly is permanent there is no other way but to acquire strength through alliance with powers opposed to the expansionism of China enabling assistance to come whenever hostilities demand such assistance." A positive alliance with the Western Powers, Rajaji realized, might be inconsistent with the past postures and statements. "But after what has been disclosed neither pride nor consistency should stand in the way of prudence. A nation may bend; it may be necessary to do so sometimes in the course of events. Bending is not always yielding. We take a step back to leap forward. The bow bends to gain force thereby. Getting weapons from the West is not enough. We must get from them, and give to them, friendship and counsel and moral companionship and power."² Rajaji was clearly placing the abandonment of non-alignment on a high, moral pedestal.

Even Congress leadership, for some time, seemed to have been shaken up. As K. K. Shah, General Secretary of the Congress party wrote, the Chinese attack had "not only given a jolt to non-alignment but has shaken the very basis on which non-alignment was based." "If non-aligned countries cannot depend upon the publicly declared intentions of allied nations," bemoaned Shah, "and if either bloc tried to exploit the economic weakness of the age-long backwardness and military unpreparedness of a non-aligned country, non-alignment can no longer remain a reality."³ He was particularly shocked by the policy of non-alignment in which the non-aligned countries seemed to be persisting even when one of the non-aligned countries had been attacked. He did not realize that non-aligned as they were, they could not be expected to throw their weight on one side or the other in a war between China and India. Many others also, who had supported non-alignment all these years, began to wonder whether for a poor, developing and economically backward country such as India,

non-alignment was not a luxury which it could ill afford. "Most people are apt to think of non-alignment in purely political terms," wrote Frank Moraes, "On an under-developed country the impact of non-alignment is really economic though it has its political and, as recent events have proved, its military overtones. But the major casualty is economic growth..." "If we cease to be non-aligned," continued Frank Moraes, "their (China's) position *vis-a-vis* the Russians is strengthened and simultaneously they can put the finger of scorn at us before the Afro-Asian world and exclaim 'there you are.' If we remain non-aligned it cannot embarrass them but could induce public opinion in the Western countries now aiding us to slow the tempo of their aid. In either case the Chinese win."⁴ A cruel dilemma indeed !

While many political leaders and intellectuals in India seemed to have been greatly shaken up in their long abiding faith in non-alignment, the country as a whole did not lose its nerves. The policy of non-alignment, it was realized, had added to the stature of India and paid her and also many Asian and African countries rich dividends in the past. "It is rather surprising", wrote *Amrit Bazar Patrika*, "that at a time when the policy of non-alignment has started receiving better appreciation from even the Western countries where it used to be viewed with suspicion, pressure from the Rightist parties should be brought on the Prime Minister to revise the policy."⁵ The case for revision or modification would have found some justification had India been isolated at this crisis. But most of the countries of the world, aligned as well as non-aligned, had extended sympathy and support to India. It was China which found herself isolated, even within the Communist bloc. The whole issue, in fact, had to be viewed from the standpoint of the wider happenings on the world scene – the growing split between Communist China and the Soviet Union on the one hand, and the move in the direction of a rapprochement between the United States and the Soviet Union on the other. It was true that the Soviet Union had not come over to the side of India in her conflict with China, but she had fulfilled all her obligations to India, including the delivery of MIGs. The Soviet Union did not like the Chinese aggression against India, and even chided China for her intransigent attitude. What was remarkable was that responsible statesmen in the Western countries themselves, had expressed anxiety that India should not give up non-alignment as it might throw Khrushchev into Mao's embrace. Of course, as Nehru pointed out, there could be no non-alignment with regard to China.

National interest, as the policy-makers see them, is always the most important factor in determining a country's foreign policy. If the United States and the United Kingdom quickly moved their military aid to Indian armies fighting in the Himalayan

terrains, it was not so much because their hearts had melted by India's distress but because they realized that any substantial military conquest by China on Indian territory would seriously disturb the delicately poised balance of power in the world. India certainly was not militarily or economically strong enough to play the role of a balancer, but the very fact that she was a large country with immense potentialities of development and dedicated to the ideals of democracy, made it a matter of vital interest to the Western Powers to come to her rescue against the Chinese aggression. In trying to save India from China they were primarily concerned with their national interest. Nobody in Downing Street or the White House in the hour of India's crisis ever thought in terms of India being aligned or non-aligned. They extended their help to India not because she was a part of this bloc or that pact. Actually it made it easier for them to rush with help to India because she did not belong to any bloc or pact and their help to India was not likely to upset any apple-cart anywhere. Nobody, not even the Soviet Union, could have raised any objection to it. In fact, their interest in India's safety was so great that they also made it clear that they would not mind, in fact would even be happy, if the Soviet Union similarly extended military aid to India. As long as it succeeded in containing China and aggravating Sino-Soviet differences, it was perfectly in order for them.

It is sometimes pointed out that if India had been aligned, China would not have invaded her. This is a purely hypothetical question. China, in fact, did not seriously believe in Indian non-alignment. She represented India as a camp follower of the Western imperialism and one of the suggested reasons why she invaded India was that she wanted to expose the hollowness of Indian non-alignment to the entire Afro-Asian world. What she did to India in October 1962, she could have perhaps done even if India had been a member of the Western bloc; nothing could have prevented her from declaring a cease-fire at a psychological moment in the way in which she did and relapsing into an attitude of a pure innocence afterwards. What actually happened was that China, guided by an entirely wrong reading of the situation, selected a very wrong moment in the moving scene of international politics, for her action. There is no evidence to show that the Soviet building up of missiles in Cuba and China's invasion of India had any co-ordination behind them, but in view of the apparent determination and dexterity with which the Soviet Union was building up these missile bases in Cuba, China had reasons to think that it might develop into a big conflagration, and she could then depend on both the Soviet Union and the United States being so much entangled with each other as becoming completely incapacitated from taking an interest in the Sino-Indian conflict. Khrushchev, not less shrewd than Mao Tse-tung,

hurriedly withdrew his missiles from Cuba, thereby not only bewildering the West but throwing China into utter confusion. Whether the Soviet Union brought any direct pressure on China to end her fighting in India or not, there is overwhelming evidence to show that she and other Communist countries (excepting Albania) expressed their open disagreement with the Chinese adventurism. On the other hand, the United States and her allies were completely free to give their maximum help to India. If these developments (which China did not expect) had not taken place, China seemed to be quite ready to march down the Himalayas into the plains and oil fields of Assam.

At the close of 1964, it appeared unlikely that China would repeat the invasion. Whatever her ambitions in India, and across India into Southeast Asia, she was not likely to launch upon another venture of this kind unless she was sure that (a) her differences with the Soviet Union had been more or less patched up and (b) she could depend on some kind of moral help, if not the active support, of the Soviet Union. A repetition of aggression was also likely to depend on the future of her relations with Pakistan. As early as 1959, the Chinese ambassador in India had warned that India might have to face hostilities on two fronts, meaning the Chinese and the Pakistani frontiers. Since then China had consistently tried to win over Pakistan. This had been quite in conformity with Communist China's policy of winning friends and influencing countries all over the non-Western world, with a view to isolating India. But what is more intriguing is the fact that Pakistan has played quite an active role in wooing China (reminding one, of the parleying tactics which the Muslim League used to adopt with the British, in order to bring pressure on the Congress). It has been a risky game but Pakistan has been playing it with courage. The negotiations which she carried on with India between December 1962 and May 1963, apparently under pressure from her Western friends, might as well have been designed to throw the blame of a final rupture on India and strengthening her case for greater dependence on Communist China. Besides securing the co-operation of the Soviet Union (of which there was no likelihood) and at least the neutrality of Pakistan, China, in case she decided to invade India again, would also have to take the fact into consideration that she would *now* face a much greater military preparedness and national determination on the part of India than was experienced in October 1962. India would not only offer her a much greater resistance in the mountains and the valleys but would bring to bear against any Chinese attempt to move into the plains a terrific striking power, which she had acquired. India could also be expected, in any future invasion by China, to make the maximum use of her air power. She could also depend on the Western Powers to provide her a great deal of security from air attacks, if not under the *air umbrella*, under any other

kind of project jointly evolved by them and India for her defence. And if the worst came to the worst, if Indian resistance proved to be of no avail and if India found herself entirely helpless, she would have no hesitation even in giving up non-alignment and joining the Western bloc if that was the price she had to pay for maintaining her national independence. This would, however, be a great price and India would avoid it so far as possible, until she was convinced that there was no other way of maintaining her independence.

Some people believe that the logic of events would force India to give up non-alignment. China, as Nehru himself admitted time and again, was likely to be a permanent menace. In a long-term war against a determined enemy with unlimited manpower resources and preparedness to go to any length in seeking to attain his objective, "it would be necessary to insure", as D. R. Mankekar pointed out, "a copious pipe-line of arms and equipment and if necessary be prepared to re-inforce our defences with allied armies. The bitter choice then would be between enslavement to stronger enemy and permitting foreign friendly troops to help us to avert that calamity. Alignment with the West in that case would mean a choice of the lesser evil." "It is this logic," wrote Mankekar, "that will increasingly drive us into the arms of the West and into a military alliance with it."⁶ A close alliance with the West was also regarded by some to be the only insurance against undue pressure from Pakistan and for the inviolability of the Indo-Pakistan border. If an alliance with the West was in the logic of things, the question was asked, why not have it now. A factor which seemed to be missing from all these arguments in favour of an abandonment of non-alignment was that freedom always demanded a price and the price could only be paid by the people of the country. "We cannot expect others," as Nehru once pointed out, "to pay the price of our freedom." "You have to pay a price for this independence, if you refuse to pay it freedom will slip out of your hands." There was nothing wrong in seeking the help of friends. Non-alignment did not come in the way of such assistance. "We have taken help from our friends," Nehru said, "and we shall continue to take such help as we need it, but I wish to caution you against depending too much on foreign assistance." If India depended too much on Western help, it would sap her vitality. It would weaken her own will to resist and it would make her more and more dependent on the Western countries. Moreover, even if India was prepared to throw herself completely on the support of the Western Powers, it was doubtful whether the West would come forward with all-out support for her. The United States could be expected to give military weapons to India. She could be expected to enlarge the amount of her economic aid, but she might not be expected to send her young men to fight India's battle for defending the long Himalayan

frontiers. It was clear that whatever the nature of her relationship with external powers she would have to take up the responsibility of her defence on her own shoulders.

Non-alignment, thus, had nothing to do with China's invasion of India. In fact, non-alignment proved to be of definite advantage to India in facing the crisis, inasmuch as it helped in the localisation of the war, in the neutralization of the Soviet Union and in facilitating the acceptance of large-scale aid from Western Powers. What actually went wrong was due not to India's policy of non-alignment but to her mistaken policy towards China. Non-alignment does not preclude a country from military preparedness. In fact, what is sometimes not sufficiently appreciated, non-alignment adds to the responsibilities of a country. It is only a strong and militarily stable nation which can afford a policy of sturdy independence. For a long time India seemed to be confusing non-involvement in the cold war with what amounted to a policy of isolation in Asia. As Frank Moraes pointed out, "a policy of non-alignment can only be maintained and sustained by creating in the country a climate not of peace but of preparedness. This means that in the years to come India will have to spend more and more of her resources on building up and keeping her armed forces in a state of preparedness." It is a heavy price for a developing country to pay, but as pointed out earlier, it is a price which nobody else is going to pay. "India", commented G. H. Hansen, "is too large and independent minded a country ever to be a camp follower. She is not likely to give up her policy of non-alignment as long as her national interests remain the same and non-alignment continues to prove to be an adequate means of achieving them, or she is convinced that alignment is likely to achieve them better. Yet the policy is likely to change in emphasis". According to A. Appadorai, "if the present crisis has any lesson for us it is precisely this, that a non-aligned nation in particular has to provide adequate built-in resources for her own defence; the crisis has provided an occasion to build all India national unity and to develop built-in resources; it does not seem wise at this juncture to prefer alignment, especially when the responsible leadership of the country is confident that the nation can stand the test."⁸ India may now adopt, what Jansen described "a stripped down non-alignment—cold, clear-eyed and calculating; a practical policy, not a creed to be exported according to which nations are divided into 'good' believers and 'bad' non-believers". "She has willy-nilly completed the process of bursting out of the chrysalis of Afro-Asia which is not as drastic a development as it sounds: India was practising non-alignment when two-thirds of the present Afro-Asian bloc were not yet independent countries—she has been on her own before."⁹ A decided shift, however, has already taken place in the tone of Indian policy towards the West without at the same time weakening the belief that India and the Soviet Union are natural partners in a geo-political triangle with Communist China.

INDIA AND PAKISTAN : GENESIS OF CONFLICTS

The Chinese aggression against India in October 1962 exposed to the glare of public attention the many skeletons in the cupboard of Indo-Pakistani relations. It was no longer possible for both India and Pakistan to continue with their mutual intransigence, and it appeared for some time that, after initial inhibitions, the two countries were gradually realizing the importance of viewing the problems of Indo-Pakistan sub-continent in their totality. That this realization was short-lived and did not bring about any substantial improvement in the relations between the two countries is a fact which has to be reckoned with, and while discussing the impact of the Chinese aggression on Pakistan's foreign policy in general and on Indo-Pakistan relations in particular, it is desirable to keep in view the historical context in which these developments were taking place. In this connection it is necessary to go briefly into the genesis of the conflicts between India and Pakistan, which have inhibited the relations between the two countries since their very birth.

While it is true that on emergence into freedom, India had friendly relations with all countries, her relations with Pakistan began soon to get strained. The leaders of the Indian National Congress, who had played an important role in getting freedom for their country, had been forced to accept partition as the price of independence. But they seemed to have reconciled themselves to it. They accepted Pakistan in all sincerity, but the attitude of the leaders did not prove to be of much help in restraining the emotions of the masses. Communal riots broke out both in India and Pakistan, involving migration of millions of refugees from one country to another. They affected India but they affected Pakistan all the more. "The new India suffered in the transition," writes Keith Callard, "but Pakistan was virtually shattered. India inherited a working federal Capital with the majority of the cabinet and other public servants willing to continue at their posts. Pakistan had to create a new Capital and a new government. India had large areas which were substantially untouched by partition...in Pakistan there were few such areas of relative tranquillity."¹ Some of the leading

merchants, bankers, and traders, most of the leading doctors and technical personnel and a good proportion of teachers of higher education in the areas which now constituted Pakistan were Hindus and they all migrated to India. The return stream of refugees consisted of poor peasants, artisans and small shop-keepers. It was surprising therefore, that the economy of Pakistan did not break down completely. "Somehow the crop was moved along the railroads and the economy shuddered and survived."² Her Government was in a similar predicament. The British officials, who formed a sizable cadre of senior administrative posts and held the Governorships of three of the four provinces, helped Pakistan to maintain her existence, but "even more vital was the devoted service of humble officials. Hard-bitten, hard-drinking sub-inspectors of police forswore bribes and dedicated themselves to their countrymen: cynical, self-serving office clerks took on social service duties and lived among squalor and filth. Pakistan survived because enough Pakistanis were determined that it should survive."³

With the best of intentions, however, it was not possible to get over mutual suspicions. "Many nationalists", as Keith Callard points out, "had spent their political lives in the struggle for a strong, united and free India. They accepted Pakistan with reluctance because the alternative was civil war, and pro-Pakistanis had looked upon the Hindu majority in India as hostile to their religion and aspirations. Thus, even before partition, Pakistan and India had grounds for mutual suspicion and dislike."⁴ What happened in the second half of 1947 "transformed mistrust into bitter hatred, founded on fear and deepened by blood and cruelty." At the governmental level, the old rivalry between the Congress party and Muslim League took the form of a new rivalry between India and Pakistan. The basic conflict between the Congress and the League attitudes to the two-nation theory soon involved the two neighbouring countries in the veins of which the same blood had flown, into a hostile confrontation. Kashmir became the main battle-ground for this conflict.

When the British Government departed from India, they left behind them not only the two sovereign entities, India and Pakistan, but more than five hundred other princely states also, which were given the option to accede either to India or Pakistan. Most of the states which were in the physical proximity of India acceded to her. Some states, like Bahawalpur, Khairpur and the states of Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier joined Pakistan. A sharp difference soon broke out between India and Pakistan over the tiny state of Junagadh, which was under a Muslim ruler while the majority of its population consisted of Hindus. The ruler announced his accession to Pakistan, an uprising broke out against him and Indian troops had to be moved in to restore order. After a plebiscite the state was admitted to the Indian Union. Pakistan refused to recognize

the validity of this action but did not seem to attach much importance to it. Pakistan showed greater concern over the fate of Hyderabad. Surrounded by Indian territory on all sides, it was a state ruled by a Muslim Nizam but predominantly populated by Hindus. The Nizam had wavered for some time, and perhaps entertained some hope of acceding to Pakistan, but this state of uncertainty had merely strengthened the fascistic right-wing organization of the Razakars on the one hand and the Communists on the other, the latter beginning to use force in the Telingana region with a view to seizing land. All this had forced the Government of India to move in with armed forces and take over control of the state.

Soon there came the question of Kashmir. With 85% of its population consisting of the followers of Islam, Kashmir was under a Hindu Maharaja. Like the Nizam of Hyderabad, the Maharaja of Kashmir too tried to avoid acceding to either India or Pakistan. He proposed "standstill" agreements with both India and Pakistan under which Kashmir could continue to have the facilities enjoyed by her before August 1947. The rioting in India and Pakistan, however, had its repercussions on Kashmir also. Taking advantage of the 'persecution' of the Muslims, as the actions of the Maharaja undertaken with a view to restoring law and order in the state were characterized, tribesmen from across Pakistan began to enter Kashmir. The Government of Pakistan denied repeatedly that it was responsible for organizing the tribal invasion, but it was clear that many local officials had lent their active assistance to the tribal invaders and they had definitely entered Kashmir through Pakistan territory. "If they came from beyond the Durand Line," asked Krishna Menon in the Security Council, "what right has a civilized state, which was in existence, as a result of an agreement between its neighbour, the British Parliament and itself, to permit their territory, their fuel, their food, their communications to be used in order to permit aggression on any neighbouring state?"⁵ Unable to defend Srinagar against the massive onslaught, the Maharaja appealed to New Delhi for military aid. This could be provided only after the formal accession of Kashmir to India, which was offered by the Maharaja on October 26, 1947, and accepted by the Indian Government the following day. The Indian army then took over and established military control over the greater part of Jammu and the valley of Kashmir.

The legality of India's rights in Kashmir could not be questioned, even if we were not adequately convinced by the arguments repeated so often by the Indian representatives in the Security Council that (a) Kashmir had always been a part of India and that (b) India, being a succession state to Britain, which Pakistan was not, had every right to protect any territory which had once been a part of British India, from foreign invaders as long as the territory had not declared accession to Pakistan. The Government of India

had taken action in Kashmir only after the legality of accession had been carried out.⁶ The principle of accession was not something new and invented merely to fit into the exigencies of the situation. It had been part of the requirements of the Act of 1935, under which both India and Pakistan had established their respective governmental institutions. Under the Act, the request had to be made by the head of the state, irrespective of the fact, whether he had the support of the people or not, and if the state to which the request was made accepted it, the accession was to be regarded as a complete act. Both these steps had been duly taken. The Maharaja had made a request for accession, and the Government of India had accepted the accession. It was, therefore, a complete contract, and the accession was full and final. The same procedure had been adopted in the case of five hundred and sixty other states. The applications for accession were made by princes, chieftains, feudatories, whatever they were, and they were accepted, by the Government of India in the person of the Governor-General. An attempt was made later to point out, that the accession of Kashmir to India was a conditional accession and that India had declared its intention to refer the matter to a plebiscite in the future. No such condition, in fact, was attached so far as the accession was concerned. The act of accession was complete. It was in a separate letter, which accompanied the accepted instrument of accession, that the Governor-General had suggested that wishes of the people would be ascertained in the matter after the restoration of law and order in the state. This assurance was not given to Pakistan at all. It was aimed at satisfying the National Conference which had been agitating for a long time for constitutional government in Kashmir and which, as it were, had strong links with the Indian National Congress. The Government of India which stood for democratic principles, did not want to give the impression to the people of Kashmir, who had long stood by the leadership of the National Conference in its advocacy of a constitutional government for the state, that they were by-passing them and accepting the accession of Kashmir simply because the Maharaja had asked for it. Pakistan came into the picture only as an aggressor. It was only after the Pakistani troops had been moved into the state and come into direct conflict with the Indian army that the United Nations was moved which brought about a cease-fire in Kashmir. India, of her own accord, had carried the matter to the United Nations. To India the issue, as it stood before the Security Council, was a simple fact of aggression by Pakistan. The presence of Pakistani irregulars and armed forces was a clear violation of Indian soil. India was not prepared to agree to any solution as long as the Pakistani forces had not vacated the aggression.

To Pakistan, however, the situation appeared in quite a different light. Kashmir being a predominantly Muslim majority state, it was not entitled according to Pakistani thinking, to take any other course of action except that of merger with Pakistan.

Prior to partition, Kashmir was linked economically with an area now comprising West Pakistan. Through Kashmir passed the three rivers—the Indus, the Jhelum and the Chenab—which controlled, to a very large extent, the agricultural economy of West Pakistan; about nineteen million acres of land in West Pakistan was irrigated by these rivers. Pakistan showed a consistent refusal to accept the Indian case on Kashmir. Even the organized tribal invasion, in which she had refused all complicity in the beginning, was subsequently justified as a rescue operation to save the lives and property of the persecuted Muslim majority. The accession to India by the Maharaja was dismissed as a mere subterfuge. There was a widespread conviction in Pakistan that the Indian possession of Kashmir was an act of occupation by force, “an act of naked Indian aggression against defenceless people, committed under cover of a fraudulent and invalid instrument of accession surreptitiously obtained from a Hindu ruler who had lost the confidence and support of his people, and whose writ had no longer any force within the state.”⁷

Having taken a definite position with regard to Kashmir, and forcibly occupied one-third of its territory in the face of India's challenge, Pakistan has ever since been governed by the fear of India. Her entire foreign policy has been based on this fear. In her earlier years she was influenced to a great extent in her foreign policy by the considerations of developing closer ties with Islamic countries. But she could not have expected anything from these Islamic nations by way of help against India. They were too small to count. The need to protect Pakistan against a potentially hostile big neighbour overshadowed all contacts between her and other countries. For Pakistan, the supreme test of friendship was the willingness on the part of her friends to support her cause against India. The first source from which Pakistan expected help was the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth, a hope which was not realized. “When Pakistan, soon after she came into existence, became involved in a series of disputes with India, some of them of a grave nature”, complained Sarwar Hasan, “she appealed to the Commonwealth of Nations for assistance in their solution. The reply that she received from them was *nonpossumous*.”⁸ Meanwhile the matter was placed before the United Nations. The United Nations passed resolutions and sent mediators who presented a series of reports. But this was never carried to the length of positive international intervention. While the United Nations was prepared to use force on a large scale in Korea, the leaders of Pakistan complained, she had not done anything to help Pakistan in obtaining Kashmir. The natural conclusion drawn by many Pakistanis was that only where the interests of a great power were at stake would the United Nations take any decisive action. She had, therefore, to turn elsewhere for support.

In the early years the United States was almost as remote from Pakistan as Russia or China. The United States was primarily concerned with containing Communism in Europe and in the Far East. India and Pakistan were distant countries to which the United States looked with hope and expectancy, so far as their democratic experiments were concerned. Of the two, she was more familiar with the India of Gandhi and Nehru than with Pakistan. The policy of the Truman Administration was to avoid involvement in the dispute between India and Pakistan. In 1950, Liaquat Ali Khan visited the United States. This visit did something to increase the United States knowledge about his country, but that was an isolated instance. The foreign policy that Pakistan was pursuing, one of non-alignment and of non-involvement in the great power conflict, the same as that of India, did not give the United States any reason to hope that she could expect anything different from Pakistan than what she expected from India. In the case of India, however, under pressure from Chester Bowles, the United States had started giving economic aid to her. By 1953, however, by a strange turn of circumstances, the United States and Pakistan seemed to be driving closer to each other. It is difficult to say who took the initiative. With the installation of the Republican Party in office in Washington and the rise of Dulles as the American Secretary of State, there started an attempt to enlarge the area of encirclement of Communism. The fact that Mohammed Ali, until recently Pakistan's ambassador to the U.S.A., was now the Prime Minister of Pakistan must have eased the situation. In May 1953, Dulles visited Karachi and came to the conclusion that "the strong spiritual faith and martial spirit of the people (of Pakistan) make them a dependable bulwark against Communism."⁹ Earlier than this, the Western Powers had proposed the establishment of a Middle East Defence Organization. This proposal had fallen through on account of the opposition of the Arab countries and of Iran. The Arabs were not prepared to enter into a Western-sponsored defence pact as long as the West did not modify its policy with respect to Israel. In addition to this, Egypt was not prepared to consider the MEDO proposal so long as Britain and France did not come to a settlement with her over the future of the military bases at Suez. Iran wanted her dispute with Great Britain with regard to the Iranian oil to be settled first. Pakistan fully appreciated and sympathized with the Arab and the Iranian points of view. If the Arabs and Iranians, after coming to a settlement with the British and the French, had agreed to enter a Middle East Defence Organization, Pakistan would have gladly joined it since this would have provided her with "just the kind of support and strength that she needed and was looking for." It was significant that when the proposal for the establishment of a MEDO was mooted and it was conjectured that Pakistan would join it, it was denounced both officially and unofficially in India as a threat to her security.¹⁰

Due to difficulties and delay in the setting up of the MEDO, the United States thought in terms of entering into a military pact with Pakistan. Pakistan had already entered into a pact with Turkey, a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and this provided a bridge for the United States and Pakistan to come together. When the offer came from the United States, Pakistan hesitated for some time. Sarwar Hasan points out that they were "apparently unwilling to create the impression at home and abroad, particularly in other Asian countries, that they were, prepared to come under the obligation of a foreign power." The late Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan had proudly declared that Pakistan owed nothing to any other country and was subservient to none in matters of policy. If Pakistan now accepted military aid from the United States, she would definitely be under obligation to a foreign power and her independence in policy matters might be compromised, as was that of Turkey after her acceptance of American aid. A gift of 610,000 pounds of wheat of the value of 67.2 million dollars, at a time when Pakistan was faced with a desperate food situation, "gratefully received by the people of Pakistan...removed the hesitation of the Pakistan leaders to a military agreement with the United States."¹¹

India's persistent attitude of hostility in this matter seemed to have further egged on Pakistan to go ahead with her designs. As early as the end of 1952, when unconfirmed reports had appeared in the press of a possible military alliance in West Asia with Pakistan as one of the participants, Nehru had made it clear that "if any such development takes place, it means that the region of cold war comes right up to our borders. We have to be concerned with any matter which directly or indirectly affects our country." In November 1953, with definite reports beginning to come from Washington following talks between Ghulam Mohammed and Eisenhower, that a United States-Pakistan pact was in the offing, Nehru had declared that while it was "a matter of which constitutionally or otherwise it is none of our concern what Pakistan and the United States of America are doing...it is a matter of the most intense concern to us and something which will have very far reaching consequences on the whole structure of things in South Asia and especially in India and Pakistan." On December 9, Nehru sent a formal protest letter to Pakistan in which he not only stated general objections to such alignment on the ground that they increased the chances of war, adversely affected the re-awakening of Asia and professedly limited the independence of the country so entangled, but also elaborated the specific implications of Indo-Pakistan relations. "Whatever the motive may be", wrote Nehru, "the mere fact that large scale rearmament and military expansion takes place in Pakistan must necessitate far reaching repercussions in India...the whole psychological atmosphere between the two countries will change for the worse and every question that is pending between us will be affected.

by it." Nehru described "such an expansion of Pakistan's war resources with the help of the United States as an unfriendly act to India and one that is fraught with danger."¹²

India made it clear that this was bound to have a tremendous impact on the Kashmir problem. "The whole issue will change its face completely if heavy and rapid militarization of Pakistan herself is to take place...it becomes rather absurd to talk of demilitarization if Pakistan proceeds in a reverse direction with the help of the United States...the question before us becomes one of militarization and not de-militarization." Pakistan expressed its great surprise at the fact that any attempt to strengthen Pakistan's defences could be looked upon by India, which was so much stronger than Pakistan, as an unfriendly act. Were these friendly relations to be established between the two countries, asked the Prime Minister of Pakistan, only on the basis that "present great disparity in the military potential of India and Pakistan shall never be altered to India's disadvantage?" "It is difficult to understand," wrote Sarwar Hasan, "how the acceptance of American aid would bring the war 'right to our door'. If there is a world war, the sub-continent is bound to become involved in it. If such a war does not take place, American aid to Pakistan cannot provoke it." Secondly, if the defence of Pakistan against any external attack were to be strengthened, it would only be an asset to India. Thirdly, it was asked, if India herself believed in the policy of neutrality, did she thereby acquire the right of imposing this policy on other Asian countries? If the inclination of Pakistan now was that of aligning herself with the United States, it was entirely because of India's attitude towards her—"India did not give Pakistan the choice of remaining neutral." In fact, Pakistan had never seriously believed in India's pretensions to neutrality. India's neutrality, according to her, was not altogether motivated by a desire to keep out of the great power conflict, but was rather a counter for bargaining with the great powers and for increasing her own importance in world affairs. Finally, it was alleged that India desired to see Pakistan remaining weak, and it was in so far as the pact with the United States was in the nature of an insurance of Pakistan's life, that India was opposing it.¹³

THE KASHMIR PROBLEM : AN IMPASSE ?

As a result of the United States military aid to Pakistan, the Indian attitude towards the Kashmir problem was completely changed. While Pakistan regarded this attitude on the part of India as the unwarranted linking of an extraneous issue with the settlement of the Kashmir dispute, India felt that Pakistan was "drawing the Kashmir dispute out from the region of a peaceful approach for a friendly settlement, by bringing in the pressure of arms." To India it was not merely that the Kashmir question had become difficult of solution but that a serious threat had arisen to the entire country. India's closest neighbour, forming the first line of her defence, had been sucked into the heart of the cold war, and the area of peace which the Government of India had consistently endeavoured to expand, had been seriously endangered at her common frontiers with Pakistan. With Pakistan as one of the active members of the Western military alliance, the dangers of the cold war breaking into a shooting war had now come very close to India. This was a view taken not only by the Government of India but by almost all the other political parties in the country, and no amount of assurances from the American press were able to make India change her attitude in the matter. While not challenging the United States motives, Nehru said on March 1, 1954, four days after the American press had formally announced the United States decision to assist Pakistan militarily, "...we know from past experience that aggression takes place and nothing is done to thwart it. Aggression took place in Kashmir six and half years ago with dire consequences. Nevertheless the United States thus far has not condemned it and we are asked not to press this point in the interest of peace." Nehru demanded the withdrawal of American observers attached to the United Nations' observers team on the cease-fire line in Kashmir as he no longer regarded them as neutrals.

In January 1955, the Pakistan Government, presumably in the hope that she was now in a stronger position, made another attempt to solve the Kashmir problem. Ghulam Mohammed, the Governor-General of Pakistan accompanied by three of his cabinet ministers,

Dr. Khan Sahib, Iskandar Mirza and Mohammed Ali, came to India and attended the Republic Day celebrations in New Delhi. "I have more faith in Jawaharlal than you have", he told his audience at a public meeting, "I am convinced that Jawaharlal desires happy relations between our two countries." The *Dawn* wrote, "our people do not want Pakistan and Bharat to remain enemies always, nor do they want to grudge the success which our neighbour has made of their country, and democracy seems to be in a much better shape than here and the common man's lot less unenviable." Direct negotiations were subsequently started between the Pakistan Prime Minister, accompanied by two of his cabinet colleagues, Khan Sahib and Iskandar Mirza, and the Government of India representatives on May 14. While the contents of the negotiations were not revealed and the joint communique issued at the end of the talks merely stated that talks would be continued at a later stage, there were reasons to believe that, as Nehru put it, "the approach on both sides had not only been friendly but constructive and not the old dead wall approach." There were rumours that Pakistan was prepared to waive aside, or dilute, her insistence on a plebiscite in Kashmir. The *London Times* reported that Pakistan had decided not to persist "in this obviously unprofitable approach (holding of a plebiscite) for the time being" and A. M. Rosenthal reporting to the *New York Times* said that "both Pakistan and India were talking about plans that would be variations on the status quo of a divided Kashmir, which would not involve a plebiscite in the entire state." "The matters we have now discussed may be new", said Pakistan Prime Minister on May 18, "it is a less rigid approach than before. There are some new ideas." This was perhaps based on what Nehru revealed at a public meeting in New Delhi more than a year later, that he had suggested to Pakistan, that India would agree to the partition of Kashmir on the basis of the cease-fire line and renounce her legal claim to the whole state. It was, however, the public opinion in Pakistan, as revealed through the press, which torpedoed all hopes. There were doubts and suspicions in Pakistan regarding the role of their own representatives and a complete loss of faith in India. "It is quite clear", wrote the *Dawn*, changing its own position, "that Mr. Nehru will never be able to bring himself to that reasonable and honest frame of mind in which his international commitment to abide by the agreed procedure for the settlement of the dispute will outweigh his overmastering greed to hold on to his loot by hook or by crook..." Mohammed Ali retracted his words and quick political changes took place in Pakistan.

The Indian attitude was one of shock at this change in Pakistan's behaviour. What trust could be placed in the leaders of Pakistan, if they could bend and surrender so easily before an excited public opinion and unabashedly withdraw from their commitments? India also failed to understand the reason for all this excitement in Pakistan. She had responded to Pakistan's efforts at settlement of

the Kashmir issue in a constructive manner and was spurned. This led to an increase of loss of faith in Pakistan and a more definitive approach towards Kashmir. Things could not wait for Pakistan for all time to come. In the mean-time the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir had resolved to unite with India. In the first week of July 1955, Govind Ballabh Pant, India's Home Minister declared in Srinagar that the decision of the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir 'was the verdict of the people which cannot be disregarded.' This was followed by Nehru asking in a public meeting at New Delhi if there was any use "going round and round with eyes blindfolded," and, upholding Pant's statement, Nehru subsequently announced in the Indian Parliament that while international commitments were there, India also had to take into consideration "what had happened during the last six or seven years." In September 1956, a coalition government was formed in Pakistan with Suhrawardi as Prime Minister, a man who was once regarded in India as 'one of the Pakistani statesmen to whom India did not appear as an enemy.' India was, therefore, shocked all the more when she found that the hate campaign against India reached unprecedented proportions during the regime of Suhrawardi.

Taking advantage of India's unpopularity with the West, arising out of her stand on Suez, Pakistan re-opened the Kashmir issue in the Security Council in January 1957. India was now faced with another shock. While Krishna Menon was still in the process of replying to Pakistan's charges, and the Security Council should have at least shown the courtesy of waiting until he had finished his speech, a five-power draft resolution sponsored by U.S.A., the United Kingdom, Australia, Colombia and Cuba was introduced in the Security Council which adopted it soon after. It reminded the two Governments of their earlier commitments for a plebiscite and re-affirmed that any step taken by the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir would not constitute a disposition of the state in accordance with this principle. India immediately declared that, not having participated in it, she did not regard herself bound by the resolution of the Security Council. The resolution, however, was a marked triumph for the Pakistan stand. She now urged upon the Security Council to arrange for an early plebiscite and suggested that a United Nations' force be sent to India. A further proposal was brought forward in the Security Council to send Jarring to India and Pakistan to examine proposals for de-militarization or for the establishment of other conditions for progress towards the settlement of the dispute, bearing in mind the proposal for the use of a temporary United Nations' force. The Soviet Union which had earlier abstained from voting on the five-power resolution now opposed the idea of the United Nations' force. Colombia suggested that the proposal should be examined only if the two parties accepted it. India took up a strong stand saying that she "will in no circumstances permit foreign troops on its soil." "The Security Council dare not ask us to accept the introduction of

foreign troops on our sacred soil," roared Krishna Menon in his characteristic way and the Soviet Union finally vetoed the resolution. The idea of the United Nations' troops being sent to Kashmir evoked strong reactions in India, Nehru calling it, "collective aggression or collective approval of aggression." On February 1, a second resolution was adopted by the Security Council, without any reference to United Nations' force, which asked Jarring to examine with the two Governments "any proposals which are likely to contribute towards the settlement of the dispute." Jarring spent nearly a month in India, mid-March to mid-April 1957, and submitted a report to the Security Council which clearly showed a greater appreciation of the realities with regard to the situation in Kashmir. His report marked a significant departure from the attitude displayed by the majority of the Security Council members. First, he showed his awareness of "the great problems that might arise in connection with and as a result of a plebiscite." Secondly, he also pointed out that any discussion by the Security Council had to take note of "the changing political, economic and strategic factors surrounding the whole of the Kashmir question together with the changing pattern of power relations in West and South Asia." Jarring clearly seemed to be aware of the implications of the United States military pact with Pakistan and their impact on the Kashmir situation. Thirdly, he made it clear that decisions taken several years back with regard to a situation might not hold the same validity, if the situation had been materially transformed—"that implementation of international agreements of an *ad hoc* character, which has not been achieved fairly speedily, may become progressively more difficult because the situation with which they were to cope has tended to change." For some time it appeared that the matter had been set at rest there.

Jarring had proposed arbitration on the question whether or not part I of the UNCIP Resolution of August 13, 1948, concerning cease-fire and military disengagement, had been implemented. Pakistan had maintained that it had implemented Part I of the resolution "in good faith and in full." India rejected Jarring's proposals. This was not because she was against the principle of arbitration but because "the issues in dispute were not suitable for arbitration" and because such procedure would be inconsistent with the sovereignty of Jammu and Kashmir and the rights and obligations of the Union of India in respect to this territory and because she realized "that arbitration even on an isolated part of the resolution might be interpreted as indicating that Pakistan had a *locus standi* in the question." On October 9, 1957, Menon made particular references to sabotage activities in Jammu and Kashmir and charged Pakistanis of being implicated in them. Subsequently he referred to the *aide memoires* which the governments of Turkey and Iraq had sent to India expressing their concern at the unrest which the Kashmir problem was creating in West Asia and the concern it was causing a fellow member of the Baghdad Pact. On November 11, Menon told the Security

Council in specific words, "In no circumstances whatever are we prepared to countenance a proposition which means the Balkanization of India for an abstract principle which does not exist." India, he pointed out, was not a confederation, that the right to secede could not be granted to the constituent units and no government could sacrifice the unity of the country. India wanted friendly and cordial relations with Pakistan, but she also wanted Pakistan to vacate its aggression in Kashmir. At any rate she was not prepared to re-open the issue of accession of Kashmir to India. He refused to accept any de-militarization in Kashmir.

While Menon continued to plead the cause of India, often in language which was not quite tactful, the Security Council went ahead with its proposals. The draft of an Anglo-United States resolution on Kashmir which was circulated on November 15 referred to the need for demilitarization as a step towards a plebiscite. This was in complete disregard of India's views. Dr. Frank Graham, the former United Nations' representative in Kashmir, was now asked to proceed to the Indian sub-continent and devise a scheme of demilitarization, "which shall be implemented within three months of such agreements being reached." The proposal was supported by Australia, Colombia and the Philippines. On November 18, Menon expressed India's "total opposition to the proposal." On November 21, the Soviet delegate made it clear that he was going to veto the resolution since it "merely repeats the proposals which experience has proved to be fruitless." The resolution, at Jarring's suggestion, was subsequently modified and all references to demilitarization were dropped. Under the amended form the resolution merely authorized the United Nations' representative "to make any recommendations to the parties for further appropriate action with a view of making progress towards the implementation of the resolutions of the UNCIP of August 13, 1948 and January 5, 1949 and towards a peaceful settlement." The resolution was finally adopted on December 2, 1957, by the Security Council and the Indian delegate made it clear there and then that his country was not in a position to accept it. In the meantime, in April 1957, the state of Kashmir had its general elections in which the National Conference had captured sixty-nine out of seventy-nine seats. The Government of Kashmir as well as the newly formed Democratic National Conference led by G.M.Sadiq, emphatically rejected the possibility of any reversal of the decision to accede to India.

With the coming of Ayub Khan into power in Pakistan, there were hopes everywhere that the relations between the two countries would now improve. Ayub Khan appeared determined not only to solve the domestic problems of Pakistan but also to settle her external issues. He seemed to have started well. In late 1959, and early 1960, India and Pakistan reached an agreement on almost all their remaining border disputes. The most remarkable achieve-

ment of the Ayub regime, however, was the solution of the canal waters dispute. This had dragged on for eight long years. The good offices of the World Bank played a very important role in settling the problem. The solution of the canal waters dispute, removed a major stumbling block in the way of improving relations between India and Pakistan. The Indus Waters Treaty was signed by Nehru and Ayub Khan and Mr. Web Iliff representing the World Bank in Karachi in September 1960. This was followed by long discussions between Nehru and Ayub Khan over a great range of subjects affecting the relations between the two countries. The settlement of Indus Basin Waters question and the elimination of the border disputes had presented to the two Government, as the joint communique issued on September 23 pointed out, "an unparalleled opportunity to direct their policies towards the promotion of mutual understanding and friendly cooperation between their two countries." Their hopes, however, were not realized. Pakistan gradually seemed to have developed a harder line towards India. The Pakistan press started a campaign of vitriolic attacks on India. Following India's taking over of Goa in December 1961, Pakistan tried to exploit the reaction of anger and exasperation which was being manifested by the Western countries against India. The line of propaganda Pakistan adopted for foreign consumption was, that India would follow up her aggression against Goa by an aggression against Pakistan. In February 1962 she again brought the matter before the Security Council. Discussion was resumed after India had completed her third general elections. The old positions, involving the same set of arguments and counter-arguments, were taken once again, and nothing came out of them. Once again, Krishna Menon, speaking on behalf of India made it absolutely clear that any compromise on India's part with regard to her sovereign rights in Kashmir was incomprehensible. He made it clear that India could not agree to a plebiscite, the free elections in Kashmir having already unequivocally expressed the views of the people there. Said Menon, "This is the 104th meeting on this subject, I believe. You can hold two hundred meetings. We will come here every time that you ask us, but in no condition shall we trade our sovereignty, on no condition shall we sell our heritage, on no condition shall we open the door for the disruption and disintegration of India which would be a calamity not only for the Indian people but for the whole of that part of the world." At the same time Menon repeated the pledge that "in spite of our moral, political and legal rights. in spite of the serious difficulties we have in that part of India, we shall not try to force a solution by a force of arms."

Frustrated in her attempts to reach any agreement with India on Kashmir either through direct negotiations or through the United Nations, Pakistan now seemed to have started re-assessing the very basis of her foreign policy. She began to feel more and more irritated with the military alliances of which she was a member, and in

which the United States was her chief ally, and she began to make overtures to the Soviet Union and Communist China. As the *Morning News*, analyzing a speech by Ayub Khan in which he had said "that if India attacked Pakistan she would not depend so much on CENTO and SEATO as on her own armed forces," wrote on January 1962, "Whatever the basic postulates of our foreign policy in the past, we must reorientate our thinking to meet the new dangers and prepare ourselves afresh with one sole objective—the survival of Pakistan in the midst of its enemies." On June 27, 1962, Mohammed Ali, the new Foreign Minister of Pakistan, in a major foreign policy speech said, "We do not propose to be a camp follower of any power group." Referring to the military pacts, he said that while they had "served a useful purpose at a time when we were apparently friendless and alone" Pakistan was "not fully satisfied with these pacts." He then referred to Pakistan's desire for closer and more cordial relations with the Soviet Union and China. With the Soviet Union, already in 1961, an agreement had been signed for the development of Pakistan's oil resources, and with Communist China an agreement had been entered into more recently to demarcate the common border. It was clear that Pakistan had taken the initiative in the wooing of China. Mohammed Ali was now talking about his "personal friendship with the great Chinese leader Chou-En-lai" and declaring that "the recent agreement between China and Pakistan to demarcate the common border should help towards the achievement of our mutual desire to establish and promote close relations." Pakistan now took up the line that in the Sino-Indian dispute it was India which was creating trouble. She described Indian allegations against the Chinese regarding border aggression as "the clever exploitation of the situation—deliberately exaggerated for the purpose—by India to stampede Americans and others into massive 'help India' campaigns" and, strangely enough, quoted Chou En-lai in support of the argument! "It was India's own forward policy which, according to *Dawn*, January 20, 1961, "created misgivings in Peking and forced the latter to attend more diligently to the guarding of China's frontiers with her ambitious rival for Asia's leadership." It was clear that Pakistan's hostility towards India was now taking dangerous international proportions.

What, then, could be the solution of the Kashmir tangle? A plebiscite was definitely not the answer. In fact, while both Lord Mountbatten and Nehru gave assurances that the future of Kashmir would not be settled without reference to the people neither of them used the term 'plebiscite'. The holding of a plebiscite might have been possible in the earlier stages—if the conditions laid down by India had been fulfilled, if Pakistan had withdrawn its armies, if the people who had been made to leave the country had been encouraged to come back and settle down, and if a representative government had been established in Kashmir. Pakistan's refusal to cooperate in the creation of such conditions invalidated, in India's

opinion, the idea of holding a plebiscite. India's commitment, it might be pointed out, was not to accept the accession of Kashmir as final until the approval of the people of Kashmir had been obtained. Since then, there had been three general elections in Kashmir and the representatives of the people duly elected to their legislature had firmly and unequivocally given their word in favour of Kashmir as being an inalienable part of India. The impartiality of the Kashmir elections was often doubted, if not actually challenged in the West and there was a feeling that perhaps there had been manipulation in them. The overwhelming support obtained by the National Conference seemed to have confirmed these doubts but this had been quite in the tradition of Kashmir. As early as 1934 the Muslim Conference, which was the parent of the National Conference, won nine seats without any contest; in 1938 nineteen seats out of twenty-one were captured by them. It was in 1946 that the Muslim Conference was converted into National Conference. When the National Conference decided to boycott the farcical elections, arranged by the Maharaja, ninety-two per cent of the electorate, obeying the National Conference mandate, abstained from voting. It was, therefore, not surprising that in 1951 the National Conference was able to win forty-three out of forty-five seats without any contest. In 1957 elections, twenty-three candidates were returned unopposed, but thirty-two seats were contested with ninety candidates in the field, with four political parties and twenty-four independent candidates participating in the elections. In the elections of 1961, thirty-four candidates were returned unopposed, but thirty-nine seats were contested, nearly fifty-five per cent of the electorate taking part in the elections. The elections in Kashmir, like the elections in other parts of India, were free from any governmental interference. In the light of these facts it would be difficult to say that the people of Kashmir did not express their views with regard to the country to which they would like to accede.

Kashmir has as much freedom of expression as any other part of India or any democratic state in the world. In 1962, there were fifty-four newspapers in the Indian administered part of Kashmir. There are all kinds of political parties. There is even a Plebiscite Front, the Pakistan sponsored party, which stands for the boycott of elections. There is an independent judiciary in Kashmir, which is a part of the judiciary of the Indian Union, in the sense that it is by and large under the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of India. The rule of law applies and whatever discrepancies there were in the transition period, they have been gradually eliminated. The judiciary in Kashmir including the High Court, is independent of the executive. While one-third of the state under the military control of Pakistan, writhes in agony, subjection and poverty, India has changed the economic face of the territory of Kashmir under her control. The investments and revenue, state income and food production, power potential and roads, education

at all the stages, have all gone up. In view of the complete change that has come over the conditions in Kashmir it would be futile to think of applying a solution which might have been workable at one time to resolve the problem.

If India is so sure of the public opinion in Kashmir being in her favour and of the growing awareness among the people of Kashmir of the political freedom and economic development that their association with India has brought to them, why does she shirk from facing the issue of a plebiscite? Is there not enough reason to think that the people of Kashmir will vote in favour of India? It is exactly here that the rub lies. A plebiscite is not always the correct way to find out what the people want. In many cases, where there is the possibility of the emotions of the people being aroused through a direct appeal, particularly where religious emotions are involved, a better way of finding out the will of the people is to assess it from what the duly elected representatives of the people say. All political decisions with regard to the future of a people have often been taken by consultations and negotiations with the representatives of the people. It was through negotiations and arrangement with the leaders of the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League that the British Government decided to partition the Indian sub-continent and to hand over power to the political parties which had established their *hona fides* by obtaining an overwhelming majority of seats in the legislature. A plebiscite held in Kashmir over the question of its future could lead to serious consequences. The issue of the plebiscite cannot be detached from its religious moorings. The supporters of Pakistan are bound to pose it as a vote for Islam. "Do you, a true believer in Islam as you are, propose to throw in your entire future with an infidel country? Is it not your religious duty, enjoined upon you by the Almighty, to stand by your true religion and by Pakistan?" It would be very difficult to organize any rational answer to these questions. There have been innumerable cases in history of people showing a willingness to throw off great economic advantages for the sake of political freedom and many more examples of people willing to sacrifice both economic prosperity and political freedom for the sake of supporting the cause of religion.

We should also keep the fact in mind that such a plebiscite can be arranged only when the people of Kashmir are made to start from the scratch: the present administration is dismantled, the Indian armies are withdrawn; Kashmir is placed under some kind of international administration. It is difficult to say that the decision, the people of Kashmir take under these circumstances, is likely to be guided by rational considerations of the pros and cons of the situation. Supposing that the people of Kashmir decide by means of an internationally supervised plebiscite in favour of joining Pakistan, what happens to the Hindu minority, exposed to the religious frenzy of a triumphant Muslim majority? Where is the guarantee that the

religious feelings would not be infuriated to a fever pitch, and such a result of the plebiscite would not set ablaze a trail of mass slaughtering? A plebiscite in Kashmir ending in a decision in favour of Pakistan will set into motion forces which might shatter the fabric of political unity and democratic system built up by India, with great effort, and the repercussions on Pakistan may be of an even more gigantic nature. It would, therefore, be unwise to think in terms of a plebiscite for deciding the future of Kashmir. Even a military solution may not be so bad. It is, however, clear that a war between India and Pakistan over Kashmir is bound to get involved in the wider issues that are troubling Asia and might lead to a world war involving thermo-nuclear annihilation. In fact, neither a plebiscite nor a military war would bring the solution of the Kashmir problem nearer. The United Nations, like most of the countries in the West, has clearly failed to understand the problem of Kashmir in all its implications and may no longer be the proper venue for solving the problem. The only way to solve it is by direct negotiations—under appropriate conditions. If one of the two parties tries to back up the negotiations by military force, which Pakistan has been trying to do for the last several years, or if the great powers sit down upon India and Pakistan and interfere in the negotiations, as the United States and United Kingdom were reported to be attempting in the wake of the Chinese crisis, it will merely complicate the issues still further.

INDO-PAKISTAN RELATIONS : EMERGING TRENDS

Pakistan's attitude towards the Sino-Indian war came as a great shock to India. Here was a country fighting a grim battle for its very existence, its armies falling back under the terrific, and massive Chinese invasion through Himalayan defences, and here was Pakistan carved out of India's own flesh, a country whose citizens were India's nationals until fifteen years back, vilifying India, patting China on the back, and showing preparedness even to enter into agreements with her with regard to frontiers which she had illegitimately taken out of Indian territory. Pakistan's policy in the wake of the Chinese invasion of India, was formulated by Foreign Minister, Mohammed Ali. He described the Western military aid to India as a threat to Pakistan's safety and security and as the allied betrayal of Pakistan. "I speak in anguish and not in anger," he said, "that one of our allies had promised us that we would be consulted before any arms assistance is given to India. I regret to have to observe that this was not done." While he prided in Pakistan possessing "one of the finest armies in the world, well-disciplined, well-trained, and whose morale is of the highest order," he thought that the Western military aid to India would disturb the balance of military power in South Asia. He ridiculed the idea that China and India were engaged in a major conflict and described the cease-fire order as 'an act of great statesmanship' on the part of the Chinese Prime Minister, Chou En-lai, and his associates and an evidence of their sincere desire to limit the conflict to the settlement of the border dispute. Mohammed Ali expressed his amazement at India's refusing to withdraw her armies from the Pakistani frontiers and at the fact that the Western Powers should have expected Pakistan to make an unilateral gesture to India by announcing to them that they would not exploit India's difficulties in furthering their own national interests. He used India's hesitation in withdrawing her armies from the Pakistan border as an argument in favour of India's assessment of the nature of the Chinese invasion. If India had been convinced that China wanted to carry out a major military offensive against her, she would have done so, said Mohammed Ali. He obviously did not think of India's difficulty in doing it in the face of growing Pakistani

threats of exploiting the situation. He regarded the military aid given by the United Kingdom to India as "an act hostile to Pakistan." He also threatened to withdraw from the military pacts if they did not fulfil the national interests of Pakistan. "I do wish to say" he pointed out, "that international arrangements are not permanent or static. If situations change and new developments occur, we are bound to re-appraise our policies. Should we find that membership of these pacts is no longer in the national interests of Pakistan...we shall not hesitate for a moment to get out of them." "There is no eternal friendship in international relations", Mohammed Ali continued, "and there is no eternal enmity...As situations change enemies can become friends and friends can become enemies...If friends let us down, we shall not consider them friends. Friends that stand by us we shall stand by them." He also used the occasion to announce the fact that Pakistan's relations with China were cordial and that their border negotiations were proceeding apace and satisfactorily, talked of the "positive and independent line we are adopting", and invited "all those who want our friendship to extend their hand of friendship."¹

President Ayub in a television interview on January 6, 1963, spoke in a more restrained tone and did not specifically say that Pakistan was contemplating any serious changes in her foreign policy. But he also took practically the same view of the Sino-Indian situation—that India's heart was really not in fighting the Chinese, that her military reverses were not due to lack of arms but because of 'several other reasons', that India's present arms build-up was primarily directed against Pakistan, that India had a record of intimidating her smaller neighbours, that Western military aid to her constituted a threat to Pakistan's security and to peace on the sub-continent, that it was India which was obstructing a Kashmir settlement, etc. President Ayub also extended a veiled threat to the United States saying that Pakistan might be compelled to re-assess her relationship with the West. What was remarkable was that on the one hand he asked the United States to put military pressure on India to concede Kashmir to Pakistan and on the other hand he refused to rule out a military solution of the problem. When questioned whether Pakistan would not attempt a military solution of the Kashmir problem at this moment when India was pre-occupied with China, he merely asked "will India ever be involved to that extent in these mountains? Will she ever be able to draw that number of troops that she will be vulnerable for us to march into India?" A strange question to ask!

While the Foreign Minister Mohammed Ali conveyed to the National Assembly of Pakistan the attitude of the Government on matters of foreign policy and President Ayub made some efforts to

reassure the West that Pakistan was not contemplating to walk out of the Western alliances, the Pakistani press was brutally frank in arguing as to what should determine a nation's attitude. Wrote the *Pakistan Times*, "No nation acts as logically and high-mindedly as the Western countries seem to have Pakistan believe... That we should raise the Kashmir issue admittedly in the hour of India's peril is perfectly natural...we hope danger might awaken Mr. Nehru to reality, if his sense of justice has so far failed to do it, but surely he will not be awakened to it unless we help him in the process. The way we can help him is by withholding assurances that Pakistan will not embarrass India during her engagement with China." In fact, the Pakistani press seemed to have taken up a tirade against India. Wrote the *Morning News*, "India's past record of expansionism and its blood and iron policies would have put even Bismark's militarism under a shade, for it has already alarmed its neighbours and they cannot view with equanimity a perilous rise in its striking power." "The story of Pakistan-China relations", wrote the *Indus Times*, "is a happy one and no one in this country is going to annoy a powerful, friendly neighbour for the sake of a hypothetical friendship with India which has never really accepted the independence of this country and the nature of whose nationalism is patently chauvinistic and anti-Pakistan in inspiration and purpose." What the Pakistan papers wrote was repeated by the political leaders of the country. Khwaja Nazimuddin, a former Governor-General, advised Pakistan to "mobilize her armed forces on a war-footing and deploy them along the Indian borders", as long as India failed to accept certain conditions prior to reaching an understanding on Kashmir. Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas, the leader of the Kashmir Muslim Conference, said that now was the time to raise the Kashmir issue once again with full vigour and, if India did not agree to settle the dispute through an impartial and unfettered plebiscite under the United Nations auspices, all other methods "including force" should be used.

While feelings were running high in Pakistan, and the press and leaders of the country were demanding a *jihad* against India, a strange transformation of feelings toward Pakistan was taking place in India. There was a demand coming from quarters which had opposed Pakistan for all these years that a settlement with her was necessary. This was inspired primarily by considerations of evolving a defence strategy adequate enough to meet the Chinese aggression. "The position of East Pakistan lying athwart West Bengal and Bihar on the one side and Assam, NEFA, Manipur and Nagaland on the other", wrote one of the contributors to the *Hindustan Times*, "makes nonsense of strategy and defence as long as Pakistan is not with us." The northwestern flank was equally vulnerable. "Pragmatic considerations alone", continued this correspondent, "in the long run would demand that Pakistan

and India would be friends and allies. And yet large armies are immobilized in facing each other in futile, hostile positions across the borders." "But beyond pragmatic considerations," continued the writer, "are more basic and fundamental ones. After all Pakistan is closest to us historically, geographically and in blood. We speak of ourselves as two nations but our destiny and place under the sun is one. No matter what unfortunate reasons led to the division of the sub-continent, the division has been accepted by both sides. But the time has now come for a visionary and revolutionary approach to the question and our future relations. The darkness of the past—and it is only a short one—must yield to a new and glowing light." "It is a pity," wrote another writer in the same paper that "it took both our countries a whole sordid aggression by China to realize that our defence, security and peace are indivisible...Having so much in common in history, culture and geography, in Mr. Nehru's words, why must India and Pakistan continue to regard themselves as two hostile camps?" This writer also drew the attention of the reader to the case of Saarland where Germany and France gave up their claims in order to cement their friendship, and to NATO and the Coal and Steel Community and the other efforts which had been made towards cooperation in Western Europe. A settlement of the Kashmir question, of course, would have validity only in the larger context of common defence. From a common defence this writer suggested, the two countries could possibly go on to a customs union, "to restart the process of harmony woefully disturbed in 1947". The writer seemed to apologize for India's failure to respond positively to President Ayub's earlier proposal of a joint defence treaty and pleaded: "If there was any remissness on the part of India in this respect that should be seen in the light of China's invasion as no more fundamental than Pakistan's own subsequent refusal to see the enormity of Communist China's expansionism." The writer continued: "The real issue before the leaders of India and Pakistan is how best to secure the future of over 500 million peoples of their countries. The darkness of today could be a prelude to a glorious dawn. The cobwebs of prejudice and partisanship must go from the minds of our leaders, if our countries are to go on enjoying the fruits of freedom they were severally ushered into on August 15, 1947. When the ship is in distress, we do not go on painting our cabins separately." This reflected the sentiments shared by a large number of people in India.

It was during their visit to India that Averell Harriman and Duncan Sandys seemed to have thrown out a hint that India might enter into fresh talks with Pakistan for a settlement of her outstanding disputes, including Kashmir. The Indian response was quick and favourable. The task of bringing the representatives of the two countries to a conference table having been initiated.

United States and the United Kingdom awaited with bated breath to see how they would go on. A casual remark made by the Indian Prime Minister that there would be no surrender on the part of India of her basic stand with regard to Kashmir brought the fact into clearer relief that the negotiations would have to be hard and prolonged. Paul Grimes, described it as a major diplomatic break-through and thought that there was a glimmer of hope for a settlement of the problem "in the fact that for the first time in both countries there is an apparent eagerness to search for medicines that might, just might, heal the old sore of Kashmir, given time." "Maybe", wrote Paul Grimes, "the first dose of the medicine will be a little one, the diplomatic doctors say. But they hope a second dose will be bigger, and so on. The doctors feel that if ultimately the Kashmir dispute can be settled, the immediate result would be a thorough concentration of the military resources of both countries against the threat from the north."² The negotiators selected by the two countries were the very best. Sardar Swaran Singh, India's Railways Minister, had played an important part in the negotiations with regard to the Canal Waters Dispute. Z.A. Bhutto, the representative of Pakistan, also seemed to have taken up the task in right earnest. They started with a joint appeal urging leaders, officials, press, radio and other media of publicity to refrain from any statement of criticism or propaganda which might prejudice the success of the Indo-Pak negotiations or tend to create discord between the two countries. There was, however, a basic difference in their approach to the entire problem. While Swaran Singh believed that if the various other matters bedevilling the relations between the two countries could first be resolved, the proper atmosphere would be created for reaching some kind of accord on the matter of Kashmir. From the Indian point of view and from the point of view of the Western Powers, the most important objective was a settlement between India and Pakistan which might enable them to organize a joint defence of the country. Bhutto asserted, on the other hand, that the most important dispute between the two countries was with regard to Kashmir and if this dispute could be resolved, it would facilitate the solving of other differences. Pakistan did not care to look beyond a settlement of the Kashmir issue and seemed most unwilling to think in terms of a future which involved, on the part of Pakistan, the acceptance of any responsibilities with regard to the evolution of joint defence with India.

Pakistan's approach seemed to have been further conditioned by the feeling that India was not in a particularly strong bargaining position after her military reverses at the hands of the Chinese. She also appeared to be under a kind of impression that, having taken the initiative in bringing the two countries on the conference table, the United States and the United Kingdom were in duty bound

to take a hand in working out a solution. The official American position was subsequently made clear, namely that military aid to India was not dependent on the settlement of the Kashmir dispute. This perhaps, made Bhutto to realize that it would be futile to depend on outside intervention. The various meetings held between the two delegations certainly served the function of making both sides aware that the conflict was sapping the vitality of both India and Pakistan and blocking up their economic progress. The fact that 'an agreement in principle' had been reached between Pakistan and China on the alignment of their Himalayan border could have torpedoed the very opening of negotiations, had Pakistan not come out with a quick explanation that the timing for the announcement was the responsibility of the Government of China. India merely expressing its 'surprise and regret', refused to allow the declaration to come in the way of a constructive discussion on the various proposals. In the face of continuous use of pressure tactics by Pakistan—or was she being merely forced into embarrassing situations by Communist China?—India refused to break off negotiations. The fourth round of talks at Calcutta in March 1963, was preceded by Bhutto concluding a border treaty with Communist China, in which Pakistan gave away 5040 square miles of territory involved in the dispute between India and Pakistan for which talks were being held. If anybody expected that the talks would lead to a quick solution of the long-standing Kashmir problem it was certainly expecting too much. As Bhutto explained at the beginning of negotiations, the differences extending over a period of fifteen years could not have been resolved so quickly. Both the parties to the negotiations seemed to be convinced that they had to move cautiously in the matter.

It was impossible for India to accept the basic Pakistani assumption that as the majority of the people of Kashmir consisted of Muslims, India should hand over the territory to Pakistan. Even if India had accepted the assumption, it was not likely to help greatly in the realization of the ultimate objective, for which the negotiations were being held. The solution of the Kashmir problem, in fact, could be treated only as a means to an end in what it might contribute towards an improvement in the relations between the two countries. The Indian representative had emphasized at the very beginning of the negotiations that a settlement of the Kashmir dispute had meaning only in the context of such a programme and that "if we try to bring about a Kashmir settlement in terms of a purely territorial dispute, our discussions will only repeat the views that have been endlessly expressed in the last fifteen years and lead to no result."

In view of the fact that Pakistan had staked everything over her efforts to get Kashmir and it was impossible for any government in Pakistan to persuade the people of Pakistan to surrender their claims over it, India had no alternative but to make some

kind of compromise on the Kashmir issue. The suggestion made by Pakistan that the question might be resolved by means of a plebiscite and the suggestion made by India that they might agree to treat the cease—fire line as the line of a permanent division of Kashmir into areas belonging to Pakistan and India, were both quickly ruled out, and had certainly become out of date. As pointed out earlier, it would be impossible for India to accept the two-nation theory on the basis of which Pakistan was forwarding her claims. India, however, at the beginning of discussions, expressed a readiness to accept substantial modifications of the cease-fire line, which could be regarded as a major concession in that it overlooked Pakistan's initial aggression. It soon became clear that while Pakistan might permit India to hold on some fractions of Jammu territory, where Hindus were in an overwhelming majority, she would not be satisfied with anything less than the rest of Kashmir. While not conceding her sovereign rights over Kashmir, India could, if Pakistan had responded to the gesture, discuss with her the consequences of the major part of Kashmir remaining with India and ensure to Pakistan many of the economic profits which she might have derived if Kashmir had belonged to her. They could have discussed, and resolved, other important issues too. Beginning with a settlement of secondary questions like the issue of shrines on both sides of the border, the question of travel facilities for Indian and Pakistani nationals and of minor border disputes relating to Tripura and the Rann of Kutch, they could have taken up the settlement with regard to the more important questions of the use of India's eastern rivers feeding some of the East Pakistan projects, exchange of through rail facilities, etc., all of which would have undoubtedly created an atmosphere of goodwill in both countries. It was expected that the negotiations would end not only in a clearer understanding by both countries as to how far the other was able to move but also in evolving a formula of agreement. It was time that India realized that by her own attitude in the past, she had created complexes in the mind of Pakistan and Pakistan realized that, come what may, India would not agree to yield her rights of sovereignty over Kashmir. Field-Marshal Ayub in his television interview had expressed the hope that wisdom would ultimately dawn on Nehru and he would see the Pakistan point of view in the matter. It would be in the interest of a settlement between the two countries if wisdom was also to dawn on the minds of the leaders of Pakistan and they were in a better position to appreciate the Indian point of view. Unless the leaders of the two countries could bring to bear greater boldness and vision, a more creative imagination and a more sympathetic understanding of the problems than they were displaying even after the Chinese aggression, India and Pakistan, separated from each other in the travail of their birth, were not in a position to draw closer, and unless India and Pakistan drew closer, there could be neither political stability nor economic development in South Asia.

INDIA AND NEPAL : BONDS OF CULTURE AND FRIENDSHIP

Nepal was never completely under the control of the British Government in India. Defeated in a war and forced to give up a substantial part of her territory to the British, she occupied a position of subservience. But the British did not make any attempt to interfere in her internal affairs. The British were satisfied with controlling Nepal's foreign trade and external relations and drawing upon her valiant soldiers for the army. On the eve of their departure from India, in 1946, the British Legation in Kathmandu was raised to the status of an Embassy, which was symbolic of their recognition of the full independence of Nepal. The Government of free India might have quietly pursued the British policy had they not become aware, following the Chinese occupation of Tibet in 1950, of the vulnerability of Nepal to an invasion from China. In the new treaty they signed with Nepal on July 31, 1950, in abrogation of all previous treaties between British India and Nepal, they recognised Nepal's "sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence." In fact as Nehru pointed out in a statement before the Lok Sabha in December 1950, India had gone farther than the British in her respect for Nepal's independence in permitting her to "develop other foreign relations." However, there was soon manifested a basic difference between the approaches of the two countries with regard to the lines on which their future relations were to develop. While conceding to her the maximum freedom with regard to both domestic affairs and foreign policy, India took up the stand that, particularly in view of the Chinese position in Tibet, she had some "special responsibility" with regard to Nepal, which amounted to India taking up the position that "no other country can have intimate relationship with Nepal as ours is" and asking every other country "to appreciate the intimate geographical and cultural relationship that exists between India and Nepal."

The force of circumstances soon threw India into the vortex of Nepal's domestic politics. Parallel to the struggle for democratic rights waged by the Indian people, there had been a similar movement in Nepal too. Like the Indian political movement, the Nepalese movement also had its socialistic texture. Most of the political

leaders of Nepal had received their education at Indian universities, and had very intimate relations with Indian political leaders—S.P. Upadhyaya being a disciple of Rafi Ahmed Kidwai and B.P. Koirala a follower of Jaya Prakash Narayan. The Nepalese National Congress was formed in India in 1946, and looked towards the Indian political leaders for support. While the Government of India maintained a 'correct' constitutional attitude and abstained from any interference, some of the opposition parties supported the Nepalese Congress. However, the Government of India too was keen that, like India, Nepal should develop itself on democratic lines. Their moral support, which led to their sheltering the King of Nepal and his supporters in the Indian Embassy at Kathmandu, was decisive in the success of the revolution which had broken out in Nepal in 1950. India, however, did not seem to realise that by supporting the King and those who stood by him in the name of democracy, she was converting the entire Rana elements, the backbone of Nepal for ages, into her inveterate enemies. By 1954, even the Nepal Congress thought, in order not to allow the suspicions of her being pro-Indian deepen any further, that it was necessary to join the chorus of anti-Indian campaigning in Nepal. In fact, a stage had been reached when no political party in Nepal had a good word for India. Tanka Prasad Acharya accused India of imperialistic designs and demanded opening of diplomatic relations with other "democratic countries", notably the People's, Republic of China, and K.I. Singh declared that they have "no special ties with any particular country."

The Government of India continued its policy of aid to Nepal in the face of all the criticism that was being levelled against her. As early as April 1952, she had started providing experts in administration and planning to Nepal. In July 1953, following B.P. Koirala's visit to Delhi, a million-rupee grants-in-aid was given to Nepal and it was decided to transfer the excise duty levied in India on Nepalese imports to Nepal, which amounted to another million rupees a year. In December 1953, the Tribhuvan Rajpath, an 82-mile road link between Amlekhganj and Kathmandu, built by Indian money and engineers, was declared open. By October 1955, according to the report of the Consultative Council of Colombo Plan at Singapore, Nepal had received 85 million rupees from India. By 1956, Nepal had developed her own foreign relations with various other countries in the world. But India continued to give larger and larger aid to her.

While it is true that Nepal has been geographically, culturally, politically and economically closer to India than to China, her links with China also have been fairly old. Between 640 and 703 A.D. Nepal was regarded as a vassal state of the Tibetan empire and it was only after the Gurkha conquest of Nepal in 1769 that they ceased, for a brief period, to pay any tribute to Tibet. Following a successful war with Tibet, in 1854-56, she actually started receiving tributes from Tibet. But she continued to send her five-yearly

missions to Peking, and the last mission had been sent as late as 1908. The resumption of relations with China, in fact, followed inevitably in the wake of India's 'regularisation' of her own relations with her in 1954. It was during negotiations between India and China at Peking in 1954 that the first "definite" suggestion was made by China that Nepal's relations with Tibet be "regularised" against a proper perspective. India did not raise any objection. Again, what India wanted was, that while Nepal might 'regularise' her relations with China she should also keep in mind India's "special position" —as revealed in the policy, systematically followed by her during recent years, of "not interfering with their independence but not looking with favour on anybody else interfering with their independence either." Negotiations with China were opened in July 1955, through the Chinese Embassy in India. In August 1955, a joint declaration was made by the two countries affirming *Panchsheel* and deciding upon an exchange of diplomatic representation. The Sino-Nepalese Treaty of Friendship and Trade, signed on September 23, 1956, marked the "normalisation of Nepal's relations with China with regard to Tibet." Nepal surrendered her claims in Tibet and decided to pull her troops out of it. This was followed by an economic aid of 60 million rupees from China. In January 1957, Chou En-lai paid a visit to Kathmandu and talked of Nepalese and Chinese being "blood brothers", whose relationship "nothing can poison".

It would be wrong to see in Nepal's various moves of friendship towards China any basic hostility towards India, as many people seemed to think at that time. Tanka Prasad Acharya, on resigning in July, 1957 accused the Indian Government of intriguing to have him dismissed from power because of his pro-China policy. But he produced no evidence in support of his wild allegation. Nor was the appointment of K. I. Singh in July 1957, as Prime Minister indicative of any pro-China sympathies of King Mahendra. In fact, K. I. Singh had changed his attitude so much since his return to Nepal from China that in the opinion of many people his appointment appeared to have the support of India. What King Mahendra was actually planning to do was to build up his own supreme power inside Nepal, which was clear from the fact that he had introduced some checks and balances against the exercise of political power by K. I. Singh, and to establish relations with all the countries of the world, with a view to bolstering up Nepal's position on the international map. Following the establishment of diplomatic relations with China, diplomatic relations were established with the U. S. S. R. in July 1956. Early in January 1957, Nepal entered into a tripartite agreement with India and the U. S. A., which was followed by a U. S. Nepalese Agreement signed on May 31, 1957, under which the United States contributed 1.88 million dollars for Nepal's development projects. On August 5, 1957, K.I. Singh met Nehru and expressed his support for the Indian stand on Kashmir. Two more tripartite agreements were signed between Nepal, India and U. S. A. in

June 1957 and January 1958. King Mahendra visited Moscow in June 1958, and signed a joint *Punchsheel* communique with President Voroshilov, accepting Soviet aid which was followed by a Soviet technical mission visiting Kathmandu in February 1959. On April 24, 1959, a Soviet-Nepalese economic and technical aid agreement was signed, providing for Russian equipment and consultants for a hydro-electric plant, a sugar refinery and cigarette factories and a hospital in Kathmandu. On April 1959, King Mahendra laid the foundation stone at Hanumansagar, for the Kosi barrage, the biggest in India, with a view to controlling that tumultuous river in the interests of both India and Nepal. Nepal also took over the administration of its international postal service and issued first internationally recognised postal stamp. In view of the comprehensive relationships that Nepal was building up with various countries of the world, it would not be correct to say that she was trying to move closer only to China. The charge of 'India's growing interference' in her international affairs, was equally irrelevant.

In fact, Nepal's policy under King Mahendra would seem to be that of maintaining an equi-distance between India and China. Following the swearing-in of B. P. Koirala as Prime Minister on May 27, 1959, King Mahendra, in a broadcast referred to Nepal's "historical and inseparable" relations with India, which were "growing closer" but also recalled her "age old ties" with China which were being 're-established'. In the same statement he welcomed the establishment of a Soviet Embassy in Kathmandu and said that he was prepared to "welcome other countries" in establishing their embassies. Her attitude on the Sino-Indian border dispute, which was now coming up rapidly, was that of keeping out of it. A Nepalese delegation attended the tenth anniversary celebrations in Peking on October 1, 1959, and a Chinese industrial exhibition was opened in Kathmandu on the same day. Nehru's statement reasserting that "any aggression against Nepal would be considered as aggression against India" was treated by Nepal as just an 'expression of friendship towards Nepal'. Nepal pointed out at the same time that she was "at peace with everybody" and "did not apprehend any aggression on its territory from any quarter"¹ It was further pointed out that "no situation had developed or occasion arisen for Nepal to seek aid from other countries" and that "in case of aggression, Nepal had a number of friends and she was also a member of the United Nations." Asked whether the Indian army would come to Nepal if China violated her frontiers, B. P. Koirala sharply retorted, at a press conference in Kathmandu, on November 29, 1959, that "Nepal and not India would decide if there had been any aggression against Nepal".

India continued to give economic aid to Nepal. In October 1959, an agreement was signed between the two countries under which India was to pay 3 million rupees for local development and rural welfare projects. On December 4, 1959 an agreement was

signed on the gigantic Gandak Project under which some 140 acres of land in Nepal and north Bihar were to be brought under cultivation and a hydro-electric station built by India at the cost of 20 million rupees on Nepalese territory, to be handed over to Nepal when its output reached 10,000 kw. During his visit to India, B. P. Koirala burst into tears when he was describing Indo-Nepalese friendship as a "historical and cultural reality" and said that "any attempt to explain or interpret the intimate relationship between friends or brothers is rather unnatural". Nepalese sentiments seemed to have been actively expressed by one of its papers in the following words: "We are in the midst of two friendly countries and we are sure that India will not attack us and China also will not do so". On January 28, 1960, a joint communique talked of "the similarity of approach to international problems by the two Governments and their desire to cooperate with each other in regard to them". This was followed by the signing of a new commercial treaty between the two countries on September 11, 1960, separating Nepal's foreign exchange and permitting normal imports out of Nepal's own resources.

On returning to Kathmandu, Koirala told pressmen on January 31, 1960, that he apprehended no danger from China and that there was no border dispute between China and Nepal, except some minor differences which would "soon be resolved". On March 24, 1960, on his visit to Peking, B. P. Koirala announced in a joint communique that the "customary and traditional" frontier between Nepal and China had been accepted by both sides and that they had agreed to appoint a joint border commission to "conduct surveys", determine the "state of actual jurisdiction", and "scientifically delineate and formally demarcate" the border on ground. Koirala also brought back from China an announcement for an economic aid amounting to Rs. 100 million within the next three years "without any political conditions attached." Koirala, in fact, hoped, as he told pressmen in Calcutta on his return that the "success of the recent Sino-Nepalese negotiations would provide a useful background to the forthcoming talks between Nehru and Chou En-lai". At the end of April, 1960, Chou En-lai visited Nepal, paid tributes to Nepal's courage and wisdom in remaining neutral and told the Nepalese people that if they so insisted they could have all the 100 square miles of disputed territory. He also proposed a ten-year non-aggression pact, which Koirala politely declined as "unnecessary" on the plea that the 1956 Sino-Nepalese Agreement had included "mutual non-aggression". On April 28, 1960 a treaty of peace and friendship was signed with China, with stress upon development and further strengthening of economic and cultural ties between the two countries. Regarding the Himalayas which stood between the two countries, he said, "The Himalayas soaring between our two countries have not blocked the friendly contacts between our two peoples. On the contrary, the Himalayas have become a symbol of the profound friendship between our two peoples". A joint Sino-Nepalese Border Commission had been set

upin the meantime, and a survey of the border taken up for boundary demarcation. It presented some major difficulties including the one regarding claims to Mt. Everest. A boundary treaty was finally signed in Peking on October 5, 1961, by King Mahendra and Liu Shao Chi, Chairman of the Chinese People's Republic, which was, on the whole favourable to Nepal, the Chinese being keen to show, as in the case of their border settlement with Burma, to the world and to Nepal that they were guided by the friendliest of motives and that if their border dispute with India was still hanging fire it was due to the unreasonable attitude taken by her Government. In general, the boundary agreement affirmed the principles of custom, tradition, known geographical features and watersheds as the bases. A further agreement was signed between the two countries under which Nepal agreed to let China build a road linking Tibet and Kathmandu which, it was stated, would for the first time bring China within physical reach of the Capital of Nepal, open up new strategic possibilities, in an economic as well as military sense, and tilt the balance of power in Nepal in favour of China.

The royal *coup* which took place on December 15, 1960, involving the arrest of all political leaders, dissolution of the parliament and declaration of an emergency in which the entire constitution including the fundamental rights was suspended *sine die* and all political activity was banned, brought about a great deal of strain on Indo-Nepalese relations. While Chou En-lai had quietly accepted the change, and had perhaps even felt relieved at Koirala's fall, Nehru had expressed his "shock" at the "complete reversal of democracy, the democratic process" in Nepal. It was not for him, he said, to criticise the King's action, but it was "obviously a matter of regret for all of us that the democratic experiment or practice that was going on there should have suffered a set-back". Nehru publicly expressed the opinion that the happenings "in a country on our threshold, a country with which we have such intimate relations as Nepal, have been a matter of great concern to us." Following Nehru's remarks there started a virulent anti-Indian campaign in the Nepalese press. The Government of Nepal tried to repair the rift, which she had no intention to widen. Dr. Tulsi Giri, Nepal's new Foreign Minister, visited Delhi on January 19, 1961, with a personal message from King Mahendra to the Prime Minister Nehru. In April 1961, Nepal received from India a further aid of Rs. 13.20 million for village development, irrigation, small power plants and local development works. Nepal at the same time accepted an amount of Rs. 160 million from China for cement, paper and hydro-electric projects. In May 1961, as mentioned earlier, the relations between India and Nepal were further smoothed. A visit to Nepal by Jaya Prakash Narayan in June-July 1961, helped in clearing up suspicions in India with regard to Nepal's attitude to democracy. Democracy, Jay Prakash Narayan pointed out, was relegated into the background "not

due to desire for personal power but to his (King Mahendra's) conviction that parliamentary democracy had failed in Nepal". There was an appreciation in India of King Mahendra's declaration that "a democratic system imposed from above" had "proved unsuitable", and that Nepal had now to "build democracy gradually layer by layer from the bottom upwards", on the bases of panchayats. The appointment of Nar Pratap Thapa as Nepal's Ambassador in India in April 1961, helped in further improving the relations between India and Nepal. Late in August, King Mahendra came to India for talks with Nehru, which was followed by visits to Pakistan and China. India was not particularly happy with Nepal's continuation of closer relations with Pakistan and China. In the meantime, the activities carried on by dissident Nepalese leaders from India made it more difficult for the two countries to pull on together. Another visit by King Mahendra to India in April 1962, helped in clearing certain misunderstandings. The Chinese invasion of India in October 1962, seemed to bring about a marked improvement in the attitudes of both countries towards each other. While the Indians realised that a different pattern of government might be more suitable to another country, the Nepalese came to understand that danger of aggression from Communist China was not something of an illusion but could take the concrete shape of a grim reality.

INDIA'S SENTINELS ON THE NORTHERN FRONTIER

Bhutan is the second largest kingdom in the Himalayas. With a territory of 18,000 sq. miles and a population of nearly 850,000. Bhutan has considerable strategic importance. As in the case of Nepal, the population of Bhutan also is an admixture of Tibetan, Mongoloid and Indo-Aryan races, but the Bhutanese are closer than the Nepalese to the Tibetans in racial texture as well as cultural background. The people, particularly in the northern reaches, follow the lamaist religion. The Tibetan element of the Bhutanese seems to belong to the Khamp tribal area in East Tibet whereas the Indian tribes came from Assam. Till 1860, when the British, took the Bhutanese under their tutelage depriving them of a considerable part of their territory, Bhutan hardly had any central government. The Chinese also had not taken any interest till 1865 in the kingdom. But when the British took over Bhutan, under the Sinchula treaty, Chinese interest in her was suddenly revived, and in a letter addressed to 'the Chiefs of Bhutan' the Chinese Government claimed that "the Bhutanese are the subjects of the Emperor of China who is the Lord of Heavens". This was followed by a visit to Bhutan by a Chinese official. Sir Charles Bell, the British Political Officer for Sikkim, Tibet and Bhutan took the stand that Britain had the right to intervene in Bhutan only in the case of disputes, and that if Bhutan at any time in future agreed to Chinese intervention in her affairs, e.g., by receiving Chinese agency in Bhutan, the British could not do anything. But the British Government of India was not willing to take up the same liberal view. They increased the annual subsidy of the Maharaja of Bhutan and asked him to sign a new treaty with them on January 8, 1910, according to which the British Government undertook to exercise no interference in the internal administration of Bhutan and, on its part, the Bhutanese Government agreed "to be guided by the advice of the British Government in regard to its external relations." It was clear that the treaty was mainly aimed at the prevention of the Chinese colonisation in Bhutan. China had already, in 1909, made strenuous efforts to populate the inhospitable tracts round Bantang in Eastern Tibet with Chinese colonists, and she was now looking towards the Southeastern Tibet, which was

not far from Bhutan, with the same objective in view. Bhutan had an ideal climate for the Chinese from southern and central China.

When India gained independence in 1947, Bhutan, which had enjoyed a kind of isolated semi-sovereignty under the British, began to dream of complete independence. It is difficult to imagine what policy the Indian Government would have followed in case the Communist Party had not succeeded in capturing power in China in 1949. Following the major change in China's position, India had no alternative but to clamp down its domination over Bhutan by a new treaty signed with her in August 1949, confirming the treaties of 1865 and 1910. While some jurists kept on discussing constitutional problems as to whether Bhutan was, or was not, an Indian protectorate, or whether she could, or could not, establish diplomatic relations with any other country, India completely abstained from any interference in the domestic affairs of Bhutan. No Indian of note visited the country for another decade and the Political Officer in Sikkim looked after the affairs in Bhutan also. In the meanwhile there were some political simmerings in Bhutan, as a Bhutanese State Congress came into existence in 1953 and engaged itself in the futile task of submitting lengthy memorials to Maharaja for "a speedier amelioration of the wretched conditions of the oppressed Bhutanese masses." It was in 1958 that Nehru, on the cancellation of his proposed visit to Tibet, undertook a visit to Bhutan, travelling for six days by train, automobile and horseback. In a public meeting in Paro on September 23, 1958, Nehru described India and Bhutan as both "members of the same Himalayan family", who should live as "friendly neighbours so as to safeguard the freedom of both the countries". He further assured the Bhutanese that "in the event of any aggression against Bhutan by any country, India would consider it as an act of aggression against herself and act accordingly". Nehru also seemed to have discussed with the Maharaja various problems of road construction and economic development, including that of a need for a mineral survey, a model agricultural farm, etc., which could be developed only with Indian technical assistance. The Maharaja was reluctant, but the Indian Government went ahead with its policy of help in modernising Bhutan, and gradually, as the danger from Communist China grew in dimension, the Maharaja too changed his attitude.

In September 1961, India and Bhutan signed a pact to harness the river Jaldhaka for hydro-electric power generating 18,000 kilowatts of power, out of which Bhutan was to receive a free supply of 250 kw. The agreement was, in every way, favourable to Bhutan, particularly to its southwestern parts which were lacking in coal and oil supplies.¹ A little earlier, in July 1961, Bhutan had announced a five-year development plan, involving an investment of 172 million rupees, completely financed by India. Under this plan

a major emphasis was placed on road and transport development, India being eager to bring the Bhutanese closer to her through greater trade and speedier means of communications. A large number of administrative officers and technical experts and advisers, engineers, doctors, and teachers, have been sent to Bhutan in recent years to help Bhutan in her process of modernisation. Till 1959, there was hardly any road in Bhutan. Subsequently, construction was started on three roads running from north to south from central Bhutan to the Indian border and on an east-west road connecting the north-south highways across the central Bhutan. The Government hopes to complete an ambitious plan of building some 800 miles of new roads by 1966. Some of these roads would be running through mountain passes more than 11,000 feet high. The work is being shared between the Bhutanese Engineering Service and India's Border Road Development Board. Bhutan, which had been sleeping for centuries, now seems to be getting out of its deep slumber.

All this has come not without deep spiritual anguish. Bhutan is sensitive to any encroachment upon what she regards as her sovereign power. Following Pandit Nehru's visit to Paro, Jigme Dorje, the then acting Prime Minister of Bhutan, came to India and said in some of his speeches that "he would not like his country to involve itself in the Sino-Indian border dispute" and that because "Bhutan did not want to get involved in the dispute he would not support the Indian stand that the McMahon Line was the valid boundary between India and Tibet". As the Maharaja of Bhutan revealed in February 1961 in Calcutta, Bhutan had received from China offers of aid for her development projects, recognition of sovereignty and diplomatic recognition abroad. But the Maharaja had turned them down. In fact, the Tibetan revolt of 1959 seemed to have brought about a basic change in Bhutan's outlook towards China. By 1959 all trade with Tibet had been stopped and in 1960 the Bhutanese trade representative in Lhasa recalled. By 1962 the Bhutanese farmers were already transporting their surplus rice to West Bengal. During his visit to India in February 1961, the Maharaja of Bhutan not only accepted a planning commission for Bhutan to organise and develop more roads, schools, small industries, etc., but also agreed to India taking over the responsibility of Bhutan's defence, a prerogative till then zealously guarded. He also authorised the Indian Prime Minister to "initiate or take up any question with China regarding our (Bhutanese) northern border". On February 15, 1961, Nehru repeated in the Parliament that India had taken full responsibility for the defence of Bhutan and the aggression on Bhutan would be considered aggression on India². An expert team of the Planning Commission was sent to Bhutan in June 1961 to examine the prospects of certain hydro-electric projects, exploration of copper, manufacture of paper-pulp, establishment of secondary schools and hospitals, etc. A coordinated five-year

programme for economic development, involving an outlay of Rs. 17.5 crores, was announced on July 30, 1961, out of which Rs. 12 crores were to be spent on road building.

China has persistently refused to acknowledge the nature of India's relations with Bhutan. The Chinese maps include about 200 square miles of territory belonging to Bhutan. In reply to Nehru's letters referring to the Bhutan-Tibetan boundary, Chou En-lai said that this did not fall within the scope of the "present discussion". A protest, lodged by the Government of India on September 26, 1959, to the effect that "under treaty relationships with Bhutan, the Government of India are the only competent authority to take up with other governments matters concerning Bhutan's external relations", remained unreplied. On December, 29 1959, China declared that she had no quarrel with Bhutan, adding that "all allegations that China wants to encroach on Bhutan and Sikkim...are sheer nonsense". All the same, Chinese troops had been concentrating on the Bhutanese borders and on many occasions came very close to Bhutan's territory. The Chinese also have been making a very systematic attempt to win over the Bhutanese. They keep on pointing out to them that they are of Tibetan origin, that they speak a language allied to the Tibetan, that they have the same religion, that their trade has always been with Tibet and that all the roads from Bhutan lead in the direction of Tibet. The Bhutanese are allowed free entry into Tibet, as well as free use of medical and educational institutions there, and are paid well for their goods by the Chinese.

In spite of the fact that the Bhutanese have had historical, economic and racial links with the Tibetans, and the Chinese have been engaged in a powerful propaganda campaign on the very frontiers of Bhutan, the Bhutanese seem to be completely aligned with India. In his talks with Indian officials in February 1961, the Maharaja of Bhutan made it clear that his country would have no direct dealings with China, and this was despite Peking's refusal to accept India's privileges in the sphere of Bhutan's foreign relations. There is a complete agreement between the Maharaja of Bhutan and the Defence Ministry with regard to the strengthening of the defences of Bhutan. The strength of the Indian defence force standing ready to rush at immediate notice to the help of Bhutan has been very much increased. There are not many air strips in Bhutan but there are facilities for the landing of helicopters. The Government of Bhutan is also engaged in a large-scale recruitment of militia from the native population for border patrolling. It was with Indian sponsorship that Bhutan became a full participant in the Colombo Plan. Her first postal stamps were issued in 1962. The strategic importance of Bhutan is realised by both India and Bhutan. If Bhutan falls before Chinese aggression, Sikkim becomes strategically useless and China immediately gets into a position in which it becomes easier for her to strike against lower Assam oil fields and

the plains of West Bengal.

Tucked in between Nepal and Bhutan, there is the small state of Sikkim, with an area of 2,800 square miles and a population of 167,000. Situated very close to the inverted triangle of the Chumbi valley described by Sir Charles Bell as 'a dagger aimed at the heart of India', now occupied and garrisoned by the Chinese People's Liberation Army, it has a great strategic importance. The original people of the state, called Lepchas, are sometimes described as having migrated from southern Tibet, but the ethnic and cultural links between Sikkim and Tibet, are not as close as those of Bhutan and Tibet. The ruler is of Tibetan descent. Their religion is the Lamaist form of Buddhism. Separated from Nepal in 1816, it was made a British protectorate in 1861. Between March and September 1888, following an invasion by the Tibetans, the Sikkim Expeditionary Force expelled the last of the Tibetans across the Jelep La in north Sikkim. The British troops, which had advanced 12 miles across the frontier into the Chumbi valley, later withdrew. The British then deposed the reigning Maharaja, Thatob Namgyal for his pro-Tibetan, pro-Chinese activities and replaced him by his younger son born to his second wife. The British occupation of Sikkim was confirmed in March 1890 by a treaty signed between Great Britain and China, which recognised a British protectorate over Sikkim, delimited the Tibet—Sikkim frontier and provided for various measures for promoting Indo-Tibetan trade. As compared to Bhutan, Sikkim was exposed to greater modernisation by British officers like J. Clyde White and Sir Charles Bell, and there was also more of road building.

But for the Chinese moves in Tibet and her persistent refusal to accept India's protectorate over Sikkim, India might not have adopted her present policy with regard to her. But even before this, important political developments were taking place in the state. The Sikkim State Congress was organised in 1947 and started agitation for an interim government as "a precursor of the democratic form of the government to come", and immediate accession to India on the model of other princely states. In opposition to the Sikkim State Congress, there came into existence the Sikkim National Party, sponsored by the Maharaja, to fight the democratic agitation, pleading for revision in Sikkim's political relations with the Indian Union "on the basis of equality". Following an agitation by the Sikkim State Congress, and through the intercession of the Indian Political Officer, an interim government with Congress participation was installed in May 1949. The attitude of the Government of India was reflected to some extent in the statement made by Dr. Keskar during his visit to Gangtok in the same month. The Government of India, he pointed out, could not countenance any disorder or turmoil to disturb the security of the Indian frontier and that, in the event of such a contingency arising in Sikkim, the Government of India would be obliged to exercise

their authority. Within 28 days, the popular ministry was dismissed and a Dewan was appointed. On December 5, 1950 an India-Sikkim peace treaty was signed in Gangtok which clarified Sikkim's political relations with free India, confirming that Sikkim was a "protectorate of India", "enjoying autonomy in regard to its internal affairs". The treaty restated that the Government of India shall be responsible for her "defence and territorial integrity" towards which end it "shall have the right to take such measures as it considers necessary" including stationing of troops, construction and maintenance of strategic roads and communications etc., and that India shall exercise absolute control over her external relations. The Government of India granted an annual subsidy of Rs. 300,000 to assist Sikkim in the "development and good administration." This was followed by political reforms and a great measure of freedom, levelling-up in citizenship status, removal of evils of the landlordism and considerable economic development.

The strategic location of Sikkim as well as the historical background of the British relations with Sikkim, seemed to have compelled the Government of India to follow a different policy with regard to her. While India had advocated the democratisation of Nepal she believed more in the economic development of Sikkim than its political advancement. In March 1953 a constitution was introduced when an elected State Council as a deliberative body and a separate elected Executive Council led by the Dewan as Chief Executive were installed. But the method of election was rather retrograde and the constitutional bodies could hardly be regarded as representative of the people. Demands for a "full-fledged responsible government with immediate effect," a "coalition interim government", as a precursor to it and the "framing of democratic constitution," raised by all the political parties in the state including the National Party, which was a hand-maid of the Maharaja, were ignored. Again in August 1950, a delegation of Sikkim National Congress demanded a (1) completely representative government with an executive entirely responsible to "an assembly elected by adult franchise on a party basis", (2) constitutional monarchy, (3) rule of law, (4) independent judiciary, and (5) a High Court. While these could not be considered, Sikkim went ahead with her economic development plans. On March 22, 1960, a Joint (Indo-) Sikkim Mining Corporation was constituted in order to locate and exploit mineral deposits in Sikkim. In January 1961, the Maharaja came to India and asked for experts in planning and defence build-up. Subsequently, a team consisting of experts in different fields of development was appointed by the Planning Commission. The regulations regarding citizenship qualifications were modified.

In view of what the Government of India has done with regard to Sikkim in the field of economic development there can be little doubt that, with better political stability on the frontier,

India will be only too glad to support the movement for democracy in Sikkim. Neither the Maharaja nor the Indian Government opposes self-government for the country. Moreover, all through the crisis created by the Sino-Indian border dispute, Sikkim has consistently been on the side of India. In view of the vulnerability of the state to the Chinese aggression, India has placed her armies in Sikkim, and has allowed Sikkimese to have a share in the defence of the border by raising a separate militia of their own. The Sikkimese also maintain some of the border roads. When China launched her massive attack on India's northern frontiers in October 1962, a state of emergency was declared in Sikkim on November 13, and on December 19, an all-party Sikkim People's Consultative Committee was nominated with the Prince as President. Civil defence plans were already being made with the constitution of three 5-member committees to look after air-raid precautions and other defence measures. On January 21, 1963, she imposed a strict check on the entry of Tibetans into the country and on February 2 she started screening of Tibetans who had already entered into the state. New roads also were being constructed, including one from Gangtok to La Chan. This solidarity between the Sikkimese and the Indian people during the period of a severe crisis, together with the Chinese intimidation of Sikkim by concentrating on her borders some fifty thousands to a lakh army personnel, coupled with China's deliberate attempts to ignore India's special interests in this Himalayan Kingdom despite Treaty obligations, has brought about such a relationship between India and Sikkim in which neither of them can afford to ignore the other.

"No nations bordering upon the British dominions in India," wrote J. McCash in 1887 in his *Topography of Assam*, "are less generally known than those inhabiting the extreme northeast frontier of Bengal and yet in a commercial, statistical or a political point of view, no country is more important. There our territory of Assam is situated in almost immediate contact with the empires of China and Ava (Burma), being separated from each by a narrow belt of mountainous country, possessed by barbarian tribes of independent savages, and capable of being crossed over in the present state of communications in ten or twelve days..." In this strategic area, dwell a variety of smaller tribes, but the more important among them are the Nagas, Abors, Mishmis and Daphlas. Of these the Nagas have emerged as the most important. Probably of Mongoloid-Tibetan stock, who emigrated from the north-western borders of China six or seven centuries back, to which the tribal emigrations from Bengal and Assam had contributed a major strand, the Nagas consisted of various tribes speaking different dialects, fighting against each other and carrying inroads into the plains of Assam. While the British Government did not interfere with the internal affairs of the Nagas, they allowed Christian missionaries to go and spread the gospel there, with the result that

in course of time a large number of them were converted into Christianity. The contact with missionaries also created in them an awareness of political rights and a flair for autonomy. In 1880, a 'Naga Hills District' had been formed, consisting of 'subject Nagas' which left some 16 other tribes known as 'free Nagas', out of British control. As long as the Chinese were far and away, the British policy was that of interfering as little as possible with the life of the tribesmen. But with the Chinese pressure growing, they had to change their attitude and adopt a more vigorous policy aiming at the consolidation of their frontiers.

The Naga problem rose out of this complex situation. Not completely linked up with Indian culture and outlook, the Nagas began to think in terms of independence for themselves. In 1927, the representatives of the Nagas submitted a memorandum to the Simon Commission saying that they would not agree to the consideration by it any such reforms which involved their being transferred under a government based in India, and that they would prefer complete independence. Under the Act of 1935, the Naga Hills were 'left outside the purview of the new constitution', and declared an 'excluded area'. In 1946, the Naga National Council, which had started as a body concerned with furthering the cultural and social advancement of the Nagas placed before the Cabinet Mission the demand for independence. In 1947, they demanded an interim government for a period of 10 years, after which they were to become independent. On August 14, 1947 A.Z. Phizo declared his own village of Khonoman independent from India and revived his agitation for an independent Nagaland. In his capacity as President of the Naga National Council, he began to send memorandum after memorandum to the President, Prime Minister and the Governor of Assam, claiming independence for the Nagas. In January 1951, he called for a plebiscite among the people of the region on the issue of an independent Nagaland, and approached the United Nations as well as a member of a certain foreign diplomatic mission for help.

The policy of the Government of India towards the tribals was clear from the very beginning. It was one of bringing them under "more direct administrative control to enable them to share the benefits of a welfare state, subject to the protection of their distinct social and cultural pattern". On December 29, 1951, Nehru on a visit to Assam told the Naga National Council that in the present context of affairs in India and the world it was impossible to consider even for a moment the demand for independence. The Government of India, at the same time, adopted various welfare measures in the area including spread of education, eradication of disease, development of tribal culture along traditional patterns and achievement of self-sufficiency in food. The Naga Hills were constituted into a separate district, named as the Tuensang Frontier District in 1953. The Nagas failed to appreciate what India was

doing for them and gradually a mass movement grew among them involving considerable lawlessness. Assaults on Government servants and threatening of those Nagas who dared to keep themselves away from the boycott, and non-cooperation programme launched by the Naga National Council, became frequent features. In 1952, there was a riot in Kohima. In 1955, widespread riots broke out in the Naga Hills-Tuensang area. The Government of India could not tolerate such conditions on her frontiers. In July 1955, it was declared a 'disturbed area'. In March 1956, the Government of India had to decide to use the Indian army at full strength against the Nagas. The Government at the same time made it very clear that "the army has not to fight a foreign enemy" but to restore order among their own kith and kin whatever might be the attitude of the hostiles". The Army action brought about a certain demoralization among the Naga hostiles. General Kaito withdrew himself from Phizo's leadership. T. N. Sakhrie, another Naga leader was killed. Phizo himself went underground. In September 1956, a Naga delegation met Pandit Nehru and a general amnesty was granted to all the rebels who laid down their arms by October 26. On November 5, a Naga Hills Tuensang Area (NHTA) was constituted as separate from NEFA to accord a homeland to the Nagas. In August 1957, the Naga convention, attended by 1765 delegates from different parts of the Naga Hills districts and the Tuensang Frontier Division was held. A second convention was held in 1958. Both these conventions repudiated the demand for independence and sought a settlement of the Naga problem "within the Indian Union." The third Naga convention held in October 1959, also repudiated the demand for independence, and asked for the creation of a full-fledged state called Nagaland consisting of contiguous Naga areas in Assam Manipur, NEFA and NHTA, with a state assembly and a regular ministry. The demand was, however, put in such a fantastic form that the Government was not able to accept it. In the meantime, insurrectionary activities continued.

The Government of India did not give up its efforts to bring about a settlement of the Naga problem suited both to the welfare of the tribals and the security of the country. On July 30, 1960, an agreement was reached whereby the existing Naga Hills-Tuensang area was to become a separate state of Nagaland, with a legislative assembly and a responsible cabinet, after a transitional period of three years, during which an Interim Body and an Executive Council were to act in an advisory capacity. The Governor of Assam, who was also to be the Governor of the Nagaland was entrusted with the responsibility for law and order as well as finance, until such time as the situation remained disturbed. On February 1, 1961, a 48-member Interim Body with Dr. Ao as Chairman and a 5-member Executive Council with Dr. Shilu Ao as Head were formally inaugurated in Nagaland. Phizo who in the meantime had escaped to London was carrying on a propaganda from Reverend Micheal

Scott's house. The situation had now clearly improved. Between 1956 and 1960, as Nehru reported to the Lok Sabha, Rs. 2,628 crores had been spent in the NHTA on welfare activities. By December 1959 the number of rebels had been brought down from 5,000 in 1956 to 2000, dropping down in 1960 to 1500 only, Phizo offered on January 21, 1962, to negotiate with the Indian Government without any preconditions, and expressed his readiness even to discuss the establishment of Indian military bases in Naga territory if these were necessary to India, and participation in development of Naga resources. This was to some extent an indication of a sense of frustration and the realization of the futility of war, the Naga hostiles had been waging against India for a long time. The Indian Government, true to its policy of settling problems amicably so far as possible, continued its attempts to persuade the hostile Nagas to give up their unreasonable demand for 'independence' and at the same time went ahead with the creation of Nagaland as an integral and constitutional part of India. In August 1962 five bills were introduced and passed in the Indian Parliament finally making Nagaland the sixteenth state of the Indian Union, with the provisions of finance and law and order under the control of the Union Government. The tribal area is not yet all quiet. While Phizo despite his feelers for negotiations continues to campaign for complete Naga independence and threatens to approach the Chinese or the Burmese for help for the Naga cause, the people of Nagaland are not quite satisfied, it appears, with the limitations imposed on their autonomy. But in all this din and noise Nagaland seems to be gradually settling down to normalcy. If the people are restive with what they regard as curbs on their rights, they do not have any willingness to go to China or Burma for support either.

INDIA IN SOUTH ASIA : RELATIONS WITH CEYLON AND BURMA

As a result of the Chinese invasion it became very necessary for India to do a good deal of re-thinking on, and re-fashioning of her foreign policy with regard to her next-door neighbours. As we have seen earlier, Kashmir became a kind of insuperable barrier between India and Pakistan, and instead of being able to depend on Pakistan, without which a real defence of the sub-continent against China was not possible, India had to treat her as a source of potential danger. India's relations with Ceylon and Burma have been on the whole friendly but she has not tried to place them against a wider background of South Asia as a whole. She did not seem to have realized till the Chinese invasion began that the withdrawal of the British power and hegemony, first from the Indian sub-continent and later on from the Indian Ocean had left the entire region of South Asia and its surrounding seas almost defenceless. When the British left the Indian sub-continent in 1947, and Burma and Ceylon subsequently, transferring sovereign rights to them, the situation was different. Japan, which had run over a major part of South Asia, including Burma, during the Second World War had renounced war as an instrument of policy and was concentrating on economic reconstruction. The Soviet Union was not regarded as a danger to any of these territories and China was still in the throes of a civil war. There was, thus, no danger of the vacuum left by the British being filled up by any hostile power. India, Pakistan, and Burma, therefore, could be justified in not thinking in terms of any danger to their security. Ceylon was in a slightly different position. Situated at a point of focal importance for sea-borne trade routes and strategic naval calculations, Ceylon had also to depend on the highways of the ocean for her import and export trade. She was linked up by air routes with the Philippines, Indonesia, Australia, and Europe. As long as the British ruled over India and controlled important gateways into the Indian Ocean, they could treat it almost as a British lake. When the British withdrew, Ceylon of all countries in South Asia allowed herself to be linked up, not only in trade relations but also in matters of defence, with Great Britain. Most of her trade was carried through Britain.

Britain acted as her banker and arranged for all the economic transactions that Ceylon carried out with all the other countries of the world. The British were allowed to retain their important naval installations in Trincomalee and their air bases at Katunayake in the western province. The British also were permitted to maintain a military command in Colombo, though its size was rapidly reduced after 1949 and restricted to the areas of the bases. Since both India and Pakistan were members of the Commonwealth and friendly to Great Britain, they did not think that there was anything wrong in Ceylon maintaining her ties with the British.

This close contact with the British undoubtedly proved to be of great advantage to Ceylon. With her limited resources she was not in a position to defend herself. As Senanayake, the first Prime Minister of Ceylon, bluntly put it "...we cannot defend ourselves...let us confess that our defence depends upon some one or other undertaking to help us defend ourselves."¹ In 1947, with India and Pakistan involved in quarrels arising out of partition, Burma torn by insurrection, Indonesia fighting for its very independence, there was "only one country, according to the Ceylonese Prime Minister, with sufficient interest to defend us at their expense ...Great Britain." It was good that she was dealing with a Britain which was "no longer the Britain of the imperialist period ...(but) the ally of the forces of democracy...The Britain of the Labour Party...the Britain of Harold Laski."² "Indeed" as Wiggins points out, "Britain's very decline in power was a virtue for, no longer possessing overwhelming power in the Indian Ocean, British officials would not be tempted to misuse the opportunity if they were called upon to help restore order."³ It was also an extremely inexpensive arrangement. Ceylon's defence budget never went beyond 1% of her total budget until 1951-1952 and did not exceed 6% in 1956, compared to 20% in India, 35 to 40% in Pakistan, 30 to 35% in Burma and 25 to 30% in Indonesia. While closely linked with Great Britain, Ceylon could have a look of distance and unconcern over the problems of the world. Ceylon had hardly any direct contacts with the United States, nor did she have any fear of the Soviet Union. Her alliance with Britain was, therefore, not the result of any choice on any ideological grounds but a mere continuation of her constitutional links with that country. As Britain was being forced to withdraw further from its responsibilities in South Asia, those links were bound to be weakened. In fact, the forces which had made England withdraw from South Asia continued to operate after 1947 also, and Britain had no alternative but to withdraw more and more from her responsibilities in this region. In the meantime, Ceylon was also coming of age. As Ceylon developed its own army, navy, and air force, the British forces could be gradually withdrawn. Already by 1951, the United Kingdom had no army personnel on the island. On the other hand, the fact could not be ignored that Ceylon was an Asian country with

Asian neighbours and that closer association with them was culturally and religiously not only congenial to her but of great advantage. While for some time she could try to strike a balance between her traditional association with Britain and her growing consciousness of being an Asian country, it was inevitable that she would be forced to change the emphasis in course of time.

The change of emphasis in the direction of neutralism or non-alignment came in the person of S. W. R. D. Bandarnaike. Bandarnaike, with his faith in "socialism", was opposed to Communists, who in his eyes attempted to "hypnotize people" into believing that "the only conceivable alternative to reaction, imperialism and capitalism lies alone in the Communist view point." He was against capitalism also and compared the two antagonistic ideological camps to Frankenstein monsters, each created out of the intransigence, the presumptions and the fears of the other. Only by holding aloof from both camps and pursuing a policy of neutrality, argued Bandarnaike, could Ceylon be saved from disastrous clashes between the two irreconcilable monsters. Until 1954 there was no serious challenge to the policy of alignment with the British. It was the SEATO initiative by the United States in 1954 which for the first time aroused suspicions and anxieties in the minds of the Ceylonese with regard to possible attempts by Western Powers to re-establish their military power in Asia. The opposition to the British bases in Ceylon and to the organization of SEATO was first voiced by the trade unions and was gradually taken up by cultural and religious associations in the country. Bandarnaike and his M.E.P., however, fought the elections of 1956 on the basis of their declared faith that the interest of Ceylon could be best achieved by "steering clear of involvement with power blocs and by the establishment of friendly relations with all countries", implying further that "no bases can be permitted in our country to any foreign power, and all foreign troops must be immediately withdrawn from our country."

On coming to power Bandarnaike opened negotiations with the British Government for turning over the bases to the Ceylonese Government. Strangely enough, this coincided with the British policy of withdrawal which had become more or less inevitable after the Suez fiasco of 1956. In November 1957, the Union Jack was brought down and the national flag of Ceylon, bearing the Sinhalese lion, flew at the military bases, making Ceylon's independence, in the words of the Prime Minister, "at last completed." It was a great day in the history of Ceylon's rise to nationhood, but nobody seemed to have realized that Ceylon now stood without immediate military associates and had to depend upon its own slender defence resources alone. With the Indian Ocean cleared of military installations held by countries not belonging to the area, the responsibilities of India for the naval defence of Ceylon, which would involve her own naval defence, increased a hundred-fold.

India now had a very real interest in insuring that no hostile power should establish itself in Ceylon. If the air strips of Ceylon and the naval control of Trincomalee ever passed into foreign hands India would be exposed to air and sea bombardment and assault along her extensive coast. For all defence purposes, as Panikkar pointed out, Ceylon was "an integral part of India."

India and Ceylon have very old and historical links. India has contributed a great deal to the building up of the culture of Ceylon. The relations between some of the South Indian kingdoms and Ceylon had been very intimate. The British intervention had halted the process that seemed destined to merge Ceylon in one of the South Indian kingdoms. At the height of Indian nationalist movement, Indian nationalist leaders, including Nehru, had at some time expressed the view that "culturally, racially, and linguistically, Ceylon is as much a part of India as any province," and that political and economic developments "point inevitably to a closer union—presumably as an autonomous unit of the Indian Federation." These views had created some anxiety in the Ceylonese mind, and had since then been repudiated. The Government of Ceylon had every reason to feel satisfied with the policy followed by the Government of independent India with regard to her. She could have no fears of Indian expansionism, but being a small country, with a population of 10 million, living under the shadow of a giant country having a population of 460 million, she naturally had her small-power complex towards a powerful neighbour. This was further complicated by the problem of the Indian immigrants in Ceylon.

The Indian 'coolies' had started going to Ceylon in the 1820's and there were constant reports of their being maltreated, which had made it necessary for the Government of India to intervene on various occasions. In 1923, the British Government of India had gone to the extent of issuing a notification, under which immigration to Ceylon could be permitted only after the latter had given assurance to the former that the Indian immigrants there would enjoy the same political rights as other British citizens in Ceylon. For some time a struggle went on between the nationalistic-minded Ceylonese, organized in the Ceylon National Congress who wanted to refuse any grant of franchise on the basis of equality to Ceylon Indians, and the Ceylon Legislative Council, consisting mostly of nominated members, which wanted to treat them at par with the Ceylonese. But, following the economic depression of the thirties, a policy of open preferential treatment for the Ceylonese as against the Indian immigrants was adopted with increased intensity. In June 1939, 2,517 out of 6,624 Indian daily—paid workers were thrown out of Government departments. This was followed by the Government of India banning the emigration of unskilled labour to Ceylon. In 1940, the Indians in Ceylon organized the Ceylon Indian Congress. During the war years, when the flow of labour to Ceylon plantations was resumed, a number of conferences took

place between the two Governments to solve the problem. No solution, however, was arrived at. Ceylon insisted on "her right to determine the composition of her population by the imposition of such restrictions as she may determine necessary upon the entry of newcomers." This was a position which the Indian Government refused to accept. Following independence, negotiations were started in 1953 between Nehru and Senanayake during which it was proposed that some 400,000 Indian immigrants be registered as Ceylonese citizens, and an additional 250,000 might be granted permanent resident permits valid for ten years, and some 300,000 be accepted as Indian citizens and gradually repatriated. This was perhaps as far as the Ceylonese Government could go and, if India had accepted it, it would possibly have brought about a considerable improvement of relations between the two countries. But India took up its stand on high legalistic grounds. This was followed by the signing of the Delhi Agreement in 1954, under which India agreed to certain measures for preventing illicit emigrants from leaving the country. India, also, accepted Ceylon's right to deport illicit immigrants, and both Governments approved administrative measures to speed the registration of their citizens in order to complete the task within two years. This was a fairly reasonable settlement. But this also failed in stopping the growing numbers of stateless people and the feeling on both sides that the other was not acting in good faith. Technical difficulties appeared insurmountable, and this was further complicated by the lethargy of Government officers. The situation became so bad that at one stage the Indian High Commissioner was asked to leave Ceylon because of alleged indiscretions and interferences in the affairs of the Ceylonese Government. It was expected that the election of Bandarnaike and his M.E.P. to Government in April 1956, would be followed by better relations between the two countries. With Ceylon veering round to a foreign policy closer to her own, India, which had shown much concern at Pakistan breaking away from her, could be expected to take a more liberal attitude in the matter. But nothing was done to solve the problem. While the two countries came to follow a relatively similar policy towards world affairs, on the regional plane the problem of Indian immigrants in Ceylon continued to be a source of annoyance between the two countries.

India and Ceylon did not also take any tangible steps to establish closer economic relations. As mentioned earlier, Ceylon is geographically so situated that she has to depend on distant countries like Burma, Singapore, Australia, United Kingdom, and Brazil for her imports as well as exports, with the result that she is perpetually tied to distant economies. During the Second World War, when she could not procure rice from Rangoon (1,000 miles) Saigon (2,000 miles) or Bangkok (2,500 miles) she had to obtain it from Egypt (4,000 miles) and Brazil (12,000 miles). If India could develop a significant export surplus of industrial goods and satisfy

Ceylon's needs for basic machines, and vehicular, chemical and other high processed articles, she would be able to release Ceylon from her dependence on distant countries. Ceylon similarly has to go out far and wide in search of markets. For her manufactured goods she depends on Britain and West Germany (8,000 miles) on the one side and Japan (5,000 miles) and the U.S.A. (10,000 miles) on the other. She exports 35 to 45 per cent to Britain. Britain and Australia are her principal buyers of tea, and the United States, of rubber. But American purchases of rubber have fluctuated so widely from year to year that it has badly shaken up Ceylon's rubber plantation economy. On several occasions Britain has been her principal investor, and this has not left Ceylon's foreign policy completely unaffected. Any country that could offer both high and stable prices for Ceylon's commodities and, in addition, provide large quantities of essential imports could have an easy passage to economic relations with Ceylon. India could have taken advantage of the situation and strengthened her economic ties with Ceylon but she did not do anything in the matter and, while India slept, China came forward and established very close economic relations with her. It is also true that India could not have done much by way of establishing closer economic relations with Ceylon without disturbing her own plans of development. The economies of the two countries are competitive rather than supplementary. This applies also to other countries of South and Southeast Asia, like Burma, Malaya, and Thailand. But while these other countries generally produce a single commodity like tea or rubber or rice, India alone has a highly diversified production and could afford to orient her economic policies and develop closer economic ties with Ceylon.

What was, however, most important was that from the point of view of defence, Ceylon, following the British withdrawal, could have been drawn closely into the Indian orbit of defence. A defence pact of the South Asian countries—India, Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon—could have been conceived and even if the relations between India and Pakistan appeared to be incapable of resolution, India could have done something to join hands with Ceylon and Burma in evolving a defence plan. The only possibility of aggression in this area could be from Communist China and Indian foreign policy until the fall of 1962 was based on the strong conviction that China would not commit aggression. China's growing military and political pressure on Burma and increasing economic pressure on Ceylon was looked upon by India with indifference. There was a feeling both in Ceylon and Burma that India would not provoke the Chinese for fear of raising a conflict with her which might throw her economic development off keel. Moreover, India's defences were organized on the Pakistan frontier. It was widely believed to be Burma's feeling also that she could not have depended upon India for a common defence against Communist China and this had

made her agree to a border settlement with China. There were, thus, neither close economic ties nor any common defence arrangements evolved between India and Ceylon until the Chinese invasion.

India's relations with Burma have been fairly close. Burma's foreign policy of "neutralism" with reference to "power blocs" and anti-colonialism has been very similar to India's, though in Burma's case it has been more of neutrality than an active interest in, and contribution to the solution of world problems. "We are neutrals and we must stay neutral," said U Nu, "we do not desire alignment with a particular power bloc antagonistic to other opposing blocs." Of the three great powers,—the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R., and U.K., Burma has tried "to keep friendly relations with all the three." Burma has felt the need of allies but, like India, has refused to enter into defence pacts. She has been loyal to the United Nations. She would like to depend on the U.N., rather than on military alliances and power blocs, in case her independence is threatened by any country. She has not encouraged the establishment of a new third power bloc but has believed in enlarging the "area of peace." Besides anti-colonialism and abhorrence of racialism, Burma has believed in the promotion of what she calls Asian socialism. She has also taken a keen interest in Buddhism, not only at home but abroad. The way in which U Nu was able to steer clear of all conflicts at Bandung and was successful in establishing the most cordial relations with all delegates irrespective of their ideological attachments was remarkable.

Prime Minister Nehru was a loyal friend of Burma. Krishna Menon represented the attitude of India towards Burma when he said in the United Nations in April 1953, "Any violation of the honour of Burma or any wrong done to that country was as significant to it as a wrong done to India." He repeated in November that "what hurt Burma, hurt India."⁴ Because of the links of friendship, geography and history between the two countries, India has scrupulously avoided interference in Burma's internal affairs. As Nehru said in Rangoon in 1950, "It is not our purpose—and it is not right for us—to interfere in any way with other countries but, wherever possible, we give such help as we can to our friends. We have ventured to do so in regard to Burma too, without any element of interference."⁵ In July 1951, a treaty of friendship was signed between India and Burma which obliged the two states to "recognize and respect the independence and right of each other," a clause which was in addition to, and took precedence over the provision relating to "everlasting peace and unalterable friendship" in the case of similar treaties with Indonesia and Philippines.⁶ India actively contributed in influencing the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference (April 1949) which decided to help Burma with loans and arms at a moment when she

was involved in a serious internal trouble on account of the revolt of the Karens. Indian arms, in fact, had helped U Nu's Government to keep itself in power. Trade relations between the two countries have been regulated by agreements, though differences over the price of rice have often led to acrimony. Frequent visits have been exchanged between the two countries by the important leaders of India and Burma.

However, there have been serious differences between the two countries with regard to the regulation of Indian immigration to Burma. The Government of India has expressed concern over the treatment of Indians in Burma, and the claims of the Chettyars have often created serious rifts in the relations between Rangoon and New Delhi. Of the 1.25 million Indians living in Southeast Asian countries, some 800,000 live in Burma. While most of them are engaged in agricultural activities, often as labourers, there are many who have settled down in Burma as merchants and moneylenders. The attitude of the Government of India has been very clear in the matter. It has been opposed to dual citizenship. Nehru had always urged upon the Indians living in Burma to keep Indian citizenship and have the status of foreigners or seek the citizenship of Burma. Of course, in the former case the Government of India would like to secure for the Indian citizens the same treatment as that of the most favoured aliens and in the latter they would like them to be permitted to enjoy the full rights of citizenship. Burma, on the other hand, has laid down qualifications of citizenship which have often excluded many Indians living in Burma for long years. Anti-Indian violence has often occurred in Burma in the past. The boundary relations between the two countries have also been affected by the problem of the Nagas, who live on both sides of the frontier. The Nagas have often moved from one country to another and created trouble. At one stage there was some suspicion in India that Burma was in favour of a greater Nagaland under her control. The two countries, however, have tried scrupulously to avoid all points of conflict and their relations have been governed by sweet reasonableness.

Burma's attitude towards China also has been one of friendship and warmth. Burma was the first non-Communist state to recognize the People's Republic of China. Despite Liu Shao Chi's condemnation of U Nu as an imperialist stooge and deep differences over the delimitation of frontiers extending over 1,500 miles which continued for a number of years, Burma never allowed her relations with China to deteriorate. "There are no problems between Asian countries like China, India and Burma," asserted U Nu in Parliament on March 8, 1951, "which cannot be solved through normal diplomatic channels...Sino-Burmese border has been shown as undemarcated boundary and we see no difficulty in sitting down together and demarcating boundary. China has no territorial ambitions."⁷ Burma opposed the U.N. General Assembly resolution

of February 1, 1951, which called the People's Republic of China an aggressor in Korea. In 1954, Chou En-lai and U Nu signed a treaty based on *Panchsheel*, and exchanged visits. On the occasion of U Nu's visit to Peking, it was decided to improve trade and communications between the two countries. China agreed to purchase rice from Burma and to sell her industrial equipment and other items. Following this, an air service was started between Kunming and Rangoon. The exchange of trade and cultural missions became a frequent phenomenon in the subsequent years.

Relations between Burma and China became strained in July 1956, when *The Nation* of Rangoon published a series of articles on the armies of Communist China entering Burma at a number of places and occupying territory. They had moved to the west of the Iselin Line in the Wa state area and into the Kachin state to the south. These military incursions into Burmese territory went on for more than six months. It seems that the Burmese Government tried to suppress the facts from her people. This was followed by U Nu visiting Peking and entering into an agreement with regard to a border settlement "in principle" along the traditional frontier, except for three Kachin villages of Hphmaw, Gawlum, and Kanfang, which were to be transferred to China along with the Namwan Assigned Tract. The subsequent border agreement between the two countries was made almost on the same basis. Since they commanded a number of high mountain passes leading into China, the three villages of Hphmaw, Gawlum, and Kanfang were of strategic importance. The Namwan Assigned Tract in southern Kachin state, similarly, was of great strategic importance and it was on this account that it had been secured for Burma on perpetual lease under the Anglo-Chinese Agreement of 1897. The border treaty was signed in January 1960, and was regarded as an outstanding demonstration of the efficacy of Burma's neutralism. This was followed by further exchange visits of dignitaries. U Nu visited Peking in October 1960, and Chou En-lai arrived in Rangoon with a delegation of over 400. U Nu and Ne Win again went to Peking in October 1961. In January 1961, Burma had received from China a credit of about Rs. 425 million with interest repayable only after the first ten years, which considerably accelerated trade between the two countries. Trade missions and national delegations have been exchanged, and Communist China has acclaimed the military Government of Burma (which replaced U Nu) as equals in the "spirit of revolution."

While there is nothing in the Sino-Burmese border settlement that goes against the "five principles of peaceful co-existence," the relations which have developed between the two countries following the settlement have drawn Burma much closer to Communist China and made her "less neutral" toward the West. It is interesting to find that the border settlement was followed by a treaty of friendship and mutual non-aggression, which provided that each

“contracting party undertakes not to carry out acts of aggression against the other and not to take part in any military alliance directed against the other contracting party.” This is the first treaty of this kind which Burma has signed with any nation. This limits Burmese freedom from making any defence arrangements with non-Communist nations in Asia or elsewhere or asking for non-military assistance in future contingencies if the Chinese Communists wanted to object under the terms of this treaty. “In effect,” as Johnstone points out, “the treaty gives to the Peking regime a veto over Burma’s future foreign relations in respect to military defence... Since the Chinese Communists already have their mutual defence agreement with the U.S.S.R. this treaty does not tie their hands.”⁸ It has also been partly in fulfilment of Article IV of the non-aggression treaty that Burma and China have developed closer and more extensive economic and cultural ties. The Chinese loan has been followed by a considerable expansion of the Sino-Burmese trade and use of Chinese Communist technicians in Burma and there has also been an increased number of “goodwill military missions travelling back and forth.” Burma has provided a kind of open door to the world for China. There is nothing very objectionable in all this. But, as Johnstone points out, “When two countries expand their official and trade relations across a common border, there is always a net residue of greater understanding and accommodation towards each other. When one country is a big power and its neighbour is small and weak, however, the net result is to increase the influence of the larger over the smaller associate.”⁹ It is interesting to note that China’s continuous aggression against India since 1959 has not affected the cordiality and the warmth of relations between Burma and China. During this period, relations between Ceylon and Burma have also improved, just as relations between Ceylon and China have improved. India it appears has been thrown into a state of virtual isolation. One wonders if the large scale military offensive of China on India’s northern and north-eastern borders has revealed to India’s neighbours in South Asia the true nature of China’s Asian policy, and will succeed in drawing India, Ceylon, and Burma closer to each other.

Following the Chinese invasion the Government of India seemed to have become aware of the need for closer relations with Ceylon, Burma and other neighbouring countries. During 1959—1962, exports to Ceylon, Burma, Malaya, Singapore, Indonesia and Thailand had not recorded any increase but actually registered a decline from Rs. 993·8 million to Rs. 386·5 million. Imports also had declined sharply because of India’s anxiety to reduce unwanted imports and their inability to supply India rubber and other items in the desired quantities. The new agreements made with Ceylon and Burma in the wake of the Chinese invasion were indicative of a positive approach on the part of the Government of India. Ceylon being unable to increase imports on account of a difficult balance of

payments position, India agreed to give her liberal export credits which could enable her to purchase from India railway rolling stock, communication equipment and other capital goods with a deferred credit of 5 crore rupees, and arrangement which was expected to be helpful to Indian industry also. India also agreed to import from Ceylon larger quantities of copra and rubber. A new trade agreement with Burma provided for regular purchase of rice, metallic ores, timber and other items, and the exports of textiles, engineering goods, dried fish, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals. Special steps were to be taken to increase the volume of trade and residual payments were to be made in freely convertible currency. This was clearly a new trend in Indian outlook. As K. Rangaswami wrote in *The Hindu Weekly Review*, "The feeling is now growing in Delhi that India must take greater friendly interest in neighbouring countries. The withdrawal of British power from this region has created a vacuum...for all these years the Government of India felt that vacuum could be left to be filled by the countries in the region themselves. But the law of gravitation seems to be operating inexorably and the recent developments reveal the trend that China is steadily seeking to fill in this vacuum."

SOUTH ASIA AS A REGION : PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

The concept of South Asia as a region is of comparatively recent origin. Even the concept of Southern Asia came into existence only during the Second World War. All the countries from India to Indonesia were treated as parts of Southeast Asia, though there gradually emerged the tendency to separate India from Southeast Asia. A term which found some acceptance among the Western writers later was Southern Asia, which included both what we now regard as South Asia and Southeast Asia. More recently, South Asia is being regarded as a region in itself. There is, of course, no general agreement with regard to defining the area. Some would regard it as limited to India, Pakistan, Ceylon, and Nepal. Others would extend it to Afghanistan in the west and Burma in the east. Afghanistan and Burma, however, are included in all the accepted definitions of West Asia and Southeast Asia respectively, but they have plenty of common features with the countries of South Asia to warrant their inclusion in any study of this region. Pakistan is also sometimes regarded as a part of West Asia or Southeast Asia on the ground that West Pakistan along with Afghanistan shares a certain community of interests with the other West Asian countries, while East Pakistan, facing Burma across the Assam territory, is not far away from the countries of Southeast Asia. This argument is often invoked to explain Pakistan's membership of CENTO and SEATO.

The area possesses geographical contiguity, if we include Afghanistan and Burma, and geographical compactness if we leave them out. Both Afghanistan and Burma are separated from the other countries of the South Asian region by high mountain range; and deep valleys, though these two countries by themselves are similarly separated from the other countries of West Asia and Southeast Asia. Leaving Afghanistan, which never came under direct British rule, the entire region was brought under the unified control of British imperialism. This impact, which was shared by all the countries of South Asia, led to the development of common

political philosophy and common political, legal and administrative institutions, even common system of education and sources of literary inspiration. There are other spheres also in which it becomes difficult to distinguish these countries from one another. They have common religions, like Hinduism, Islam, Sikhism, Buddhism and Christianity, which are shared by different countries. India has a population consisting of 85% Hindus and 10% Muslims. Pakistan has 88% Muslims, 5% Hindus and a large trickling of Christians and Buddhists. Nepal and Sikkim are predominantly Hindu but have large Buddhist minorities, Sikkim having as many as 28% Buddhist. Burma and Ceylon predominantly Buddhist, have 80% and 70% Buddhist population respectively. Ethnically and linguistically too, there is a great deal of overlapping between these countries. The Aryans and the Dravidians have closely intermingled in India, the Aryan element being predominant in the north and the Dravidian in the south. In the Himalayan regions there is plenty of Tibetan-Mongoloid blood mixed up with the Aryan. West Pakistan, like North India, is predominantly Aryan, with a certain admixture of Turco-Iranian blood, while East Pakistan is predominantly Mongoloid. In Ceylon the majority is Sinhalese of Aryan origin, whereas there is a large minority of Tamilians of Dravidian origin. North India and Pakistan have inherited the same Indo—Aryan languages, with some admixture of Turco-Iranian (Baluchi, Pushtu) in West Pakistan. Both South India and Ceylon share Tamil, though in the case of Ceylon Sinhalese is the language of the majority. The Himalayan kingdoms share with Burma the Tibeto—Burmese languages.

The countries of South Asia, have a number of problems in common. They have common economic problems—created by rapidly growing populations bearing heavily on limited resources and vulnerability to fluctuation in commodity prices in the world market—and seem determined to develop their economies through planning and democracy adapted to their respective socio-economic and political set up. They are trying to develop their own cultures and to discover their spiritual and cultural roots. "Surely," as Howard Wriggins points out, "they can learn much from one another and some of these objectives might be pursued by concerted policies." What Williams Henderson wrote of a large area, the Southeast Asia, applies with greater force to South Asia, "Political power...is now largely in the hands of modernized elite groups that are themselves the product of the Western impact. There exists among them a unity of outlook which transcends in large measure their undoubted racial, linguistic and cultural diversity."¹ What is more important is that the withdrawal of British power from South Asia has made it necessary for India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma and Nepal to evolve measures of common defence. While the Western Powers may not be interested in

returning to the area, the threat of Communist China continues to loom large on the northern horizon.

South Asia presents all the requisite conditions for the formation of a regional organization. As early as 1918 His Highness Agha Khan had written of a Southern Asiatic federation, with India as the pivot, embracing "a vast agglomeration of states, principalities, and countries of Asia, extending from Aden to Mesopotamia and from the two shores of the Gulf to India proper, from India proper across Burma, and including the Malay peninsula, and thence from Ceylon to the states of Bokhara, and from Tibet to Singapore." While no one else thought in terms of a 'Southern Asiatic Federation', the idea of an Asian federation, or a federation of South and Southeast Asian states, was popular for a long time in the Indian National Congress circles. In 1922 M.A. Ansari, as president of the Khilafat Conference, called for the formation of an Asian federation, C. R. Das later developed the idea still further. In 1926, Srinivas Iyenger said that the time had come "seriously to think of a federation of the Asiatic peoples for their own common welfare." In 1928 the Indian National Congress adopted a motion for the creation of a Pan-Asian Federation in 1930 in which India should be "the leader of a renaissance Asia," While J. M. Gupta talked of India as "mistress of the Indian seas, leader of Asiatic *zollverein*, upholding the right of the coloured races throughout the world," Nehru thought of a general federation of Asian states as the best solution for Asia's problems. Nehru, however, had only a hazy impression of what this federation would be like, "My own picture of the future is a federation which includes China and India, Burma and Ceylon, and Afghanistan and possibly other countries." In August 1945, Nehru, in a speech in Kashmir, supported the idea of "a South Asia federation of India, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and Burma" and the Congress talked of India developing a common defence and common economic and cultural policies with China, Burma, Ceylon and the countries of the Middle East. In 1946 Nehru, speaking at Kuala Lumpur on the "compulsion of geography in India's future status", told a big crowd that India was "the pivot of the Indian Ocean, just as it was the pivot of the Asian struggle for freedom, no matter what schemes for defence or strategies anybody might work out." In December 1948, while addressing the Southeast Asian Regional Meeting of the I.C.A.O. Nehru was still talking of India being "the pivotal centre of South, Southeast and Western Asia." "I am not thinking," said Nehru, "in terms of India as the leader of Southeast Asia or dominating this region but rather co-operating with other countries in building up a common sphere of action."

The idea never took a very concrete form and as each one of the newly emergent Asian states settled down to a status of inde-

pendence and was confronted with vast internal problems it was made aware more and more of conflicts of interests with neighbouring countries, and the idea of a regional organization, never very pronounced, was relegated into the background. Describing the situation in 1952, Werner Levi wrote, "India's relations with Asian nations are determined by this situation and India has already had a faint taste of the dilemmas which can arise. But for the time being roughness in relations can still be smoothed out rather easily. The era of goodwill in which Asian solidarity originated has not yet expired. Inter-Asian relations are still affected by the solidarity of the past, partly because it has become a habit, partly because there is still a reason for its existence. Colonialism has not completely disappeared from the world. But as it is losing its hold in Asia, solidarity is weakening."³

The difficulties, even dangers, of attempting regional integration in South Asia are clear. The political *elites* in India (as in other South Asian countries) have stronger links with the West than with their close neighbours. The economies of most of the South Asian countries are competitive rather than supplementary. South Asian countries in spite of the impact of British political institutions vary from each other in their political systems ranging from parliamentary democracy through enlightened despotism to military dictatorships—as well as in foreign policies—ranging from stubborn non-alignment to full alignment. A closer contact between these countries, even on the level of an attempt at the better understanding of each other's political systems, may accentuate their difficulties and may even lead to great internal strains. The monarchical system in Nepal, which is doing so much to improve the conditions of the people and even preparing them for a democratic set-up, may show signs of crumbling under the impact of democratic ideas from the south. A more continuous contact between Pakistan and India may, by whetting the desire of East Pakistanis for a democratic system of government, accentuate differences between West Pakistan and East Pakistan. Burma, so intent on withdrawing more and more within herself, may find herself exposed to ideas she would not like to entertain (Burma, having been less exposed to westernization than India, remains more traditional). A freer inter-course between India and Ceylon might accelerate the Tamilian influx into the country. In India also (where faith in democracy is widespread but distrust in democracy also is fairly large), the examples of Pakistan and Burma may make the appeal of militarism stronger. The differences in the foreign policy of South Asian countries are also fairly acute. In fact, it seems that it is in the interest of domestic stability, and of flexibility and manoeuvrability in foreign policies, so essential for South Asian countries, that they should resist any temptation of drawing closer to their neighbours in South Asia.

Even if there is a general agreement on the need to bring about some kind of regional integration in South Asia, there would be the

problem of how to bring it about. There can be two ways of resolving it. One is, for a great power to bring about the integration of the region under her leadership. The Organisation of American States is a good example. The only countries in Asia which can attempt it are China and India. China would be happy to integrate the whole of Asia (if not also Africa and Latin America) under her leadership. But she might not be acceptable to other Asian nations. India, with less of military power and lacking in military posture, may not be so unacceptable. But any attempt on the part of India to initiate such a proposal is also likely to create suspicion and mistrust. India has always refused to take any initiative in the matter. A second way to bring about regional integration would be for smaller powers to attempt it in their common interest. It is interesting to note that the initiative for the Colombo Conference came from Ceylon and for Bandung from Indonesia. Yet, there are strong reasons which suggest that India must draw closer to some of her neighbouring countries.

All these difficulties may very well explain the fact that during the last decade and a half of independence, there has been very little effort in the direction of evolving any regional organization in South Asia. India, Pakistan and Burma were able to agree in principle on the virtues of non-alignment. But before Ceylon came over to develop the same outlook in foreign policy, Pakistan had chosen to follow a different course. While adhering to the policy of non-alignment, Burma has clearly moved closer to the Chinese sphere of influence, maybe because she did not expect that India would encourage any effort in the direction of regionalism. Their economies, competitive as they are, have fallen more and more apart.⁴ There has been very little of cultural exchange. In fact, while a sense of a shared destiny had proved a useful weapon in mobilizing resistance to European rulers, the growth of nationalism, which involved digging deeper into history, made them more aware of cultural differences. Pakistan tried, unsuccessfully, to reconstruct her position in the Islamic world at the same time as she was trying to destroy her links with the 'Hindu-dominated' India. Ceylon's resistance to Tamilian influx has not inclined her very much to the revival of her links with the Aryan roots. Burma's Buddhism and Socialism and pliability have allowed her to maintain links with India but they also have induced her to develop stronger links with Communist China. While Kashmir has bedevilled relations between India and Pakistan, tensions over the status and future of Indian immigrants has come in the way of Ceylon and Burma coming closer to India. It is interesting, though disappointing to see that in spite of the colonial link having been severed, the countries of South Asia, including India, continue to take greater interest in happenings in the U.K. or the U.S.A. than in their neighbouring countries. The American presidential election may be watched with greater interest by the people of Ceylon

than elections taking place at the same time in Burma. Indian political scientists may study interest-groups in the United States or factions within the Labour Party in the United Kingdom, but may not know how basic democracies are functioning in Pakistan or socialistic goals of U Nu being implemented by Ne Win. Most Ceylonese, as Wriggins points out, when they have funds and time for travel abroad, prefer to go to Great Britain, Western Europe, or the United States. More recently, they have been going also to the Soviet Union and China.⁵

Some attempts have been made in the past to bring the countries of Asia closer to each other. The first and one of the most significant of these attempts was the Asian Relations Conference convened at New Delhi in March-April 1947. Nehru placed the Asian Relations Conference on a high level of vision when he said in his inaugural address, "We live in a tremendous age of transition and already the next stage takes shape when Asia takes her rightful place with the other continents...the old imperialisms are fading away. The land routes have revived and air travel suddenly brings us very near to each other. This Conference, itself, is significant as an expression of that deeper urge of the mind and spirit of Asia which has persisted in spite of the isolationism which grew up during the years of Europe's domination. As the domination goes, the veils that surrounded us fall down and we look at each other again and meet as old friends long parted...There is a new vitality and powerful creative impulse in all the peoples of Asia." "Far too long have we of Asia," Nehru continued, "been petitioners in Western courts and chancellories. That story must now belong to the past. We propose to stand on our own feet and to co-operate with all others who are prepared to co-operate with us. We do not intend to be the playthings of others."⁶ The widespread participation at the Conference was indicative of deep interest. But it was clear that Asia did not speak with one voice. Those who could look behind the scenes could see that there were deep differences among the participants. Fifield, in his *The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia*, writes, "Neither India nor Nationalist China wanted to see the other emerge from the Conference as the leader of Asia. The Egyptians did not agree with the Palestine Jewish delegates. The representatives of Ho Chi-minh were aloof from those of Cochin China, Cambodia, and Laos. The Chinese at the Conference criticized the treatment of Chinese living in parts of Southeast Asia. The delegates from the Republic of Indonesia and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, of course were seeking the support of their fellow Asians but did not gain all that they wanted. Malaya's delegates, it should be noted, were largely radical labour leaders, anti British, and not representative of the country. The Filipinos spoke warmly of the United States, but the Thais took a generally passive role. None of the Southeast Asians wanted to be dominated by India or China."⁷ The next

session of the Asian Relations Conference, scheduled to be held in China in 1949, was never convened. The Asian Relations Organization, set up by the Conference, was quietly wound up in 1957. However, the very fact that twenty-eight countries of Asia, including Egypt had met in a conference was significant.

The next important step towards Asian cooperation was the Conference on Indonesia held in New Delhi in January 1948⁸. It was convened for a specific purpose: to consider the situation created by the Dutch police action in Indonesia. Nehru was clearly thinking in terms of achieving more than the freedom of Indonesia. "Asia, too long submissive and dependent and a plaything of other countries", he said, "will no longer brook any interference with her freedom."⁹ Nehru also specifically mentioned the various attempts at regional cooperation being made in the West, and suggested that something on the same lines be done in Asia too. "The Americans", he said, "have already recognized a certain community of interest and have created machinery for the protection and promotion of common interests. A similar movement is in progress in Europe. Is it not natural that the free countries of Asia should begin to think of some more permanent arrangement than this Conference for effective mutual consultation and concerted effort in the pursuit of common aims—not in a spirit of selfishness or hostility to any other nation or group of nations, but in order to strengthen and bring near fulfilment the aims and ideals of the charter of the United Nations?"¹⁰ Romulo of the Philippines, urged the establishment of "a continuing machinery—including a small permanent secretariat in New Delhi, or may be Manila, to serve as a clearing house of information essential to concerted action by our various governments..."¹¹ All that came out of the pleadings of Nehru and Romulo was a resolution asking the participating Governments to consult among themselves in order to explore ways and means of establishing suitable machinery...for promoting consultation and cooperation within the framework of the United Nations".¹² Nehru persisted with the idea for some more time, "One of the resolutions passed at that Conference", Nehru told the Parliament on March 8, 1949, "was that we should explore methods of close cooperation. We are pursuing that line of enquiry and perhaps in the course of a month or two or perhaps more, we may have some more definite results to consider..." One main difficulty, was that of fixing up limits of the region of cooperation. "India is interested in several regions of Asia, whether all this should be grouped together or separately we do not know"¹³. By the end of the year, Communist China had risen as a great power in Asia, and the difficulty of leaving it out of any Asian regional organization and the danger of including it brought about a change in the climate of public opinion in India with regard to the idea of developing institutions for regional cooperation in Asia.

The rise of Communist China led to attempts at regional integration in Asia on military lines, to which India could not be a party. The idea of a Pacific Pact, originally mooted by Chiang Kai-shek and Syngman Rhee and later sponsored by Romulo, was summarily rejected by India, to Romulo's great surprise. "I want India to realize", Romulo said in New York, on September 2, 1949, "that the proposed union is only a continuation of the Asian Conference and nothing more," and that India as "the strongest and most enlightened nation of Asia today" was bound to step into the position of leadership". India agreed to attend the Conference on condition that it confined itself to non-military affairs. The Bagino Conference, held under such conditions, could not do anything more than passing resolution recommending general cooperation in cultural matters. The next important gathering of Asian powers was the Colombo Conference of 1954 consisting of the representatives of India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, and Indonesia. It maintained a good deal of unity. It was anti-colonial. But it worked under the growing shadow of India-Pakistan differences (accentuated by the U. S. arms aid to Pakistan) and of attempts being made, with American and British participation, for the establishment of a military organization in Southeast Asia similar to the NATO in Europe. Nehru again gave a remarkable lead to the members of the Colombo Conference, and one of the important achievements of the Conference was the six-points formula suggested for the solution of the problem of Indo-China, which was subsequently adopted by the Geneva Conference consisting of the Western Powers as well as Communist China, and created the proper climate for the withdrawal of the French from the trouble-torn peninsula, and the creation of the new states of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in the area. At the Colombo Conference, Ceylon, under Sir John Kotelwala, and Pakistan took up an anti-Communist stand. Burma wanted to steer a middle course, and India and Indonesia stood up against any stand of that kind.¹⁴

The schism within Asia was magnified when the first really large scale conference of Asian and African countries was held at Bandung in Indonesia from April 18 to 24, 1955. ¹⁵ The Bandung Conference attracted the notice of the entire world but by this time even the Colombo Powers had become sharply divided in their foreign policy outlook. Bandung further widened the differences between the pro-Western group and the powers which stood for a policy of non-alignment. The Conference provided a respectable place to Communist China in the comity of nations, which she was not slow to exploit, but also made it clear that any resistance to Communist China would be divisive. The Bandung Conference seemed to have left such a bad taste in the mouth of some of those who had enthusiastically supported it that any talk of reviving it became an anathema to them.

A conference was subsequently held in Simla, India, to discuss whether American aid to Southeast Asia could be channelled through some co-ordinated machinery¹⁶ Among the items on the six—point agenda were : utilization of special allocation for development of intra-regional trade and the setting up of machinery to provide credit to enable Asian countries to tide over short-term balance of payment difficulties, and the setting up of a small permanent secretariat for the Colombo Plan Consultative Committee to provide a technical wing. The United States was clearly interested in greater regional cooperation in Asia, though she desisted from participating. The general view, however, was that in the existing situation of economic development of the Asian region and having regard to the order of additional funds likely to be available, there would be no advantage in having an intermediate regional organization. Even the idea of a permanent secretariat for the Colombo Plan was ruled out, and the delegates appeared to be most disinclined to the earmarking of funds for any project based on a regional approach.¹⁷ Most of the countries decided to continue with bilateral arrangements. What really came in the way of closer economic cooperation in South Asia was lack of necessary political prerequisites. “Deeper than economic justifications and rationalizations”, wrote A. M. Rosenthal, “ran the suspicions”.¹⁸

As a way out of the various difficulties hampering regional integration in South Asia, it has been suggested by some writers that India and Pakistan might form themselves as the units of possible integration. They are fully aware of the difficulties in the way but are also conscious of the advantages and potentialities. The difficulties seem to be overwhelming, but the advantages too are obvious. India and Pakistan have a close identity of interests—economic, political, strategic, cultural—but it is mainly on the *strategic* plane that a close coordination between the two is of absolute necessity. As President Ayub pointed out, Pakistan flanking India on the west and in the east, is the natural sentinel of India—almost all the invasions of the sub-continent in history having started with the region which now constitutes West Pakistan. Without friendship with India, which alone can ensure free communications between the two wings of Pakistan, Pakistan will not be able to consolidate herself fully. One may also take note of other facts of the situation which are likely to lead the two countries in the direction of greater cooperation. Pakistan started with efforts to integrate the Muslim countries of West Asia, but met with failure. Her recent pact with Iran and Turkey may do something to improve her trade with these countries, but can hardly add any strength to her voice in world affairs. Her membership of the Commonwealth, of the U. N., and of military pacts with the U.S.A. and the West have been equally frustrating. This experience might induce Pakistan to think of more feasible alternatives. India too seems to be realizing the great harm she did to herself by getting too much obsessed with Pakistan—hostility to Pakistan over Kashmir

being only next to non alignment as an important plank of her foreign policy.

For the moment, Pakistan is working for greater cooperation with China and closer relations with South Asian countries--Ceylon, Burma, Nepal and Afghanistan. While drawing closer to China, Pakistan is not prepared to give up the Western alliance and since India is more friendly towards the West after the Chinese invasion than ever before, the foreign policies of the two countries may not be so distant from each other as they seem to be. Pakistan is also making frantic efforts to establish better relations with the U.S.S.R., which again should bring her closer to India. Pakistan and India seem to be rivalling each other (India taking up this policy only in recent months) in winning the favours of South Asian countries. Yet, any direct effort to bring together India and Pakistan is bound to founder against the solid rock of mistrust that exists between the two countries today. It would be a step in the direction of the resolution of the tangle if we could define the region to which both India and Pakistan rightfully belong, the region of South Asia, and analyse the possibilities and limitations of the integration of countries in this region. If India and Pakistan can come together, the way towards a closer integration of South Asian countries becomes smooth. But perhaps one of the methods of bringing India and Pakistan together would be to resolve their differences against a wider background of South Asia as a region.

There is also another level, a smaller area in South Asia, in which there is some talk of regional integration, There is talk of a confederation of the the Himalayan kingdoms of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim into a kind of Himalasia. These Himalayan kingdoms have remained cut-off from the outside world, mainly on account of the British policy of non-interference in their internal affairs, but they are now being rapidly thrown into the vortex of modernization. These countries differ from each other in many respects, in area, population natural resources, economic development, and social structure. Yet, there is similarity of politico-geographic problems, and all are facing identical problems of development, involving the setting up of new political systems and administrative machinery. As Karan and Jenkins put it, "A major transformation is stirring in the remote highlands of these three kingdoms as their rulers attempt to change the middle-age feudalism of the Himalayan lands into the world of the twentieth century"¹⁹. The challenge of the Chinese aggression in the Himalayas has also deeply affected them. Some people have compared the Himalayan kingdoms to Switzerland, and they believe that, like Switzerland, the Himalayan kingdoms also should decide to remain uninvolved into the whirlpool of power-politics and above the surging waves of Communism and Democracy lashing against their northern and southern slopes. Undoubtedly, there are similarities between the Himalayan countries and Switzerland. Each is a mountainous area,

lacking in agricultural lands but rich in the potentialities of hydro-electric power. Each is composed of diverse linguistic groups having language and cultural ties with other nations along the borders. Yet, the reasons which led Switzerland to develop a policy of neutrality do not exist in the Himalayan region. In the modern world when they are being exposed to strong winds from the north and the south, when their mountain tops are breaking under the pressure of bull-dozers and being flattened into motorable roads, when appeals to different ideologies keep shaking them to their very roots, it is not easy for any one of them to remain isolated, or to confederate with each other to build up a small neutralized Asian Switzerland of their own. If the Sino-Indian relations get worsened, and the struggle for the Himalayas becomes more intense, they will have to make a choice. Maybe, their future lies with India. For, it is only by aligning themselves with the democratic India that they can maintain their traditional culture and also move into the broad horizons of individual liberty and socio-economic justice.

While it is not correct to say that it was the Chinese invasion of India in 1962 which brought into focus the significance of South Asia as a region, there is also no doubt about the fact that this set many people in India, Pakistan and the other countries of the region thinking in terms of some kind of regional cooperation. The region is located in a very strategic part of the world. Juxtaposed between West Asia and Southeast Asia it lies at the crossroads of the world. All the important arteries of communication, on the high seas or on the blue skies inevitably pass through this region in their movements from west to east or east to west or round the globe (the situation might change when travelling through the Arctic and the Antarctic becomes as easy as travelling through or over the Atlantic or the Pacific). The region is separated by a narrow strip of territory (the Wakhan) from the Soviet Union and lies athwart Chinese expansionism towards West Asia or Southeast Asia. One of the most densely populated regions of the world (600 million, including India's 460 million), it is the most strategic area bordering on the Indian Ocean. Most of the countries of the region believe in, and have followed systematically for years, a policy of non-alignment in the cold war and have striven for world peace. Ceylon, starting with alignment with the United Kingdom, came to adopt a policy of non-alignment by 1956, and Pakistan, which broke away from a policy of non-alignment in 1954, seems to be in a repentant mood today and is proclaiming a policy of neutrality between the two blocs and independence in world affairs. Unlike Communist China, they have, on the whole, maintained good relations with both the super powers and have tried to serve the cause of world peace. If they are integrated closely on the basis of economic cooperation and political understanding they can become a force both in checking China's expansionism and in world peace. If they fall apart, as they seem

to be doing in recent years, not only will they not be able to advance economically but will also fall a prey to Chinese expansionism.

In the case of countries geographically belonging to the same region, economically and culturally depending on each other and having the same political traditions, it should not be difficult to start contacts. On the academic level, certainly, an attempt can be made by the social scientists in South Asia to understand the patterns of economic, social and political developments in their neighbouring countries, and the press and radio can play an important role in the dissemination of this understanding. The political *elite* of South Asian countries, like that of all colonial countries, has looked far too long a time to the imperial power for inspiration. The time has now come when greater attention has got to be focussed on one's immediate neighbours. On the cultural level, countries like India and Pakistan, having the same forms of music and dancing, will gain a great deal by renewing the thousand-year old contacts. This can be extended to other countries too. Much could be done by India and Pakistan jointly by way of developing the two great water systems they share in common. The economies of India and Pakistan being complementary to each other, increased trade between them would be to mutual advantage; joint planning and a customs union will be still better. A greater economic cooperation between the countries of South Asia is bound to be to the advantage of all. Travel and communications between these countries have got to be speeded up, along with a general relaxation of visa restrictions, and better coordination achieved in the means of transport. Some kind of political consultative machinery can also be set up for discussing common problems. This, of course has got to be on the basis of national sovereignty, which could imply equality of representation in all intra-regional bodies. In a group of five or six sovereign countries the voice of the largest will be equal to that of the smallest—India will have the same role in decision making as Nepal. Some kind of understanding with regard to defence also has got to be developed. Accepting all the diversity in which the region is so full, there seems to be little difficulty for the countries of the region to develop some kind of integration on these lines.

South Asia as a region cannot be developed on the basis of *status quo*. There are outstanding questions like Kashmir between India and Pakistan, though Kashmir is not the only question—there are problems of forcible deportation (as Pakistan alleges) of Pakistani infiltrators (as India looks at them), of evacuee property, even a few border disputes. The demand for Pakhtunistan continues to be devil the relations of Pakistan and Afghanistan. The question of Indian immigrants in Ceylon and Burma has been allowed to hang fire for too long a time, and has brought about immense harm to international understanding in the region. There are innumerable other problems also. But it may be easier to solve them all against the wider

background of the region than taking them up individually on the basis of any bilateral negotiations. A large country like India may have to make some sacrifices in the process of settling these problems but is definitely bound to emerge stronger in world affairs.

The great necessity of resolving differences in South Asia cannot be over-emphasised if the region is to stand on its legs and not become a cock-pit of differences among greater powers, if economic development of the various under-developed countries is to be speeded up, and if China's expansionism is to be checked. A trend towards regionalism, in fact, is one of the outstanding phenomena of the post-war world. There is greater cooperation today in Western Europe than there ever was. Eastern Europe, the American hemisphere, the African continent, the Arab world, the Southeast Asian countries have all evolved, or are trying to evolve, some kind of regionalism. In some cases it is stronger, in others feeble. While it may be true that during the last fifty years or so the trend in South Asia has been towards disintegration of larger units into smaller entities, perhaps in no other time of history was there a greater need for closer integration in the region.

NOTES

CHAPTER I: INDIA AND CHINA : PARTING OF WAYS

1. The study of Indian works by Chinese Buddhists is said to be responsible for the creation of 35000 new words in the Chinese language (like *Nirvan* becoming *Ni-pan*). The intimate knowledge of Indian writings in China is also testified by the common use of terms like *Se-yo-hu-shu* ('strange writing of western countries') and *Pa-lanen-shu* ('Brahmin way of writing'). There was also some Indian impact on the Chinese architecture. The *Pa-Me-Sa* in Lyong ('Monastery of the White House') was supposed to have been modelled on the architecture of the *Anathapindarama* in the Indian state of Kosala ; the White Town of the Miaoyung monastery in Peking was designed in 1348 by Asaka, a Nepalese ; the Temple of the Five Pagodas was built in 1403 by Panch-Darma, an Indian Buddhist monk, on the model of the Buddha-Gaya. The rock-grottoes and the sanctuaries of Yung, Kuang, Lung-Men and Tung-Awan remind one of Ajanta and Ellora.

2. "We firmly believe that in order to attain and consolidate victory, we must lean to one side...There is no exception to this rule. To sit on the fence is impossible and there is no third path...Not only in China, but in the whole world, one leans without exception either to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. Neutrality is a hoax. The third path does not exist." (Mao Tse-tung, *On People's Democratic Dictatorship*, 1949, p. 7). Similar views were expressed by Liu Shao-chi, *Internationalism and Nationalism*, 1949, pp. 32-33.

3. "Every Communist must grasp the truth : Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun...We can even say that the whole world can be re-moulded only with the gun...war can only be abolished through war...in order to get rid of the gun, we must first grasp it in our hands". (Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, p. 75).

4. Jawaharlal Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy*, The Publications Division, New Delhi, Speech delivered in the Constituent Assembly, August 14, 1947, on the eve of the attainment of independence by India.

5. *World Culture*, September 16, 1949, "India and Anglo-American Imperialism".

6. Telegram sent to B.T. Ranadive, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of India, and published in *Jen-min Jih-pao*, November 20, 1949. Quoted briefly in the *Communist* of Bombay, January 1950, and quoted in full by Stuart R. Schram, *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung*, p. 260.

CHAPTER II : INDIA, CHINA AND TIBET

1. The first known king of Tibet was an Indian, Nya-tri Tsen-po, the fifth son of king Prasenjit of Kosala. The earliest religion and literature

which influenced Tibet were Buddhism and Sanskrit. Her alphabet was modelled on Nagari and Bengali scripts. Her first contact with China was through a marriage of a Chinese princess with King Song-Tsen Gam-po, a descendant of Nya-tri, in 635 A.D. as a symbol of assertion of superiority. In 763 A.D., on the Chinese emperor failing to pay the promised tribute, the Tibetans placed one of their own nominees on the throne. In 1252 Kublai Khan conquered the major part of Tibet but ended with recognition of Phagspa Gyal-tsen, a Buddhist scholar, as his *guru* and acceptance of Buddhism. Neither the Yuan nor the Ming dynasties of China (1277-1634) exercised any political control over Tibet. Describing the Dalai Lama's visit to Peking, Rockhill wrote that he was "treated with all the ceremony which could have been accorded to any independent sovereign, and nothing can be found in Chinese works to indicate that he was looked upon in any other light" (W.W. Rockhill, *The Dalai Lamas of Lhasa and their Relations with the Manchu Emperors of China, 1644-1908*, p. 3, Quoted by Ram Gopal, *India-China-Tibet Triangle*, p. 4). It was only in 1720 that the Chinese, taking advantage of Tibet's internal decay, despatched armies to Tibet and appointed a representative there to 'supervise its affairs'. But the Chinese 'supervision' soon became unpopular and in 1747 the Tibetans killed the two Chinese Residents (Ambans, as they were called) and 49 out of the 100 guards. This was followed by greater assertion of authority on the part of the Chinese. As the Manchu authority declined in the early years of the nineteenth century the Tibetans once again became independent.

2. The British fear was substantiated later by the diary of General Kuropatkin, Russian Minister of War. "I told Whitte", he noted on March 1, 1903, "that our Tsar has grandiose plans in his head to capture Manchuria and annex Korea. He is dreaming also of bringing Tibet under his domination." (Quoted by Ram Gopal, *op. cit.* p. 12)

3. "It would be a serious misfortune to the Indian Government and a danger to our northern frontier", Prime Minister Balfour told the House of Commons, "should Tibet fall under any European influence other than our own". (*Ibid.* p. 12)

4. For a fuller study of the texts of treaties, agreements and certain exchange of notes relating to the Sino-Indian boundary see *The Sino Indian Boundary*, published under the auspices of the *Indian Society of International Law*, 1962. S.N. Dhyani has included all the important conventions with regard to Tibet in the appendices at the end of his book *Contemporary Tibet: Its Status in International Law*, Lucknow, 1961. One may also look into the appendices at the end of Ram Gopal's *India-China-Tibet Triangle*, Lucknow, 1964. The following books on Tibet may also be consulted by those keen to understand the earlier history of Tibet : Charles Bell, *Tibet Past and Present* and the *People of Tibet*; M. Bailey, *No Passport to Tibet*; Heinrich Harper, *Seven Years in Tibet* ; Li Tich-Tseng, *The Historical Status of Tibet*; David Macdonald, *Tibet* ; Rockhill, *Dalai Lama*.

5. The Chinese Communist Party, in fact, had never concealed its intention to capture Tibet when it came to power. As early as May 1922, the C.C.P. had announced that it would "liberate" Mongolia, Tibet and Sinkiang and unify them with China, though even at that stage they paid lip-sympathy to the principle of self-determination.

6. *New China News Agency*, September 24, 1949.

7. It is interesting to note that even before K.M. Panikkar had left for Peking, in May 1950, to take up his ambassadorship he had made up his mind (and secured Nehru's approval for the idea) that India would be willing to sacrifice Tibet on the altar of India-China friendship. "The only area where our (China and India's) interests overlapped", he wrote, *In Two Chinas: Memoirs of a Diplomat*, London, 1955, pp. 26-27, "was in Tibet and knowing

the importance that every Chinese Government, including the Kuomintang, attached to exclusive Chinese authority over that area, I had, even before I started for Peking, come to the conclusion that the British policy (which we were supposed to have inherited) of looking upon Tibet as an area in which we had special political interests, could not be maintained. The Prime Minister had also in general agreed with this view." Reaching Peking, he threw himself headlong into "working out an area of cooperation by eliminating causes of misunderstanding, rivalry, etc." At the time when the Chinese were planning their invasion of Tibet (mid-October), Panikkar was mainly pre-occupied with attempts to prevent direct conflict between China and the United States. He knew nothing about the Chinese military occupation of Tibet until it was broadcast over Radio Peking, and even when he learned about it, treated it with the greatest calmness.

8. *The Times of India*, January 7, 1950.

9. For a detailed account of the Chinese invasion of Tibet see Peter Calvocoressi, *Survey of International Affairs, 1949-50*, London, 1953.

10. K.M. Panikkar, *In Two Chinas*, p. 113.

11. *General Assembly Official Records*, sixth session, 1950, p. 19.

12. In fact, as revealed by Dalai Lama after his escape to India in 1959, it was imposed on what was only a Tibetan Goodwill Mission to Peking and stamped with a false Tibetan seal.

13. Quoted in *Indian Views of Sino-Indian Relations*, Indian Press Digests—Monograph Series, Institute of International Studies, University of California at Berkeley, No. 1, February 1956. Ed. Margaret W. Fisher and Joan V. Bondurant.

14. It is sometimes suggested that General MacArthur's crossing of the 38th Parallel determined the Chinese action in Tibet. This, however, is not borne out by the facts of the situation. While General MacArthur crossed the 38th Parallel on October 8, 1950, the Chinese invasion of Tibet had started on October 7, a day earlier, by the crossing of the Dre Chu river. A day's difference may not be very important but, as Ram Gopal argues, "It will be a far-fetched argument to suggest that if there were no crossing of 38th Parallel, there would have been no invasion of Tibet. On the contrary it can be suggested that the 38th Parallel affair gave China an excuse to carry out her intentions quietly." (*India-China-Tibet Triangle*, p. 34)

15. In all the Indian comments on developments in Tibet there is a complete absence of speculation regarding Russian designs in Tibet. One of the few exceptions was *Mysindia*, which published on September 27, 1953, p. 4, an article stating—on what authority it is not known—that in November 1950 "intelligence reports" had revealed a "Soviet plan of grand strategy for Asia" and that two Russian parties had thoroughly surveyed large areas of Western Tibet in April, May and part of June 1950 and chosen sites for air bases.

16. Statement made by Prime Minister Nehru in the Indian Parliament on November 25, 1951.

CHAPTER III : CONSOLIDATION OF INDIAN FRONTIERS

1. Jawaharlal Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy*, Publications Division, New Delhi, 1961, pp. 435-36.

2. For an interesting account of the fighting in Nepal read Erika Liuchtag, *Erika and the King*, New York, 1958.
3. *Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, 1949-1953*, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Delhi, 1954, p. 176.
4. Jawaharlal Nehru, *op., cit.* pp. 435-36.
5. Nehru told newsmen at this time: "I feel that the fear on the part of the British and other governments was that if the present conditions continued, other elements in Burma may begin to play a more important role than either the Karens or the Burmese Government, which they did not want them to play." (Quoted by K.P. Karunakaran, *India in World Affairs, 1952-53*, Bombay, Oxford, 1957, pp. 109-11).
6. K.M. Panikkar, *In Two Chinas*, p. 113.

CHAPTER IV : SINO-INDIAN AGREEMENT ON TIBET

1. For the official text on the Agreement see *White Paper 1, Containing Notes, Memoranda, and Letters exchanged and Agreements signed between the Indian Government and the Government of China*, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 1959, pp. 98-101.
2. *Indiagram*, No. 445, May, 4, 1954, p. 4.
3. "We had to recognize Chinese sovereignty over Tibet". (Nehru's Statement in the Lok Sabha, March 30, 1959, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 28 (1959), Col. 8518.
4. *National Herald*, May 1, 1954, Quoted in *Indian Views of Sino-Indian Relations*, p. 24.
5. *Times of India*, May 1, 1954.
6. *Hindustan Times*, May 1, 1954.
7. "In diplomacy hope is permissible, but precaution is imperative. The talks about Tibet must not, therefore, be confined to the question of trade and pilgrims, as the Prime Minister has led many people to believe. There must be an over-all long-range settlement so that all possible points of friction between the two neighbours may peacefully be eliminated. The Government of India will do well to insist on a clear definition of the Indo-Tibetan boundary line. Needless to say, this should include the boundary line between Nepal and Tibet. Along with this question may also be taken up another obviously of a more delicate nature. The Chinese are reported to be militarizing Tibet. But Tibet's continuance as a demilitarised zone between India and China is the minimum that India can expect from Peking as a token of its confidence in her". (*The Thought*, November, 28, 1953).
8. *National Herald*, May 1, 1954, Quoted in *Indian Views of Sino-Indian Relations*, p. 25.
9. Statement in Lok Sabha, May 15, 1954.
10. *Hindustan Times*, May 1, 1954. Quoted in *Indian Views of Sino-Indian Relations*, p. 27
11. *Pioneer*. May, 1, 1954.

12. *Organiser*, May 1, 1954 .
13. *Vigil*, May 15, 1954.
14. *Janata*, May 30, 1954.
15. *Organiser*, May 24, 1954.
16. *Statesman*, May 2, 1954.

17. In view of the more recent stand taken by Communist China with regard to India's action in Goa, echoing the Pakistan stand, this seems to have escaped a general notice. However, Peking Radio had said, on October 26, 1955, that "Lisbon's attempt to continue her colonial rule in Goa, Daman and Diu" constituted "an intolerable insult to Chinese people, to the Indian people and to all Asian people." (Quoted in *Asian Recorder*, 1, October 22-28, 1955, p. 473). There were also occasions when Chou En-lai himself had stated China's support for India's claim to Goa. (*Asian Recorder*, 1, January-February 1956), p. 646.

18. A. Doak Barnett, *Communist China and Asia*, London, 1960, p. 310.

CHAPTER V : INDIA'S CHINA POLICY : AN ANALYSIS

1. No account of India's China policy in the early formative years of the life of modern India and China could be regarded as complete without an evaluation of the role played by K.M. Panikkar. Brought up "in the liberal tradition", in his own words, Panikkar claimed to have no sympathy for a political system in which individual liberty did not find a prominent place. However, during his four years' stay in China as India's Ambassador (1948-52), he failed to understand the basic character of the Chinese regime. Regarding the establishment of the Communist regime in China as the "culminating event of Asian resurgence" and believing that the Chinese Communists had "no desire to be anything other than Chinese," he asserted that the Chinese Government was adhering strictly to the principle of religious liberty, that there were a large number of private-owned dailies in China over whose policy the Government did not exercise any control, that there was no compulsion in China in the matter of work ("If you want to sit quietly in your house, nobody will disturb you"), that the 'liquidation' of Chiang Kai-shek's forces only meant their being 'disarmed and put out of action', and that the Chinese had "no aggressive designs against any other country" (Sunderlal, ed., *China Today*, 1952). One of the visitors to China, who was not carried off his feet like many others, thought that this was due to Panikkar (for a long time in the service of Maharajas) having "acquired the habit of mind which wants to please the powers that be at all times". "In Chiang kai-shek's time", writes Raja Hutheesing, "he was a believer in Kuomintang invincibility, and from Nanking advised the Government of India to enter into a pact with Chiang in 1948. When I met him in Peking in October 1961, after a lapse of many years, I listened to his discussions on the achievements of the New Democracy only to find that all his 'facts' were Chinese Communist propaganda" (*Window on China*, p. 11) However, this 'lack of balanced judgment and liability to erratic enthusiasm' did immense harm to the cause of his country. "There is no doubt", commented a Western observer, "that Panikkar was personally sympathetic towards the Chinese revolution, but his blind acceptance of what he was told by the Peking regime was inexcusable in his position as Ambassador representing

India's interests, and did incalculable harm both at the time and later", (George N. Patterson, *Peking versus Delhi*, Faber and Faber, London, 1963, p. 74).

2. It is interesting to note that while the Chinese invasion of Tibet had started on October 7, 1950, the vanguard units of the Chinese People's Liberation Army did not reach Lhasa until September 9, 1951. It was not so much a full-scale military operation as a military pressure on the Tibetan Government to make her accept Chinese sovereignty. On Chinese armies marching into Tibet, the Tibetan Government approached the Government of India for military and diplomatic assistance. The Government of India refused to comply with the Tibetan request, and advised the Tibetan Government to negotiate with the Chinese Government for a peaceful solution of the problem. India's attitude made it impossible for the Tibetan Government to secure military aid from any other country.

3. By the end of November 1950, India had completely given up Tibet. As Panikkar put it, "both the parties had made their point of view clear, and were content to let it rest there". (K.M. Panikkar, *In Two Chinas*, p. 113.)

4. *Ibid.* p. 105.

5. Another member of the delegation went to the extent of declaring, "We, in our non-violence, have forgotten Gandhi. The Chinese have somehow resurrected him through the violence and vitality of their revolution" (R.K. Karanjia, in *China Today*, ed. by Sunderlal). Sunderlal himself went to the extent of declaring that the Chinese had no aggressive or territorial designs against any country and that Tibet not only enjoyed full religious and other liberties but also, as a part of the great People's Republic of China, was safe against any aggression. (*Ibid.*) Dr. V.K.R.V. Rao is reported to have told the Chinese: "I can tell you as a professor who mixes with young people that we in India know that China stands for peace. We know that your volunteer army is fighting in Korea to preserve peace in Asia". For reports by members of the goodwill delegations to China see *Indian Press Digests*, Vols. I and II.

6. For an analysis of the impressions of Indian visitors to China, see Margaret W. Fisher and Joan V. Bordurant, "The Impact of Communist China on Visitors from India", *Far Eastern Quarterly*, Vol. XV, No. 2, February, 1956. Foreign observers too could notice the significant impact these mutual exchanges of visitors were having on Indian public opinion. "It is no understatement to say today," wrote the Indian correspondent of *Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), March 1954, "that more Indians admire the New China, or what they believe the new China to be, and this mental neighbourhood is fraught with greater potential for Asia and the world than the two countries' physical juxtaposition."

7. The Government-sponsored delegation consisted of some outstanding intellectuals, some of whom gave a very different interpretation of what they saw in China. Two of them—Frank Moraes and Raja Hutheesing, in their books *Report on Mao's China* and *Window on China*—made a critical assessment of the achievements and significance of the Chinese experiment.

8. R.K. Nehru, India's Ambassador-designate to China, was reported to have said in Hongkong: "It is quite clear to us that Taiwan and other off-shore islands are parts of China". (Quoted by Peking Radio on October 26, 1955). Both Jawaharlal Nehru (in a Press Conference held in New Delhi on September 7, 1958) and Krishna Menon (in a debate in the U.N. General Assembly on October 7, 1958) supported the Chinese claim to Formosa.

9. One of the main reasons why India refused to sign the Japanese Peace Treaty, thus, was the failure of the Treaty to restore Formosa to China,

the continuation of the U.S. control over the Ryuku and Bonin islands and the retention of the U.S. occupation forces in Japan.

10. Nehru clarified India's stand in a policy statement he made in the Lok Sabha on August 27, 1951, and said, "the Anglo-American draft did not fully satisfy India's insistence that the treaty should concede to Japan a position of honour, equality and contentment among the free nations". He further said that "the terms failed to fulfil India's condition that the treaty should enable all countries especially interested in the maintenance of a stable peace in the Far East to subscribe to the Treaty, sooner or later." For a detailed study of the reasons why India refused to participate in the conclusion of peace treaty with Japan see the Indian Note of August 23, 1951 to the U.S. Government (*Department of State Bulletin*, Washington, 25, September 3, 1951, 385-86).

11. "In China, Indians saw not the communism but the restoration of a great Asian civilisation to its place in the world, after a hundred years of corruption and despair" (*World Politics*, Vol. VII, 1955, "Indian Foreign Policy : An Interpretation of Attitudes," by Taya Zinkin, p. 201).

12. George N. Patterson, *Peking Versus Delhi*, Faber and Faber, London, 1963.

13. Nehru was "eager to establish relations with Peking because he believed that the Chinese Communists could be weaned from Moscow and that India and China could together constitute a third force which might perhaps build a bridge between Washington and Moscow". (*Survey of International Affairs*, 1949-50, p. 325, article by Peter Calvocoressi). Lord Attlee also thought on the same lines. Writing in an article entitled "The Position of Asia" in the *United Empire*, May-June 1955, he said, "I think it is essential to keep the doors as wide open as possible to the influence of the world and not to drive the Chinese to depend on the Russians. Unless we do that they will be driven harder to communism."

14. Michael Brecher, *India's Foreign Policy, An Interpretation*. Institute of Pacific Relations publication, February 1958.

15. *Ibid.* pp. 27-28.

CHAPTER VI : FROM GENEVA TO BANDUNG : HIGH TIDE OF SINO-INDIAN FRIENDSHIP

1. This chapter is based largely on *Indian Views of Sino-Indian Relations*, Indian Press Digest, Monograph Series I, February 1954, edited by Margaret W. Fisher and Joan V. Bondurant, and published by the Institute of International Studies, University of California at Berkeley. This is an invaluable treasure-house of contemporary sources most carefully and conscientiously compiled. For the arrangement and interpretation of the material, as well as for the conclusions drawn, the author is completely responsible. He had, however, the privilege of meeting Dr. Fisher and her colleagues at the Centre for South Asian Studies at Berkeley more than once and discussing with them various aspects of the Sino-Indian relations.

CHAPTER VII : BANDUNG CONFERENCE : CHINA'S RETURN TO ASIA

1. For a deeper study of the Bandung Conference read the following : Appadorai, A., *The Bandung Conference*, The Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi ; Kahin, George McTurnan, *The Asian-African Conference*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York ; *Asia-Africa Speaks from Bandung*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, Jakarta ; *Asian-African Conference*, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Govt. of India, New Delhi ; Romulo, Carlos P., *The Meaning of Bandung*, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill.

2. The final list of invitees consisted of : Afghanistan, Cambodia, Central African Federation, People's Republic of China, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gold Coast, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Nepal, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Veitnam (North), Vietnam (South) and Yemen. Among the Asian and African countries *not* invited were : Israel, the two Koreas, Nationalist China, the Union of South Africa and the Mongolian People's Republic. It was decided not to invite Australia or New Zealand. In commenting on certain countries not being invited, the Indonesian Prime Minister pointed out that the unanimous agreement of the Colombo Powers was necessary for extending an invitation. It was on account of the lack of unanimity that, despite the insistence of India and Burma, Israel could not be invited whereas invitations had been sent to all the Arab countries.

3. Joint Communique, *Report on Indonesia*, Vol. 6, January 1955, p. 2.

4. McTurnan Kahin, *The Asian African Conference*, p. 29.

5. For the final communique of the Asian-African Conference see Press Release, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations. Russell H. Fifield has incorporated the communique as Appendix C in *The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia, 1945-1958*, New York, 1958, pp. 512-519. The text of the Communique is also available in *India, Foreign Policy of India : Texts of Documents*, pp. 171-81.

6. *Hindu*, April 27, 1955. Quoted in *Indian Views of Sino-Indian Relations*, p. 137.

7. *Statesman*, April 29, 1955. *Ibid.* p. 139.

CHAPTER VIII : SHIFT IN CHINA'S POLICY IN ASIA

1. *Indonesian Observer*, April 29, 1955.

2. This was in spite of the efforts made by Burma to establish the best of relations with China. Disregarding Liu Shao-chi's condemnation of U Nu along with Soekarno and Nehru as puppets of imperialism and dispatch of greetings to the Communist rebels in Burma in November 1949, Burma was keen to have the distinction of being the first non-Communist State to recognise the Chinese People's Republic. On India agreeing to let her have the satisfaction of doing so, ambassadors were exchanged between the two countries in August and September 1950. But this did not in any way affect the attitude of the Burmese Communists towards their government. It was an open secret.

in Burma that the Kachin Autonomous State Movement in China under the Communist Kachin leader, Nam Seng, was being encouraged by the Chinese. The Chinese maps continued to show large areas of Burmese territory as Chinese and to the protest from the Burmese Government they gave the usual reply that they were old maps prepared during the Kuomintang period which they had found no time to revise.

3. *Parliamentary Debates (Hansard)*, 5th Series, Vol. 532. House of Commons Official Report, November 1-12, 1954, Col. 929. Quoted in R. H. Fifield, *The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia, 1945-1958*, New York, p. 336.

4. Note from the United Kingdom to the Soviet Union, *Vietnam in World Affairs*, p. 127.

5. Broadcast Talk by Malcom Macdonald, *Documents on International Affairs, 1949-1950*.

6. Speech of David Marshall, "What I Believe," January 24, 1957.

CHAPTER IX: CHINESE AGGRESSION AGAINST INDIA

1. In a communique issued by the Government of India at the time, it was said that Bara Hoti covered about two square miles of territory at an altitude of over 16,000 feet and had no strategic or other importance. "The Indo-Tibetan border is well defined. The question is merely one of fact, namely whether this small area...lies north or south of the border pass. It is admitted on both sides that if the area is north of the border pass it would be in Tibet, if it is south it would be in India".

2. It was in reply to a question by N.G. Goray in the Lok Sabha that Nehru acknowledged the fact that the Chinese had constructed a road through Aksai Chin. Goray had asked "whether the Chinese had built a road across this territory joining Gartok with Yarkand and whether this road has been there for the last one year or so". Even while replying to the question in affirmative Nehru had added, "not exactly near this place", as if he was trying to remove the emphasis on the strategic importance of the road. He further diluted the Indian claims by adding that there was "no actual demarcation" in this area. "So far as we are concerned our maps are clear that this is within the territory of the Union of India. It may be that some of the parts are not clearly demarcated or anything like that. But obviously, if there is any dispute over any particular area, this is a matter to be discussed". On a pointed question being asked by Sushila Nayar "if these troubles on the border are over the same areas of territory which the Chinese had indicated as their territory in their maps," Nehru evaded it by saying that "what we are discussing and the question which I have answered relates to about two or three miles. Two or three miles are not visible in these maps". The area in dispute in Ladakh was nearly 10,000 square miles. "The Aksai Chin area", Nehru told the Lok Sabha on September 12, 1959, "is in our maps, undoubtedly. But it is a matter for argument as to what part of it belongs to us and what part of it belongs to somebody else. I have frankly to tell the House that the matter has been challenged for hundred years. There has never been any delimitation there". *India's Foreign Policy*, p. 354). While India seemed to be unaware of the importance of the area, China was only too conscious of it. "This area is the only traffic artery linking Sinkiang and Western Tibet," said the Chinese Note of December 26, 1959, "because to its northeast lies the Great Gobi of Sinkiang through which direct traffic with Tibet is practically impossible".

3. "When requested to withdraw", Nehru told the Lok Sabha, on August 28, 1959, "they pushed back, actually pushed back, our greatly outnumbered patrol to a bridge at Drokung Samba....They actually physically pushed our men back. There was no firing".

4. An Indian journalist, commenting on the "remarkably dispassionate narration" of Chinese attacks at Khinzemane and Longju, wrote, "There was no animus in it. He made it read like a fairy tale. The Chinese came, threatened our men, pushed them back and when they went back apprehended them. At Khinzemane, after the *tamasha*, the Chinese went away and the *status quo* was restored. At Longju they used fire-arms, our men returned fire but were overpowered and driven back. The Chinese stayed put there". (G.S. Bhargava, *The Battle of NEFA*, p. 51). The difficulties of defending Longju with less than a dozen policemen can be better appreciated if one keeps in mind that this outpost, situated 'about three or four miles within the Indian frontier, was five days' march from an Indian post in the interior, Limeking, which was about twelve days' march from the next place behind it...altogether about three weeks' march from a roadhead.' (Nehru's statement in the Lok Sabha, August 28, 1959). Following these incursions, some steps were taken towards strengthening the Indian defences. The various posts, Limeking and others, were strengthened and the entire border area of NEFA was placed directly under military authorities, namely the Assam Rifles Directorate. But even when the Prime Minister of India talked in terms of defence preparation he had in mind nothing more than minor skirmishes. He refused to think that the Chinese could make a large-scale invasion of India. "I cannot imagine", Nehru told the Lok Sabha, "that all this is a pre-cursor to anything more serious. It seems to me so foolish for anybody, including the Chinese Government, to function in that way, and I do not give them the credit or rather the discredit for folly. I do not think they will do it".

5. *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements signed between the Governments of India and China (1954-1962)*, *White Paper I*, p. 52.

6. *Ibid.* p. 55.

7. As K. Gopalachari has pointed out, *International Studies*, July-October, 1963 "The India-China Boundary Question", p. 33, "the India-China boundary is not a complicated question left over by history, but one definitely settled by history".

8. For details with regard to the correspondence between the Prime Ministers and Governments of India and China see *Notes, Memoranda and Letters exchanged and Agreements signed between the Governments of India and China (1954-1962)*, *White Papers I to VIII*, Ministry of External Affairs.

9. *The China Quarterly*, October-December 1962, "Sino-Assam Frontier", by G.F. Hudson.

CHAPTER X : SINO-INDIAN FRONTIERS : (1) CLAIMS AND COUNTER-CLAIMS

1. *International Studies*, July-October 1963, "The India-China Boundary Question", by K. Gopalachari, p. 33.

2. For the text of the Treaty of 1842 see *The Indian Society of Inter-*

national Law, *The Sino-Indian Boundary, Texts of Treaties, Agreements and certain Exchange of Notes*, 1962, p. 1.

3. "Respecting the frontiers", wrote the Chinese Imperial Commissioner at Canton to the British Government on January 13, 1847, in response to a British request for the demarcation of this sector of the boundary, "I beg to remark that the borders of these territories have been sufficiently and distinctly fixed so that it will be best to adhere to this ancient arrangement and it will prove far more convenient to abstain from any additional measures for fixing them." (*White Paper II*, p. 36). The same Chinese official, reaffirming his Government's stand in a further communication to the British Government a week later pointed out that there was "an ancient frontier" between Ladakh and Tibet and that it was unnecessary to establish any other. (*The Report of the Officials of the Government of India and the People's Republic of China on the Boundary Question*, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 1961).

4. It was interesting that authoritative Chinese evidence too supported the Indian position. Among others the *Report* quoted the following: *Chin-Ting Huang-Yu Hsi-Yu Tu-Chin* (1762), *Chia-Ching Chung-Hsiu Ta-Ching Tung Chih* (1820), and *Hsin-Chiang Tu-Chih* (1911). A large number of records testify to the exercise of administration and jurisdiction by India. The *Report* mentions a systematic settlement of revenue made for all Ladakh, including the border areas in 1860-1865, revenue records for the years 1901-1940, the consolidated revenue register of Ladakh Tehsil for the years 1901-1940, etc. Trade routes in Aksai Chin and the Chang Chenmo areas were maintained by the Maharaja of Kashmir and wild life in these areas controlled by Indian authorities. Topographical and geological surveys were regularly made by Indian authorities.

5. There is testimony for watershed being accepted as demarcating Indian-Tibetan frontiers in the writings of British officers like J. O. B. Beckett, Settlement Commissioner of Kumaon and Garhwal in 1863-75 and E. K. Pauw, Settlement Commissioner of Garhwal in 1896. Official Indian maps, as well as maps published in China, also delineated the boundary as lying along the watershed. (*International Studies*, July-October 1963, "The India-China Boundary Question", by K. Gopalachari, p. 36).

6. This is testified by a copper plate inscription of 1667 A. D.

7. It is interesting to note that no claim to Sangcha Malla or Lapthal was raised by the Chinese at the conference held at New Delhi in 1958 to discuss the question of Bara Hoti. All that they had then claimed was an area of roughly 200 sq. kilometres—which did not include these areas. It was in the course of the talks of the officials in 1960 that China put forward the claim that Bara Hoti, Sangcha Malla and Lapthal were parts of one large composite area of approximately 300 sq. miles.

8. The Atlas of the Chinese Empire, published in London by the Chinese Inland Mission in 1906, shows as the frontier in this area an alignment which is almost identical with what was settled at Simla in 1914.

9. The Lohit area was surveyed by the Mishmi Mission in 1911-12, the Dibhang Valley was surveyed in 1912-13 and the Abor area in 1913. Captain Bailey carried out extensive surveys of the southern limits of Tibetan jurisdiction in the whole area in 1913-14.

10. "As it was feared that there might be friction in future unless the boundary between India and Tibet is clearly defined", wrote Lonchen Shatra, the Tibetan Plenipotentiary in his letter of March 25, 1914, "I submitted the map, which you sent to me in February last, to the Tibetan Government at Lhasa for orders. I have now received orders from Lhasa and I accordingly

agree to the boundary as marked in red in the two copies of the maps signed by you subject to the conditions mentioned in your letter dated the 24th March, sent to me through Mr. Bell. I have signed and sealed the two copies of the maps". (Quoted by Dr. K. Krishna Rao, "The Sino-Indian Boundary Question : A Study of Some Related Legal Issues", in *The Indian Journal of International Law*, 1963, p. 159).

11. Even if China had challenged it, she had no right to do so under international law. There is ample evidence to show that Tibet had every right to enter into bilateral agreements with foreign powers and that China had, on more than one occasion, explicitly acknowledged this right. (J. B. Morse, *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire, 1834-1860*, 1910, p. 9). As late as August 17, 1912, Great Britain, in a note sent to the Chinese Government, had affirmed Tibet's right to enter independently into treaty relations with her, and the Chinese Government in their reply of December 23, 1912, had made no protest against this statement. It was clear, as testified by the fact of Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, Tibet and China presenting their separate credentials at the Simla Conference, that the three Powers had participated in the Conference on an equal footing. (*Report*, p. 111)

12. The Chinese contention that a multi-lateral treaty, if one of the sides concerned has not signed it, is invalid, is not borne out by international law. The fact that one of the negotiating parties refuses to enter into treaty relations cannot prevent the other parties from concluding the treaty.

13. Nehru's reply to debate in Rajya Sabha, September 10, 1959. (*India's Foreign Policy*, p. 351)

14. This settles the position in international law. It is difficult to imagine that the Chinese are so naive as to challenge the contention that silence means acquiescence and to say that it does not reflect the accepted principles of international law. "Passiveness in front of given facts", as was maintained by the International Court of Justice in the *Preah Vihear* case, "is the most general form of acquiescence or tacit consent. Failure of a state to assert its rights when that right is openly challenged by another state can only mean abandonment of that right". (I. C. J. Reports, 1962) This can be illustrated by reference to a number of other decisions of international tribunals, based on the same reasoning as in the case concerning the Temple of *Preah Vihear* in which Thailand, by her failure to protest at a time when the circumstances so warranted, was deemed to have acquiesced in the boundary alignment as affirmed by Cambodia (*Ibid.*, p. 23). Oppenheim also has taken the same view, "... if a state acquires knowledge of an act which it considers internationally illegal and in violation of its rights, and nevertheless does not protest, this attitude implies a renunciation of such rights..." (*International Law*, 8th edition, Vol. I, 1955, p. 875). Official Indian maps published in 1950 and 1952 show the alignment claimed by India today. As the *Report* points out (p. 99), "The Chinese Government had never disputed the statements of the Indian Government at the time they were made, and in fact had never raised any claims to traditional Indian territory until their communication of 8 September, 1959. It was inconceivable that if the Chinese Government had such claims in mind, particularly when they applied to such large areas of Indian territory, they would have remained silent in 1950, 1954 and indeed right upto 1959." The very fact that China sometimes objected to India's alignment in minor areas, as in the case of Bara Hoti in 1954, "goes to prove that she accepted the Indian alignment by and large." In fact, as Dr. Krishna Rao has argued (*Indian Journal of International Law*, "The Sino-Indian Boundary Question", pp. 171-72), the declaration in the *Panchsheel* agreement between India and China assuring each other's "territorial integrity and sovereignty" was in itself as binding on the two States as a treaty. Dr. Krishna Rao further quotes Oppenheim in his support (*International Law*, 8th edition, Vol. I, 1955, pp. 872-873, 898, 899), where the latter says that

declarations, whereby the parties undertake to pursue in future a certain line of conduct "differ in no respect from treaties." The reference in the Joint Statement to mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty and to non-aggression implies an understanding as to the boundary line between the two countries" For a full discussion of the legal issues involved in the Sino-Indian boundary question, read Dr. K. Krishna Rao's articles in *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, 1962 (p. 375), *Indian Journal of International Law*, 1962 (p. 200), *Indian Journal of International Law*, 1963, (p. 151), and *International Law Aspects of the Sino-Indian Boundary*, 1963, published under the auspices of the Indian Society of International Law, New Delhi.

15. The Indian Constitution, in its Sixth Schedule, makes specific provision for the NEFA.

16. *Report*, pp. 272-74.

CHAPTER XI : SINO-INDIAN FRONTIERS (2) : ANALYSIS OF CONFLICTING CLAIMS

1. Alistair Lamb, *The China-India Border : The Origins of the Disputed Boundaries*, Chatham House, London, 1964, has tried to give an academic and scholarly-looking background to the untenable, and unproved, Chinese contention that the existing Indian frontiers were determined by the British out of imperialistic motives and involved, in many cases, a violation of the Chinese territory. This entire chapter is a repudiation of the thesis.

2. Referring in particular to the northeastern frontier, G.F. Hudson wrote, after a detailed study of the various aspects of the problem, "Since, however, modern international law does not recognize tribes like the Akas or Abors as having sovereign rights, the disputed area can only belong to the organized state which was first to recognize jurisdiction there and this was India under the British Raj. There is no evidence of an effective Chinese jurisdiction which was forcibly replaced by British encroachment, as China's propaganda would have it." (*The China Quarterly*, October-December 1962, "Sino-Assam Frontier", by G.F. Hudson).

3. August Hermann Francke, *A History of Western Tibet, One of the Unknown Empires*, London, S.W. Partridge, 1907.

4. Luciano Petech, *China and Tibet in Early Eighteenth Century : History of the Establishment of Chinese Protectorate in Tibet*, Leiden : Brill, 1950.

5. The most important of the Chinese documents is *Hsi-Tsang Tsou-shu* (Tibetan Memorials and Reports), compiled by Meng Pao, Imperial Resident at Lhasa from 1839 to 1844, out of state papers in six volumes, and privately printed in Peking. This was perhaps used for the first time in English by Fisher, Rose and Huttenback (*Himalayan Battleground*, Frederick A. Praegar, New York, 1953), who have incorporated the more important reports and memorials in an Appendix.

6. *Himalayan Battleground : Sino-Indian Rivalry in Ladakh*, by Margaret W. Fisher, Leo E. Rose and Robert A. Huttenback, the fruit of diligent and deep research by three specialists on South Asia from the University of California at Berkeley, is a remarkable work. Based on a dissection of hundreds of maps, documents, diaries, books, despatches, articles and memoranda in English and Chinese, it emphasises the pivotal position of Ladakh

in Central Asia from time immemorial, and successfully contradicts all claims made by China in the region. The authors have also made a penetrating study of Chinese approach to negotiations and the Chinese tactics. To mention one example, having captured the Aksai Chin plateau, the strategic corridor between Tibet and Sinkiang, by subterfuge, they attempted to gain by "negotiations" Indian surrender of more strategic territory. "To that end", the authors state, "the Chinese employed a dual strategy directed on one level to confuse or deceive the rest of the world. For this purpose they have made clever tactical use of deceptive propaganda of various kinds, including spurious documentation and the frequent re-iteration of allegations that had already been refuted beyond any attempt at rebuttal". *Himalayan Battleground* is the most documented and objective confirmation of the Indian claims with regard to the northwest frontier so far brought out

7. The Chinese have distorted the significance of the *Lapchak* missions sent by Ladakh with gifts to the Dalai Lama and other Lamaist authorities in Tibet by taking the view that they were "tribute" missions symbolizing Ladakh's political subordination to Tibet. They were clearly "not one-sided arrangements", as the Government of India has pointed out. There is evidence to show that while the Ladakhis sent *Lapchak* missions with gifts for the Dalai Lama the Tibetans sent *Chaba* missions to Ladakh with gifts for the King. "*Lapchak*...(has), therefore, no potential significance." (*Report of the Officials of the Government of India and the People's Republic of China, on the Boundary Question*, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, 1961, p. 59) It may be added that the so-called "tribute" was not paid to the civil authority in Tibet but to the Dalai Lama, and what it symbolized was Ladakh's recognition of the Dalai Lama's spiritual and heirarchical authority. It is interesting to note that what some of the Chinese writers propounded when it suited China, namely, that a distinction had to be made between the secular and the worldly authorities, other Chinese writers repudiated when they found it to be going against China's interest. Both Sun Pao-chi, China's Foreign Minister under Chiang Kai-shek, and Ivan Chen, the Chinese Plenipotentiary at the Simla Conference, had taken the view that while the Lamas might have ecclesiastical authority, 'this did not necessarily mean that these places belonged to Tibet'. (*op. cit.*, pp. 173-174 and *White Paper* III, p. 93). The concept of 'political religious unity' is an invention of the Communist regime in China.

8. *Proceedings of the Royal Geographic Society*, XI (1867), p. 165.

9. *The Making of a Frontier*, p. 120.

10. Letter to Lord George Hamilton, Secretary of State for India, May 1899.

11. Alistair Lamb, *The China-India Border, The Origins of the Disputed Boundaries*, Chatham House, London, 1964.

CHAPTER XII : REVOLT IN TIBET AND ITS AFTERMATH

1. The extracts in the above paragraphs, illustrative of Nehru's mind and Government of India's policy towards China, have been culled from the speeches or statements Nehru made in the Lok Sabha on August 28, 1959, September 4, 1959, September 12, 1959 (reply to debate), November 17, 1959, November 25, 1959, November 27, 1959 (reply to debate), December, 21, 1959, December 22, 1959 (reply to discussion), and on April 26, 1960, and those made in the Rajya Sabha on August 31, 1959, September 4, 1959, September

10, 1959 (reply to debate), December 8, 1959, December 9, 1959 (reply to debate), and on April 29, 1960. They have been taken from Jawaharlal Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy*, pp. 328–391.

2. For a good discussion of the strategic importance of Ladakh see *Asian Survey*, October 1962, "Ladakh and the Sino-Indian Border Crisis", by Margaret W. Fisher and Leo E. Rose, pp. 27–37.

3. An official report submitted by the Chinese Government's representative in Tibet on March 9, 1955.

4. Fan Ming was a member of the Chinese Communist Tibetan Work Committee.

5. *Prime Minister on Sino-Indian Relations*. Government of India, New Delhi, p. 26.

6. *China Today*, New Delhi, Vol. IV, No. 6, p. 15.

7. Jawaharlal Nehru's statement in Lok Sabha in reply to a non-official resolution that India should take the Tibetan issue to the United Nations, September 4, 1959 (*India's Foreign Policy*, p. 341).

8. Statement in Lok Sabha, March 30, 1959.

9. Jawaharlal Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy*, pp. 319–20. Statement in Lok Sabha, April 27, 1959.

10. *China Today*, New Delhi, Vol. IV, No. 6, p. 65

11. Jawaharlal Nehru, *op. cit.*, p. 315. Statement in Lok Sabha, March 30, 1959.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 322. Statement in Lok Sabha, April 27, 1959.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 341. Statement in Lok Sabha, September 4, 1959.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 319. Statement in Lok Sabha, April 27, 1959.

15. *Asian Survey*, October 1962, "Ladakh and the Sino-Indian Border Crisis", by Margaret W. Fisher and Leo E. Rose, pp. 31–32.

16. One striking factor with the Chinese evidence was the paucity of documentation with regard to their claim over the Aksai Chin area. Only one document was produced, which also was a recent one and did not show that their administration had extended to the part of Aksai Chin claimed by India. For the whole of Ladakh only one document was produced by China and that was regarding the collection of produce from a private estate in Demchok. The same was true of Spiti, Nilang and Jadhong. With regard to the Eastern Sector, no record from any of the administrative subdivisions pertaining to a chart or a map or any proof showing alignment tallying with Chinese claims was brought forward, and no evidence whatsoever was produced regarding the collection of revenues, surveys or construction of public works in the inhabited areas. What was most surprising was that though the Chinese Government claimed to have administered the areas, now under dispute, for several centuries, they could not even furnish relevant topographical details with regard to these areas. (*Report*, pp. 234–235, 256–257 and 261).

CHAPTER XIII : STRATEGY AND MILITARY BUILD-UP BEHIND CHINA'S AGGRESSIVENESS

1. Lowell Thomas Jr., *The Silent War in Tibet*.

2. Referring to China's 'comparatively superior armed strength', the Diplomatic Correspondent of the *Hindustan Times* reported, on May 6, 1960, "The Chinese might think of launching upon a gamble without fear of being detected in time or checked effectively. On a conservative estimate the Chinese hold in Tibet, in combat readiness, more than six divisions. A Chinese division usually consists of 15,000 men. Some of their air-bases are supposed to be less than two hours' flight to New Delhi. The roads they have built in and to Tibet keep their supply and communications in good order." The same correspondent reported that each Chinese division was in possession of artillery up to 152 m. m. self-propelled guns, armoured gun regiments, T-34 Russian tanks and transport vehicles.

3. For a detailed study of China's military build-up and strategy see : Edgar O' Ballance, *The Red Army of China*, London, 1962 ; Mao Tse-tung, *Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary Wars*, Peking, 1936 ; Mao Tse-tung *On the Protracted War*, Peking, 1938 ; Harold C. Hinton, "Political Aspects of Military Power and Policy in Communist China" in Harry L. Coles, ed., *Total War and Cold War*, Ohio State University Press, 1962 ; F. F. Liu, *A Military History of Modern China, 1924-1949*, Princeton University Press, 1956 ; Colonel Robert B. Rigg, *Red China's Fighting Hordes*, Harrisburg, Pa ; Alice L. Hsieh, *Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era*, Prentice-Hall, 1962.

4. It was during this period that Mao Tse-tung's military and political thinking was worked out in four volumes : *Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary Wars* (1936) ; *On the Protracted War* (1938) ; *Strategic Problems of Guerilla Warfare against the Japanese* (1938) ; and the third part of *The Present Situation and Our Tasks*.

5. Lin Piao, "March Ahead Under the Red Flag of the Party's General Line and Mao Tse-tung's Military Thinking", in *Ten Glorious Years*, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1960, pp. 80-81.

6. Alice Langley Hsieh, *op. cit.* p. 179.

7. Herbert S. Dinerstein, author of *War and the Soviet Union, 1959*, published in January 1960 a study of Soviet policies in under-developed areas under the title : *Soviet Strategic Ideas*. Also see his article "Rivalry in Underdeveloped Areas" in *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1964, pp. 64-72.

8. In September 1961, Khrushchev told C. L. Sulzberger, the *New York Times* correspondent, that the Soviet Union had given no nuclear warheads or long-range missiles to Communist China or to the East European countries and that such weapons were not stationed outside Soviet territory except "perhaps in East Germany". (*The New York Times*, September 8, 1961).

9. *U. S. News and World Report*, January 11, 1960.

10. On October 16, 1964, at 3 P. M., China blasted her way into the nuclear club by exploding its first atom bomb. An official statement issued by the Peking Government described it as 'a major achievement of the Chinese people in their struggle to increase their national defence capability and oppose the United States imperialist policy of nuclear blackmail and nuclear threats'. China at the same time described the treaty on the partial halting of nuclear tests, signed by the U. S., Britain and the Soviet Union in Moscow in July 1963 as 'a big fraud to fool the people of the world' and an effort 'to consolidate the nuclear monopoly held by the three nuclear powers, and tie up the hands and feet of all peace-loving countries'. China was happy that she was now able to break the nuclear monopoly of the nuclear Powers.

CHAPTER XIV : CHINA'S DIPLOMACY : PRELUDE TO INVASION

1. Denis Warner, *Hurricane from China*, 1961.
2. Howard L. Boorman, "Peking in World Affairs", *Pacific Affairs*, Fall 1961.
3. Denis Warner, *op. cit.*
4. *Foreign Affairs*, January 1963, "The Two Chinas in Africa", by Leon M. S. Slawewski.
5. *Peking Review*, September 14, 1960.
6. Denis Warner, *op. cit.*, p. 101.
7. *Nation*, Rangoon, quoted in Denis Warner, *op. cit.* p. 170.
8. For a text of the joint communique issued by Mao Tse-tung and Norodom Sihanouk, see *Peking Review*, September 2, 1958.
9. An idea of Sihanouk's friendship for China can also be formed by the fact that he sent, in July 1960, three of his sons to study in China.
10. Denis Warner, *op. cit.* p. 172.
11. In a joint communique by Chen Yi and Subandrio, at the end of the former's visit to Jakarta in March-April 1961 and the signing of a Treaty of Friendship, the two foreign ministers expressed their confidence in the eternal friendship and mutual understanding between the peoples of China and Indonesia, "and proclaimed the stand of their respective governments of supporting all national struggles against imperialism and colonialism including the Algerian people and other African peoples" (*Peking Review*, April 7, 1961). This was followed by Soekarno's visit to Peking in June 1961, at the end of which Soekarno declared with Liu Shao-chi "their determination to unceasingly struggle side by side with all the other progressive forces of the world against imperialism and colonialism in all their manifestations, and affirmed their resolute support to the struggle of the Asian, African, and Latin American peoples to win, and safeguard their complete independence and to build a happy life" (*Peking Review*, June 16, 1961).
12. Howard L. Boorman, *op. cit.*

CHAPTER XV : TACTICS OF CONFRONTATION : FORWARD MILITARY MOVES

1. *White Paper*, No. V.
2. *Indian Express*, October 25, 1961.
3. *Times of India*, basing its opinion on 'military experts', reported, on May 4, 1961, that "the Chinese and Indian forces now confronting each other in these bleak Himalayan regions are more or less equal in strength". "Though they (the Chinese) have developed in recent years a vast network of garrisons in Sinkiang and Tibet for internal security purposes", the report continued, "the overall logistic position of the front line Chinese troops is,

by and large, no better than the present position of the Indian forces". It recounted with satisfaction the fact that during the preceding eighteen months the Indian Army had "established scores of new outposts, built hundreds of miles of mountain tracks and developed a vast logistic complex to supply and reinforce the troops in several sectors more speedily than the Chinese could manage in the event of a crisis".

4. The correspondent asked some pertinent questions: (1) whether army training in mountain warfare is proceeding well and will deliver the goods, (2) whether the institute for jungle warfare is now properly established, is suitably located and will not become a replica of the academic land-air warfare school, (3) whether ordnance factories are bringing out suitable weapons for mountain warfare in sufficient quantities, and (4) whether military stores are reaching border areas in time and in accordance with requirements. To these questions there was no clear answer. (*Indian Express*, November 11, 1961).

5. *Peking Review*, No. 18 (1962)

6. *Ibid.*

7. It was disclosed in the Lok Sabha on June 19, 1962 that some 3,600 Indian traders were affected by the termination of trading facilities in Tibet and had been forced to leave their assets.

8. *Asian Survey*, October 1962, "Ladakh and the Sino-Indian Border Crisis, by Margaret W. Fisher and Leo E. Rose, p. 33.

9. *White Paper*, No. VI, pp. 83 and 88,

10. *Peking Review*, No. 32 (1962).

11. This is the reason why India has been demanding the restoration of the position as on September 8, 1962 as pre-condition for the opening of any talks for the settlement of the problem.

12. Speaking in London on September 10, 1962, Nehru expressed the idea that border dispute could "develop suddenly into a conflict".

13. The Indian authorities in NEFA were taken completely by surprise. They did not seem willing to take the Chinese "incursion" seriously—the official statement merely mentioning that "latest reports indicate that there is a Chinese group several hundred yards away from our post and appears to be on the Indian side of the international border." The strength of the Chinese 'group' was variously estimated as 300, 800 and 1200, though the official sources did not believe them to be more than 200.

14. The posture adopted by the Government of India seems to have misled many foreign observers too. For example, the *London Times* wrote on September 17, 1962, that "the persistence of the Chinese in standing firm in spite of the relatively heavy Indian forces now concentrated against them sharpens the Indian Government's dilemma. If they are not to be frightened out, should they be thrown out?"

15. Noting that "a massive invasion of Chinese territory by Indian troops on the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian boundary seems imminent," the *Jen-min Jih-pao*, wrote, on October 14, 1962: "It is high time to tell Mr. Nehru that the heroic Chinese troops...can never be cleared by any one from their own territory. History has repeatedly furnished proof that not the Chinese troops but the Japanese Imperial Army and the Yankees were cleared out of Chinese territory...If there are still some maniacs who are reckless enough to ignore our well-intentioned advice and insist on having another try, well, let them do so. History will pronounce its inexorable verdict".

16. The whole philosophy behind the Indian build-up", as V.P. Dutt has pointed out, *China's Foreign Policy*, 1964, p. 216, "was the acquisition of

sufficient strength which would make possible realistic and fruitful negotiations. At no time did the Indian authorities seriously contemplate a war to dislodge the Chinese forces from the Aksai Chin road ; the Indian defence effort was not even geared to withstanding a massive Chinese attack. In fact, the Indian Government, to the standing misfortune of the country, did not even consider an attack from China as a probability ; it thought merely in terms of local and limited conflict on the Himalayan heights”.

CHAPTER XVI : CHINA'S MILITARY INVASION OF INDIA

1. *Notes, Memoranda and Letters exchanged between the Governments of India and China*, October 1962-January 1963, *White Paper* No. VIII, p. 1.

2. *Chinese Aggression in War and Peace*, Letters of the Prime Minister of India, letter dated October 27, 1962.

3. This account of China's military invasion of India in October-November 1962, prepared during the author's stay in the U. S. A., is based on an exhaustive study of the despatches by the Indian correspondents of the leading U. S. newspapers and journals, editorial reviews and comments and expert analyses of the current political scene, published from time to time in the *New York Times*, *Christian Science Monitor*, *Washington Post*, *Nation*, and *Republic*, and the clippings of the *Statesman*, *Times of India*, *Indian Express*, *Hindustan Times* and other leading Indian newspapers which were being regularly sent to him from India by his colleagues in the Department of Political Science, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur. His emphasis being more on a connected and critical narrative, it has not been thought necessary to burden the text with too many references.

4. G. S. Bhargava, in *The Battle of NEFA*, Allied Publishers, 1964, has tried to examine the debacle at NEFA at some length. He thinks that the Indian armies at Se La should have anticipated the Chinese strategy of out-flanking them. The yak track across the Palit range which the Chinese used in bypassing Se La had been seen by newspapermen a few days before the fall of Se La and it was well-known in Towang and its neighbourhood that the people of Mago village to the northeast of Towang migrated in winter to the village of Lagani, southwest of Se La, and they took a mule track which skipped Se La. Even the maps of the Kameng Division with NEFA Administration officials had the footpaths and mule and yak tracks marked on them. There was, thus, no reason for the Indian armies not to be prepared for the strategy adopted by the Chinese.

The fact, however, is, that even if they had decided to check the onrush of the Chinese forces down the yak track they did not have enough forces with them to make such an attempt. Bhargava's objection is that "even then Se La need not have been abandoned so readily". The Indian armies should have offered some resistance instead of beating a hasty retreat. He thinks that the Indian armies at Se La should have continued to fight even after they had been outflanked. "After all", he suggests, "the Chinese artillery could not have been moved across the mountains along mule tracks. Even the troops which effected the bypass could not be large in numbers. Even if our supply line had become tenuous the enemy's sources of replenishment could not have been inexhaustible. If we had fought to retain control of the road either by staying put and facing the enemy fire from both sides, or withdrawing into the jungle and re-grouping, the situation would have been different" (pp. 115-16). He is convinced that the Se La campaign suffered from a failure of generalship and was "mismanaged from the beginning".

Bhargava also thinks that the Indian armies at Se La need not have remained idle between October 25 and November 15, when the enemy was relatively quiet. If they had moved up an infantry division and spread themselves out at Se La the enemy bypass would have lost its sting. But from where could they have got the infantry division? One view was that if the Indian armies had not joined battle at Walong and rushed troops from there to Se La the situation would have been different, the supporting argument being that the enemy could not have pushed so easily through the difficult terrain in Lohit Division. However, it was too great a risk to be taken. Bhargava is right in thinking that the Chinese could not have been permitted to move in the direction of the Assam oil-fields. Moreover, the valour shown by the Indian officers and men at Walong proved a great factor in boosting up the morale of the Indian Army as a whole, which had been so badly shaken up by the ignominious retreat at Se La. Together with the courageous stand the Indian armed forces had taken at Chushul in Ladakh, the battles fought at Walong restored the Indian self-confidence. Whatever the *causes* of the debacle at Se La, the *results* were serious. The defenders of Bomdi La were counting on the Chinese Army getting a tough resistance at Se La, and when the Chinese Army quietly passed Se La and appeared in full vigour at Bomdi La it, naturally, became impossible for them to meet it. The effect on the psychological level was even greater. The Army had pinned its major hopes on the impregnability of Se La, and when it fell without even a struggle, it shattered the confidence of Indian officers and men fighting on the other fronts. If Chushul and Walong had not done something to redress the balance, the situation would indeed have become very serious.

5. An enquiry into the military reverses suffered by the Indian armies in the NEFA was conducted by Lt.-Gen. Henderson Brooks and Brig. Prem Bhagat. The developments in NEFA being closely related to those in Ladakh, the scope of the enquiry was extended to developments and operations in the Ladakh sector. The enquiring officers studied in great and intimate detail the extent of the preparedness of the Indian army at the time, the planning and strategic concepts behind it, and the way those plans were adjusted in the course of operations. They further examined the developments and events prior to hostilities as also the plans, posture and strength of the Army at the outbreak of the hostility. The enquiring officers submitted the report to the Chief of Army Staff on May 12, 1963, who submitted the report along with his comments to the Defence Minister on July 2. The report was never published, but the Defence Minister made a statement in both Houses of Parliament on September 2, 1963, in which he high-lighted the main points.

It was a most revealing statement. While the enquiry revealed that the basic training of the Army was sound and the soldiers adapted themselves to the mountains adequately, it was admitted that the *training* of the troops did not have orientation towards operations *vis-a-vis* the particular terrain in which the troops had to operate. "Our training of the troops", said the Defence Minister, "did not have a slant for a war being launched by China. Thus, our troops had no requisite knowledge of the Chinese tactics, and ways of war, their weapons, equipment and capabilities." The enquiry also revealed that there was need for toughening and battle inoculation, and that the main aspect of training as well as the higher commanders' concept of mountain warfare required to be put right. As regards *equipment*, the enquiry confirmed that there was an overall shortage of equipment both for training and during operations. "The crucial difficulty in many cases," explained the Defence Minister, "was that, while the equipment could be reached to the last point in the plains or even beyond it, it was another matter to reach it in time, mostly by air or by animal or human transport to the forward formations who took the brunt of fighting." The position of logistics was

aggravated by two factors : (i) the fast rate at which troops had to be inducted, mostly from plains to high mountain areas ; and (ii) lack of properly built roads and other means of communications.

The *weapons* used by the Indian Army were regarded as adequate to fight the Chinese and compared favourably with theirs. The enquiry had pinpointed the need to make up deficiency in equipment, particularly suited for mountain warfare, but more so to provide means and modes of communication to make it available to the troops at the right place at the right time.

The enquiry revealed that there was basically nothing wrong with the *system* and *chain of command*, provided it was exercised in accepted manner at various levels. During the operations, difficulties arose only when there was departure from accepted chain of command, and such departures occurred mainly due to haste and lack of adequate prior planning.

As regards the *physical fitness* of the Indian troops — the enquiry revealed that, despite the fact that an unacclimatised army could not be as fit as one which was, Indian troops, both officers and men, stood the rigours of the climate, although most of them were rushed at short notice from plains. In the words of the Defence Minister, they were “physically fit in every way for their normal tasks, but they were not acclimatised to fight at the heights at which some of them were asked to make a stand. Where acclimatisation had taken place, such as in Ladakh, the height factor presented no difficulty”.

The collection and evaluation of *intelligence* in general was found not satisfactory. The acquisition of intelligence was slow and the reporting of it vague. A clear picture of the Chinese build-up was not made available. No attempt was made to link up the new enemy build-up with the old deployment. The dissemination of intelligence too, was slow.

With all this variety of causes and weaknesses leading to the reverses of the Indian armed forces, it would not be fair to impugn the Indian army as a whole. As Y. V. Chavan pointed out, “the attack was so sudden and in such remote and isolated sectors that the Indian Army as a whole was really not tested. In that period of less than two months last year only about 24,000 of our troops were actually involved in fighting. Of these, those in Ladakh did an excellent job even when overwhelmed and out-numbered. In the eastern-most sector, though the troops had to withdraw in the face of vastly superior enemy strength from Walong, they withdrew in an orderly manner and took their toll. It was only in the Kameng sector that the Army suffered a series of reverses. These battle were fought on our remotest borders and were at heights not known to the army and at places which geographically had all the disadvantages for our troops and many advantages for the enemy.”

CHAPTER XVII : CHINESE AGGRESSION : A STUDY IN MOTIVES

1. The theory that China might have agreed, at one stage, to barter NEFA for the disputed area of Ladakh does not seem to be tenable, particularly when we realize that Chinese already had the “disputed area of Ladakh” under their control when they invaded the NEFA. Without the Aksai Chin highway the aggression in NEFA would have been nearly impossible. “This view”, as George N. Patterson has pointed out, *Peking Versus Delhi*, p. 290, fails “to take account either of the intensity of purpose of the present regime in China to take back everything to which it can make even the most shadowy historical claim or of the special Chinese

jealousy of India as China's rival for influence and leadership in Asia". Moreover, if the primary objective of the Chinese was to establish a link with their Tibet region it was natural that they would also like to have a road through the Lohit Frontier Division, which would be nearer, less vulnerable as well as less affected by snow, than the Aksai Chin highway.

2. During the preceding two or three years, China had experienced unusually serious economic difficulties, and diplomats, journalists and other observers from non-Communist countries had testified to the gravity of China's economic reverses. The *communes* had clearly failed. The food situation was serious—involving death by starvation of many thousand Chinese. However, there was no evidence to show that these domestic difficulties threatened the hold of the Communist regime in Peking to such a great extent that it was forced to adopt adventurist policies abroad.

3. The fact of Sino-Soviet rivalry, particularly in the Asian context, seems to have been a powerful factor. As Walter Lippman put it, "Chinese aggression is a peril not only to the political influence of Moscow, but also to the vital interests of Russia from the Urals to the Pacific". Norman D. Palmer also thought, "Trans-Himalayan Confrontation", *Orbis*, Winter 1963, that "one of China's aims in abandoning its pretence of friendship with India may have been to strengthen its position in the Himalayan regions and in the Indian sub-continent *vis-a-vis* the Soviet Union".

4. Nehru's own thought seemed to be running in the same direction. Speculating into China's motives behind her 'wanton and massive invasion of last autumn, Nehru wrote in "Changing India", *Foreign Affairs*, April 1963, "If the world is viewed as divided essentially between imperialists and communists between whom war not only is inevitable in the end, but between whom tension in some form must be kept alive and even intensified as opportunity occurs, then there is indeed no place in it for the non-aligned. The non-aligned nations must, in this context, seem to be occupying an unstable, anomalous position from which, if they could be dislodged, either by cajolery or coercion, the result would be to accentuate the polarization of world forces. It is logical to conclude that China's multiple campaign against India is an exercise in *realpolitik* on these lines. India is such an outstanding member of the non-aligned community that her defection, whether voluntary or enforced, cannot fail to bring grave and far reaching consequences in its train".

5. There had been reports, during the last two weeks of October 1962, of Kuomintang infiltration along the coast of South China in Kwangtung and Fukien provinces and of paratroopers practising in southern Taiwan in the largest Sino-American airborne manoeuvre in the past eleven years. There were also reports of Kuomintang paratroop drops near the coast in North China. Commenting on this 'little-noticed and potentially significant aspect of the Asian scene', the *New Republic* asked, "While U.S. dismantling of the Cuba missile bases occupies Mr. Khrushchev and India engages Mao, might Chiang attempt his return to the mainland?" (*New Republic*, November 10, 1962).

6. *Ibid.*

7. *The Jen min Jih-pao*, October 27, 1962, accused Nehru of attempting to establish an Indian sphere of influence in Asia that "would far surpass that of the colonialist system formerly set up in Asia by the British Empire".

8. "China's basic aim, therefore, may be to weaken and humiliate India, to gain strategic superiority over its Asian rival, to lessen Indian power and influence generally, and to hamper India's economic progress" (Norman D. Palmer, "Trans-Himalayan Confrontation", *Orbis*, Winter 1963). There is no doubt that the first Soviet reaction to China's conflict with India, flaring up in full fury in the Chinese attack on India in October 1962, was one of sympathy for Peking's stand (*Jen-min Jih-pao* editorial, November 1,

1962). The *Pravda* editorial of October 25 also supported Peking. It is difficult to know what exactly brought about a change in the Soviet attitude. Could it have been the large-scale and successive military victories of the Chinese in the Himalayas? But they could not have been regarded as completely unexpected. It is also possible that Khrushchev was piqued by Mao's attempts to condemn him in the Communist world for his 'betrayal' of Castro. But once the Soviet Union had decided to criticise the Chinese line, they went on hammering at it at successive Communist gatherings—in Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Italy.

9. The Soviet readiness to carry out its project to help India with the establishment of a factory for the manufacturing of MIG fighters and to deliver the promised quota of MIGs was also not affected by the Chinese aggression against India

CHAPTER XVIII : CEASE-FIRE AND AFTER : BATTLE OF DIPLOMACY

1. Kingsley Martin, *New Statesman*, November 22, 1962.
2. *New Statesman*, November 29, 1962.
3. *Ibid.*
4. *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged between the Governments of India and China, October 1962—January 1963, White Papers*, No. VIII, pp. 53-58
5. *Keesing's Archives* (1963), p. 19335.
6. *Ibid.*
7. The Conference was attended by : General Ne Win of Burma, Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia, Mrs. Bandaranaike of Ceylon, Ofori-Atta of Ghana, Dr. Subandrio of Indonesia and Aly Sabry of the U.A.R.
8. For the text of the Colombo Proposals, see *Indian Journal of International Law*, Vol. III, No. 1, 1963, p. 131.
9. It was on January 28, 1963 that the Indian High Commissioner in Colombo conveyed to Mrs. Bandaranaike India's formal acceptance of the Colombo Proposals (*Keesing's Archives*, 1963, p. 19338.)

CHAPTER XIX : PROBLEMS OF DEFENCE AND DEVELOPMENT

1. *United Asia*, January 1963, p. 22.
2. *Seminar*, July, 1962.
3. *Ibid.*
4. *Ibid.*

5. *Economic Implications of the Present Emergency*, published by the National Council of Applied Economic Research, New Delhi, p. 5.

6. Fulfilment of physical targets incorporated in the Third Plan was expected to raise the national income by some 30 per cent over a span of five years, but the growth during the first two years was extremely slow—in the first year only 2.2 per cent as against 5.4 per cent necessary to achieve the Plan target. The low over-all growth in the economy was shared by both industry and agriculture. This had to be considerably speeded up if the Plan targets were to be realized.

7. Wilfred Malenbaum, *Prospects for Indian Development*, p. 42.

8. As the National Council of Applied Economic Research pointed out in its Occasional Papers No. 5, *Economic Implications of the Present Emergency*, there was a clear difference in India's position during World War II and the present emergency. Over the past fifteen years, India had built up an industrial base which was capable of a switch-over to defence production at a relatively short notice. The nation also had at its command a machinery of planning which could effectively direct the productive capacity of the country towards desired goal. What was even more important, the Chinese invasion had roused the nation into a sense of solidarity and purposefulness which was never witnessed before. The unified will of the people to drive the enemy out was a tremendous potential asset. Financial problems posed by the needs of defence and development were serious but not beyond the capacity of the people or the economic and social institutions which had been built up during the last four years.

CHAPTER XX : IMPACT ON INDIA'S DOMESTIC POLITICS.

1. Jawaharlal Nehru, *We Accept China's Challenge*, Publications Division, New Delhi.

2. *Chinese Aggression in War and Peace*, Letters of the Prime Minister of India, Letter of October 27, 1962.

3. *Ibid.*

4. *A Nation Aroused*, Publications Division, New Delhi.

5. From the text of the resolution passed by the Lok Sabha on November 14, 1962.

6. Jawaharlal Nehru, *We Accept China's Challenge*, Publications Division.

7. *The New York Times*, November 17, 1962.

8. In an interview to *Yojana*, Mrs. Robinson said that while the British economy went a long way towards socialism under the impact of war, paradoxically in India the emergency had not strengthened those "who are in favour of equality, development and social justice". "On the contrary," she added, "it is right-wing elements with intimate links with the private sector who seem to be profiting from the emergency".

9. Writing of the profound changes in India in "politics, in thought, in international attitudes and in the lives of men in power", A. M. Rosenthal, opined that "the next Government of India will be led by the mode-

rates and conservatives of the Congress Party rather than the Left wing represented by Mr. Menon". (*The New York Times*, October 28, 1962)

10. The return of the three stalwarts of opposition, Acharya Kripalani, Minoo Masani and Ram Manohar Lohia in the bye-elections marked an assertion on the part of the people of their democratic right of registering their protest not so much against the policies of the Government as the way in which they were being implemented; ideologically, the only common factor among them was their vehemence of opposition against the Congress Government; their success in elections could hardly be termed as a victory of the Right.

CHAPTER XXI : INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY : DOCTRINAIRE OR PRAGMATIC ?

1. Arnold Toynbee, *India and the World*

2 "Whatever policy we may lay down, the art of conducting the foreign affairs of a country lies in finding out what is most advantageous to the country. We may talk about international goodwill and mean what we say. We may talk about peace and freedom and earnestly mean what we say. But in the ultimate analysis, a government functions for the good of the country it governs and no government dare do anything which in the short or long run is manifestly to the disadvantage of the country". (Jawaharlal Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy*, September 1946 to April 1961, p 28, Speech in the Constituent Assembly, December 4, 1947).

3. *Ibid.* p 47. Speech delivered at the Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi, March 22, 1949.

4. *Ibid.* p 32 Speech in the Constituent Assembly, March 8, 1948.

5 N.V Rajkumar, ed., *The Background of India's Foreign Policy*, New Delhi, 1952.

6 Michael Brecher, *India's Foreign Policy, An Interpretation*, Institute of Pacific Relations publication, February 1958.

7. *Political Science Review*, Vol. 3, No. 1, May 1964, pp. 1-25. "The Need for a Pragmatic Indian Foreign Policy", by M.S. Rajan Dr Rajan has expressed similar views in *International Studies*, Vol. V Nos. 1-2, July-October 1963, pp 115-132, "Chinese Aggression and the Future of India's Non-alignment Policy".

8. Hans J. Morgenthau, (*Politics Among Nations, The Struggle for Power and Peace*, New York, 1960, pp. 4-15) discusses what he calls six principles of political realism. India's foreign policy satisfies all these six principles. Even though working mostly on a high moral plane, Nehru was always conscious of the need of realism. "What exactly is idealism?", he asked in reply to a debate on foreign affairs in Parliament, December 7, 1950, and said, "Surely it is not something so insubstantial as to elude one's grasp. Idealism is the realism of tomorrow. It is the capacity to know what is good for the day after tomorrow or for the next year and to fashion yourself accordingly". *India's Foreign Policy*, p. 51.

9. "The main objectives of that policy", Pandit Nehru observed in his Lok Sabha speech of December 7, 1950, "are the pursuit of peace, not through alignment, but through an independent approach to each controversial or disputed issue; the liberation of subject peoples; the maintenance of

freedom, both national and individual ; the elimination of racial discrimination, and the elimination of want, disease and ignorance which affect the greater part of the world's population". (*Ibid*).

10. One of the strongest criticisms of the policy of neutrality was made by Charles Malik, former Foreign Minister of Lebanon, in his paper on "Limitations of Neutrality" contributed to *A Study of Nehru*, the summary and substance of which was that the foreign policy of each country was guided by its own interests. It was not correct, according to him, to take an absolute stand that any nation should never enter into any military understanding with any other nation. One cannot say that India was thinking of non-alignment from any such absolute point of view. India followed the policy of non-alignment because it best suited her national self-interest. India does not mind other countries following the concept of positive, collective security or any other concept which might suit their peculiar needs. If one exposed oneself to the receiving of economic aid from both the combatants in the cold war, Charles Malik thought, it was merely transferring the cold war from the international to the national scene. India has, again, set an example as to how one can receive aid from both the sides, without involving oneself in the cold war. "When it comes to ultimate matters", writes Malik, "there is no neutrality, there is either truth or falsehood, and there are, of course, all grades of approximation to the truth. But man every where is always interested only in the truth". This approach does not at all come into conflict with India's policy of neutrality or non-alignment. On the other hand, India is pledged to the testing of every case purely on its own merits. (*Political Science Review*, Vol. 1, No. 1, February 1962, p. 25.)

CHAPTER XXII : THEORY AND PRACTICE OF NON-ALIGNMENT

1. Michael Brecher, *India's Foreign Policy, An Interpretation*, Institute of Pacific Relations publication, February 1958.
2. For a good discussion of theory and practice of non-alignment see Parmeswaran Nair, "Non-alignment : History, Ideology, Prospects". *Outside the Contest*, New Delhi, 1963.
3. *Review of International Affairs*, Belgrade Conference, No. 5.
4. N.S. Khrushchev, *Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the Twentieth Party Congress*, February 14, 1956, Moscow, 1956.

CHAPTER XXIII : NON-ALIGNMENT : RESPONSE TO NEW CHALLENGES

1. *Swarajya*, December 22, 1962.
2. *Swarajya*, December 1, 1962.
3. *A.I.C.C. Economic Review*, November 15, 1962.
4. *Indian Express*, December 10, 1962.

5. *Amrit Bazar Patrika*, November 30, 1962.
6. *Indian Express*, December 12, 1962, "Facing the Facts".
7. *Indian Express*, December 10, 1962.
8. *Yojana*, December 9, 1962.
9. *The Statesman*, November 29, 1962.

CHAPTER XXIV : INDIA AND PAKISTAN : GENESIS OF CONFLICTS

1. Keith Callard, *Pakistan, A Political Study*. Macmillan. 1957, page 14.
2. Hugh Tinker, *India and Pakistan*, Praeger, 1962.
3. *Ibid*
4. Keith Callard, *op. cit.* page 15.
5. *Kashmir*. V.K. Krishna Menon's Speeches in the Security Council on May 3 and May 4, 1962. Information Service of India, New Delhi.
6. Lord Birdwood, who made an on the spot study of the problem, verifies to the fact that India was absolutely unprepared for any action in Kashmir, that soldiers had to be picked up from their barracks, and put into planes hurriedly equipped with whatever arms could be provided to them ready to take the flight to Srinagar, and that if this action had been delayed by a few hours, Srinagar could have been lost. (*A Continent Decides*).
7. Prime Minister Mohammed Ali, in the National Assembly of Pakistan *Parliamentary Debates*, Vol. I, March 31, 1956, p. 306.
8. K. Sarwar Hasan, *Pakistan and the Commonwealth*. Pakistan Institute of International Relations, Karachi, 1950, p. 10.
9. Quoted in Human Relations Area Files, *Pakistan, Government and Politics*, New Haven, 1956, p. 224.
10. Mohamrad Ahsan Chaudhri : *Pakistan and the Regional Pacts*, East Publications, Karachi, 1958.
11. K. Sarwar Hasan. *The Strategic Interests of Pakistan*, Pakistan Institute of International Relations, Karachi, 1954, p. 7.
12. Indian Council of World Affairs, India Papers Nos. 1, 2 and 3. *Aspects of India's Foreign Relations, India's Relations with Pakistan*, by Sisir Gupta (Mimeographed).
13. K. Sarwar Hasan, *op. cit.*, Karachi, 1954.

CHAPTER XXV : THE KASHMIR PROBLEM : AN IMPASSE ?

For a fuller study of the Kashmir problem see Michael Brecher, *The Struggle for Kashmir*, Toronto, 1953, Josef Korbel, *Danger in Kashmir*, Princeton, 1954 ; Lord Birdwood, *Two Nations and Kashmir*, London, 1956. For a reference to articles see the bibliography attached to *Seminar* No . 58, June 1964, Kashmir Number. For an impassioned advocacy of Indian and Pakistani views on Kashmir read *Kashmir, V.K. Krishna Menon's Speeches in the Security Council on May 3 and May 4, 1962*, Information Service of India, New Delhi and *Kashmir, Speech Delivered to the Security Council by Mr. Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto, May 5, 1964*, Department of Films and Publications, Karachi, respectively. M.C. Chagla's speeches before the Security Council on May 8, 1964 and May 12, 1964 are comparatively more objective.

CHAPTER XXVI : INDO-PAKISTAN RELATIONS : EMERGING TRENDS

1. In a speech made before the National Assembly of Pakistan on November 22, 1962.
2. *New York Times*, December 3, 1962

CHAPTER XXVII : INDIA AND NEPAL : BONDS OF CULTURE AND FRIENDSHIP

1. "We are in the midst of two friendly countries and we are sure that India will not attack us...and China also will not do so." (*Echo*, Kathmandu, March 19, 1960).

CHAPTER XXVIII : INDIA'S SENTINELS ON NORTHERN FRONTIERS

1 *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Vol. 34, October 5, 1961, pp 7-9, "Bhutan : Pact on Power Project", by K.K. Moorthy. Jaldhaka is a tributary of Brahmaputra which rises in Sikkim and forms the boundary of Bhutan and West Bengal for a distance of 12 miles.

2. This was in reply to a question by Dr. Ram Subhag Singh asking the Prime Minister whether he could give the Lok Sabha "a clear guarantee that the Chinese will in no case be allowed to set up any post in Sikkim or Bhutan". Nehru said, a little hesitatingly, "that any kind of incursion into Sikkim or Bhutan will be considered incursion into India, and we shall abide

by the assurances we have given to them" (*India's Foreign Policy, Statement in Lok Sabha, August 28, 1959, p. 339*). Nehru was more emphatic in his reply to debate in Lok Sabha on September 12, 1959, "We have publicly, and rightly, undertaken certain responsibilities for the defence of Sikkim and Bhutan. It is very necessary for us to understand that if something happens on their borders, then it is the same thing as an interference with the border of India." (*Ibid. p. 356*)

CHAPTER XXIX : RELATIONS WITH CEYLON AND BURMA

1. *Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. V., p. 445.*
2. *Ibid.*
3. W. Howard Wriggins, *Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation*, Princeton, 1960, p. 390.
4. United Nations, General Assembly, Seventh Session, *Official Records, First Committee, 605th and 657th Meeting, on April 17, 1953, p. 165, and November 5, 1953, p. 166*
5. Welcoming U Nu, Prime Minister of Burma in New Delhi on November 13, 1960, Nehru said, "when you come here you not only bring the perfume of your country but also an air of serenity, of calm, of friendliness. And in this world bedevilled by fierce animosities and conflicts and by the expressions of these animosities, it is good to come into an atmosphere of peace and calm and serenity". (*India's Foreign Policy, pp. 293-294*)
6. *The Indian Year Book of International Affairs, 1953, Vol. II, p. 330.*
7. Speech by U Nu, March 8, 1951, quoted in *From Peace to Stability*, p. 198.
8. William C. Johnstone, *Burma's Foreign Policy, A Study in Neutralism*, p. 196.
9. *Ibid p. 197.*

CHAPTER XXX : SOUTH ASIA AS A REGION

1. William Henderson, "The Development of Regionalism in Southeast Asia", *International Organization, Vol. IX (November, 1955), p. 464*
2. J S. Bright (ed.), *Before and After Independence*, New Delhi, 1950, p. 279
3. Werner Levi, *Free India in Asia*, p. 61
4. "With the exception of Japan and to a lesser extent India and China, all the countries of Asia and the Far East are still largely in the stage of primary mineral and agricultural production, with similar commodities to export and having to import the greater proportion of their requirements

in terms of manufactured articles.... This state of affairs is in contrast with that in Europe where there is a complementary relationship". P.S. L. Knathan, "Regional Cooperation in Asia", *India Quarterly*, January-March 1951.

5 Sisir Gupta, in his *India and Regional Integration in Asia*, has made some very pertinent observations with regard to the nature of the Indian elite. He mentions, in particular, "the lack of communications between the elites, in the different Asian countries and the propensity of the Indian elite to identify itself with European values and problems" (p. 89). Edward Shils also has mentioned the "provinciality" of the Indian intellectual, by which he means that the Indian intellectual, by and large, is inclined towards intellectual centres of Western Europe in preference to his own tradition and culture with the result that he is more interested in global problems than in regional ones (Edward Shils, *The Intellectual between Tradition and Modernity: The Indian Situation*, The Hague, 1961), "In fact," as Sisir Gupta points out, "it is the British and West European currents of thought which have for decades been determining Indian elite thinking on world affairs—resulting on the one hand in an over-enthusiastic participation in European affairs and in a broad socialistic fervour on the other (Sisir Gupta, *op. cit.*, p. 92). This attitude, represented at its highest in the personality of Jawaharlal Nehru, has had its impact on India's foreign policy too—Nehru looking on India less as a South Asian country and more as a kind of meeting-ground for various trends and forces, "a meeting ground between what might roughly be called the East and the West" (*Speeches*), 1947-1949, p. 236). Sisir Gupta is right in maintaining that "...the foreign policy of India is primarily formulated and conceived by the leaders of an elite group which is emotionally linked with Britain and West Europe more than with the regions to which they belong" *op. cit.*, pp. 92-93.

6 Speech of Jawaharlal Nehru, March 23, 1947, *Asian Relations, Being a Report of the Proceedings and Documentation of the First Asian Relations Conference*, New Delhi, March-April 1947.

7 Russell H. Fifield, *The Diplomacy of South Asia, 1945-1958*, 1958, p. 450.

8 Among the countries which participated in the New Delhi Conference were : Afghanistan, Australia, Burma, Ceylon, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Iraq, Iran, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen.

9. Jawaharlal Nehru, *Speeches*, p. 327.

10 *Ibid.*, p. 329.

11. Harris Wofford, *India's Role in Asia*, p. 121.

12 *Ibid.*, p. 131.

13. Jawaharlal Nehru, *Speeches*, p. 246.

14 The Colombo Powers had their last meeting in November 1956 at New Delhi when they discussed the Egyptian and Hungarian crises, and passed resolutions condemning Britain and France on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other, for their respective aggressions. Pakistan refused to attend. Once again the Prime Ministers talked of having joint and cooperative action and setting up a machinery for this purpose. Nothing, however, was done by way of implementing the idea.

15 The details of the Bandung Conference have been discussed earlier in this book in Chapter VII.

16. This Conference was attended by thirteen Asian nations of the Colombo Plan Consultative Committee—Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Nepal, Pakistan, Malaya, Singapore, Borneo, Sarawak, Thailand.

17. This, naturally, was disappointing to the U.S.A. "The clear hope of the U.S.A.", wrote A.M. Rosenthal, in the *New York Times*, May 13, 1955, "was that the experts would come up with some plans for putting the Eisenhower fund to use on a cooperative basis. But a major result of the Simla Conference has been to show that more countries of Asia are not ready for, or are afraid of, regional planning". (Quoted by Sisir Gupta, *op. cit.* pp. 81-82).

18. *New York Times*, May 13, 1955.

19. Pradyumna P Karan and William M. Jenkins, Jr, *The Himalayan Kingdoms : Bhutan, Sikkim, and Nepal*, 1963, p. 5.

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
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The precise nature of the Chinese claim to Indian territory has not been stated by Chinese authorities and is not known to the Government of India. In the Chinese maps some parts of Indian territory have been incorrectly shown as China. These areas are roughly indicated by slanting lines in this map. The southern border of these areas as they appear in Chinese maps has been roughly shown by a broken line.

2. The places on the traditional international boundary disputes have also been roughly marked in the map. So is the road built across Aksai Chin in Ladakh in North-West India.